GENERAL- SHERMAN 


GREAT    COMMANDERS 

*  *  *  * 

GENERAL   SHERMAN 


BY 

GENERAL  MANNING    F.   FORCE 


NEW    YORK 
D.    APPLETON    AND    COMPANY 

1899 


COPYRIGHT,  1899, 
BY  D.  APPLETON  AND   COMPANY. 


All  rights  reserved. 


PREFACE. 


GENERAL  SHERMAN  was  the  most  picturesque 
figure  in  the  civil  war.  His  character  was  abso 
lutely  pure  and  spotless.  He  had  a  vigorous  and 
penetrating  intellect,  prompt  and  clear  in  compre 
hension  and  in  decision.  While  steadfast  in  his 
opinions,  he  was  subordinate  in  conduct ;  he  held 
to  his  judgment  in  issue  against  President  Lincoln, 
but  yielded  as  unquestioning  obedience  to  Mc- 
Clernand  as  to  Grant.  He  was  an  omnivorous 
reader,  and  was  a  storehouse  of  felicitous  anecdote. 
His  cheerful  disposition  and  inexhaustible  fund  of 
conversation  made  him  always  a  delightful  com 
panion.  Frank  as  a  child  and  outspoken  in  his 
likes  and  dislikes,  Sherman  was  often  engaged  in 
controversy. 

The  war  filled  only  a  few  years  of  his  life,  but 
comprised  most  of  his  activity  and  achievements. 
Accordingly,  his  biography  naturally  groups  itself 
into  these  parts — before,  during,  and  after  the  war, 
and  so  it  is  written,  in  the  following  pages.  The 
effort  in  this  narrative  has  been  to  give  in  the  sim 
plest  form  a  statement  of  the  facts  without  com 
ment.  The  completion  of  the  publication  of  the 
First  Series  of  the  War  Records  gives  opportunity 
for  a  fair  approximation  to  a  correct  statement. 

242336 


vi  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

Exacting  occupation  and  loss  of  energy,  conse 
quent  upon  a  temporary  partial  failure  of  health, 
caused  delay  in  the  preparation  of  this  little  book, 
and,  with  the  approval  of  the  editor,  I  asked  Gen 
eral  J.  D.  Cox  to  write  the  period  from  the  expedi 
tion  to  Meridian  to  the  setting  out  upon  the  march 
to  the  sea,  and  the  entire  period  subsequent  to 
the  review  in  Washington  at  the  close  of  the  war. 
As  for  the  first  of  these  two  periods,  he  not  only 
can  say,  Omnia  quae  vidi  et  pars  fid,  but  he  had 
already  gone  over  it  in  his  previous  publications. 
For  the  second,  his  intimate  acquaintance  with  the 
public  affairs,  as  well  as  with  General  Sherman, 
gave  him  special  qualification.  General  Cox  kindly 
gave  prompt  consent,  and  so,  as  often  happens,  an 
apparent  evil  resulted  in  good  fortune. 

M.  F.  FORCE. 

December,  1808. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.— ANTE  BELLUM i 

II. — THE   BEGINNING   OF   THE   WAR 21 

III. — THE   BATTLE   OF   SHILOH 36 

IV. — FROM  CORINTH  TO  MEMPHIS  .....    78 
V. — THE  MISSISSIPPI  MOVEMENT 98 

VI. — VlCKSBURG    CAMPAIGN  ......    117 

VII. — CHATTANOOGA  AND  MERIDIAN         .        .        .        .151 
VIII. — MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI         .        .  187 

IX.— CAMPAIGN  OF  ATLANTA 204 

X. — CAMPAIGN    OF   OCTOBER — DEVELOPMENT   OF  THE 

MARCH    TO    THE   SEA 22$ 

XL — THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA 243 

XII. — THE  CAROLINAS 265 

XIIL— THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 293 

XIV.— POST   BELLUM 3H 

vii 


LIST    OF   ILLUSTRATIONS. 

FACING 
•  PAGE 

Portrait  of  General  Sherman        .         .         .        Frontispiece 
Engraved  on   steel  by  Charles  Schlecht,  from  a  photograph 
by  Napoleon  Sarony  taken  in  1887. 

Sherman  and  his  corps  commanders  .....  204 
From  a  photograph,  taken  in  1865,  by  Matthew  Brady 

Mr.  Lincoln's  Atlanta  letter  .  224 

The  Peacemakers .  .295 

From  a  painting  by  George  P.  A.  Healy. 

Tomb  of  General  Sherman  in  St.  Louis  cemetery          .         .     347 


LIST    OF    MAPS. 

Battlefield  of  Shiloh 36 

The  Vicksburg  campaign 117 

The  Atlanta  campaign : 

No.       1 206 

No.     II 219 

No.  Ill 232 

Atlanta  to  Savannah,  Ga 243 

Savannah  to  Columbia,  S.  C 288 

Columbia  to  Raleigh,  N.  C. 295 


GENERAL   SHERMAN. 


CHAPTER    I. 

ANTE    BELLUM. 

WILLIAM  TECUMSEH  SHERMAN  came  from 
brainy  stock.  His  brother  Charles,  his  father, 
grandfather,  and  great-grandfather  were  judges; 
Roger  Sherman,  signer  of  the  Declaration  of  In 
dependence,  William  M.  Evarts,  Senator  and  Judge 
Hoar  were  collateral  kindred.  All  were  descended 
from  Edmond  Sherman,  who  emigrated  from  Ded- 
ham,  Essex  County,  England,  and  was  in  Boston 
with  three  sons  before  1636.  Taylor  Sherman,  born 
in  1758  and  died  in  1815,  great-great-great-grand 
son  of  Edmond  Sherman,  was  lawyer  and  judge 
in  Norwalk,  Conn.  He  received  two  sections  of 
land  in  Ohio  as  compensation  for  his  services  as 
one  of  the  commissioners  who  settled  the  title  and 
boundaries  of  the  Fire  Lands  in  the  Connecticut 
Western  Reserve  in  Ohio. 

Charles  Robert,  son  of  Taylor  Sherman,  was 
admitted  to  the  bar  in  Norwalk,  married  there 
Mary  Hoyt,  migrated  to  Ohio,  and  settled  in  Lan 
caster  in  1811,  being  then  twenty-one  years  old. 
He  was  held  in  high  esteem,  and  was  appointed 
judge  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  State  in  1821, 
and  remained  on  the  bench  till  his  death,  in  1829. 
He  conceived  a  great  admiration  for  Tecumseh, 
who  figured  conspicuously  in  Ohio  in  the  War  of 
1812,  and  when  his  third  son  was  born,  February 

i 


2  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

8,  1820,  gave  him  the  name  William  Tecumseh. 
He  died  poor,  but  left  to  his  large  family  of  chil 
dren  the  rich  inheritance  of  a  good  name.  The 
widowed  mother  was  unable  to  care  for  them,  but 
friends  gladly  took  to  their  homes  and  adopted 
the  children  of  Judge  Sherman.  William  Tecumseh 
was  adopted  by  a  neighbor  and  friend  of  his  fa 
ther,  Thomas  Ewing. 

Lancaster  lay  amid  a  stretch  of  fertile  lands  by 
the  winding  river,  almost  under  the  rocky  emi 
nence  of  Mount  Pleasant.  When  Sherman  was  a 
boy  the  original  pioneers  who  planted  their  cabins 
there  in  the  trackless  forest  had  barely  passed 
away.  It  was  a  small  town;  its  population  in  1846 
was  only  2,120.  But  it  had  a  notable  society- 
notable  for  ability,  character,  and  graceful  hospi 
tality.  The  central  figure  was  Thomas  Ewing. 
He  was  a  man  of  powerful  frame  and  majestic 
bearing.  He  was  in  youth  a  noted  athlete.  He 
could  jump  higher,  leap  farther,  and  run  faster  than 
any  competitor,  and  was  famed  for  being  the  only 
man  who  could  throw  an  axe  over  the  courthouse. 
His  mind  was  as  vigorous  as  his  body.  He  was 
recognized  as  the  master  intellect  in  Ohio.  The 
State  sent  him  several  times  to  the  national  Senate, 
and  he  was  a  member  of  the  Cabinet  under  Presi 
dent  Harrison  and  President  Taylor.  Politics  never 
weaned  him  from  his  devotion  to  law.  In  the  first 
cases  that  he  tried  he  excited  surprise,  and  won 
reputation  by  discovering  unexpected  points  which 
determined  the  cases  in  his  favor.  Daniel  Web 
ster  in  his  last  days  often  associated  Mr.  Ewing 
with  him  in  important  cases.  After  Webster's 
death,  Ewing  was  the  leader  of  the  American  bar. 
James  G.  Elaine  said  of  him :  "  He  was  a  grand 
and  massive  man,  almost  without  peers.  With  no 
little  familiarity  and  acquaintance  with  the  leading 
men  of  the  day,  I  can  truly  sav  I  never  met  one 
who  impressed  me  so  profoundly." 


ANTE    BELLUM.  3 

The  lawyers  of  Lancaster,  competing  with  him 
in  almost  every  case,  were  kept  continually  on  their 
mettle ;  and  the  bar  of  this  little  country  town  com 
prised,  besides  Mr.  Ewing  and  Judge  Sherman, 
Hocking  Hunter,  recognized  as  one  of  the  most 
accurate  and  soundest  lawyers  in  the  State,  and 
Henry  Stanbery,  whose  reputation  was  national, 
who  became  Attorney-General  of  the  United  States, 
as  well  as  others,  also  able,  though  less  known. 
Governor  Medill,  who  filled  with  distinction  many 
important  offices,  both  State  and  national,  lived  in 
Lancaster  after  1832.  Young  Sherman  was  for 
tunate  to  grow  up  under  the  care  of  good  teach 
ers,  and  more  fortunate  in  having  the  unconscious 
training  of  daily  contact  with  choice  spirits. 

In  the  spring  of  1836  he  was  appointed  a  cadet 
at  West  Point.  Mr.  Ewing  being  then  in  the  Sen 
ate,  young  Sherman  made  a  visit  to  the  capital  on 
his  way  to  the  academy.  Leaving  Lancaster  in 
May,  three  days'  travel  by  day  and  night  brought 
him  to  Cumberland,  Md.  Though  the  railroad  was 
then  running  to  Cumberland,  he  drove  thence  to 
Washington.  Jackson  was  then  President.  The 
Senate  sat  in  the  little  chamber  now  occupied  by 
the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States.  Martin 
Van  Buren,  Vice-President,  presided.  Clay,  Cal- 
houn,  and  Webster  towered  above  their  fellow-sena 
tors.  But  among  them,  besides  Mr.  Ewing,  were 
Silas  Wright,  the  strongest  man  New  York  has 
sent  to  Washington ;  Benton,  the  indomitable  man 
from  Missouri ;  Cass ;  Preston,  of  South  Carolina, 
esteemed  the  most  elegant  orator  in  the  Senate; 
Willie  P.  Mangum,  of  North  Carolina;  and  Ber- 
rien,  of  Georgia.  John  Quincy  Adams  added  luster 
to  the  House  of  Representatives.  A  week  spent  in 
daily  contact  with  these  leaders  was  a  course  of 
intellectual  training. 

Though  fragmentary  railways  had  quickened 
travel,  it  was  still  a  two  days'  journey  from  Wash- 


4  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

ington  to  New  York.  The  route  was  by  railroad  to 
Baltimore,  by  steamboat  thence  to  Havre  de  Grace 
or  Elkton,  then  by  railroad  across  to  the  Dela 
ware  River,  and  by  steamboat  up  the  river  to  Phila 
delphia.  There  the  traveler  rested  for  the  night. 
Next  morning  the  journey  was  resumed  by  steam 
boat  up  the  Delaware  to  Bordentown,  by  railroad 
across  New  Jersey  to  Amboy,  and  by  steamboat 
to  New  York.  Sherman  traveled  by  this  route, 
stopping  to  visit  friends  in  Philadelphia  and  New 
York,  and  reached  West  Point  June  I2th.  There 
were  one  hundred  and  forty  cadets  in  the  class,  of 
whom  only  forty-two  graduated.  Among  his  class 
mates  were  George  H.  Thomas,  Stewart  Van 
Vliet,  George  W.  Getty,  Richard  S.  Ewell,  William 
Hays,  Bushrod  R.  Johnson,  and  Thomas  Jordan, 
who  survived  to  take  active  part  in  the  civil  war. 

His  letters  written  at  the  academy  breathe  the 
same  childlike  and  yet  manly  frankness  which  char 
acterized  him  alwrays :  "  Bill  is  very  much  elated 
at  the  idea  of  getting  free  of  West  Point  next  June. 
He  does  not  intend  remaining  in  the  army  more 
than  one  year,  then  to  resign,  and  study  law  prob 
ably.  No  doubt  you  admire  his  choice,  but,  to 
speak  plainly  and  candidly,  I  would  rather  be  a 
blacksmith.  Indeed,  the  nearer  we  come  to  that 
dreadful  epoch,  graduation  day,  the  higher  opin 
ion  I  conceive  of  the  duties  and  life  of  an  officer 
of  the  United  States  army,  and  the  more  confirmed 
in  the  wish  of  spending  my  life  in  the  service  of 
my  country.  Think  of  that!  The  church  bugle 
has  just  blown,  and  in  a  moment  I  must  put  on  my 
side  arms  and  march  to  church  to  listen  to  a  two- 
hours'  sermon,  writh  its  twenty  divisions  and  twen 
ty-one  subdivisions ;  .  .  .  but  I  believe  it  is  a  gen 
eral  fact  that  what  people  are  compelled  to  do  they 
dislike.  I  fear  I  have  a  difficult  part  to  act  for  the 
next  three  years,  because  I  am  almost  confident 
that  vour  father's  wishes  and  intentions  will  clash 


ANTE    BELLUM.  5 

with  my  inclinations.  In  the  first  place,  I  think 
he  wishes  me  to  strive  and  graduate  in  the  en 
gineer  corps.  This  I  can't  do.  Next,  to  resign  and 
become  a  civil  engineer.  .  .  .  While  I  propose  and 
intend  to  go  into  the  infantry,  be  stationed  in  the 
far  West,  out  of  reach  of  what  is  termed  civiliza 
tion,  and  there  remain  as  long  as  possible. 

"  You  no  doubt  are  not  only  firmly  impressed 
but  absolutely  certain  that  General  Harrison  will 
be  our  next  President.  For  my  part,  though,  of 
course,  but  a  '  superficial  observer,'  I  do  not  think 
there  is  the  least  hope  of  such  a  change,  since  his 
friends  have  thought  proper  to  envelop  his  name 
with  log  cabins,  gingerbread,  hard  cider,  and  such 
humbugging,  the  sole  object  of  which  plainly  is  to 
deceive  and  mislead  his  ignorant  and  prejudiced 
though  honest  fellow-citizens,  while  his  qualifica 
tions,  his  honesty,  his  merits  and  services  are  mere 
ly  alluded  to." 

He  graduated  in  June,  1840,  sixth  in  his  class, 
and  was  appointed  second  lieutenant  in  the  Third 
Artillery.  In  the  autumn  he  reported  to  his  regi 
ment  in  Florida,  where  his  time  was  mainly  spent 
in  fishing  and  hunting,  diversified  with  occasional 
expeditions  to  capture  parties  of  Seminole  Indians. 
In  November,  1841,  he  was  promoted  first  lieu 
tenant.  Here  he  wrote:  "  We  hear  that  the  new 
Secretary  of  War  intends  proposing  to  the  next 
Congress  to  raise  two  rifle  regiments  for  the  West 
ern  service.  As  you  are  at  Washington,  I  presume 
you  can  learn  whether  it  is  so  or  not,  for  I  should 
like  to  go  in  such  a  regiment  if  stationed  in  the 
far  West ;  not  that  I  am  in  the  least  displeased  with 
my  present  berth,  but  when  the  regiment  goes 
North  it  will,  in  all  likelihood,  be  stationed  in  the 
vicinity  of  some  city — from  which  God  spare  me!  " 
In  another  letter  he  writes:  "  If  you  have  any  re 
gard  for  my  feelings,  don't  say  the  word  '  insinua 
tion  '  again.  You  may  abuse  me  as  much  as  you 


6  GENERAL    SHERMAN. 

please,  but  I'd  prefer  of  the  two  to  be  accused  of 
telling  a  direct  falsehood  than  stating  anything 
evasively  or  underhand,  and  if  I  have  ever  been 
guilty  of  such  a  thing,  it  was  unintentionally." 

In  March,  1842,  he  moved  with  his  company 
to  Fort  Morgan,  at  the  entrance  to  the  Bay  of  Mo 
bile,  and  in  June  the  garrison  sailed  in  a  brig  to 
Fort  Moultrie,  in  Charleston  harbor.  He  remained 
there  till  1846,  and  became  at  home  with  the  charm 
ing  society  of  Charleston.  In  the  summer  of  1843 
he  made  a  visit  to  Lancaster,  Ohio,  and  became 
engaged  to  Ellen,  daughter  of  Mr.  Ewing.  Re 
turning  to  his  post  at  Fort  Moultrie,  he  went  by 
stage  to  Portsmouth,  on  the  Ohio;  thence  by  boat 
to  Cincinnati ;  thence  by  boat  to  St.  Louis ;  then 
down  the  Mississippi  to  New  Orleans;  by  boat 
across  Lake  Pontchartrain  to  Mobile,  and  up  the 
Alabama  River  to  Montgomery;  thence  partly  by 
stage,  but  mainly  by  rail,  to  Savannah,  and  then 
by  sea  to  Charleston  harbor.  The  journey  took 
six  weeks ;  two  weeks  and  a  half  were  spent  in 
visits  to  the  cities,  and  three  and  a  half  weeks  were 
spent  in  actual  travel  night  and  day. 

While  at  Fort  Moultrie  he  was  not  idle  or  given 
wholly  to  society.  He  wrote  to  a  son  of  Mr.  Ewing: 
"  Every  day  I  feel  more  and  more '  in  need  of  an 
atlas  such  as  your  father  has  at  home,  and,  as  a 
knowledge  of  geography  in  its  minutest  details  is 
essential  to  a  true  military  education,  idle  time 
necessarily  spent  here  might  be  properly  devoted 
to  it.  I  wish,  therefore,  you  would  procure  for  me 
the  best  geography  and  atlas  (not  school)  extant." 

In  June,  1844,  he  wrote:  "Since  my  return  I 
have  not  been  running  about  in  the  city  or  the 
island  as  heretofore,  but  have  endeavored  to  inter 
est  myself  in  Blackstone,  which,  with  the  assistance 
of  Bouvier's  Dictionary,  I  find  no  difficulty  in  un 
derstanding.  I  have  read  all  four  volumes,  Starkie 
on  Evidence,  and  other  books  semilegal  and  semi- 


ANTE    BELLUM.  7 

historical,  and  would  be  obliged  to  you  if  you 
would  give  me  a  list  of  such  books  as  you  were 
required  to  read,  not  including  your  local  or  State 
law.  I  intend  to  read  the  second  and  third  vol 
umes  of  Blackstone  again,  also  Kent's  Commen 
taries,  which  seem,  as  far  as  I  am  capable  of  judg 
ing,  to  be  the  basis  of  the  common-law  practice. 
This  course  of  study  I  have  adopted  from  feeling 
the  want  of  it  in  the  duties  to  which  I  was  lately 
assigned."  Later  he  wrote:  "  I  have  no  idea  of 
making  the  law  a  profession — by  no  meaws  ;  but,  as 
an  officer  of  the  army,  it  is  my  duty  and  interest 
to  be  prepared  for  any  situation  that  fortune  or 
luck  may  offer.  It  is  for  this  alone  that  I  prepare, 
and  not  for  professional  practice." 

In  February,  1844,  he  was  relieved  from  duty 
on  court-martial  to  report  to  Colonel  Churchill,  at 
Marietta,  Ga.,  and  aid  in  taking  evidence  in  cases 
of  claims  against  the  Government.  While  at  Mari 
etta  he  made  frequent  visits  to  Kenesaw  Mountain. 
On  the  same  duty  he  traveled  on  horseback  to  the 
Etowah  River,  Alatoona,  Rome,  Wills  Valley,  Sand 
Mountain,  and  Raccoon  Range  to  Bellefonte,  Ala., 
and  returned  by  Rome,  Alatoona,  and  Marietta 
to  Atlanta,  making  unconsciously  a  preparatory 
reconnoissance  for  his  Atlanta  campaign. 

In  1846,  when  war  with  Mexico  was  impend 
ing,  he  received  a  regular  recruiting  detail,  and 
reported  at  New  York  on  the  ist  of  May.  He 
was  assigned  early  in  May  to  station  at  Pittsburg, 
with  a  subrendezvous  at  Zanesville,  Ohio,  which 
was  conveniently  near  to  his  friends  at  Lancaster. 
The  news  of  General  Taylor's  first  battles  in  Texas 
inflamed  him  with  desire  to  be  ordered  to  the  field. 
He  received  at  Pittsburg  at  8  P.  M.  an  order  trans 
ferring  him  to  Company  F,  then  under  orders  for 
California.  Working  all  night,  he  made  out  his 
money  accounts  and  property  returns,  and  next 
morning  left  them,  with  the  cash  balance  and  cloth- 


8  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

ing  and  other  property  and  receipts  to  be  signed 
by  his  successor,  in  the  hands  of  the  physician  of 
the  recruiting  depot,  and  set  out  at  once  on  his 
journey  to  New  York.  Company  F  was  filled  up 
to  one  hundred  and  thirteen  enlisted  men  and  five 
officers.  They  embarked  on  the  storeship  Lexing 
ton,  with  six  months'  provisions  and  with  six 
months'  pay  drawn  in  advance,  and  set  sail  on  the 
1 4th  of  July.  The  soldiers  did  the  work  on  deck, 
were  drilled  whenever  the  weather  permitted,  were 
carefully  supervised  in  their  health  and  cleanliness, 
and  on  arriving  at  Monterey,  Cal.,  after  a  voyage  of 
one  hundred  and  ninety-eight  days,  every  man  was 
able  to  march  to  post  with  all  his  equipments. 

California  was  extensive,  but  thinly  inhabited. 
About  a  score  of  little  towns  and  settlements,  small 
aggregations  of  one-story  adobe  houses;  a  few  re 
maining  missions,  each  with  a  colony  of  Indian 
converts  attached;  and  ranches  sparsely  scattered 
in  spots  favored  with  water,  comprised  the  popula 
tion.  Commodore  Sloat,  and  afterward  Commo^ 
dore  Stockton,  of  the  navy ;  General  Kearny,  with 
two  companies  of  United  States  dragoons;  Colonel 
Fremont,  with  a  battalion  of  volunteers ;  and  Colo 
nel  Cook,  with  a  regiment  of  volunteers,  made  the 
conquest  and  suppressed  an  insurrection.  Cali 
fornia  was  quiet,  while  Scott  and  Taylor  with  their 
commands  were  winning  glory  on  the  borders  of 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico. 

Company  F  arrived  at  Monterey  early  in  Janu 
ary,  1847.  With  six  months'  rations,  and  grist 
mill,  sawmill,  and  other  stores,  and  twenty-eight 
thousand  dollars  in  money,  and  with  Sherman  for 
acting  quartermaster  and  commissary,  they  were 
soon  in  quarters  on  the  hill  just  west  of  the  town. 
When  appropriate  staff  officers  arrived,  Sherman 
was  relieved  of  these  temporary  duties,  and  served 
as  aid  to  General  Kearny.  In  the  absence  of  more 
serious  occupation,  a  dispute  had  arisen  as  to  who 


ANTE   BELLUM.  g 

held  supreme  command  in  California.  Commo 
dore  Stockton  claimed  it  as  successor  to  Commo 
dore  Sloat,  who  was  the  first  to  take  possession  for 
the  United  States.  General  Kearny  claimed  it  as 
the  senior  military  officer  in  the  Territory.  Colonel 
Fremont  claimed  it  as  protege  of  Senator  Benton, 
a  prominent  and  influential  politician.  This  ab 
surd  contention  lasted  till  Kearny  and  Fremont 
went  East  at  the  end  of  May,  and  Colonel  R.  B. 
Mason,  who  had  arrived,  in  undisputed  command 
on  land,  while  Commodore  Biddle,  arriving,  had 
like  undisputed  authority  afloat. 

Colonel  Mason  appointed  Sherman  his  assist 
ant  adjutant  general,  and  soon  found  him  useful. 
When  Commodore  Sloat  took  possession  of  Cali 
fornia  he  issued  a  proclamation  declaring  the  in 
habitants  to  be  American  citizens,  and  calling  upon 
them  to  elect  officers.  The  little  town  of  Sonora, 
made  up  mostly  of  immigrants  from  the  United 
States,  thereupon  elected  Air.  Nash,  one  of  their 
number,  alcalde.  General  Kearny,  holding  that 
California  was  simply  conquered  territory — Mexi 
can  still  though  conquered — and  was  held  and  con 
trolled  by  military  power  until  its  status  should 
be  determined  by  competent  authority,  appointed 
Mr.  Boggs  alcalde,  and  ordered  Nash  to  turn  the 
office  over  to  him.  Colonel  Mason,  soon  after  suc 
ceeding  to  command,  received  a  letter  from  Boggs 
stating  that  Nash  claimed  that  a  military  com 
mander  had  no  right  to  eject  him  from  a  civil 
office.  Colonel  Mason  wrote  to  the  captain  of  a 
company  stationed  at  Sonora,  directing  him  to 
notify  Nash  to  vacate  and  turn  over  his  books, 
papers,  and  accounts  to  Boggs,  and,  in  case  of  re 
fusal,  to  compel  compliance  by  force.  The  captain 
replied  that  the  settlers  were  greatly  excited,  and 
supported  Nash  in  his  refusal,  and  further  stated 
on  his  own  account  that  he  was  an  officer  of  vol 
unteers  soon  to  be  mustered  out,  and,  as  he  ex- 


10  GENERAL    SHERMAN. 

pected  to  remain  in  Sonora  as  a  permanent  settler, 
he  asked  to  be  excused  from  enforcing  the  order. 
The  legitimacy  of  military  authority  was  directly 
put  in  issue.  Scanty  as  were  Colonel  Mason's  re 
sources,  he  proposed  at  once  to  peremptorily  com 
pel  obedience.  Sherman  requested  him  to  put  the 
matter  into  his  hands,  and  promised  success. 

Receiving  permission,  he  left  Monterey,  ac 
companied  by  a  single  private  soldier,  and  traveled 
on  horseback  to  Yerba  Buena,  where  San  Fran 
cisco  now  stands.  Commodore  Biddle  listened 
with  great  interest  to  Sherman's  statement  of  the 
matter,  and  gave  him  a  boat,  manned  by  a  mid 
shipman  and  eight  men,  and  allowed  one  of  his 
lieutenants  to  go  in  company.  They  sailed  up  the 
bay,  reached  the  mouth  of  Sonora  Creek  by  dark, 
and  a  landing  on  the  creek  near  the  town  by  mid 
night.  Next  evening  Nash  was  seized  while  at 
supper,  hurried  into  the  boat,  taken  down  the  bay 
to  the  flagship,  and  put  into  the  hands  of  the  com 
modore.  Sherman  returned  overland  to  Monterey, 
while  Nash  was  sent  around  by  water.  Nash  was 
released  by  Colonel  Mason  upon  his  promise  to 
make  no  attempt  to  regain  his  office.  Boggs  en 
tered  upon  his  duties  without  opposition,  and  there 
was  no  further  attempt  to  dispute  the  authority 
of  the  military  in  the  enemy's  country  in  time  of 
war. 

In  the  spring  of  1848  workmen  putting  up  a 
sawmill  for  Captain  Sutter  at  Coloma,  on  the 
American  fork  of  the  Sacramento  River,  found 
particles  of  gold  in  the  earth.  The  discovery  could 
not  be  kept  secret.  People,  dropping  other  pur 
suits,  thronged  to  the  valley  of  American  fork. 
The  gravel  beds  by  the  river  teemed  with  their 
camps  and  resounded  with  the  ceaseless  rattle  of 
their  rockers.  Sherman's  restless  activity  per 
suaded  Colonel  Mason  that  it  was  his  duty  to  make 
a  personal  inspection  of  the  "  diggings "  before 


ANTE   BELLUM.  II 

sending  a  report  of  the  discovery  of  gold  to  the 
Government  at  Washington. 

News  came  in  the  early  summer  of  the  termina 
tion  of  the  war.  The  only  remaining  volunteer  regi 
ment  was  mustered  out,  and  swarmed  to  the  gold 
fields.  The  only  troops  left  were  a  company  of 
dragoons  and  one  battery.  Colonel  Mason  pre 
vented  their  desertion  in  mass  by  giving  liberal 
furloughs,  and  thus  giving  every  soldier  in  turn 
a  chance  at  the  mines.  Men  at  the  placers  gath 
ered  in  gold  sometimes  a  hundred  dollars  in  a  day; 
sometimes  more.  Prices  of  labor  and  commodities 
became  extravagant.  Day  laborers  received  six 
teen  dollars  per  day;  domestics  could  not  be  hired 
for  less  than  three  hundred  dollars  per  month.  Col 
onel  Mason  authorized  officers  to  draw  rations  in 
kind,  and  by  clubbing  together  and  waiting  on 
themselves  they  could  live.  In  the  autumn  Sher 
man,  with  two  other  officers,  camped  out  near 
Coloma,  and  contributed  the  capital  to  a  store. 
Each  received  a  profit  of  fifteen  hundred  dol 
lars,  which  enabled  them  to  live  through  the 
winter. 

On  the  23d  of  February,  1849,  General  Persifor 
F.  Smith  arrived.  Two  regiments  and  a  battalion 
came  to  re-enforce  the  two  companies.  The  Pa 
cific  coast  was  made  a  military  division,  comprising 
the  two  departments  of  California  and  Oregon. 
Colonel  Mason  was  relieved,  and  Sherman  was  ap 
pointed  acting  adjutant  general  of  the  division,  and 
served  as  such  until  Major  Joseph  Hooker,  the 
regularly  assigned  adjutant  general  of  the  division, 
arrived.  Sherman  was  then  appointed  by  General 
Smith  aid-de-camp. 

The  news  of  the  discovery  of  gold  spread,  and 
grew  in  magnitude  as  it  spread.  Immigrants  poured 
in  by  land  and  by  sea  from  all  quarters  of  the  globe. 
Some  halted  to  build  up  towns  and  thrive  by  trade. 
The  little  village  by  the  mission  of  Ycrba  Buena 


12  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

expanded  into  the  city  of  San  Francisco,  and  on 
Slitter's  ranch  by  the  river  sprang  up  the  city  of 
Sacramento.  In  the  rush  to  the  mines  all  other 
employments  were  abandoned  and  all  engagements 
broken.  General  Sherman  says  in  his  Memoirs 
that  six  hundred  abandoned  vessels  lay  and  rotted 
at  their  moorings  in  front  of  San  Francisco,  and 
that  the  regular  steam  packets  on  arriving  anchored 
alongside  of  a  man-of-war  to  retain  their  crews 
till  the  time  for  their  return.  In  the  excessive 
throng  some  were  unable  to  find  employment  in 
mining,  and  others  were  unable  to  do  the  work. 
Under  the  stress  of  circumstances,  men  who  had 
been  merchants  and  capitalists  earned  their  bread 
as  laborers  and  hostlers,  and  Harvard  graduates 
eked  out  a  living  by  serving  as  hotel  waiters  and 
cooks  for  miners'  messes.  The  camps  of  Ameri 
cans  organized  communities,  adopted  laws,  and 
established  tribunals  to  enforce  them.  The  rules 
defining  mining  rights  evolved  by  them,  and  sup 
plemented  later  by  the  miners  in  Colorado,  were 
adopted  substantially  by  Congress  and  enacted  into 
a  statute. 

General  Smith  and  some  of  his  staff  had  brought 
their  families  to  California,  with  a  retinue  of  serv 
ants.  The  attendants,  white  and  colored,  vanished 
as  soon  as  the  ship  touched  land.  After  a  vain  ef 
fort  to  keep  house  without  any  assistance  and  a 
hopeless  struggle  to  live  there  upon  officers'  pay, 
the  families  returned  to  their  old  homes.  Army 
officers  were  in  request  as  surveyors  and  engineers, 
and  General  Smith  encouraged  them  to  accept  em 
ployment  Sherman  obtained  a  two  months'  leave, 
and  used  the  time  so  profitably  in  laying  out  town 
sites  and  surveying  and  platting  ranches  that  he 
records  he  returned  to  duty  with  a  net  prcnt  of  six 
thousand  dollars  from  his  two  months'  work.  On 
the  1st  of  January,  1850,  he  sailed  with  dispatches 
from  General  Smith  to  General  Scott,  and  deliv- 


ANTE   BELLUM.  13 

ered  them  in  person  to  the  general  in  New  York 
at  the  end  of  the  month. 

Lieutenant  Sherman  reported  to  General  Scott, 
who  then  had  his  headquarters  in  New  York,  and 
was  warmly  received.  After  a  few  days  he  pro 
ceeded  to  Washington,  where  he  was  very  cordially 
received  by  General  Zachary  Taylor,  then  Presi 
dent.  Mr.  Ewing  was  Secretary  of  the  Interior, 
and  lived  in  the  house  across  the  avenue  from  the 
War  Department,  afterward  occupied  by  Mont 
gomery  Blair.  Lieutenant  Sherman  obtained  a  six 
months'  leave  of  absence,  and,  after  a  visit  to  his 
friends  in  Ohio,  returned  to  Washington,  and  on 
May  ist  married  Miss  Ellen  Boyle  Ewing,  to  whom 
he  had  become  engaged  in  his  visit  to  Ohio  in  the 
autumn  of  1843.  Miss  Ewing  was  a  notable  figure 
in  Washington.  She  inherited  from  her  father 
a  stately  presence,  vigorous  intellect,  and  reso 
lute  character ;  from  her  mother,  benignity  and 
devout  religious  faith.  She  was  admired  by  men 
and  loved  by  friends  of  her  own  sex.  Some  la 
mented  that  she  bestowed  her  hand  upon  an  un 
known  lieutenant — unknown  to  them.  All  that  was 
distinguished  in  Washington  gathered  at  the  wed 
ding — the  President  and  Cabinet,  the  diplomatic 
corps,  the  army  and  navy;  Clay,  Webster,  and 
Corwin,  and  their  compeers,  and  the  justices  of 
the  Supreme  Court.  They  little  dreamed  that  the 
unknown  lieutenant  was  to  achieve  a  fame  that 
would  outshine  the  most  noted  of  their  number. 

The  President,  General  Taylor,  was  taken  ill 
on  the  4th  of  July,  and  died  a  few  days  after.  His 
indomitable  courage,  simple  ways,  and  purity  of 
character  had  endeared  him  to  the  people,  and  his 
direct  honesty,  good  sense,  firmness,  and  patriot 
ism  had  inspired  confidence  in  his  administration  in 
the  troubles  which  were  already  making  themselves 
felt.  His  death  was  a  shock  to  the  nation.  Lieu 
tenant  Sherman  acted  as  an  aid-de-camp  at  the 


14  GENERAL  SHERMAN. 

funeral.  He  reported  for  duty  at  St.  Louis  in  Sep 
tember,  and  found  among  the  officers  there  Swords 
and  Van  Vliet,  who  were  afterward  prominent 
quartermasters  in  the  war  of  the  rebellion,  and 
Buell,  Hancock,  Andrew  J.  Smith,  and  Bragg. 

An  act  was  passed  by  Congress  providing  for 
the  appointment  of  four  additional  captains  in  the 
commissary  department,  and  Sherman  was  ap 
pointed  one  of  the  four.  There  being  some  irregu 
larity  in  the  office  of  the  commissary  stationed  at 
New  Orleans,  he  was  relieved  and  Sherman  was 
appointed  in  his  place.  He  went  to  New  Orleans 
in  September,  1852,  and  in  the  following  winter 
the  house  of  Lucas  and  Symonds,  of  St.  Louis,  pro 
posed  to  establish  a  bank  in  San  Francisco  under 
the  name  of  Lucas,  Turner  and  Company,  in  which 
Sherman  was  to  be  a  partner.  He  obtained  a  six 
months'  leave  of  absence  and  embarked  for  San 
Francisco  in  March,  1853.  Competent  assistants 
were  employed  to  have  charge  of  the  details  and 
routine  business,  and  Major  Turner,  of  St.  Louis, 
remained  as  manager.  Sherman  showed  such  apti 
tude  for  the  business  that  he  resigned  from  the 
army,  and  in  November  Turner  returned  to  the 
Last,  leaving  Sherman  the  responsible  manager  of 
the  bank.  In  mastering  and  managing  this  new 
occupation  he  displayed  his  characteristic  traits  of 
character.  He  was  quick  and  clear  in  his  grasp 
of  facts  and  principles,  prompt  in  judgment,  reso 
lute  and  energetic  in  action,  and  cool  in  emergen 
cies.  With  all  his  nervous  and  vivacious  tempera 
ment,  he  was  a  prudent,  conservative,  and  safe 
man  of  business. 

The  speculator  Meigs,  who  enjoyed  unlimited 
credit  and  was  a  large  borrower,  was  indebted  in 
a  considerable  sum.  Sherman  conceived  a  distrust 
of  him,  and,  against  the  opinion  of  his  cashier  and 
the  judgment  of  other  bankers,  insisted  upon  the 
settlement  of  two  thirds  of  his  debt  and  additional 


ANTE   BELLUM.  15 

security  for  the  remainder.  When  the  crash  came 
and  Meigs  fled,  leaving  unsettled  debts  to  the 
amount  of  nearly  one  million  dollars,  many  of  his 
creditors  were  ruined,  while  Sherman's  loss  was 
trifling.  In  February,  1855,  a  run  upon  the  bank 
of  Page,  Bacon  and  Company,  by  far  the  largest 
house  in  San  Francisco,  caused  the  bank  to  close 
its  doors  and  fail.  The  people  in  a  panic  rushed  to 
all  the  banks,  drawing  out  their  deposits  till  nearly 
all  closed.  Sherman,  apprehending  trouble,  had 
strengthened  his  funds,  and  when  the  crash  came 
acted  with  such  prompt  vigor  that  the  run  upon 
his  bank  spent  its  force  without  causing  any  dis 
turbance  or  delay  in  paying  over  his  counter  every 
demand  made  upon  it.  While  the  city  was  strewn 
with  financial  wrecks,  the  bank  of  Lucas,  Turner 
and  Company  weathered  the  storm  without  injury, 
and  gained  increased  credit  by  the  ordeal. 

The  abundance  of  gold,  the  recklessness  of  the 
miners,  and  the  absence  of  established  government 
drew  many  gamblers  and  desperadoes  to  California. 
When  regular  government  was  established,  cor 
ruption  in  elections  was  believed  to  result  in  putting 
into  office  men  who  were  in  league  with  the  crimi 
nal  class,  and  who  screened  them  from  punishment. 
In  May,  1856,  James  King,  an  editor  who  advo 
cated  law  and  order,  and  fearlessly  assailed  the 
gamblers  and  their  allies,  and  who  was  one  of  the 
most  popular  men  in  San  Francisco,  was  deliber 
ately  murdered  in  broad  day  in  a  public  street  in 
the  heart  of  the  city.  The  murderer  at  once  gave 
himself  up  to  the  sheriff.  This  last  straw  aroused 
the  people.  A  large  number,  embracing  many  of 
the  best  men  in  the  city,  organized  themselves  into 
a  Vigilance  Committee,  a  secret  organization,  to 
purge  the  community  independently  of  the  officers 
of  the  law.  The  first  step  proposed  was  to  rescue 
the  murderer  of  King  from  the  friendly  custody  of 
the  sheriff  and  dispose  of  him. 


16  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

Sherman  had  no  hesitation  as  to  his  course. 
He  was  clear  that  it  was  the  duty  of  every  citizen 
to  aid  in  having  the  law  enforced  by  the  officers 
of  the  law,  and  that  the  assumption  of  citizens  to 
form  themselves  into  an  unauthorized  body  for  the 
punishment  of  criminals  independent  of  the  law  and 
its  officers  was  a  menace  to  the  State.  The  gov 
ernor,  who  was  earnest  in  having  Casey,  the  mur 
derer,  punished  by  due  course  of  law,  consulted 
freely  with  Sherman,  and  appointed  him  major  gen 
eral  of  militia  for  the  district  embracing  San  Fran 
cisco.  Sherman  found  enough  citizens  of  his  way 
of  thinking  to  form  several  companies,  and  was 
promised  by  General  Wool,  the  commander  of  the 
military  department,  a  supply  of  arms  and  am 
munition.  This  preparation  was  at  the  point  of 
success  when  General  Wool  withdrew  his  promise, 
and,  all  other  arms  being  already  in  the  posses 
sion  of  the  Vigilance  Committee,  Sherman's  move 
ment  fell  to  the  ground,  and  the  State  was  pow 
erless.  Casey  was  taken  from  the  jail  and  hanged. 
Some  other  dangerous  characters  were  made 
away  with,  and  the  rest  were  banished.  The  city 
was  purged,  order  established,  and  a  feeling  of  se 
curity  restored.  The  Vigilance  Committee  be 
came  a  permanent  institution,  and  still  exists.  It 
has  several  times  since  been  called  into  action, 
but  only  in  great  emergencies,  and  has  always 
restricted  its  activity  to  the  occasion  which  called 
it  out. 

Sherman  held  that,  great  as  the  immediate  bene 
fit  was,  the  same  good  would  have  been  obtained  if 
the  same  combined  energy  had  been  used  to  stimu 
late  and  strengthen  the  constituted  machinery  of 
government,  without  sapping  its  authority.  And 
who  can  tell  how  much  the  success  of  the  California 
Vigilance  Committee  and  the  approbation  that  it 
received  has  encouraged  and  stimulated  the  Ku- 
klux  of  the  South,  the  White  Caps  of  the  North, 


ANTE   BELLUM.  \j 

and  lynching  parties  and  insurrectionary  labor 
unions  throughout  the  land. 

The  feverish  prosperity  of  California  had  passed 
its  climax.  The  influx  of  population,  with  the  at 
tendant  competition  in  all  branches  of  business  and 
employment,  put  an  end  to  inordinate  profits.  The 
shrinkage  and  readjustment  which  ensued  was  ac 
companied  by  failures,  bankruptcies,  and  withdraw 
al  of  foreign  capital.  Acting  on  the  suggestion  of 
Sherman,  the  home  office  determined  to  close  out 
their  San  Francisco  business  and  withdraw  the 
means  employed  in  it.  In  May,  1857,  the  San 
Francisco  house  ceased  business,  and  transferred 
undrawn  deposits  to  other  banks.  Sherman  re 
turned  to  the  East,  leaving  one  of  the  firm  to  col 
lect  outstanding  credits  and  dispose  of  real  estate. 

Lucas  and  Company  (as  the  house  was  called) 
still  availed  themselves  of  his  services,  and  gave 
him  employment.  He  and  a  partner  were  ap 
pointed  agents  in  New  York  of  the  .St.  Louis  firm. 
He  had  been  in  business  barely  a  month  when,  on 
the  2 ist  of  August,  th'e  Ohio  Life  and  Trust  Com 
pany,  in  Cincinnati,  failed.  It  was  the  most  im 
portant  financial  corporation  in  the  West,  and  was 
esteemed  safe  as  the  Bank  of  England.  The 
shock  to  credit  spread  in  waves  that  soon  covered 
the  West,  and  then  extended  to  the  Eastern  States. 
It  spread  to  and  over  Europe,  and  through  Persia 
and  India  to  China  and  Japan.  The  world  was 
girdled  with  financial  wrecks.  Sherman's  firm  had 
not  contracted  debts,  but  Lucas  and  Company,  in 
St.  Louis,  unable  to  turn  securities  into  money  fast 
enough,  failed.  The  business  of  the  New  York 
agency  was  wound  up,  and  Sherman  took  the 
moneys  and  assets  to  St.  Louis. 

Declining  to  make  another  venture  in  business, 
he  entered  into  partnership  with  his  brother-in-law, 
Thomas  Ewing,  Jr.,  afterward  chief  justice  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Kansas,  and  conspicuous  in  the 


18  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

war  of  the  rebellion,  but  then  practicing  law  at 
Leavenworth,  Kas.  In  the  spring  of  1859  he  left 
the  firm  to  open  and  improve  a  farm  upon  a  tract 
of  land  in  Kansas  owned  by  Thomas  Ewing,  Sr. 
But  the  yearning  for  military  life,  probably  never 
extinguished,  returned.  He  wrote  in  June  to  his 
friend  Don  Carlos  Buell,  then  on  duty  with  Secre- 
tary-of-War  Floyd,  asking  if  there  was  any  chance 
of  his  being  appointed  a  paymaster  in  the  army. 
Buell  replied,  advising  him  to  apply  for  the  place 
of  superintendent  of  a  military  school  which  was 
about  to  be  opened  in  Louisiana.  He  made  appli 
cation  by  letter,  receiving  prompt  notice  in  July 
that  he  had  been  elected  superintendent,  with  re 
quest  to  report  in  Louisiana  as  soon  as  possible. 

In  the  autumn  he  reported  to  the  Governor  of 
Louisiana,  and  was  cordially  welcomed  by  him  and 
by  all  who  were  interested  in  the  undertaking.  He 
found  on  the  grounds  of  the  institution,  near  Alex 
andria,  a  large  building,  but  not  so  much  as  a  chair 
or  table  in  it.  Setting  energetically  to  work,  he 
succeeded  in  having  the  building  furnished  and 
equipped,  a  full  corps  of  professors  appointed, 
courses  of  study  and  rules  of  government  adopted, 
and  on  the  1st  of  January  the  academy  opened  with 
a  good  attendance  of  cadets.  The  Legislature  made 
liberal  appropriations.  The  governor  took  personal 
interest  in  the  institution,  and  the  first  term  closed 
at  the  end  of  July  with  general  approbation.  In 
the  summer  vacation  Sherman  went  to  Washington 
to  solicit  from  the  War  Department  arms  for  his 
academy.  Louisiana  had  already  received  more 
than  its  quota  from  the  General  Government,  but 
Secretary  Floyd  approved  with  alacrity  a  requisi 
tion  for  two  hundred  muskets  and  accouterments, 
and  promptly  forwarded  them. 

The  school  opened  on  the  1st  of  November  with 
a  largely  increased  number  of  cadets.  Abraham 
Lincoln  was  elected  President  the  same  month. 


ANTE    BELLUM.  19 

The  whole  country  was  seething  with  the  discussion 
of  slavery,  and  the  secession  of  the  Southern  States 
from  the  Union  was  openly  advocated.  Sherman 
did  not  vote  at  the  election,  and  avoided  political 
discussion.  But  when  it  was  necessary  to  speak 
he  gave  his  opinion  frankly,  and  did  not  hesitate  to 
say  that  secession  was  treason  and  was  war.  Presi 
dent  Buchanan,  in  his  message  to  Congress  in  De~ 
cember,  said  that  no  State  had  the  right  under  the 
Constitution  or  otherwise  to  secede  from  the  Union ; 
but  that  if  a  State  should  wrongfully  determine  to 
secede,  neither  the  President  nor  Congress  could 
interfere  by  force  to  prevent  the  accomplishment 
of  the  purpose  and  stay  the  dissolution  of  the  Union. 
In  the  same  month  South  Carolina  seceded.  Other 
States  followed.  In  December  the  Governor  of 
Louisiana  seized  the  unguarded  forts  on  the  Missis 
sippi,  and  on  the  loth  of  January,  by  an  overwhelm 
ing  force,  compelled  the  surrender  of  the  arsenal 
at  Baton  Rouge.  The  time  had  arrived  when  every 
one  had  to  take  his  side.  Sherman  wrote  to  the 
governor  on  the  loth  of  January,  1860: 

SIR  :  As  I  occupy  a  quasi  military  position  under  the 
laws  of  the  State,  I  deem  it  proper  to  acquaint  you  that  I 
accepted  such  position  when  Louisiana  was  a  State  in  the 
Union,  and  when  the  motto  of  this  seminary  was  inserted  in 
marble  over  the  main  door  :  "  By  the  liberality  of  the  General 
Government  of  the  United  States.  The  Union — esto  per 
petual  Recent  events  foreshadow  a  great  change,  and  it  be 
comes  all  men  to  choose.  If  Louisiana  withdraw  from  the 
Federal  Union,  I  prefer  to  maintain  my  allegiance  to  the 
Constitution  ns  long  as  a  fragment  of  it  survives,  and  my 
stay  here  would  be  wrong  in  every  sense  of  the  word.  In 
that  event,  I  beg  you  will  send  or  appoint  some  authorized 
agent  to  take  charge  of  the  arms  and  munitions  of  war  be 
longing  to  the  State,  or  advise  me  what  disposition  to  make 
of  them.  And  furthermore,  as  president  of  the  Board  of 
Supervisors,  I  beg  you  to  take  immediate  steps  to  relieve  me 
as  superintendent  the  moment  the  State  determines  to  se 
cede,  for  on  no  earthly  account  will  I  do  any  act  or  think 


20  GENERAL    SHERMAN. 

any  thought  hostile  to  or  in  defiance  of  the  old  Government 
of  the  United  States. 

With  great  respect,  your  obedient  servant 

W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Superintendent. 

The  governor  accepted  the  resignation  with 
regret  and  with  warm  expressions  of  friendship  and 
esteem.  The  Board  of  Supervisors  passed  resolu 
tions  of  regret  at  his  leaving  and  thanks  for  his 
past  service.  Every  one  spoke  kindly  and  regret 
fully.  While  he  was  settling  his  accounts  and  turn 
ing  over  property,  Bragg,  Beauregard,  and  other 
ofBcers  of  the  army  were  abandoning  the  service 
of  the  United  States,  and  General  Twiggs,  on  duty 
in  Texas,  surrendered  all  the  troops  in  the  State, 
comprising  a  large  part  of  the  regular  army,  to 
gether  with  all  the  military  posts,  their  armament, 
and  all  Government  stores  to  an  improvised  colonel 
of  militia. 


CHAPTER   II. 

THE  BEGINNING  OF  THE  WAR. 

SHERMAN,  while  disapproving  of  the  institution 
of  slavery,  opposing  its  spread,  and  objecting  to 
some  of  its  features,  was  not  excited  over  its  con 
tinuance  within  existing  limits,  and  objected  to 
interference  with  it  within  those  limits.  But  he  was 
intensely  loyal  to  the  United  States  and  the  main 
tenance  of  the  Union;  was  shocked  and  pained  at 
the  desertion  of  his  brother  officers  from  their  flag; 
was  outraged  at  the  seizure  of  Government  forts 
and  buildings  and  stores;  and  was  bewildered  by 
the  apparent  acquiescence  of  the  Government  at 
Washington.  While  the  South  was  seething  with 
excitement,  breaking  away  from  the  Union,  seizing 
the  forts  and  other  public  buildings  and  property 
of  the  United  States,  forming  a  new  nation,  erect 
ing  a  new  government,  and  preparing  for  war, 
Sherman  was  arranging  his  affairs,  settling  up  his 
accounts,  and  turning  over  the  property  belong 
ing  to  the  seminary.  He  was  again  adrift,  without 
employment,  and  left  New  Orleans  about  the  ist 
of  March  to  rejoin  his  family  and  find  means  of 
supporting  them.  He  thankfully  accepted  the  of 
fice  of  president  of  a  street  railway  company  at  St. 
Louis,  offered  to  him  through  the  influence  of  his 
friends  in  that  city. 

The  people  of  the  North  were  slow  in  attaining 
to  a  realizing  sense  of  the  state  of  affairs  in  the 
South.  They  knew  little  of  war,  and  were  incredu 
lous  of  its  near  presence.  To  Sherman  this  seemed 

21 


22  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

the  apathy  of  indifference.  Upon  the  request  of  his 
brother,  then  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  he 
went  to  Washington,  and  with  him  called  on  the 
President.  When  in  the  conversation  Sherman  said 
that  the  people  of  the  South  were  preparing  for  war, 
Lincoln  replied,  "  I  guess  we'll  manage  to  keep 
house."  Sherman  said  no  more,  and  soon  left. 
The  two  men,  who  did  not  yet  know  each  other, 
parted — Lincoln,  troubled  undoubtedly  by  the 
statement,  but  veiling  his  feeling  with  a  flash  of 
levity;  Sherman,  disappointed,  disheartened,  de 
pressed,  angry. 

He  entered  upon  his  duty  as  president  of  the 
railway  company  on  the  1st  of  April.  A  few  days 
later  he  was  asked  to  accept  the  office  of  chief  clerk 
of  the  War  Department,  with  promise  of  early  pro 
motion  to  assistant  secretary  of  war.  He  had  just 
entered  upon  his  new  engagement,  and  had  not  yet 
recovered  from  the  effect  of  what  he  considered  a 
rebuff  in  Washington,  and  declined. 

Beauregard  opened  fire  upon  Fort  Sumter  on 
the  I2th  of  April.  This  was  act  of  open  war  upon 
the  United'  States,  and  the  loyal  nation,  roused 
like  a  strong  man  from  his  slumber,  sprang  to  its 
feet.  On  the  I5th  the  President  called  for  seventy- 
five  thousand  volunteers  to  serve  three  months,  and 
then  added  ten  regiments  to  the  regular  army.  A 
force  of  Virginia  troops  seized  upon  Harper's  Ferry. 
A  Massachusetts  regiment,  responding  promptly  to 
the  President's  call,  was  attacked  while  passing 
through  Baltimore.  Travel  upon  both  the  roads 
leading  to  Washington  was  stopped,  and  the  capi 
tal  was  cut  off  from  all  communication  with  the 
North  and  West.  The  blockade  lasted  till  General 
Butler  landed  at  Annapolis  and  opened  the  way 
to  the  city. 

Sherman,  notwithstanding  his  signal  proof  of 
loyalty,  found  his  friends  becoming  troubled  about 
him,  and  undoubtedly  became  dissatisfied  with  his 


THE   BEGINNING   OF   THE   WAR.  23 

position.  On  the  8th  of  May  he  wrote  to  the  Secre 
tary  of  War :  "  I  hold  myself  now,  as  always,  pre 
pared  to  serve  my  country  in  the  capacity  for  which 
I  was  trained.  I  did  not  and  will  not  volunteer  for 
three  months,  because  I  can  not  throw  my  family 
upon  the  cold  charity  of  the  world.  But  for  the 
three  years'  call  made  by  the  President  an  officer 
can  prepare  his  command  and  do  good  service.  I 
will  not  volunteer  as  a  soldier,  because,  rightfully 
or  wrongfully,  I  feel  unwilling  to  take  a  -mere  pri 
vate's  place,  and,  having  for  many  years  lived  in 
Louisiana  and  California,  the  men  are  not  well 
enough  acquainted  with  me  to  elect  me  to  my  ap 
propriate  place.  Should  my  services  be  needed,  the 
records  of  the  War  Department  will  enable  you  to 
designate  the  station  in  which  I  can  render  most 
service." 

On  the  1 4th  of  May  Sherman  was  appointed 
colonel  of  the  Thirteenth  Infantry  in  the  regular/ 
army,  and,  on  reporting  at  Washington,  was  as 
signed  to  duty  with  Lieutenant-General  Scott.  A^ 
soon  as  the  road  to  Washington  was  opened  troops 
from  the  North  and  West  poured  in.  Massachu 
setts,  New  York,  and  Pennsylvania  sent  organized 
and  drilled  regiments.  Most  of  the  troops  were 
men  who  enlisted  full  of  ardor,  but  wholly  without 
military  instruction.  They  came  to  march  to  vic 
tory  and  return  home  in  triumph  before  the  end  of 
their  enlistment.  The  Governor  of  Rhode  Island 
came  as  colonel  of  one  of  his  regiments.  The 
Seventh  New  York  camped  on  Mr.  Stone's  place, 
with  wall  tents  for  privates  as  well  as  officers,  and 
comforted  by  a  shipload  of  special  supplies.  When 
the  troops  with  their  multifarious  baggage  were 
moved  across  the  river  and  organized  into  brigades 
and  divisions,  Sherman  was  assigned  to  command 
a  brigade  of  four  New  York  and  one  Wisconsin 
regiments,  with  a  regular  battery  attached,  being 
the  Third  Brigade  of  Tyler's  division. 


24  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

It  is  an  easy  matter  to  make  paper  organiza 
tions,  but  it  is  slow  work  to  make  actual  soldiers. 
The  people,  thoughtless  of  the  want  of  preparation, 
ignorant  of  the  need  of  preparation,  persisted  in  the 
demand  for  an  onward  movement,  till  General  Scott, 
in  July,  ordered  General  McDowell,  with  the  force 
about  Washington,  to  advance  and  attack  General 
Beauregard  in  his  position  on  Bull  Run,  while  Gen 
eral  Patterson,  of  Pennsylvania,  with  a  large  com 
mand  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  should  watch  and 
hold  there  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  and  prevent 
his  marching  to  aid  Beauregard. 

Sherman  went  up  to  visit  his  brother,  John 
Sherman,  who  was  a  volunteer  aid-de-camp  to  Gen 
eral  Patterson.  George  H.  Thomas  was  there,  com 
manding  a  brigade  in  Patterson's  army.  The  Sher 
mans  and  Thomas,  being  in  a  room  together,  dis 
cussed  the  possibilities  of  the  war.  W.  T.  Sherman 
and  Thomas  spread  a  map  of  the  United  States  upon 
the  floor,  and,  kneeling  down,  tracing  campaigns, 
designated  Richmond,  Nashville,  Vicksburg,  Chat 
tanooga,  and  Atlanta  as  vital  points  to  be  taken. 
In  their  service  it  so  happened  that  they,  one  or 
both,  were  immediately  concerned  in  the  capture 
of  all  of  these  but  Richmond,  and  in  repulsing  at 
tempted  recapture  of  two  of  them. 

McDowell  moved  out  from  the  camps  on  the 
1 6th  of  July,  and  on  the  I7th  had  his  force  in  hand 
at  Centerville.  On  the  i8th,  in  a  reconnoissance 
in  force  to  Blackburn's  Ford,  on  Bull  Run,  Sher 
man  for  the  first  time  heard  artillery  in  actual  con 
flict.  At  2  A.  M.  the  army  marched  out  to  battle. 
General  McDowell,  with  the  great  part  of  his  com 
mand,  made  a  detour  to  the  right  to  gain  the  left 
of  Beauregard  before  crossing  Bull  Run.  He 
crossed  easily,  and  was  successful  at  first  in  driving  . 
the  enemy.  But  Johnston  had  succeeded  in  eluding 
Patterson,  and  had  already  joined  Beauregard.  The 
Confederate  left,  which  had  gradually  fallen  back, 


THE    BEGINNING   OF   THE   WAR.  25 

was  largely  re-enforced,  and  made  a  stand  in  a 
favorable  position  on  the  edge  of  a  commanding 
plateau.  Successive  portions  of  the  national  line 
made  successive  assaults,  but  failed  to  drive  the 
enemy  from  his  position.  No  longer  incited  by 
success,  and  not  held  together  by  the  cohesion  of 
discipline,  the  irregular  line  broke  in  places,  and 
streams  of  fugitives  poured  to  the  rear.  By  3  P.  M. 
the  battle  was  lost. 

Tyler's  division  was  left  near  Bull  Run,  in  the 
neighborhood  of  the  Stone  Bridge,  to  guard  against 
any  attempt  of  the  enemy  to  cross  there  and  deliver 
a  counter-attack.  The  sound  of  McDowell's  attack 
could  be  heard  advancing  till  about  noon.  The  roar 
of  battle  then  became  stationary.  General  Tyler 
then  sent  Sherman  with  his  brigade  to  support. 
Crossing  by  a  ford  which  he  had  discovered,  he 
marched  toward  the  sound  of  the  guns,  and  reported 
to  General  McDowell  on  the  field.  It  was  his  place 
to  march  to  attack  over  ground  swept  by  artillery 
and  musketry.  He  put  in  his  regiments  successive 
ly,  one  at  a  time,  and  each  in  turn,  after  a  gallant 
advance,  broke  and  retired.  About  half  past  three 
the  brigade  crumbled.  Many  men  had  left  the 
field.  The  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was  severe. 
Sherman  formed  what  was  left  into  as  good  a  square 
against  cavalry  as  could  be  formed  under  the  cir 
cumstances,  and  retreated  across  the  Stone  Bridge, 
and  followed  the  panic  rout  to  Centerville.  There 
he  gathered  enough  of  each  regiment  to  put  them 
into  bivouac  in  regimental  lines.  In  obedience  to 
an  order  given  by  General  Tyler,  he  resumed  the  re 
treat  at  midnight,  and  reached  his  camp  near  the 
defenses  of  Washington  about  noon  next  day. 
Here  he  at  once  rendered  the  important  service  of 
making  the  guards  at  the  aqueduct  and  neighbor 
ing  ferries  strong  enough  to  stem  the  multitudinous 
rout  and  turn  the  demoralized  fugitives  back  to 
their  camps.  Of  General  McDowell's  total  loss  of 


26  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

481  killed  and  1,111  wounded,  Sherman's  brigade 
lost  in  killed  and  205  wounded. 

When  the  news  spread  through  the  land  that, 
instead  of  the  expected  victory,  the  National  troops 
were  defeated  and  had  returned  to  Washington  in 
disorder,  the  first  feeling  was  bitter  disappointment 
and  mortification.  Then  came  a  general  recogni 
tion  of  the  fact  that  war  was  a  more  serious  matter 
than  had  been  supposed,  and  then  came  the  fixed 
resolve  to  carry  the  war  through  to  successful  issue, 
whatever  might  be  the  cost  in  toil  or  money  or 
sacrifice.  The  soldiers  were  roused  from  their 
dream  of  easy  conquest.  Excepting  men  who  had 
served  in  the  Mexican  War  and  some  members  of 
uniformed  regiments  in  the  older  States,  we  were 
so  profoundly  ignorant  of  military  matters  that  we 
were  not  aware  that  we  were  ignorant.  It  was 
commonly  supposed  that  a  knowledge  of  company 
drill  made  a  man  a  soldier.  It  was  now  perceived 
that  men  who  would  carry  on  war  must  learn  the 
business  of  war,  as  a  man  must  learn  any  business 
if  he  would  succeed  in  it.  They  set  to  work  to  learn 
through  instruction  and  by  practice  the  ways  of 
marching,  camping,  picket  duty,  reconnoitering, 
skirmishing,  and  righting  battles;  the  repair  and 
building  of  roads  and  bridges ;  the  collection,  trans 
portation,  and  distribution  of  supplies;  the  functton 
and  conduct  of  courts-martial;  the  multifarious 
paper  business  of  reports,  returns,  and  correspond 
ence;  and,  above  all,  the  necessity  for  discipline 
and  prompt,  unquestioning  obedience  of  orders. 
It  was  not  easy  for  citizens  of  a  republic,  who  know 
no  superior  but  the  law,  to  constrain  themselves 
to  obey  a  man  without  asking  why.  But  when  they 
discovered  that  military  law  is  part  of  the  law  of 
the  land;  that  military  officers  are  officers  of  the 
law,  and  obedience  to  their  authority  is  obedience 
to  the  law,  it  became  easy  to  obey  without  lowering 
their  self-respect.  And  as  the  war  continued  they 


THE   BEGINNING   OF   THE  WAR.  27 

found  that  their  own  safety  depended  upon  the  en 
forcement  of  discipline,  and  that  an  unorganized 
mob  of  men  differs  from  the  same  men  transformed 
into  a  disciplined  army,  just  as  a  pile  of  iron  ore 
differs  from  the  same  ore  smelted  and  wrought  into 
a  working  engine. 

Immediately  after  Bull  Run  Sherman  found  his 
command  scattered,  restless,  disorderly,  and,  to 
some  extent,  mutinous.  He  had  made  considerable 
progress  in  the  training  of  his  men  when,  on  the 
17th  of  May,  he  was  appointed  brigadier  general  of 
volunteers,  and  was,  August  24th,  assigned  to  duty 
under  Brigadier-General  Robert  Anderson,  com 
mander  of  the  Department  of  the  Cumberland. 
George  H.  Thomas,  by  the  same  order,  received  the 
same  appointment  and  assignment. 

All  the  States  south  of  Maryland,  Kentucky, 
and  Missouri  were  in  open  insurrection  and  war 
against  the  United  States.  Maryland  was  safe; 
Missouri  was  reasonably  safe;  Kentucky  was  quiv 
ering  between  insurrection  and  loyalty.  Sympathy 
with  the  South  was  common,  especially  among  men 
having  property  and  among  the  young  men.  But 
among  the  men  of  stanch  loyalty  were  the  names 
of  Clay,  Crittenden,  Breckenridge,  Anderson,  Ham 
ilton  Pope,  Guthrie,  Speed,  Harlan,  Rousseau, 
Goodloe,  Woolford,  Landrum,  and  other  well- 
known  families.  Among  mechanics  and  men  of 
moderate  means  loyalty  to  the  National  Government 
prevailed.  Affinity  of  institutions  allied  Kentucky 
to  the  South,  but  the-  spirit  of  Henry  Clay  and  John 
J.  Crittenden  bound  a  large  part  of  the  population 
by  stronger  tie  to  the  United  States. 

Governor  Beriah  McGoffin  called  the  Legisla 
ture  into  extra  session  in  January,  1861,  and  recom 
mended  to  it  the  convening  of  a  sovereignty  State 
convention,  the  purchase  of  arms,  and  the  mobiliza 
tion  of  the  State  militia.  He  did  not  succeed  in 
having  any  of  these  measures  adopted.  When  the 


28  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

governor  issued  his  call,  a  great  meeting  of  la 
boring  men  was  held  in  Louisville,  which  declared, 
without  qualification,  in  favor  of  remaining  in  the 
Union  and  of  sustaining  the  Government,  and  is 
sued  an  address  to  the  workingmen  of  the  country 
as  the  class  particularly  concerned  in  the  preserva 
tion  of  the  Union.  At  an  election  held  shortly  after 
ward  in  Louisville  to  fill  a  vacancy  in  the  Legis 
lature,  the  new  party  secured  the  election  of  an 
uncompromising  Union  man,  and  in  April  elected 
another  such  mayor  of  the  city. 

When  President  Lincoln  "issued  his  call  for 
troops  after  the  firing  upon  Fort  Sumter,  Gov 
ernor  McGoffin  called  the  Legislature  again  into 
session  to  force  the  State  out  of  the  Union  and  into 
the  Confederacy.  Thereupon  the  Union  Club,  a  se 
cret  society,  was  formed  in  Louisville  to  bring  ear 
nest  Unionists  together,  and  numbered  six  thousand 
members.  This  society  was  instrumental  in  the 
raising  of  two  regiments  and  a  battery  of  municipal 
troops,  or  home  guards,  which  under  the  law  were 
subject,  not  to  the  governor,  but  only  to  the  mayor. 
The  object  of  the  society  being  secured  before  the 
summer  was  over,  and  its  existence  being  no  longer 
necessary,  it  died  out  in  the  autuirih. 

When  the  Legislature,  convened  in  April  by 
the  governor,  met,  it  passed  a  joint  resolution  de 
claring  Kentucky  neutral  in  the  war.  This  was  not 
a  surrender,  and  was  not  a  compromise,  so  much 
as  a  truce.  It  prevented  secession  for  the  present, 
and  enabled  parties  to  ripen  their  plans.  Subse 
quently,  at  the  same  session,  laws  were  passed  pro 
viding  for  the  purchase  of  arms  to  be  distributed 
to  the  militia,  not  by  the  governor,  but  by  a  board 
of  Union  men;  to  provide  for  the  raising  of  home 
guards  for  local  defense ;  and  requiring  the  enlisted 
men,  as  \vell  as  the  officers  of  the  militia,  to  take 
an  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  United  States  as  well 
as  to  the  State  of  Kentucky. 


THE   BEGINNING   OF   THE   WAR. 


29 


The  Legislature  adjourned  about  the  close  of 
May.  A  special  election  of  members  of  Congress 
was  held  in  June,  and  nine  of  the  ten  members 
elected  were  pronounced  Union  men.  A  new  Legis 
lature  was  elected  in  August,  and  three  fourths  of 
the  members  elected  were  Union  men.  Recruiting 
soldiers  for  the  National  Government  became  open 
through  the  State,  and  General  Buckner  moved 
his  Confederate  recruiting  camp  across  the  State 
line  into  Tennessee.  Squads  of  recruits  united  and 
were  formed  into  regiments,  which  rendezvoused  at 
Camp  Dick  Robinson,  south  of  the  Kentucky  River, 
forming  a  brigade  under  the  command  of  General 
William  Nelson. 

General  Sherman  and  General  Thomas  reported 
to  General  Anderson  in  Cincinnati  on  the  ist  of 
September  at  the  house  of  Lars  Anderson,  where 
they  met  a  group  of  trusty  Kentucky  gentlemen  as 
sembled  for  advice  and  consultation.  A  Confed 
erate  force  under  General  Zollicoffer,  near  Cum 
berland  Gap,  another  under  General  Buckner,  near 
Clarksville,  and  a  third  under  General  Pillow,  on 
the  Mississippi  River,  were  just  beyond  the  State 
line  in  Tennessee  waiting  for  the  decision  of  Ken 
tucky,  while  General  Anderson  had  under  his  com 
mand  Nelson's  brigade  and  a  recruiting  force  under 
General  Rousseau  in  Indiana,  across  the  river  from 
Louisville.  Sherman  was  sent  to  solicit  re-enforce 
ments.  He  found  Governor  Morton,  of  Indiana, 
busy  raising  regiments,  which  as  fast  as  they  were 
mustered  in  were  assigned  to  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  then  commanded  by  General  McClel- 
lan.  At  Springfield  he  found  the  Governor  of  Illi 
nois  equally  busy  raising  regiments,  which  were 
ordered  from  Washington  to  report  to  McClellan 
or  else  to  General  Fremont,  who  commanded  in 
Missouri.  He  went  to  St.  Louis,  and  succeeded  in 
obtaining  audience  of  General  Fremont  through 
the  intervention  of  an  old  California  friend,  who 


30  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

was  in  some  capacity  on  General  Fremont's  staff. 
Here  again  he  met  refusal,  General  Fremont  say 
ing  he  must  first  drive  the  enemy  out  of  Missouri, 
and  he  could  not  give  aid  to  other  fields  until  this 
should  be  accomplished.  Sherman  returned  to 
Louisville. 

On  the  3d  of  September  General  Pillow  ad 
vanced  into  Kentucky  by  an  order  of  General  Polk, 
and  seized  Hickman  and  Columbus.  On  the  6th 
General  Grant  entered  Kentucky  and  occupied 
Paducah.  There  was  much  correspondence  by 
telegraph  and  otherwise  between  the  Confederate 
authorities,  civil  and  military,  as  to  whether  or  not 
General  Folk's  breach  of  the  neutrality  of  Kentucky 
was  a  justifiable  act  of  necessity.  Jefferson  Davis, 
President  of  the  Confederacy,  acquiesced,  and  the 
troops  remained  in  possession  of  Columbus.  On 
the  1 2th  of  September  the  Legislature  of  Kentucky 
passed  a  joint  resolution  requiring  the  governor 
to  order  the  Confederate  troops  to  leave  the  State. 
President  Davis  appointed  General  A.  S.  Johnston 
to  the  command  of  all  the  forces  in  Tennessee. 
General  Johnston  assumed  command,  and  on  the 
1 7th  sent  General  Buckner  to  Bowling  Green,  Ky. 
General  Zollicoffer  advanced  his  force  to  Cumber 
land  Ford  a  few  days  earlier.  The  dream  of  neu 
trality  was  ended. 

When  Buckner  moved  to  Bowling  Green  a  de 
tachment  pushed  forward  and  burned  a  railroad 
bridge  within  thirty  miles  of  Louisville.  The  news 
reached  Louisville  at  night.  General  Anderson  sent 
General  Sherman  across  the  river,  and  in  an  hour 
Rousseau  had  his  men,  one  thousand,  in  line.  The 
Home  Guard  of  Louisville,  under  command  of 
Hamilton  Pope,  volunteered,  and  at  midnight,  on 
a  train  secured  by  Mr.  James  Guthrie,  General 
Sherman  moved  to  the  front  with  his  extemporized 
command.  It  was  ascertained  that  Buckner  was 
not  advancing.  Sherman  placed  his  troops  upon 


THE   BEGINNING   OF   THE   WAR.  31 

Muldraugh's  Hill.  Troops  began  to  arrive,  and 
by  the  ist  of  October  Sherman  had  there  the  equiva 
lent  of  two  brigades. 

General  Anderson,  worn  out  in  his  enfeebled 
health  by  the  anxieties  of  the  situation,  relinquished 
command  on  the  8th  of  October,  and  Sherman,  by 
seniority,  assumed  command.  But  in  assuming 
command  he  wrote  to  the  War  Department,  as  he 
had  stated  orally  to  the  President  in  Washington, 
that  he  wished  to  hold  a  subordinate  command,  and 
was  assured  that  General  Buell,  then  on  his  way 
from  California,  would,  on  arriving,  relieve  him. 
General  Thomas  superseded  General  Nelson  at 
Camp  Dick  Robinson.  General  A.  McD.  McCook 
was  put  in  command  of  the  force  pushed  forward 
from  Muldraugh's  Hill  to  Nolin  Creek.  The  en 
tire  force  under  Sherman's  command  was  eighteen 
thousand  men.  He  was  confronted  by  more  than 
double  that  number,  and  Johnston  could  at  any  time 
force  his  way  to  the  Ohio  River.  Sherman  was 
anxious,  and  with  his  impetuous  frankness  did  not 
fail  to  express  his  anxiety. 

On  the  evening  of  the  i6th  of  October  Secretary- 
of-War  Simon  Cameron,  with  Adjutant-General 
Lorenzo  Thomas,  accompanied  by  some  friends, 
arrived  at  Louisville  on  their  return  to  Washing 
ton  from  St.  Louis,  and  had  an  interview  with  Gen 
eral  Sherman.  General  T.  J.  Wood  and  Mr.  Guthrie 
were  present.  Sherman  gave  to  the  Secretary  a 
full  statement  of  the  political  condition  of  Ken 
tucky,  the  probability  of  recruiting  troops  from 
the  inhabitants,  the  force  already  in  the  field  and 
its  distribution,  the  numbers  and  position  of  the 
enemy,  and  pointed  out  the  scanty  means  at  hand 
to  defend  a  line  extending  from  the  Alleghanies  to 
the  Mississippi,  and  the  ease  with  which  the  enemy 
could  select  his  route  and  penetrate  to  the  Ohio 
before  any  adequate  force  could  be  concentrated  to 
oppose  him.  According  to  Adjutant-General  Thorn- 


32  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

as,  "  on  being  asked  the  question  what  force  he 
deemed  necessary,  he  promptly  replied  two  hundred 
thousand  men."  According  to  the  statement  of 
General  T.  J.  Wood,  written  August  24,  1866 :  "  For 
the  purpose  of  expelling  the  rebels  from  Kentucky, 
'  General  Sherman  said  that  at  least  sixty  thousand 
soldiers  were  necessary.  .  .  .  General  Sherman  ex 
pressed  the  opinion  that  to  carry  on  the  war  to 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  destroy  all  armed  opposi 
tion  to  the  Government  in  the  entire  Mississippi 
Valley  at  least  two  hundred  thousand  troops  were 
absolutely  requisite."  General  Sherman  says  his 
remark  was:  "  I  argued  that  for  the  purpose  of  de 
fense  we  should  have  sixty  thousand  men  at  once, 
and  for  offense  would  need  two  hundred  thousand 
before  we  were  done."  While  this  estimate  was 
largely  in  excess  of  what  was  commonly  supposed 
to  be  sufficient,  subsequent  experience  showed  that 
his  judgment  was  correct.  But  newspapers  getting 
news  of  it,  spoke  of  his  insane  demand,  and  then 
called  him  insane,  and  demanded  his  release  from 
command.  It  was  the  fate  of  Cassandra,  treated 
with  contumely  by  the  people  for  giving  true  but 
unwelcome  warning. 

Secretary  Cameron  ordered  by  telegraph  re-en 
forcements  and  arms,  and  Sherman  diligently  or 
ganized  his  command,  watched  the  enemy,  and 
made  dispositions  to  resist  any  advance.  General 
McClellan  required  from  him  daily  reports,  and 
such  as  are  published  are  model  reports,  full  of  in 
formation,  succinct  and  clear  in  statement,  and  sa 
gacious  in  suggestion.  General  Buell  arrived  and 
assumed  command  on  the  I5th  of  November,  and 
General  Sherman  was  ordered  to  report  for  duty 
to  General  H.  W.  Halleck,  commanding  the  De 
partment  of  the  Missouri. 

General  Sherman,  on  reporting  at  St.  Louis, 
was  ordered  on  the  23d  of  November  to  visit  the 
different  stations  and  inspect  troops,  camps,  equip- 


THE   BEGINNING   OF   THE   WAR.  33 

ment,  supplies,  and  transportation  and  routes  for 
supplies.  He  reported  on  the  27th  that  he  had 
ordered  the  whole  force  from  Lexington  forward  to 
check  the  advancing  enemy.  This  order  was  coun 
termanded  by  General  Halleck  on  the  same  day. 
Sherman  telegraphed  on  the  28th  that  he  had  or 
dered  Pope's  and  Turner's  divisions  to  advance. 
On  the  same  day  General  Halleck  telegraphed  that 
Mrs.  Sherman  was  in  St.  Louis,  and  directed  Sher 
man  to  return  to  the  city  at  once.  On  the  2d  of 
December  Halleck  wrote  to  General  McClellan : 
"  As  stated  in  a  former  communication,  General  W. 
T.  Sherman,  on  reporting  here  for  duty,  was  or 
dered  to  inspect  troops  (three  divisions  at  Sedalia 
and  vicinity),  and  if,  in  the  absence  of  General 
Pope,  he  deemed  there  was  danger  of  an  immedi 
ate  attack,  he  was  authorized  to  assume  command. 
He  did  so,  and  commenced  the  movement  of  the 
troops  in  a  manner  which  I  did  not  approve  and 
countermanded.  I  also  received  information  from 
officers  there  that  General  Sherman  was  completely 
'  stampeded/  and  was  stampeding  the  army.  I 
therefore  yesterday  gave  him  a  leave  of  absence  for 
twenty  days  to  visit  his  family  in  Ohio.  I  am  satis 
fied  that  General  Sherman's  physical  and  mental 
system  is  so  completely  broken  by  labor  and  care 
as  to  render  him  for  the  present  entirely  unfit  for 
duty.  Perhaps  a  few  weeks'  rest  may  restore  him. 
I  am  satisfied  that  in  his  present  condition  it  would 
be  dangerous  to  give  him  a  command  here." 

General  Sherman  being  greatly  annoyed  and 
Mrs.  Sherman  distressed  at  the  newspaper  discus 
sion  of  his  alleged  insanity,  he  asked  for  a  twenty 
days'  leave  of  absence,  and  made  a  visit  to  Lan 
caster.  He  wrote  from  Lancaster  to  General  Hal 
leck  on  December  i2th: 

"  I  believe  you  will  be  frank  enough  to  answer 
me  if  you  deem  the  steps  I  took  at  Sedalia  as  evi 
dence  of  a  want  of  mind.  Thev  may  have  been 


34 


GENERAL   SHERMAN. 


the  result  of  an  excess  of  caution  on  my  part,  but 
I  do  think  the  troops  were  too  much  strung  out, 
and  should  be  concentrated,  with  more  men  left 
along  to  guard  the  track.  The  animals,  cattle 
especially,  will  be  much  exposed  this^  winter.  I 
set  a  much  higher  danger  on  the  acts  of  unfriendly 
inhabitants  than  most  officers  do,  because  I  have 
lived  in  Missouri  and  the  South,  and  know  that  in 
their  individual  characters  they  will  do  more  acts 
of  hostility  than  Northern  farmers  or  people  could 
bring  themselves  to  perpetrate.  In  my  judgment, 
Price's  army  in  the  aggregate  is  less  to  be  feared 
than  when  in  scattered  bands. 

"  I  write  to  you  because  a  Cincinnati  paper, 
whose  reporter  I  imprisoned  in  Louisville  for  visit 
ing  our  camps  after  I  had  forbidden  him  leave  to 
go,  has  announced  that  I  am  insane,  and  alleges 
as  a  reason  that  my  acts  at  Sedalia  were  so  mad 
that  subordinate  officers  refused  to  obey.  I  know 
of  no  order  that  I  gave  that  was  not  obeyed,  except 
General  Pope's  to  advance  his  division  to  Sedalia, 
which  order  was  countermanded  by  you,  and  the 
fact  communicated  to  me.  These  newspapers  have 
us  in  their  power,  and  can  destroy  us  as  they  please, 
and  this  one  can  destroy  my  usefulness  by  depriv 
ing  me  of  the  confidence  of  officers  and  men.  I 
will  be  in  St.  Louis  next  week,  and  will  be  guided 
by  your  commands  and  judgment." 

General  Halleck  wrote  on  the  I7th  of  December 
to  P.  B.  Ewing,  who  had  written  to  him  inclosing 
some  newspaper  clippings:  "  I  hope  General  Sher 
man  will  not  let  these  squibs  trouble  him  in  the 
least.  They  can  do  him  no  serious  injury.  When 
the  general  came  here  his  health  was  much  broken 
by  long  and  severe  labor,  and  his  nervous  system 
somewhat  shaken  by  continuous  excitement  and 
responsibility.  Those  who  saw  him  here  may  have 
drawn  wrong  inferences  from  his  broken-down  ap 
pearance  and  rather  imprudent  remarks,  but  no 


THE    BEGINNING   OF   THE    WAR.  35 

one  who  was  personally  acquainted  with  him 
thought  anything  was  the  matter  with  him  except 
a  want  of  rest.  I  have  no  doubt  but  that  the  quiet 
of  home  will  in  a  short  time  enable  him  to  resume 
his  duties  and  silence  all  these  scandalous  and 
slanderous  attacks." 

On  the  1 8th  Halleck  wrote  in  answer  to  Sher 
man's  letter  of  the  I2th:  "Your  movement  of 
troops  was  not  countermanded  by  me  because  I 
thought  it  an  unwise  one  in  itself,  but  because  I 
was  not  then  ready  for  it.  I  had  better  informa 
tion  of  Price's  movements  than  you  had,  and  I 
had  no  apprehension  of  an  attack.  I  intended  to 
concentrate  the  forces  on  that  line,  but  I  wished 
the  movement  delayed  until  I  could  determine  on 
aibetter  position.  After  receiving  Lieutenant-Colo 
nel  McPherson's  report,  I  made  precisely  the  loca 
tion  you  had  ordered.  I  was  desirous  at  the  time 
not  to  prevent  the  advance  of  Price  by  any  move 
ment  on  our  part,  hoping  that  he  would  move  on 
Lexington;  but  finding  that  he  had  determined  to 
remain  at  Osceola  for  some  time  at  least,  I  made 
the  movement  you  proposed." 

On  returning  to  St.  Louis,  Sherman  was  as 
signed  to  command  the  camp  of  instruction  and 
post  at  Benton  Barracks,  and  was,  on  the  I3th  of 
February,  directed  to  proceed  at  once  to  Paducah, 
Ky.,  and  on  the  I4th  was  assigned  to  command 
the  district  of  Cairo. 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE    BATTLE    OF    SHILOH. 

GENERAL  HALLECK  now  began  his  advance 
down  the  Mississippi  and  up  the  Tennessee  and 
Cumberland  Rivers.  General  Curtis,  with  about 
ten  thousand  men  in  southwest  Missouri,  was  ad 
vanced  into  Arkansas,  where,  in  battle  at  Pea 
Ridge,  on  the  7th  and  8th  of  March,  he  routed  and 
dispersed  the  greatly  superior  forces  of  Price  and 
McCullough,  united  under  the  command  of  Van 
Dorn.  General  Grant,  after  much  importunity, 
finally  succeeded  in  obtaining,  on  the  3Oth  of  Janu 
ary,  permission  and  order  from  General  Halleck 
to  proceed  up  the  Tennessee  and  attack  Fort 
Henry.  The  next  day  he  moved  on  transports, 
accompanied  by  Commodore  Foote  with  his  fleet, 
and  on  the  6th  of  February  the  fort,  after  a  short 
but  destructive  bombardment,  surrendered  to  the 
fleet.  On  the  nth  Commodore  Foote  sailed  down 
the  river  to  return  up  the  Cumberland,  and  Grant 
moved  by  land  next  day  to  Fort  Donelson.  The 
fort  surrendered  on  the  morning  of  the  i6th.  On 
the  1 8th  General  Halleck  pointed  out  to  General 
Pope  the  situation  of  Madrid  Bend,  and  directed 
him  to  organize  an  expedition  to  reduce  this  ap 
parently  impregnable  bar  to  passage  down  the 
Mississippi. 

Upon  the  surrender  of  Fort  Donelson  the  Con 
federate  Government  ordered  the  evacuation  of 
Columbus,  on  the  Mississippi,  and  General  A.  S. 
Johnston  withdrew  from  Bowling  Green  and  re- 
36 


Lines  of  battle  are  indicated  by  •   •  i   -i 

CamUS  ,A««.»ftAAA 

McClernand's     division  by  the  figure  1 


\V.H.  L.Wallace's 

Lewis  Wallace's 

Hurlbut's 

Sherman's 

Prentiss' 

McCook's 

Nelion'g 

Crittenden'g 

Position  of  battle  li 


Night 
Mondav,  8  A.  M. 


Battlefield  of  Shiloh. 


THE    BATTLE   OF   SHILOH.  37 

treated  through  Nashville  to  Murfreesboro.  Gen 
eral  Buell  occupied  Nashville.  General  Halleck 
immediately  began  preparation  for  further  advance 
up  the  Tennessee.  On  the  ist  of  March  he  dis 
patched  to  Sherman  at  Paducah,  to  be  forwarded 
to  Grant :  "  Transports  will  be  sent  to  you  as  soon 
as  possible  to  move  your  column  up  the  Tennes 
see  River.  The  main  object  of  this  expedition  will 
be  to  destroy  the  railroad  bridge  over  Bear  Creek, 
near  Eastport,  Miss.,  and  also  the  railroad  connec 
tions  at  Corinth,  Jackson,  and  Humboldt.  It  is 
thought  best  that  these  objects  be  attempted  in  the 
order  named.  Strong  detachments  of  cavalry  and 
light  artillery,  supported  by  infantry,  may  by  rapid 
movements  reach  these  points  from  the  river  with 
out  serious  opposition.  Avoid  any  general  engage 
ments  with  strong  forces.  It  will  be  better  to  re 
treat  than  to  risk  a  serious  battle.  This  should 
be  strongly  impressed  on  the  officers  selected  for 
expeditions  from  the  river.  General  C.  F.  Smith, 
or  some  very  discreet  officer,  should  be  selected  for 
such  commands." . 

On  the  4th  of  March  Halleck  telegraphed  to 
General  Grant :  l!<  You  will  place  Major-General 
Smith  in  command  of  expedition,  and  remain  your 
self  at  Fort  Henry.  Why  do  you  not  obey  my  or 
ders  to  report  strength  and  position  of  your  com 
mand?  "  On  the  1 5th  of  March  he  reported  to  the 
adjutant  general  of  the  army :  "  In  accordance  with 
your  instructions  of  the  loth  instant,  I  report  Gen 
eral  Grant  and  several  officers  of  high  rank  in  his 
command,  immediately  after  the  battle  of  Fort 
Donelson,  went  to  Nashville  without  any  authority 
or  knowledge.  I  am  satisfied,  however,  from  in 
vestigation  that  General  Grant  did  this  from  good 
intentions,  and  from  a  desire  to  subserve  the  pub 
lic  interests.  • 

"  Not  being  advised  of  General  Buell's  move 
ments,  and  learning  that  General  Buell  had  ordered 


38  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

Smith's  division  of  his  (Grant's)  command  to  Nash 
ville,  he  deemed  it  his  duty  to  go  there  in  person. 
During  the  absence  of  General  Grant  and  a  part 
of  his  general  officers  numerous  irregularities  are 
said  to  have  occurred  at  Fort  Donelson.  These 
were  in  violation  of  the  orders  issued  by  General 
Grant  before  his  departure,  and  probably,  under  the 
circumstances,  were  unavoidable. 

"  General  Grant  has  made  the  proper  explana 
tions,  and  has  been  directed  to  resume  his  com 
mand  in  the  field.  As  he  acted  from  a  praiseworthy 
though  mistaken  zeal  for  the  public  service  in 
going  to  Nashville  and  leaving  his  command,  I  re 
spectfully  recommend  that  no  further  notice  be 
taken  of  it.  There  never  has  been  any  want  of  mili 
tary  subordination  on  the  part  of  General  Grant, 
and  his  failure  to  make  returns  of  his  forces  has 
been  explained  as  resulting  partly  from  the  failure 
of  colonels  to  report  to  him  on  their  arrival  and 
partly  from  an  interruption  of  telegraphic  com 
munication.  All  these  irregularities  have  now  been 
remedied."  In  all  subsequent  orders  referring  to 
movements  the  injunction  to  avoid  getting  into  a 
serious  engagement  was  repeated. 

General  Grant  remained  at  Fort  Henry  in  quasi 
arrest  while  the  troops  of  his  district  were  assem 
bling,  under  the  command  of  General  Smith,  for 
the  expedition  up  the  Tennessee,  and  forwarded 
re-enforcements  after  the  expedition  had  sailed. 
General  Sherman,  on  arriving  at  Paducah,  was  busy 
forwarding  troops,  supplies,  and  dispatches,  and 
in  organizing  a  division  for  his  own  command. 
He  left  Paducah  March  loth,  and  Smith,  with  five 
divisions — McClernand's,  Hurlbut's,  Lewis  Wal 
lace's,  Sherman's,  and  his  own,  commanded  by  W. 
H.  L.  Wallace — arrived  at  Savannah  on  the  I3th. 

By  order  of  General  Smith,  General  Sherman 
sailed  with  his  division  up  the  river  to  Yellow 
Creek  on  the  I4th  to  send  out  a  force  to  break  the 


THE    BATTLE   OF   SHILOH.  39 

railroad,  if  that  could  be  done  without  bringing 
on  a  serious  engagement.  Before  starting  he  sug 
gested  to  General  Smith  that  another  division  be 
sent  to  Pittsburg  Landing  to  await  there  his  re 
turn.  A  heavy  rain,  flooding  the  country,  had 
swollen  the  streams  and  submerged  the  roads,  so 
that  the  attempt  was  ineffectual,  and  he  dropped 
down  the  river  to  Pittsburg  Landing  on  the  I5th, 
where  he  found  Hurlbut's  division  still  on  their 
boats.  Sherman  landed  his  division  on  the  i6th 
to  make  a  reconnoissance  in  force,  and  reported  to 
General  Smith,  on  the  i/th,  that  Hurlbut's  division 
would  be  landed  that  day.  General  Grant  reported 
to  General  Halleck  on  the  i8th:  "I  arrived  here 
last  evening,  and  found  that  General  Sherman  and 
Hurlbut's  divisions  were  at  Pittsburg,  partially  de 
barked  ;  General  Wallace,  at  Crump's  Landing,  six 
miles  below,  same  side  of  the  river;  General  Mc- 
Clernand's  division  at  this  place  encamped ;  and 
General  Smith's,  with  unattached  regiments  on 
board  transports,  also  here.  I  immediately  ordered 
all  troops,  except  McClernand's  command,  to  Pitts 
burg,  and  to  debark  there  at  once  and  discharge 
the  steamers,  to  report  at  Paducah  for  further  or 
ders.  ...  I  shall  go  to-morrow  to  Crump's  Land 
ing  and  Pittsburg,  and  if  I  think  any  change  of  po 
sition  for  any  of  the  troops  needed  I  will  make  the 
change.  Having  full  faith,  however,  in  the  judg 
ment  of  General  Smith,  who  located  the  present 
points  of  debarkation,  I  do  not  expect  any  change 
will  be  made." 

On  the  26th  of  March  General  B.  M.  Prentiss  re 
ported  for  duty,  and  was  assigned  to  command  the 
unattached  troops  at  Pittsburg  Landing  and  others 
as  they  should  arrive,  and  to  organize  them  into 
a  division,  to  be  called  the  Sixth.  Hickenlooper's 
battery,  that  arrived  on  the  5th  of  April,  and  regi 
ments  that  arrived  on  the  5th  and  6th,  reported  to 
Prentiss,  and  fought  in  his  command  on  the  6th. 

4 


40  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

On  the  26th  of  March  Pittsburg  Landing  was  made 
a  military  post,  and  General  C.  F.  Smith,  senior 
officer,  was  assigned  to  the  command.  On  the 
3ist  Grant  changed  district  headquarters  by  order 
from  Savannah  to  Pittsburg  Landing,  leaving  an 
office  at  Savannah,  but  did  not  move  his  personal 
quarters  to  the  landing  till  after  April  6th. 

On  the  nth  of  March  General  McClellan,  hav 
ing  taken  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
in  the  field,  was  relieved  from  command  of  all  mili 
tary  departments  except  the  Potomac,  and  the  two 
departments  under  the  command  of  Generals  Hal- 
leek  and  Hunter,  together  with  so  much  of  that 
of  General  Buell  as  lay  west  of  the  meridian  of 
Knoxville,  were  consolidated  as  the  Department  of 
the  Mississippi,  under  the  command  of  General 
Halleck.  For  some  time  Halleck  had  been  urging 
Buell  to  join  him  at  Savannah;  now,  on  the  i6th 
of  March,  he  ordered  Buell  to  move  his  forces  as 
rapidly  as  possible  to  Savannah. 

The  road  from  Memphis  to  Chattanooga  gave 
through  railroad  communication  between  the  Mis 
sissippi  and  the  East.  A  parallel  line  from  Vicks- 
burg  through  Jackson,  Miss.,  was  not  continuous, 
there  being  a  gap  from  Selma  to  Montgomery, 
in  Alabama.  The  Memphis  road  was  intersected 
at  Corinth  by  the  road  from  Mobile  to  Columbus, 
Ky.,  and  at  Grand  Junction  by  the  New  Orleans, 
Jackson  and  Northern.  General  Johnston  deter 
mined  to  gather  his  forces  at  Corinth  to  save  that 
important  line  of  communication,  and  strive  to 
achieve  a  victory  there  by  which  he  could  regain 
the  territory  lost  in  Tennessee  and  Kentucky.  Sum 
moning  thither  Bragg  from  Florida,  Polk  and 
Beauregard  from  Mississippi  and  West  Tennessee, 
and  new  levies  supplied  by  the  governors  of  the 
Southern  States,  and  moving  thither  the  force  gath 
ered  at  Murfreesboro,  he  assembled  at  Corinth  by 
the  beginning  of  April  something  over  fifty  thou- 


THE    BATTLE   OF   SHILOH.  4I 

sand  effectives.  This  number  probably  included 
officers  as  well  as  armed  men,  though  later  in  the 
war  the  Confederate  reports  of  effectives  included 
only  armed  enlisted  men.  Among  the  officers,  be 
sides  Beauregard,  Bragg,  and  Polk,  were  Hardee, 
Cheatham,  and  Cleburne. 

General  Grant  had  six  divisions :  Lewis  Wal 
lace  at  Crump's  Landing  was  encamped,  one  bri 
gade  at  the  landing,  one  at  Stony  Lonesome,  two 
miles  out  from  the  landing,  and  the  third  at  Adams- 
ville,  three  miles  beyond  Stony  Lonesome.  The 
other  divisions  were  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  five 
miles  farther  up  the  river.  The  camping  ground 
was  bounded  on  the  east  by  the  Tennessee,  on  the 
north  by  Snake  Creek,  and  on  the  northwest  and 
west  by  Owl  Creek,  an  affluent  of  Snake  Creek. 
All  these  were  bordered  by  precipitous  bluff  banks. 
The  western  portion  of  the  south  front  was  pro 
tected  by  a  small  affluent  of  Owl  Creek,  called  by 
different  names — Oak,  Rea,  and  Shiloh  Creek — 
and  in  some  of  the  reports  called  Owl  Creek.  The 
eastern  portion  of  the  south  front  was  covered  by 
Locust  Creek,  which  empties  into  Lick  Creek  near 
the  river.  A  line  of  well-constructed  earthworks 
along  this  front  would  have  been  impregnable 
against  assault  at  that  stage  of  the  war.  General 
Halleck,  while  he  does  not  appear  to  have  ordered 
the  erection  of  defensive  works,  sent  forward  in 
trenching  tools,  and  supposed  that  the  position 
was  fortified.  McPherson,  the  only  engineer  offi 
cer,  by  direction  laid  out  a  line  for  intrenchment. 
This  was  back  from  the  creeks,  inconvenient  for 
water  supply,  and  would  require  the  front  line  of 
camps — Sherman  and  Prentiss — to  move  their 
camps.  As  the  place  was  to  be  held  only  until 
General  Halleck  should  come  to  the  front  and 
begin  the  forward  movement,  such  work  seemed  to 
be  a  waste  of  labor.  And  it  was  felt  that  a  large 
portion  of  troops,  new  regiments  of  men  fresh  from 


42  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

their  farms  and  workshops,  who  had  come  to  the 
field  to  do  deeds  of  war,  would  be  disconcerted' and 
discouraged  if  they  were  set  to  work  digging,  and 
were  directed  to  fence  themselves  in  from  attack 
by  the  foe,  whom  they  expected  to  march  against 
and  overcome.  It  was  only  after  they  found  the 
value  of  earthworks  by  actual  experience  that  the 
volunteers  willingly  performed  the  labor  of  erect 
ing  them.  So,  instead  of  fortifying  the  ground, 
the  time  was  spent  in  giving  the  men  instruction 
and  practice  in  drill. 

The  divisions  of  Sherman  and  Prentiss  occu 
pied  the  front.  One  of  Sherman's  brigades,  Stu 
art's,  formed  the  extreme  left  of  the  line,  being 
close  to  the  river  and  facing  Locust  Creek.  His 
other  three  brigades  formed  the  right  of  the  line — 
McDowell,  on  a  ridge  overlooking  the  bridge  by 
which  the  road  to  Purdy  crossed  Owl  Creek ; 
Buckland,  to  the  front  and  left  of  McDowell,  and 
separated  from  him  by  a  ravine,  and  a  little  back 
from  the  valley  of  Oak  Creek,  which  stream  there 
wound  through  a  morass  tangled  with  thickets  and 
decayed  fallen  timber.  Two  of  Hildebrand's  regi 
ments  extended  Buckland's  line  up  along  the  bank 
of  Oak  Creek,  while  his  third  regiment,  Appier's, 
was  apart,  some  hundred  yards  to  the  left,  by  a 
spring  which  was  the  source  of  one  branch  of  Oak 
Creek.  The  right  of  Prentiss  was  a  full  half  mile 
to  the  front  of  Sherman's  left,  and  hidden  from 
view;  his  left  was  a  greater  distance  to  the  front 
and  right  of  Stuart's  right,  but  in  sight  from  it. 
McClernand  was  to  the  rear  and  left  of  Sherman ; 
Hurlbut,  a  mile  out  from  the  landing,  across  the 
Corinth  road  ;  and  W.  H.  L.  Wallace  on  the  plateau 
at  the  angle  between  the  river  and  Snake  Creek. 

Neither  General  Grant  nor  his  subordinates 
had  any  apprehension  of  being  attacked  in  this 
position  by  Johnston's  army.  It  was  proposed  to 
put  General  Buell  into  camp  at  Hamburg,  several 


THE    BATTLE    OF   SHILOH. 


43 


miles  up  the  river,  on  his  arrival.  Reconnoitering 
parties,  always  cramped  by  instructions  not  to 
bring  on  an  engagement,  reported  the  presence  of 
parties  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  on  the  roads.  Gen 
eral  Buckland,  on  Thursday,  April  3d,  by  direction 
of  General  Sherman,  marched  his  brigade  out  three 
miles,  and  thence  sent  out  small  parties.  Nothing 
was  found  but  small  detachments  of  hostile  cav 
alry.  Taylor's  cavalry  had  gone  out  at  midnight 
by  Sherman's  order,  and,  halting  till  daybreak  when 
four  miles  out  toward  Corinth,  advanced  until  they 
struck  the  enemy's  cavalry  pickets  and  captured 
one  of  them.  General  Chalmers,  by  a  dispatch 
dated  "  Headquarters  Advance,"  reported  this  at 
tack  upon  the  pickets  of  his  cavalry.  Friday,  the 
4th,  Clauton's  Confederate  cavalry  swooped  down 
on  Buckland's  picket  line  and  captured  and  car 
ried  off  a  lieutenant  and  six  men.  Two  companies 
of  infantry  were  sent  out  in  pursuit.  Later  Colonel 
Buckland  followed  with  three  more  companies,  and 
charged  upon  a  large  party  of  cavalry  which  had 
surrounded  one  of  the  missing  companies  and  drove 
it.  A  battalion  of  cavalry  sent  by  General  Sher 
man  then  came  up  and  drove  the  enemy  till  they 
came  in  full  view  and  under  the  fire  of  a  line  of 
infantry  and  artillery.  Colonel  Buckland  reported, 
"  We  ascertained  the  enemy  was  in  force."  Major 
Ricker,  of  the  Fifth  Ohio  Cavalry,  reported  "  three 
or  four  pieces  of  artillery,  at  least  two  regiments 
of  infantry,  and  a  large  cavalry  force."  General 
Sherman  reported  that  he  inferred  the  force  was  a 
brigade  of  two  regiments  of  infantry,  one  regi 
ment  of  cavalry,  and  one  battery  of  artillery,  sent 
to  a  point  on  the  ridge  road,  about  five  miles  in  ad 
vance  of  his  camp,  forwarded  from  a  consider 
able  force  at  Pea  Ridge  or  Monterey.  General 
Grant  reported  to  General  Halleck  that  there  were 
"  three  pieces  of  artillery  and  cavalry  and  infantry. 
How  much  can  not,  of  course,  be  estimated.  I 


44  GENERAL    SHERMAN. 

have  scarcely  the  faintest  idea  of  an  attack  (gen 
eral  one)  being  made  upon  us,  but  will  be  prepared 
should  such  a  thing  take  place."  General  Hardee 
reported :  "  Camp  near  Mickey's,  April  4,  1862. 
The  cavalry  and  infantry  of  the  enemy  attacked 
Colonel  Clanton's  regiment,  which  was  posted,  as 
I  before  informed  you,  about  five  hundred  or  six 
hundred  yards  in  advance  of  my  lines.  Colonel 
Clanton  retired,  and  the  enemy's  cavalry  followed 
until  they  came  near  our  infantry  and  artillery, 
when  they  were  gallantly  repulsed  with  slight  loss." 
In  his  subsequent  full  report  he  states  that  Mickey's 
was  sixteen  miles  from  Corinth  and  eight  from 
Pittsburg  Landing;  that  he  arrived  there  in  the 
morning  of  the  4th ;  that  it  was  General  Cleburne's 
command  that  was  attacked ;  and  that  they  biv 
ouacked  there  for  the  night.  Saturday,  General 
Grant  changed  the  assignment  of  the  cavalry,  and 
the  regiments  moved  to  their  new  positions. 
Otherwise  the  National  camp  was  quiet.  The  pick 
ets  of  the  Seventy-seventh  Ohio  noticed  rabbits  and 
squirrels  in  great  numbers  coming  from  the  woods 
in  front  and  passing  through  their  line.  Buckland's 
pickets  observed  cavalry  to  the  front,  and  Sherman 
being  advised,  and  having  no  cavalry  to  send  out, 
ordered  the  pickets  to  be  strengthened  and  to  be 
vigilant.  Prentiss  sent  out  a  party  in  the  after 
noon  which  advanced  three  miles  obliquely  in  ad 
vance  of  his  front,  and  returned  without  having 
seen  anything. 

General  Johnston  selected  forty  thousand  of  his 
effectives  for  attack  upon  Grant.  This  force  was 
organized  into  three  corps,  commanded  respective 
ly  by  Generals  Hardee,  Bragg,  and  Polk,  and  a  re 
serve  under  General  Breckenridge.  General  Beau- 
regard  had  no  corps,  but  was  second  in  general 
command.  Hardee's  corps  comprised  Hindman's 
division  and  a  separate  brigade,  commanded  by  Cle- 
burne.  Bragg's  corps  was  composed  of  two  di- 


THE   BATTLE   OF   SHILOH. 


45 


visions — Ruggles  and  Withers.  Folk's  corps  also 
was  constituted  of  two  divisions — Clark's  and 
Cheatham's.  The  reserve  embraced  three  brigades, 
commanded  respectively  by  General  Bowen  and 
Colonels  Trabue  and  Statham.  General  Johnston, 
receiving  information  in  the  night  of  Wednesday, 
April  2d,  that  Buell  was  advancing  rapidly  toward 
the  Tennessee,  moved  out  from  his  camp  at  Cor 
inth  Thursday  afternoon.  General  Hardee,  having 
the  advance,  reached  Mickey's,  eight  miles  from 
Pittsburg  Landing,  Friday  morning,  was  encoun 
tered  there  by  General  Buckland's  detachment, 
bivouacked  there  that  afternoon,  and  moved  into 
position  and  deployed  about  10  A.  M.  Saturday. 
The  remaining  troops  struggled  along  through  in 
adequate  roads  made  miry  by  rain,  impeded  by 
mud  and  by  misunderstandings,  and  finally  reached 
their  respective  positions  about  4  p.  M.  The  at 
tack  intended  to  be  made  at  eight  o'clock  Saturday 
morning  was  postponed  to  daybreak  Sunday.  As 
the  long  columns  were  all  day  sweeping  through 
the  forest,  stretching  into  long  parallel  lines,  the 
squirrels  and  rabbits,  startled  from  their  homes, 
scudding  past  the  National  pickets,  were  the  only 
messengers  who  brought  news  of  the  movement 
to  the  national  camp. 

At  3  A.  M.  Sunday,  the  6th,  three  companies  of 
the  Twenty-fifth  Missouri,  of  Peabody's  brigade  of 
Prentiss's  division,  moved  out  to  the  front,  and 
about  half  past  five  o'clock  encountered  the  ene 
my's  cavalry  and  forced  them  back  to  a  line  of 
infantry  concealed  behind  a  fence.  A  sharp  en 
gagement  ensued,  and  then  the  party  withdrew. 
Major  Hardcastle,  of  the  Third  Mississippi,  re 
ports  that  on  the  night  of  the  5th,  being  sent  out 
to  picket  the  front  of  Wood's  brigade,  he  deployed 
his  battalion  a  quarter  of  a  mile  to  the  front  of  the 
brigade,  and  posted  small  parties  one  hundred  and 
two  hundred  yards  farther  to  the  front,  cavalry 


46  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

videttes  being  advanced  still  farther  to  the  front; 
that  about  dawn  the  videttes  fired  on  an  advancing 
force  and  retired.  The  infantry  posts  successively 
did  the  same,  and  a  sharp  engagement  followed, 
which  lasted  an  hour,  in  which  he  lost  four  killed 
and  twenty  wounded  before  the  attacking  party 
withdrew,  and,  seeing  his  brigade  form  in  line  at 
half  past  six  o'clock,  he  fell  back  and  took  his  place 
in  line.  The  three  companies  of  the  Twenty-fifth 
Missouri,  returning  to  camp,  met  Colonel  Moore 
with  five  companies  of  the  Twenty-first  Missouri 
half  a  mile  out  from  the  brigade  camp,  who  dis 
patched  the  wounded  to  camp,  retained  the  others, 
and  sent  for  the  remainder  of  his  regiment.  When 
his  other  five  companies  arrived,  he  marched  by 
the  flank  about  three  hundred  yards  to  the  north 
west  corner  of  a  cotton  field,  which  was  the  See 
farm,  and  there  came  under  fire. 

General  Johnston,  instead  of  placing  his  corps 
one  in  the  center  and  the  others  in  wings  or  re 
serve,  formed  each  corps  in  line  of  regiments 
doubled  on  the  center  at  intervals  that  permitted 
them  to  deploy  into  line  before  going  into  action. 
Hardee's  corps,  so  deployed,  with  the  addition  of 
Gladden's  brigade  extending  his  right,  made  a 
front  of  two  miles.  Bragg's  corps  formed  in  like 
manner  one  thousand  yards  in  the  rear  of  Hardee, 
Polk  in  the  rear  of  Bragg's  left,  and  Breckenridge  in 
rear  of  Bragg's  right. 

It  is  impossible  to  reconcile  the  discrepant 
statements  as  to  distance  and  time.  But  it  is  rea 
sonably  certain  that  the  distance  between  Hardee's 
line  and  Prentiss's  camp  was  three  miles  or  more, 
and  that  Johnston's  army  was  not  in  motion  before 
six  o'clock.  As  the  long  lines  pressed  forward 
through  forest,  over  ground  broken  by  ridges  and 
ravines,  the  rate  of  advance  was  determined  by  the 
rate  of  the  slowest  portion,  and  at  times  the  second 
line  would  overtake  the  first.  Batteries  had  to 


THE    BATTLE   OF    SIIILOH. 


47 


swerve  from  their  direct  course  to  find  practicable 
passage.  It  was  impossible  for  brigades  to  main 
tain  the  prescribed  intervals  or  preserve  the  gen 
eral  alignment.  About  seven  o'clock  Shaver's 
brigade  struck  the  Twenty-fifth  Missouri  in  See's 
cotton  field,  and  recoiled  from  a  heavy  fire  deliv 
ered  from  a  rising  ground  in  the  field.  Colonel 
Moore,  re-enforced  by  the  remainder  of  the  Twen 
ty-first,  fell  back  behind  a  ridge,  which  shielded 
his  men,  and  stubbornly  held  his  ground.  As 
Johnston's  army  advanced,  his  line  of  skirmishers 
met  the  National  pickets,  who  fell  back  fighting. 
The  line  of  sputtering  fire  along  the  front,  by  its 
continuance  and  increasing  nearness,  was  heard  in 
the  National  camp,  and  aroused  surmise  and  specu 
lation  in  some,  excited  uneasiness  in  others.  When 
the  infantry  engagement  (for  Shaver's  battery  had 
been  detached  from  him)  resounded,  the  whole 
camp  was  startled.  Prentiss  marched  his  division 
out  a  quarter  of  a  mile  from  his  camp.  Colonel 
Moore,  falling  back  to  his  left  and  rear,  connected 
with  Prentiss  and  formed  the  right  of  the  line. 
Gladden's  brigade  attacked.  General  Gladden  was 
killed,  and  his  command  fell  back  in  confusion, 
carrying  with  it  the  two  right  regiments  of  Shaver's 
brigade.  Chalmers's  brigade  came  up  with  Jackson 
in  reserve,  and  the  attack  was  renewed  with  such 
vigor  that  Prentiss's  entire  division  gave  way,  but 
rallied  just  in  front  of  their  camp.  After  another 
fierce  contest  the  division  gave  way,  fell  back 
through  the  camp,  and  retreated  in  disorder  to 
rally  on  the  summit  of  rising  ground  half  a  mile  in 
rear  of  their  camp. 

Meanwhile  the  battle  had  joined  along  the  front 
of  two  miles.  General  Bragg  says  in  his  report 
that,  after  encountering  the  National  pickets  and 
brushing  them  away,  "  in  about  one  mile  more  we 
encountered  him  in  strong  force  along  almost  the 
entire  line.  His  batteries  were  posted  on  emi- 


48  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

nences,  with  strong  infantry  supports.  Finding 
the  first  line  now  unequal  to  the  work  before  it, 
being  weakened  by  extension  and  necessarily 
broken  by  the  nature  of  the  ground,  I  ordered  my 
whole  force  to  move  up  steadily  and  promptly  to 
its  support.  From  this  time — about  7.30  o'clock — 
until  night  the  battle  raged  with  little  intermis 
sion."  Colonel  Thompson,  aid-de-camp  to  General 
Beauregard,  in  his  report  to  the  general  says :  "  At 
6.30  o'clock  I  brought  an  order  from  you  to  Gen 
eral  Breckenridge,  who  commanded  the  reserve, 
that  he  must  hurry  up  his  troops,  as  General  Polk 
was  moving  forward,  which  was  promptly  delivered 
and  promptly  obeyed.  About  7.30  o'clock  I  rode 
forward  with  Colonel  Jordan  to  the  front  to  ascer 
tain  how  the  battle  was  going.  There  I  learned 
from  General  Johnston  that  General  Hardee's  line 
was  within  half  a  mile  of  the  enemy's  camps.  About 
ten  o'clock  you  moved  forward  with  your  staff  and 
halted  within  about  half  a  mile  of  their  camps,  at 
which  time  our  troops  were  reported  to  be  in  full 
possession  of  the  enemy's  camps." 

A  squadron  of  Georgia  cavalry  felt  along  the 
National  picket  line  Saturday.  General  Buckland 
strengthened  his  pickets  Saturday  night,  and  Gen 
eral  Sherman  ordered  the  Seventy-seventh  Ohio 
of  Hildebrand's  brigade  to  go  out  early  Sunday 
morning  to  See's  farm.  General  Buckland  was 
wakeful  through  the  night,  and,  receiving  word 
while  at  breakfast  Sunday  morning  that  his  pickets 
were  attacked  in  force,  had  the  long  roll  sounded, 
formed  his  brigade  in  line,  and  reported  to  General 
Sherman.  The  division  was  soon  formed.  The 
Fifty-third  Ohio  was  on  the  left.  Four  guns  of 
Waterhouse's  battery  on  its  right,  the  other  two 
guns  advanced  a  hundred  yards  to  the  front,  be 
yond  Oak  Creek ;  Hildebrand  to  its  right ;  Tay 
lor's  battery,  commanded  by  Lieutenant  Barrett 
(Captain  Taylor  serving  as  chief  of  artillery  of  the 


THE    BATTLE    OF    SHILOH. 


49 


division),  on  rising  ground,  commanding  the  front 
of  both  Hildebrand  and  Buckland,  Buckland  form 
ing  the  right  of  the  line,  McDowell  being  to  the 
right  and  rear  of  Buckland  on  a  separate  ridge, 
overlooking  Owl  Creek,  where  it  was  crossed  by 
a  bridge,  and  having  Behr's  battery  with  him. 

General  Cleburne's  brigade,  forming  the  left  of 
Hardee's  corps,  impeded  by  crossing  ravines  and 
ridges  through  woods,  and  by  the  obstinate  re 
sistance  of  the  National  pickets,  reached  the  farther 
side  of  Oak  Creek  about  eight  o'clock.  General 
Patton  Anderson's  brigade  was  in  reserve  and  two 
hundred  and  seventy  yards  in  rear  of  the  other  two 
brigades  of  Ruggles's  division,  which  were  one 
thousand  yards  in  rear  of  Hardee.  General  Ander 
son  speaks  of  the  difficulty  of  the  ground  and  the 
persistence  of  the  National  skirmish  line,  but  in  the 
inequalities  of  the  advance  he  pushed  into  the  front 
line  of  Ruggles's  division,  and  then  into  Hardee's 
line,  on  Cleburne's  right,  and  in  front  of  Hilde- 
brand's  brigade. 

The  muskets  of  the  Forty-third  Illinois  of  Mc- 
Clernand's  division  being  still,  Sunday  morning, 
loaded  since  Friday  evening,  permission  was  ob 
tained  to  proceed  to  the  front  and  fire  them  off. 
Distant  report  of  firearms  was  heard,  and  was  re 
ported  to  General  McClernand.  He  sent  word  to 
Colonel  Reardon,  commanding  the  Third  Brigade, 
to  form  his  command.  Colonel  Reardon,  being  ill 
in  bed,  sent  word  to  Colonel  Raith,  of  the  Forty- 
third  Illinois,  to  assume  command.  The  colonel 
of  the  Forty-ninth  refused  to  believe  that  the  dis 
tant  firing  was  from  the  enemy,  and  delayed  call 
ing  out  his  regiment.  The  brigade  was  finally 
formed  and,  moving  forward,  took  position  on  the 
left  of  Sherman's  division,  sending  a  skirmish  line 
out  to  the  front.  Colonel  Marsh,  of  the  Twentieth 
Illinois,  commanding  the  Second  Brigade,  heard 
firing  off  to  the  front.  This  continuing  some  time, 


50  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

being,  in  fact,  the  musketry  engagement  between 
General  Shaver  and  the  Missouri  regiments,  or 
dered  his  regimental  commanders  to  be  in  readi 
ness  to  form.  And  soon,  in  pursuance  of  order 
received,  he  advanced  and  formed  on  the  left  of 
the  Third  Brigade.  About  eight  o'clock  the  First 
Brigade  was  ordered  to  form  on  the  left  of  the 
Second  with  three  regiments,  and  detach  the  fourth 
regiment  to  the  right  of  the  Second  Brigade. 

Wood's  brigade  of  Hardee's  corps,  containing 
six  regiments  and  two  battalions,  pressed  forward 
against  McClernand.  Gibson's  brigade  of  Bragg's 
corps,  filling  the  interval  between  Wood  and  Patton 
Anderson,  confronted  the  Fifty-third  Ohio  and  the 
right  of  McClernand.  A  part  of  Russell's  brigade 
of  Folk's  corps  acted  on  the  right  of  Wood  against 
McClernand's  left,  and  was  soon  supported  by 
Bushrod  Johnson's  brigade  of  the  same  corps. 

General  Hurlbut,  receiving  word  about  half  past 
seven  o'clock  from  General  Sherman  that  he  was 
attacked,  directed  General  Veatch  to  form  his  bri 
gade  and  march  to  General  Sherman's  line.  Veatch 
had  just  gone  when  word  came  from  General  Pren- 
tiss  asking  for  aid.  Forming  his  two  remaining 
brigades,  Williams's  and  Lauman's,  he  advanced, 
and  met  Prentiss's  command  falling  back  in  dis 
order.  Continuing  his  advance  to  the  south  of  the 
peach  orchard,  he  met  the  enemy  and  came  under 
fire  a  little  after  nine  o'clock.  General  Prentiss  ral 
lied  and  reformed  his  command  and  formed  in  line, 
his  left  joining  Hurlbut's  right.  General  W.  H.  L. 
Wallace,  commanding  Smith's  division,  moved 
from  his  camp  at  nine  o'clock.  General  McAr- 
thur,  having  sent  one  re'giment — Thirteenth  Mis 
souri — to  General  Sherman  and  two  regiments  to 
guard  the  bridge  over  Snake  Creek,  where  the  road 
to  Crump's  Landing  crossed,  advanced  with  his 
two  remaining  regiments  to  General  Hurlbut's  left 
and  extended  Hurlbut's  line  toward  the  river. 


THE    BATTLE    OF   SHILOII.  5! 

Wallace  took  his  two  other  brigades  to  the  aid  of 
Prentiss,  resting  his  left  on  Prentiss's  right.  The 
right  of  Wallace's  line  rested  fixed  all  day  on  the 
edge  of  a  broad  and  deep  ravine,  filled  with  woods 
and  dense  thickets,  which  served  as  an  impassable 
barrier,  dividing  the  National  line  into  two  por 
tions.  Wallace's  right  rested  against  it  all  day, 
McClernand's  left  touched  and  skirted  it,  but  these 
two  divisions  were  at  no  time  in  touch  with  each 
other.  Colonel  Stuart,  at  his  isolated  camp  of  three 
regiments,  received  word  at  about  half  past  seven 
o'clock  from  General  Prentiss  that  the  enemy  was 
in  force  in  his  front.  Shortly  after  Stuart's  pickets 
sent  in  word  that  a  force  was  advancing  on  the 
Bark  road.  Before  long  a  battery  was  seen  going 
into  position  on  the  heights  beyond  Locust  Creek, 
eleven  hundred  yards  distant.  Stuart  formed  his 
brigade  in  front  of  his  camp,  facing  south,  a  quar 
ter  of  a  mile  to  the  front  and  left  of  Hurlbut's  left. 

In  consequence  of  the  formation  of  A.  S.  John 
ston's  three  corps  into  three  long  parallel  lines, 
and  also  owing  to  the  broken  and  wooded  ground 
over  which  they  advanced,  the  front  line,  by  the 
time  it  delivered  its  attack,  was  pierced  in  places 
by  portions  of  the  other  two  lines ;  the  brigades  of 
some  divisions  were  separated  from  each  other  by 
portions  of  other  commands  pushed  between,  and 
even  some  brigades  were  severed,  the  different  regi 
ments  being  sent  to  re-enforce  different  portions 
of  the  line.  In  the  course  of  the  battle  division  and 
brigade  commanders  received  orders  directly  from 
General  Johnston,  General  Beauregard,  and  all  the 
corps  commanders.  All  orders  were  obeyed  with 
alacrity  and  without  question,  except  some  in  front 
of  the  Hornet's  Nest,  in  the  eager  desire  to  press 
forward  to  victory. 

Before  nine  o'clock  the  whole  of  Sherman's  and 
McClernand's  divisions,  as  well  as  Prentiss's,  was 
fully  engaged.  Colonel  Thompsqn,.  aid-de-camp 


52  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

to  General  Beauregard,  in  his  report,  made  imme 
diately  after  the  battle,  states,  "  From  eight  to  half 
past  eight  o'clock  the  cannonading  was  very  heavy 
along  the  whole  line."  Hildebrand  was  attacked 
about  eight  o'clock.  B.  R.  Johnson's  brigade  came 
under  artillery  fire  at  half  past  eight  o'clock,  and 
about  fifteen  minutes  later  made  attack  upon  the 
left  brigade,  Hare's,  of  McClernand's  division. 

The  little  stream  which  flowed  through  the  val 
ley  or  ravine  bordering  the  front  of  Sherman's 
camp  was  fed  by  springs,  and,  spreading  over  the 
loamy  bottom,  turned  it  into  a  marsh.  Being  ob 
structed  by  fallen  timber  and  clumps  of  under 
growth,  it  was  a  serious  impediment  to  troops  ad 
vancing  across  it j  under  fire.  Bushrod  Johnson's 
brigade  was  broken  in  wading  through  the  mud  of 
the  valley,  and  his  battery  was  taken  over  with 
great  difficulty.  When  the  crossing  was  effected, 
two  of  the  regiments  were  missing,  and  it  was 
learned,  after  inquiry  by  the  brigade  commander, 
that  they  had  been  detached  by  order  of  General 
Bragg.  Advancing  with  his  battery  and  his  three 
remaining  regiments,  he  fell  upon  Hare's  brigade, 
the  left  of  McClernand's  line,  just  after  it  had  got 
into  position.  After  a  sharp  conflict,  Johnson's 
command  broke  and  fell  back.  He  renewed  the  at 
tack,  with  the  same  result.  He  tried  in  vain  to 
move  his  men  forward  again.  His  battery  lost  its 
commander  and  half  the  men,  and  all  the  guns 
were  silenced  but  one.  Johnson  himself  was 
wounded,  and  then  drew  what  was  left  of  his  com 
mand  out  of  fire. 

Wood's  brigade  fell  upon  McClernand's  second 
brigade,  commanded  by  Colonel  Marsh,  with  a 
furious  onset  and  deadly  fire.  When  Marsh  had 
lost  five  field  officers  and  many  company  officers 
killed  and  wounded,  his  command  became  disor 
ganized  and  fell  back  in  disorder.  Marsh  rallied 
and  reformed  them  about  two  hundred  yards  in 


THE    BATTLE   OF   SHILOH.  53 

the  rear.  Wood  wheeled  his  brigade  to  the  left, 
against  the  flank  of  McClernand's  right  brigade, 
commanded  by  Colonel  Reardon,  who  refused  his 
left  and  confronted  Wood.  Meanwhile  Colonel 
Preston  Smith,  assuming  command  of  Johnson's 
brigade,  regained  the  two  detached  regiments  and 
reformed  his  command ;  then  joining  A.  P.  Stew 
art's  brigade,  which  had  just  come  to  the  front,  they 
fell  upon  Hare's  brigade,  and  compelled  it  to  fall 
back  to  the  line  formed  by  Colonel  Marsh. 

The  three  regiments  of  Russell's  brigade  strug 
gled  with  difficulty  through  the  swamp  and  briers 
of  the  little  valley,  under  a  destructive  fire  from 
Waterhouse's  battery,  and  as  they  began  to  ascend 
the  farther  slope  the  Fifty-third  poured  additional 
volleys,  which  they  could  not  endure,  and  they 
fell  back  through  the  swamp.  After  they  were  ral 
lied,  reassembled,  and  formed,  another  attempt  was 
made,  with  the  same  result.  Then  Colonel  Appier 
called  out  to  his  men  to  fall  back  and  save  them 
selves.  The  Fifty-third,  hearing  the  command,  and 
not  knowing  what  danger  threatened,  fled  to  the 
rear  in  confusion.  The  adjutant,  E.  C.  Dawes, 
with  Lieutenant-Colonel  Fulton,  rallied  the  regi 
ment  and  returned  with  it  to  its  post.  Colonel 
Appier  returned  and  again  gave  the  order,  "  Fall 
back  and  save  yourselves !  "  Two  companies  re 
mained  firm  and  attached  themselves,  with  Adju 
tant  Dawes,  to  the  Seventeenth  Illinois.  The  re 
maining  eight  companies  drifted  to  the  rear,  and, 
becoming  separated  from  their  colonel,  took  posi 
tion  near  the  landing,  and  afterward  returned  to 
the  front  with  the  lieutenant  colonel. 

Fatten  Anderson,  reaching  for  Hildebrand's 
brigade  lower  down  the  little  valley,  found  it  a 
greater  obstacle  than  it  offered  to  the  troops  on 
his  right.  Barrett's  battery,  crowning  the  bluff  on 
the  farther  side,  nearly  on  a  line  with  the  left  of 
Anderson's  brigade,  poured  merciless  volleys  upon 


54  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

the  unresisting  battalions  toiling  through  the 
morass  and  thickets.  Fragments  of  regiments,  ad 
vancing  as  they  emerged  and  reached  solid  ground, 
charged  up  the  slope  gallantly,  but  without  cohe 
sion  and  without  impetus,  and  were  swept  back 
by  the  fire  of  the  Fifty-seventh  and  Seventy-seventh 
Ohio.  Hildebrand  repelled  two  such  assaults  upon 
these  two  regiments  before  the  Fifty-third  Ohio 
finally  gave  way. 

Buckland's  brigade  was  on  the  bluff  overlook 
ing  the  little  stream  near  its  junction  with  Owl 
Creek.  The  little  valley  there  was  wider,  the  morass 
deeper,  and  fallen  timber  massed  the  tangle  of 
vines  and  briers.  Barrett's  battery  swept  its  whole 
front,  and  a  projecting  spur  near  the  right  of  the 
line  served  as  a  bastion,  whence  a  company  en 
filaded  the  assaulting  enemy.  General  Cleburne, 
with  his  large  brigade  and  Trigg's  battery,  consti 
tuting  the  extreme  left;  of  the  Confederate  army, 
was  brought  by  its  position  to  the  front  of  Buck- 
land.  Trigg's  battery  did  not  descend  into  the  val 
ley,  but  in  an  artillery  duel  with  Barrett's  battery 
was  soon  silenced  and  withdrawn.  Cleburne's 
regiments  pertinaciously  forced  their  way  over  and 
through  the  obstacles,  but,  separated  and  broken, 
the  concentric  fire  from  front  and  both  flanks  rolled 
them  back  at  every  essay.  Cleburne  rode  from 
one  wing  to  another  to  encourage  his  dashing  but 
disrupted  battalions,  only  to  impel  his  ranks  to 
fresh  slaughter.  The  Sixth  Mississippi,  having  lost 
three  hundred  killed  and  wounded,  including  both 
field  officers,  out  of  an  aggregate  of  four  hundred 
and  twenty-five,  withdrew  and  took  no  subsequent 
part  in  the  battle.  The  Second  Tennessee,  having 
its  colonel  severely  and  its  major  mortally  wound 
ed  and  its  ranks  sorely  thinned,  withdrew  from  the 
field  for  the  rest  of  the  day.  The  Twenty-third 
Tennessee  drifted  to  another  part  of  the  field.  In 
the  rush  which  ensued  when  Sherman  drew  his 


THE    BATTLE    OF   SHILOH.  55 

division  back  Cleburne  was  separated  from  his 
command  until,  at  2  p.  M.,  he  found  his  remaining1 
three  regiments  halted  under  the  brow  of  an  abrupt 
hill.  Of  the  twenty-seven  hundred  and  fifty  mus 
kets  which  he  carried  into  the  assault  on  Sherman 
Sunday  morning,  he  was  able  to  assemble  only 
eight  hundred  for  the  contest  on  Monday. 

When  the  Fifty-third  Ohio  broke,  Colonel 
Raith's  brigade  was  exposed  on  both  flanks,  and 
was  ordered  by  General  McClernand  to  fall  back 
and  join  his  other  brigades.  Sherman  had  tena 
ciously  held  his  line  two  hours ;  but  now,  ten 
o'clock,  the  enemy  having  passed  to  his  rear,  or 
dered  it  to  fall  back  and  form  on  the  Purdy  road. 
When  Waterhouse  had  traversed  half  the  distance 
he  halted  and  went  into  action,  trying  to  stem  the 
pursuit  by  firing  at  short  range ;  but  the  tumultuous 
rush  overran  his  battery  and  captured  three  guns, 
while  he  barely  escaped  with  the  other  three.  Hil- 
debrand's  two  remaining  regiments  were  thrown 
into  disorder  and  partly  dispersed.  He  served  as 
a  volunteer  on  General  McClernand's  staff  the  rest 
of  the  day,  while  Major  Fearing  and  the  greater 
part  of  the  Seventy-seventh  and  a  portion  of  the 
Fifty-seventh  formed  on  the  Purdy  road,  on  the 
left  of  the  Thirteenth  Missouri,  which  was  incor 
porated  into  Sherman's  command  during  the  rest 
of  the  battle.  Buckland  withdrew  in  order,  cover 
ing  his  wagons,  which  retired  before  him.  Mc 
Dowell,  who  had  not  yet  been  attacked  or  dis 
turbed,  moved  along  the  Purdy  road,  which  passed 
through  his  camp,  to  the  position  assigned.  Mc 
Dowell's  wagon  train  proceeded  along  the  road, 
and  his  battery  (Behr's),  galloping  to  its  place,  in 
terfered  with  the  formation  of  the  line.  Captain 
Behr  being  quickly  killed,  his  men  scampered  off 
with  their  caissons,  leaving  a  break  in  the  line. 
Sherman  drew  his  maimed  division  back  to  the  left 
and  rear,  connecting  with  McClernand's  right,  and 
5 


56  GENERAL    SHERMAN. 

these  two  commanders  operated  together  during 
the  rest  of  the  day. 

Sherman  and  McClernand  together  kept  a  co 
herent  line  through  the  day.  There  were  charges 
and  countercharges,  repulses  alternately  on  both 
sides.  Confederate  charges  were  sometimes  re 
pulsed  with  serious  loss.  At  one  time  the  national 
line,  surging  back  with  a  great  impulse,  regained 
half  a  mile  of  lost  ground,  and  reoccupied  a  greater 
part  of  McClernand's  camp.  A  rally,  a  re-enforced 
mass,  an  impetuous  countercharge,  checked  the  na 
tional  divisions,  and  pushed  them  back  farther  than 
before.  The  Confederate  columns  were  continual 
ly  re-enforced  by  brigades  or  regiments  coming 
to  the  front  from  the  second  and  third  lines  and 
the  reserve  corps,  while  Lewis  Wallace  expected 
on  one  flank,  and  Nelson  expected  on  the  other, 
failed  to  appear,  and  the  National  line  was  thin 
ning,  crumbling,  contracting.  About  4.30  p.  M. 
what  was  left  of  the  two  divisions  was  on  the  east 
side  of  Tillman  or  Brier  Creek,  on  the  ground 
where  they  rested  for  the  night,  so  far  back  from 
the  woods  that  the  force  which  they  had  engaged 
passed  between  and  so  around  to  the  rear  of  Pren- 
tiss  and  W.  H.  L.  Wallace.  But  the  weary  bat 
talions  were  still  fresh  enough  to  promptly  repulse 
with  disastrous  loss  an  attack  made  by  Pond's  bri 
gade,  the  closing  operation  of  the  day  on  that  part 
of  the  field. 

In  falling  back  from  the  position  taken  on  the 
Purdy  road,  McDowell's  brigade  was  separated 
from  the  rest  of  the  division  by  the  Confederate 
troops  pouring  through  the  gap  made  by  the  de 
fection  of  Behr's  battery.  By  prompt  and  rapid 
use  of  one  gun  that  remained  manned  he  saved  his 
brigade  from  being  surrounded  and  wholly  cut 
off.  In  falling  back  through  woods  and  tents,  and 
over  ridges  and  ravines,  the  Fortieth  Illinois  be 
came  separated,  was  attacked  by  and  repelled  a 


THE    BATTLE   OF   SHILOH.  57 

Confederate  regiment,  found  its  way  to  the  rear 
of  McClernand's  division,  and  remained  there  for 
the  night.  Trabue's  brigade,  brought  forward  from 
the  reserve  corps  after  a  regiment  and  two  bat 
talions  of  infantry  and  two  batteries  and  a  squadron 
of  cavalry  had  been  detached  from  it  to  aid  some 
other  hard-pressed  brigade,  was  reduced  to  four 
regiments.  At  about  half  past  twelve  o'clock  Tra- 
bue  found  McDowell's  two  regiments  in  line  with 
in  the  edge  of  timber  bordering  a  field.  As  he 
moved  into  position  to  attack  the  Forty-sixth  Ohio 
promptly  opened  fire.  A  destructive  fight  at  close 
quarters  ensued.  McDowell  was  re-enforced  by 
the  Forty-sixth  Illinois  from  Veatch's  brigade ; 
Trabue,  by  General  A.  P.  Stewart,  with  part  of  his 
brigade  and  a  portion  of  Patton  Anderson's  bri 
gade.  McDowell  was  forced  to  give  way.  The 
Forty-sixth  Ohio  was  completely  dispersed,  and 
did  not  reassemble  till  after  the  battle.  The  Sixth 
Iowa,  commanded  by  Captain  Williams,  retired 
to  the  artillery  near  the  landing.  In  the  hour  and 
a  half  that  this  contest  lasted,  the  Forty-sixth  Ohio 
lost  thirty-seven  killed  and  one  hundred  and 
eighty-five  wounded ;  the  Sixth  Iowa  lost  fifty-two 
killed  and  ninety-four  wounded.  Of  Trabue's  re 
ported  casualties  in  the  two  days — eight  hundred 
and  forty-four — the  much  greater  portion  hap 
pened  in  this  engagement. 

Bouton's  brigade,  which  had  just  arrived  and 
had  not  been  assigned,  and  the  Fifty-third  Ohio 
were  ordered  by  General  Sherman's  assistant  adju 
tant  general  and  his  chief  of  artillery  to  leave  the 
landing  and  aid  McAllister's  battery  in  repelling 
the  final  attack  on  Sherman  and  McClernand. 
Pond's  brigade  was  ordered  by  General  Hardee  to 
advance  and  silence  the  batteries.  He  proceeded 
north  along  the  bottom  of  the  ravine  of  Tillman's 
or  Brier  Creek,  then  to  the  east  up  a  lateral  ravine 
to  take  the  batteries  on  the  flank.  When  he  drew 


58  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

near  the  batteries  withdrew,  and  the  supporting 
infantry  poured  in  such  a  destructive  fire  that 
Pond's  brigade  precipitately  withdrew,  the  Eight 
eenth  Louisiana,  the  advance  regiment,  leaving 
two  hundred  and  seven  dead  and  wounded  in  the 
ravine.  That  ended  the  battle  for  the  day  on  that 
part  of  the  field. 

When  Prentiss  fell  back  through  his  camp  and 
rallied  and  reformed  behind  Hurlbut,  Chalmers 
made  an  ineffective  attack,  which  must  have  been 
on  General  Hurlbut's  right,  and  was  by  order  re 
called  and  sent  to  the  extreme  right  of  the  Con 
federate  army.  Delaying  half  an  hour  for  a  guide, 
then  marching  south  and  crossing  Locust  Creek 
before  proceeding  toward  the  river,  he  finally 
reached  high  land,  facing  Stuart's  camp.  Some 
skirmishers,  whom  Stuart  had  sent  across  Locust 
Creek,  fired  into  the  Fifty-second  Tennessee,  and 
threw  it  into  such  disorder  that  General  Chalmers 
was  able  to  rally  only  two  companies,  and  sent  the 
remainder  of  the  regiment  to  the  rear,  where  it 
remained  during  the  rest  of  the  battle.  As  Chal 
mers  crossed  Locust  Creek  with  his  remaining  five 
regiments  and  Gage's  battery,  his  right  being  on 
the  river  bluff,  Stuart  fell  back  behind  his  camp, 
across  a  ravine,  and  took  position  on  a  wooded 
ridge  with  a  field  in  front,  his  command  being  re 
duced  to  two  regiments  by  the  defection  of  the 
Seventy-first  Ohio.  The  Fifty-fourth  and  Fifty- 
fifth  Illinois  on  the  one  side,  and  Chalmers's  bri 
gade  and  Gage's  battery  on  the  other,  fired  at  each 
other  across  this  open  field  until  Chalmers's  am 
munition  was  exhausted.  After  his  ammunition 
was  replenished  he  found  Stuart  posted  on  another 
ridge  farther  to  the  rear.  Another  stubborn  fight 
ensued,  and  when  Stuart  retired  again  Chalmers 
found  himself  near  and  then  mingled  with  the 
surge  of  troops  that  rolled  up  to  envelop  the  rear 
of  Prentiss  and  Wallace. 


THE    BATTLE   OF   SHILOH.  59 

Jackson's  brigade  was  in  rear  of  and  was  not 
engaged  with  Gladden  and  Chalmers  in  the  attack 
upon  Prentiss,  but  joined  them  after  Prentiss  had 
broken  and  retired,  and  was  ordered  to  follow 
Chalmers  to  the  extreme  right.  With  his  four  regi 
ments  and  Girardy's  battery,  he  formed  on  the  left 
of  Chalmers  on  the  south  side  of  Locust  Creek. 
Crossing  this  "  deep  and  almost  impassable  ra 
vine,"  as  Jackson  calls  it,  he  fell  upon  General  Mc- 
Arthur  and  his  two  regiments.  In  a  series  of  ob 
stinate  struggles  McArthur,  forced  successively 
from  position  after  position,  only  to  seize  new 
vantage  where  he  could  renew  the  fight,  was  even 
tually  obliged  to  retire  with  Stuart  to  the  north  bank 
of  the  ravine  near  the  landing,  and  join  the  force 
gathering  there  to  make  a  final  stand. 

Gladden's  brigade,  now  commanded  by  Colonel 
Adams,  after  resting  some  time  in  Prentiss's  camp, 
moved  to  the  right  and  attacked  Hurlbut,  whose 
line  was  then  advanced  beyond  the  peach  orchard 
and  along  the  south  side  of  the  large  field.  A  shell 
exploded  amid  the  Thirteenth  Ohio  Battery;  of 
ficers  and  men  abandoned  their  guns  and  fled.  The 
remainder  of  the  division  was  steady,  and,  after  a 
sharp  struggle,  Adams  drew  his  command  off,  and 
Hurlbut  shifted  his  line  back  to  the  north  side  of 
the  field  behind  the  fence.  Two  regiments — the 
Seventeenth  and  Twenty-fifth  Kentucky — were  left 
along  the  west  side  of  the  field.  General  Cheat- 
ham,  having  sent  Bushrod  Johnson's  brigade  to 
the  front  of  McClernand's,  was  ordered  by  General 
Beauregard  to  go  with  his  other  brigade  to  the 
extreme  right  of  the  battle  and  go  in  where  he 
found  the  fighting  hottest.  About  ten  o'clock  he 
reached  the  south  side  of  the  field  and  engaged 
Hurlbut,  firing  across  the  field.  When  General 
Breckenridge  arrived  with  Bowen  and  Statham's 
brigades,  and  formed  on  Cheatham's  right.  Cheat- 
ham  was  ordered  to  charge.  His  men  advanced 


60  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

steadily  under  a  galling  fire  till  they  had  crossed 
half  of  the  field,  when  the  Kentucky  regiments, 
rising  upon  their  flank,  poured  in  an  unexpected 
enfilading  fire,  which  shattered  their  ranks  and 
drove  them  from  the  field  in  confusion. 

General  Johnston  was  resolved  to  break  the  Na 
tional  left  and  push  forward  and  interpose  between 
General  Grant  and  the  river.  He  had  now  massed 
twenty-eight  regiments  and  six  batteries  against 
the  twelve  regiments  and  two  batteries  of  Hurlbut, 
McArthur,  and  Stuart.  Hurlbut's  men,  replenish 
ing  their  exhausted  cartridge  boxes  and  caissons, 
steadily  repelled  every  assault.  His  right  kept  con 
nected  with  Prentiss,  but,  as  Stuart  and  McArthur 
were  gradually  forced  back,  his  left  swung  back 
to  keep  in  contact  with  them,  and  he  had  to  weaken 
his  right  to  fill  and  strengthen  his  attenuated  left. 
At  half  past  two  o'clock  General  Johnston,  person 
ally  leading  the  Forty-fifth  Tennessee  to  a  charge 
against  the  Forty-first  Illinois,  which  Breckenridge 
was  unable  to  induce  it  to  make,  received  a  wound 
from  which  he  quickly  bled  to  death.  General 
Bragg,  who  had  been  sending  successive  commands 
in  fruitless  charges  against  Prentiss  and  Wallace, 
hearing  of  the  death  of  A.  S.  Johnston,  repaired 
to  that  portion  of  the  field,  where  he  "  found  a 
strong  force,  consisting  of  three  parts  without  a 
common  head — Brigadier-General  Breckenridge, 
with  his  reserve  division  pressing  the  enemy ; 
Brigadier-General  Withers,  with  his  splendid  di 
vision  greatly  exhausted  and  taking  a  temporary 
rest ;  and  Major-General  Cheatham,  with  his  divi 
sion  of  Major-General  Polk's  corps  to  their  left 
and  rear."  This  was  toward  four  o'clock.  He 
assembled  all  into  a  coherent  body  and  advanced 
against  the  exhausted  defenders.  At  about  half 
past  four  o'clock  General  Hurlbut  notified  Pren 
tiss  he  would  have  to  let  go  and  retire.  Sullenly 
withdrawing,  he  made  one  vain  effort  to  form  and 


THE   BATTLE  OF   SHILOII.  6 1 

renew  the  fight.  He  then  fell  back  behind  the  deep 
ravine  running  into  the  river  just  above  the  land 
ing.  Colonel  Webster,  of  General  Grant's  staff,  had 
here  gathered  nearly  fifty  guns  and  planted  them 
along  the  crest  of  ground.  Hurlbut  added  what 
was  left  of  his  two  fighting  batteries,  and  proceeded 
at  once  to  organize  the  regiments  and  detachments 
and  unorganized  men  into  a  force  to  support  the 
batteries.  He  estimated  the  number  of  men  so 
ranged  in  ranks  at  about  four  thousand.  The  rem 
nants  of  his  brigades  were  deployed  in  order,  their 
right  resting  on  the  left  of  the  artillery.  Other  de 
tachments  were  gathered  up  and  placed  in  continu 
ation  of  the  line  to  the  left,  and  a  battery  was  sta 
tioned  still  farther  to  the  left,  near  the  river,  pro 
tected  by  the  backwater  which  there  covered  the 
bottom  of  the  ravine,  but  without  other  support. 

Several  of  Prentiss's  regiments  were  irretriev 
ably  broken  by  passing  through  their  camp,  at  9 
A.  M.,  and  drifted  to  the  rear.  Two  were  placed  in 
reserve  to  Hurlbut.  The  remaining  five  filled  the 
space  between  Hurlbut's  right  and  the  main  Cor 
inth  road.  They  lay  down  in  a  sunken  road,  or  an 
old  road  washed  and  gullied  by  rain,  making  a  natu 
ral  trench.  Wallace's  two  brigades,  or  ten  regi 
ments,  extended  from  the  road  to  the  great,  densely 
crowded  ravine,  filled  with  tangled  growth,  and  lay 
on  the  ground.  Hickenlooper,  with  four  guns  of 
his  battery,  two  having  been  left  on  the  field  of 
action  because  all  their  horses  were  killed,  was 
posted  by  Prentiss  at  the  Corinth  road,  which  led 
directly  to  the  landing.  The  line  was  slightly  re 
fused  on  both  sides,  leaving  Hickenlooper  at  the 
apex  of  a  salient.  The  land  to  the  front  fell  away 
by  a  gentle  slope,  and  was  partially  covered  by 
dense  and  matted  thickets.  An  assailing  force, 
struggling  upward  through  the  thickets,  could  see 
only  the  battery,  but  was  exposed  not  alone  to  its 
fire,  but  also  to  the  fire  of  six  thousand  invisible  in- 


62  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

fantry.  General  Grant,  having  just  visited  Sherman 
a  little  before  his  line  gave  way  and  sent  word  to 
Lewis  Wallace  to  come  to  the  field,  visited  Prentiss 
and  W.  H.  L.  Wallace,  approved  their  dispositions, 
and  charged  them  to  hold  this  ground  at  all  haz 
ards  to  the  last  extremity.  Colonel  Webster  estab 
lished  lines  of  ordnance  wagons  to  supply  the  fight 
ing  troops,  and  through  the  day  of  constant  firing 
on  this  ground  the  store  of  ammunition  was  con 
tinually  replenished  as  soon  as  it  was  exhausted. 

After  several  desultory  attacks  had  been  re 
pulsed  Colonel  Randall  L.  Gibson  was  ordered  to 
carry  the  position  with  his  Louisiana  brigade  about 
noon.  The  regiments  struggled  through  the  en 
tanglement  of  thickets  and  approached  undisturbed 
till  they  were  near  the  battery,  when  a  sheet  of 
flame  poured  from  the  whole  length  of  the  Na 
tional  line,  and  the  assailants  who  were  able  broke 
in  confusion  and  hastened  out  of  reach  of  the  fire. 
The  brigade  was  assembled  and  again  charged, 
and  again  rolled  back  in  fragments.  A  third  trial 
was  made,  with  the  same  result.  A  stinging  order 
from  General  Bragg  sent  the  discouraged  regi 
ments  the  fourth  time  up  the  slqpe,  to  be  hurled 
back  the  fourth  time.  General  Hindman  made  a 
gallant  assault,  and  met  with  a  sore  repulse.  When 
he  was  wounded,  A.  P.  Stewart  took  his  place  and 
made  a  persistent  attack  with  his  brigade  and  two 
of  Pond's  regiments,  and  finally  drew  off  his  com 
mand,  as  he  says,  for  a  supply  of  ammunition. 
Shortly  after  2  p.  M.  Shaver's  brigade  made  a  sturdy 
effort  and  failed,  and  renewed  and  failed  again. 
General  Bragg,  then  hearing  of  General  A.  S. 
Johnston's  death,  moved  around  to  the  extreme 
right,  near  the  river,  and  there  was  a  lull  in  front 
of  the  Hornet's  Nest  for  an  hour.  About  four 
o'clock  General  Ruggles  ordered  Patton  Ander 
son  to  make  the  attempt  with  his  brigade.  Vet 
eranized  by  its  experience  in  Sherman's  front  in 


THE   BATTLE   OF   SHILOH.  63 

the  morning  and  its  success  in  subsequent  en 
gagements,  the  brigade  marched  boldly  to  the  en 
counter.  Before  long  its  shattered  fragments  came 
streaming  back,  driven  by  the  resistless  fire  which 
they  provoked. 

General  Ruggles  dispatched  his  staff  to  gather 
in  all  the  batteries  they  could  find.  He  succeeded 
in  planting  eleven  batteries  in  line.  General  Polk 
massed  behind  them  all  the  serviceable  infantry 
that  he  could  find.  Hickenlooper  withdrew  his  four 
guns,  falling  back  along  the  road  toward  the  land 
ing  till  he  reached  the  Hamburg  and  Savannah 
road,  then  turning  to  the  left  upon  it,  found  him 
self  with  General  Sherman,  near  the  intersection 
of  the  Hamburg  and  Savannah  road  with  the  road 
from  the  landing  to  Purdy.  By  five  o'clock  Bragg, 
with  his  composite  command  following  Hurlbut, 
was  arriving  in  rear  of  Prentiss.  About  the  same 
time  Hardee,  with  an  aggregate  of  disconnected 
brigades,  was  rounding  the  impassable  wood  which 
protected  W.  H.  L.  Wallace's  right,  and  was  reach 
ing  his  rear.  And  at  the  same  time  Polk  ordered 
forward  his  massed  infantry  against  the  front  of 
Wallace  and  Prentiss,  after  a  bombardment  by 
Ruggles's  batteries.  Wallace  ordered  his  division 
to  cut  their  way  out  through  the  forces  closing 
upon  their  rear.  He  was  killed  while  leading  them. 
Five  of  his  regiments,  accompanied  by  portions  of 
Prentiss's  command,  fought  their  way  through  and 
reached  the  landing.  The  rest  were  caught  and 
surrounded  by  the  closing  together  of  the  masses. 
Prentiss  bent  his  left  wing  around  till  his  com 
mand  formed  an  elongated  ellipse  open  at  one  end, 
two  lines  back  to  back,  joined  at  one  end  by  a 
sharp  curve.  The  conflict  was  desperate  and  san 
guinary.  It  became  a  useless  slaughter,  and  Pren 
tiss  surrendered.  The  Fourteenth  Iowa,  of  Wal 
lace's  division,  was  the  last  to  surrender.  Colonel 
Shaw  compared  watches  with  his  captor,  and  noted 


64  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

that  the  time  was  a  quarter  to  six  o'clock.  About 
twenty-two  hundred  surrendered.  The  battle  was 
ended  for  the  day. 

The  meeting  of  the  forces  under  Bragg  and 
Hardee  covered  the  river  bluffs  with  a  tumultuous 
and  elated  multitude.  The  gunboats  began  to 
throw  large  shells  into  their  midst,  and  there  was 
a  scurrying  to  find  shelter  in  hollows  and  moving 
out  of  range.  But  General  Bragg  proposed  to 
push  the  advantage  to  a  finish.  He  ordered  his 
division  commanders  to  form  and  charge  upon  the 
long  line  of  guns  and  the  force  assembled  by  Hurl- 
but  on  the  farther  side  of  the  deep  ravine.  Rug- 
gles  set  about  to  collect  his  scattered  regiments. 
Withers  found  of  Gladden's  brigade  only  a  colonel 
and  two  hundred  and  twenty-four  men,  and  let 
them  alone.  Chalmers's  brigade,  with  Gage's  bat 
tery,  was  quickly  ready.  The  men  of  Jackson's 
brigade  were  filling  their  empty  cartridge  boxes, 
but  quit  and  formed  at  command.  Gage's  battery, 
halting  on  the  hither  side  of  the  ravine,  undertook 
to  engage  the  National  batteries  on  the  farther  side, 
but  was  quickly  silenced  and  dismantled,  and  with 
drew  to  the  rear,  where  it  remained  out  of  the  fight 
during  the  battle  of  the  next  day. 

Chalmers  and  Jackson  descended  into  the  ra 
vine  and  reached  the  farther  side,  but  the  roar  of 
the  massed  artillery,  the  shells  from  the  gunboats, 
which  had  moved  to  the  mouth  of  the  ravine,  and 
the  fire  of  Hurlbut's  infantry  prevented  the  auda 
cious  brigades  from  ascending  the  steep  bank. 
Jackson's  men,  without  ammunition,  refused  to 
make  the  attempt.  Chalmers's  men  made  some 
abortive  attempts  to  charge  up  the  slope.  General 
Beauregard,  receiving  a  dispatch  that  General 
Buell  was  not  marching  toward  Pittsburg  Land 
ing,  but  was  aiming  for  Florence,  and  feeling  con 
fident  of  early  victory  in  the  morning,  sent  staff 
officers  to  recall  the  exhausted  and  hungry  troops 


THE   BATTLE  OF   SHILOH.  65 

to  quarters  for  the  night.  The  order  was  given 
directly  to  division,  brigade,  and  even  regimental 
commanders.  Jackson's  brigade  withdrew,  and  so 
scattered  that  he  did  not  see  any  one  or  part  of 
any  one  of  his  regiments  the  next  day.  Chalmers 
did  not  receive  the  order,  but  soon  finding  that  he 
was  alone  and  waging  an  idle  contest,  followed 
Jackson. 

General  Nelson,  of  General  Buell's  army,  was 
ferried  across  the  river  with  two  regiments  of  Am- 
men's  brigade,  while  Chalmers's  men,  who  could 
not  be  induced  to  charge  up  the  slope  of  the  ravine, 
were  still  firing.  The  Thirty-sixth  Indiana  was 
marched  out  in  front  of  Chalmers's  front,  and  the 
Sixth  Ohio  in  support.  The  Thirty-sixth  had  two 
men  killed  and  one  wounded.  The  whole  of  Nel 
son's  division  was  on  the  ground  by  nine  o'clock, 
and  bivouacked  in  line  a  few  hundred  yards  in 
front  of  Hurlbut's  men.  Late  in  the  night  General 
Crittenden  arrived  with  his  division,  and  formed 
on  the  right  of  Nelson.  After  Chalmers  had  with 
drawn  and  all  firing  had  ceased  the  head  of  Lewis 
Wallace's  division  reached  the  bridge  across  Snake 
Creek.  It  was  dark  before  the  last  regiment,  the 
Twentieth  Ohio,  reached  the  bridge.  The  division 
bivouacked  on  the  eastern  slope  of  the  ravine  of 
Brier  or  Tillman's  Creek.  General  Sherman 
formed  on  the  road  leading  to  the  landing,  his 
right  being  near  its  intersection  with  the  road  on 
which  Wallace  arrived,  and  so  having  Wallace  to 
his  right  and  rear.  Buckland  with  his  regiment 
was  on  the  right,  and  Colonel  Cockerill's  was  next. 
Colonel  Buckland's  third  regiment,  the  Forty- 
eighth  Ohio,  was  detained  for  the  night  at  the  land 
ing,  where  it  had  gone  for  ammunition.  Next  to 
Buckland  was  Colonel  Hildebrand,  with  the  Sev 
enty-seventh  Ohio  and  a  part  of  the  Fifty-seventh. 
His  third  regiment,  the  Fifty-third  Ohio,  biv 
ouacked  to  the  rear,  in  front  of  the  camp  of  the 


66  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

Second  Iowa.  The  Sixth  Iowa,  of  McDowell's 
brigade,  spent  the  night  at  the  landing,  commanded 
by  Captain  Walden.  The  regiments  of  McCler- 
nand's  division  gathered  together,  but  not  formed 
in  their  brigades,  extended  from  Sherman's  left  to 
Hurlbut's  camp.  Hurlbut's  aggregation  of  com 
mands  and  detachments  extended  from  McCler- 
nand  to  the  landing.  The  men  slept  in  ranks  on 
the  ground,  without  fires  and  in  a  heavy  rain.  The 
Confederates  occupied  the  camps  of  McClernand, 
Sherman,  and  Prentiss  for  the  most  part,  while 
many  slept  on  the  ground  without  shelter.  Gen 
eral  Cheatham,  with  a  portion  of  each  of  his  bri 
gades,  withdrew  to  the  camp  of  Saturday  night, 
and  Colonel  Pond,  with  his  battery  and  all  of  the 
regiments  of  his  brigade  but  one,  bivouacked,  in 
company  with  Wharton's  Texas  rangers,  on  the 
west  side  of  Brier  or  Tillman's  Creek,  opposite 
Lewis  Wallace.  The  formation  of  corps  had  dis 
appeared.  No  complete  division  bivouacked  in  a 
body.  It  does  not  appear  that  there  was  a  single 
brigade,  excepting  one  in  Breckenridge's  corps, 
that  held  all  its  regiments  together.  Beauregard's 
encampment  of  Sunday  night  was  an  aggregation 
of  disintegrated  commands. 

With  the  first  dawn  Monday  morning,  the  7th, 
Colonel  Pond  to  his  dismay  found  that  the  troops 
had  fallen  back  in  the  night,  leaving  him  exposed 
alone  a  mile  from  support,  and  separated  only  by 
the  ravine  from  the  National  line,  which  lay  four 
hundred  yards  to  his  front.  He  made  the  battery 
(Ketchum's)  open  fire  while  he  drew  off  his  infan 
try  and  the  Texas  cavalry.  Wallace's  batteries  en 
gaged  Ketchum,  and  the  battle  was  resumed. 

General  Nelson  about  six  o'clock  marched  out 
south,  along  the  Hamburg  road.  He  proceeded 
more  than  a  mile  before  he  began  to  come  upon 
fragmentary  detachments  of  the  enemy.  Near 
Stuart's  camp  he  came  upon  a  force  which  General 


THE    BATTLE   OF   SHILOII.  67 

Withers  had  gathered  up  and  organized,  partly  of 
battered  brigades,  partly  of  disconnected  regiments 
thrown  into  improvised  brigades  with  temporary 
commanders.  After  a  sharp  engagement  he  fell 
back  to  the  north  side  of  the  peach  orchard,  his 
line  crossing  the  Hamburg  road  and  being  at  right 
angles  to  it.  Crittenden's  division  connected  with 
Nelson's  right.  McCook  put  Rousseau's  brigade 
on  the  right  of  Crittenden,  but  facing  to  the  left. 
Kirk's  brigade  was  placed  to  the  rear  of  Rousseau's 
right.  When  W.  H.  Gibson's  brigade  arrived  later 
in  the  forenoon,  a  portion  of  it  was  placed  on  the 
right,  extending  it  to  the  wooded  ravine  separating 
General  Buell's  command  from  Grant's.  Buell's 
line  when  formed  was  almost  identical  with  the  line 
of  Wallace,  Prentiss,  Hurlbut,  and  McArthur  at 
eleven  o'clock  Sunday  morning. 

Lewis  Wallace,  sweeping  around  by  Owl  Creek, 
formed  the  right  of  Grant's  attack.  Sherman,  as 
sembling  Buckland's  brigade,  Stuart  with  two  of 
his  regiments  and  the  Thirteenth  Missouri  in  line, 
and  Hildebrand  with  his  Seventy-seventh  and  part 
of  the  Fifty-seventh  Ohio  in  reserve,  was  next  to 
Wallace.  The  Fortieth  Illinois  followed  McCook, 
and  formed  on  the  left  of  his  line  when  he  parted 
from  Crittenden.  A  detachment  of  the  Sixth  Iowa 
marched  in  reserve  to  McCook.  The  Fifty-third 
Ohio,  commanded  by  the  lieutenant  colonel,  served 
with  McClernand.  McClernand,  marching  directly 
to  his  camp,  came  there  upon  the  left  of  Sherman. 
Hurlbut's  first  brigade,  much  attenuated,  formed  on 
the  left  of  McClernand's  line,  and  constituted  part  of 
it.  Colonel  Veatch  marched  in  reserve  to  General 
McCook's  division  till  McCook  parted  from  Crit 
tenden,  and  then  by  General  McCook's  order 
formed  on  his  left,  extending  his  line.  Colonel 
Tuttle  took  command  of  what  \vas  left  of  W.  H.  L. 
Wallace's  division,  and  moved  in  reserve  to  Gen 
eral  Buell,  where  he  was  joined  by  Colonel  Crocker 


68  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

with  three  regiments  of  McClernand's  division.  He 
sent  the  Second  Iowa  to  General  Nelson  when 
there  was  a  break  in  his  line;  the  Seventh  Iowa 
to  General  Crittenden  to  aid  in  a  charge  upon  a 
battery;  the  Thirteenth  later  in  the  day  joined 
General  McCook ;  and  the  Eighth  and  Eighteenth 
Illinois  formed  on  the  left  of  Crittenden's  line  when 
he  parted  from  Nelson.  General  Bragg  com 
manded  the  Confederate  left,  Hardee  on  the  right, 
and  Polk  and  Breckenridge  between  the  two. 
There  was  no  definite  boundary  of  commands,  and 
some  brigades  and  some  separate  regiments  re 
ceived  direct  commands  from  each  of  them  in  suc 
cession.  General  Beauregard  took  his  station  near 
Shiloh  church.  The  most  compact  body  of  troops 
was  there  in  the  beginning  of  the  day,  and  through 
the  combat  commands  that  were  forced  to  give 
way  retired  toward  that  point. 

General  Lewis  Wallace,  marching  along  the 
upland  bordering  Owl  Creek  after  the  retreat  of 
Pond's  brigade  and  battery,  had  an  encounter  with 
Wharton's  Texas  cavalry  and  forced  it  back,  and 
then,  after  an  engagement  with  Trabue's  brigade, 
forced  it  south  of  the  Purely  road.  Patton  Ander 
son  coming  up,  engaged  Wallace's  first  brigade, 
while  the  second  and  third  continued  the  contest 
with  Trabue.  Sherman  moved  out  to  McCler 
nand's  camp  and  waited  till  he  heard  beyond  the 
intervening  woods  the  advance  of  Buell's  troops 
against  the  yielding  enemy.  Moving  forward  with 
Buckland  and  Stuart,  he  joined  Wallace's  left,  and, 
after  some  preliminary  skirmishes  with  detach 
ments,  came  upon  the  consolidated  force  under 
Beauregard's  immediate  command,  and  plunged 
into  the  raging  fight.  McClernand,  moving  di 
rectly  from  his  bivouac  to  his  camp,  brushing  be 
fore  him  some  batteries  and  their  supports,  joined 
the  left  of  Sherman.  While  the  conflict  raged  Mc- 
Cook's  division,  in  ranks  well  aligned,  was  seen 


THE    BATTLE   OF   SHILOH.  69 

advancing  beyond  the  point  of  the  woods,  with 
well-ordered  impetuosity  pressing  back  their  stub 
born  foes.  Sherman,  McClernand,  and  Wallace 
mention  in  their  reports  the  impression  made  on 
them  by  the  steady  push  of  the  drilled  and  disci 
plined  division. 

Nelson  in  his  march  the  day  before  from  Sa 
vannah  to  the  shore  opposite  Pittsburg  Landing, 
over  a  miry  road  through  a  swamp  overflowed  by 
high  water,  had  been  obliged  to  leave  his  artillery 
behind.  When  he  advanced  again  he  was  so  an 
noyed  by  the  enemy's  battery  that  Mendenhall's 
battery  was  sent  to  him  from  Crittenden's  division. 
This  quickly  silenced  the  antagonist.  Hazen,  rush 
ing  forward  with  his  brigade,  captured  the  guns 
and  drove  the  infantry  supports.  Bowen's  brigade 
coming  up,  dashed  unexpectedly  upon  Hazen's 
men,  disordered  by  the  pursuit,  and  they  fell  back 
in  confusion,  leaving  a  gap  in  Nelson's  line.  His 
separated  brigades  were  in  danger  of  crumbling 
when  Terrill's  regular  battery,  coming  up  at  a  gal 
lop,  pushed  out  to  the  skirmish  line  to  get  a  good 
position,  and  silenced  and  crippled  Bowen's  bat 
tery.  Nelson  fell  back.  Terrill  retired  his  guns 
by  prolonges ;  having  them  in  battery  at  every  halt 
without  wheeling,  he  kept  the  pursuers  at  bay  with 
volleys  of  canister.  Nelson  rallied  his  command 
and  again  advanced,  overcoming  stubborn  resist 
ance.  At  about  two  o'clock  he  was  in  Stuart's 
camp,  and  the  enemy  finally  withdrew  from  his 
front.  He  turned  to  the  west,  and  advancing  be 
yond  Crittenden's  front,  Mendenhall's  battery  took 
in  reverse  and  drove  away  a  battery  which  had 
blocked  Crittenden's  advance.  Crittenden  swung 
his  left  forward,  and  Terrill,  going  farther  to  the 
front,  took  in  reverse  a  battery  which  was  harass 
ing  McCook,  and  upon  his  silencing  that  McCook 
advanced.  General  Crittenden  maintained  his  po 
sition  through  the  day,  not  being  ordered  by  Gen- 


70  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

eral  Buell  to  advance,  and  being  unwilling  to  leave 
the  flank  of  Nelson  exposed.  But  he  was  engaged 
with  troops  stationed  in  the  dense  thicket,  which 
filled  a  wet  hollow  along  the  base  of  the  slope  in 
his  front  and  in  the  woods  beyond.  Portions  of  his 
command  made  charges  into  the  thickets  and  the 
woods,  and  retired  and  charged  again.  When 
Mendenhall  silenced  the  battery  in  the  woods,  it 
was  captured  by  a  charge,  and  the  enemy  disap 
peared  from  Crittenden's  front. 

McCook,  with  his  two  brigades,  Rousseau  and 
Kirk,  moved  fonvard  to  a  more  commanding  posi 
tion.  Facing  to  the  west,  he  was  in  front  of  the 
Confederate  center.  He  sustained  and  -  repelled 
vigorous  assaults  till  W.  H.  Gibson's  brigade  ar 
rived.  Then  moving  forward,  adding  the  Fifteenth 
Michigan  to  Rousseau's  brigade,  and  as  he  let 
go  from  Crittenden  annexing  Veatch's  three  regi 
ments  to  his  left,  he  pushed  back  his  assailants 
till  he  passed  by  the  intervening  woods.  Then 
reaching  McClernand's  camp,  he  came  into  view 
of  Grant's  troops,  and  then  into  contact  with  them. 
Grant  pressing  to  the  south,  and  Buell  pressing  to 
the  west,  had  bent  back  the  wings  of  the  Confed 
erate  army  and  compressed  it  into  a  compact  mass. 
A  score  of  batteries  and  about  half  as  many  di 
visions  of  infantry  fought  with  a  desperation  which 
surpassed  any  previous  conflict  on  the  field.  A 
fierce  charge  upon  McCook  by  all  the  force  that 
could  be  massed  in  his  front  was  met,  sustained, 
overcome,  and  hurled  back.  As  the  baffled  line 
retired,  General  Grant,  gathering  up  two  regiments 
— the  First  Ohio  and  another — personally  direct 
ing  them,  launched  them  in  a  charge  which  shat 
tered  the  last  defensive  line.  At  the  same  time 
General  Beauregard,  taking  the  flags  of  two  regi 
ments,  called  upon  the  men  to  follow  him  in  a 
charge.  Just  then  Colonel  Whittlesey,  of  the 
Twentieth  Ohio,  directed  Thurber's  battery  to 


THE    BATTLE    OF    SHILOH.  71 

sweep  his  front  with  rapid  volleys.  Beauregard's 
men  would  not  follow  him.  His  aid-de-camp,  Col 
onel  Thompson,  remonstrated  against  any  further 
attempt  to  prolong  the  contest.  The  retreat  had 
begun  on  the  right  nearly  two  hours  before,  and, 
posting  a  brigade  and  a  battery  to  hold  the  ground, 
the  general  led  off  what  was  left  of  his  army.  T. 
J.  Wood's  division  of  Buell's  army,  which  had  just 
arrived,  followed  a  short  distance,  and  the  battle 
was  over. 

No  battle  of  the  war  has  excited  more  contro 
versy  than  the  battle  of  Shiloh.  The  discussion 
about  surprise  is  a  dispute  about  words.  Nothing 
can  be  added  to  the  accuracy  of  the  statement 
made  by  General  Rawlins  in  his  address  to  the 
Society  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  at  the  meet 
ing  in  Cincinnati  in  1866:  "  We  did  not  expect  to 
be  attacked  in  force  that  morning,  and  were  sur 
prised  that  we  were ;  but  we  had  sufficient  notice 
before  the  shock  came  to  be  under  arms  and  ready 
to  meet  it."  General  Johnston  marched  his  army 
out  from  Corinth,  and  on  Saturday  deliberately  put 
it  into  camp,  arranged  in  lines  of  attack,  within  a 
few  miles  of  the  National  picket  line,  without  any 
one  in  the  National  camp  having  a  suspicion  of  that 
fact,  though  there  were  some  who  were  satisfied 
there  was  a  large  force  in  front.  But  as  for  the 
foolish  story  of  the  assailing  force  breaking  into 
the  camps  while  the  men  were  yet  in  bed,  it  is 
enough  to  say  that  the  records  show  beyond  any 
chance  of  controversy,  and  the  Confederate  reports 
show  more  plainly  than  those  of  General  Grant's 
army,  that  no  camp  was  entered  before  nine  o'clock, 
and,  excepting  Prentiss's,  none  was  entered  before 
ten  o'clock ;  and,  further,  that  no  camp  was  en 
tered  before  a  serious  engagement  in  which  the 
assailants  suffered  repulse  before  prevailing.  It  is 
from  the  Confederate  reports  that  we  learn  also 
that  the  retiring  pickets  fought  stubbornly  as  they 
6 


72  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

fell  back,  and,  wherever  opportunity  was  afforded 
by  the  formation  of  the  ground  or  by  dense  growth, 
they  made  a  stand  and  held  the  following  skirmish 
ers  at  bay. 

The  numbers  engaged  can  not  be  given  posi 
tively.  The  accepted  numbers  are :  Under  General 
Grant,  Sunday,  thirty-two  or  thirty-three  thousand ; 
brought  by  Lewis  Wallace,  five  thousand ;  brought 
by  General  Buell,  twenty  thousand ;  and  the  num 
ber  of  combatants  brought  into  battle  on  the  Con 
federate  side  about  forty  thousand. 

The  casualties,  according  to  the  last  revision 
of  the  War  Department,  were :  In  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee,  killed,  fifteen  hundred  and  thirteen ; 
wounded,  six  thousand  six  hundred  and  one;  cap 
tured  and  missing,  two  thousand  eight  hundred 
and  thirty ;  total,  ten  thousand  nine  hundred  and 
forty-four.  In  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  killed,  two 
hundred  and  forty-one ;  wounded,  eighteen  hun 
dred  and  seven ;  captured  and  missing,  fifty-five. 
Aggregate  killed,  seventeen  hundred  and  fifty-four ; 
wounded,  eight  thousand  four  hundred  and  eight ; 
captured  and  missing,  two  thousand  eight  hun 
dred  and  eighty-five ;  total,  thirteen  thousand  and 
forty-seven.  The  Confederate  loss  is  given  as 
follows :  Killed,  seventeen  hundred  and  twenty- 
eight  ;  wounded,  eight  thousand  and  twelve ;  miss 
ing,  nine  hundred  and  fifty-nine ;  total,  ten  thou 
sand  six  hundred  and  ninety-nine.  It  is  agreed 
that  many  of  the  reported  missing  were,  in  fact, 
dead  or  wounded.  In  one  instance  this  is  obvious. 
In  his  report  of  Colonel  Pond's  disastrous  charge 
Sunday  afternoon,  Colonel  Mouton,  of  the  Eight 
eenth  Louisiana,  says,  "  Here  two  hundred  and 
seven  officers  and  men  fell  either  dead  or  wound 
ed,"  while  in  the  reported  list  of  casualties  for  the 
entire  two  days  the  statement  for  that  regiment  is : 
Killed,  thirteen ;  wounded,  eighty ;  missing,  one 
hundred  and  eighteen.  General  Grant  says  in  his 


THE    BATTLE   OF   SHILOII.  73 

Century  article,  and  repeats  in  his  autobiography, 
of  the  Confederate  report :  "  This  estimate  must 
be  incorrect.  We  buried  by  actual  count  more  of 
the  enemy's  dead  in  front  of  the  divisions  of  Mc- 
Clernand  and  Sherman  alone  than  here  reported, 
and  four  thousand  was  the  estimate  of  the  burial 
parties  for  the  whole  field."  Sherman's  division 
lost  three  hundred  and  twenty-five  killed,  twelve 
hundred  and  seventy-seven  wounded,  and  two  hun 
dred  and  ninety-nine  missing ;  total,  nineteen  hun 
dred  and  one. 

General  Lewis  Wallace's  tardy  appearance  on 
the  field  has  been  the  subject  of  much  controversy. 
General  Grant,  on  his  way  from  Savannah  to 
Pittsburg  Landing  Sunday  morning,  stopped  at 
Crump's  Landing,  found  General  Wallace  there 
on  a  steamboat  awaiting  him,  ordered  Wallace  to 
have  his  command  ready  to  march,  and  was  in 
formed  that  the  troops  were  already  under  arms. 
General  Grant,  on  reaching  Pittsburg  and  going 
out  to  the  front,  gave  or  sent  to  Captain  Baxter 
a  verbal  order  for  Wallace  to  move,  which  order 
Captain  Baxter  wrote  out  before  starting.  He 
took  a  steamboat  to  Crump's,  and,  finding  that 
Wallace  had  taken  his  first  brigade  out  to  the  camp 
of  his  second  brigade,  two  miles  from  the  river, 
rode  out  thither  and  repeated  the  order  to  Wal 
lace,  at  the  same  time  handing  him  the  writing. 
Captain  Baxter  arrived  at  eleven  o'clock  or  a  lit 
tle  later ;  the  two  brigades  had  dinner  at  half  past 
eleven,  and  Wallace  started  at  twelve  by  the  Savan 
nah  and  Corinth  road.  This  road,  passing  through 
the  camp  of  the  second  brigade,  intersected  the  Pitts 
burg  Landing  and  Purdy  road  near  the  camp  of 
General  Sherman's  first  brigade,  his  extreme  right. 
General  Grant,  becoming  anxious,  sent  Captain 
Rowley  at  one  o'clock  to  hasten  Wallace.  Going 
to  the  camp  of  the  second  brigade,  and  learning 
there  Wallace's  route,  he  overtook  him  at  half  past 


74  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

two  o'clock.  General  Wallace  fixes  the  place  as 
on  the  Purdy  road,  near  the  crossing  of  Owl  Creek, 
close  to  McDowell's  camp,  more  than  a  mile  di 
rectly  in  rear  of  the  force  which  was  pressing  Sher 
man  and  McClernand  toward  the  river.  Wallace 
countermarched  his  column  and  found  a  little 
crossroad  which  led  to  the  river  road,  and  on  which 
he  was  overtaken  at  half  past  three  by  Colonel 
Rawlins  and  Captain  McPherson,  of  Grant's  staff, 
who  were  very  impatient  at  the  delay.  The  head 
of  the  division  reached  the  bridge  over  Snake 
Creek  after  sunset,  about  seven  o'clock,  having 
marched  fifteen  miles,  and  bivouacked  on  the  east 
ern  slope  of  the  valley  of  Brier  or  Tillman  Creek. 
The  contention  has  been  that  Wallace  was  in 
fault  (i)  in  taking  the  outer  road  when  he  was  ex 
pressly  ordered  to  take  the  river  road ;  (2)  in  coun 
termarching  his  column  instead  of  facing  to  the 
rear  and  marching  left  in  front ;  (3)  in  lagging  on 
the  way  when  utmost  speed  was  an  obvious  im 
perative  necessity,  (i)  The  order  was  to  advance 
and  support  the  right  of  the  line.  Three  of  General 
Grant's  staff  say  that  the  order  was  to  advance  by 
the  river  road.  General  Wallace  and  six  of  his  of 
ficers,  who  heard  and  read  the  order,  say  that  no 
road  was  named.  If  there  were  no  testimony,  the 
antecedent  probability  would  be  that  no  road  was 
mentioned.  For  in  ordering  Wallace  to  march  up 
from  Crump's  Landing  Grant  would  not  think  of 
any  road  but  the  one  from  Crump's  Landing  to 
Pittsburg  Landing,  and  naturally  would  not  think 
of  naming  the  road.  Whatever  the  fact  was,  cer 
tainly  Wallace  and  his  officers  understood  that  no 
road  was  mentioned,  and  thereupon,  being  at  the 
second  brigade  camp,  two  miles  from  the  river, 
they  naturally  took  the  Savannah  and  Corinth  road, 
which  was  the  direct  road  to  Sherman's  right,  and 
was  the  road  by  which  Wallace  had  sent  letters 
to  Sherman.  (2)  It  was  a  mistake  to  lose  time  by 


THE   BATTLE   OF   SHILOH.  75 

a  countermarch,  instead  of  simply  facing  to  the 
rear,  when  time  was  so  precious.  (3)  It  is  difficult 
to  fix  the  route  of  Wallace's  march  with  the  evi 
dence  now  attainable,  including  the  provision 
al  charts  of  the  Shiloh  Battlefield  Commission. 
Progress  over  the  deep  and  slippery  mud  of  the 
river  bottom,  being  the  last  part  of  the  journey, 
was  so  toilsome  that  the  field  officers  of  the  rear 
regiment  dismounted  and  let  exhausted  men  who 
fell  out  of  the  ranks  take  turns  in  riding.  The 
charge  or  intimation  that  Wallace  willfully  lin 
gered  sounds  strange  indeed  to  those  who  remem 
ber  that  this  was  the  same  Wallace  who  retrieved 
the  disaster  on  the  right  at  Fort  Donelson,  opened 
the  battle  Monday  morning  at  Shiloh,  and  with  a 
small  force,  by  desperate  fighting,  delayed  Early  a 
vital  day  in  his  march  on  to  Washington. 

General  Bragg  said  some  time  after  the  battle, 
and  it  has  been  repeated  by  many,  that  the  fire  of 
the  gunboats  Sunday  evening  was  noisy  but  harm 
less.  The  reports  of  brigade  and  regimental  com 
manders  made  at  the  time  quite  generally  men 
tion  being  ordered  to  move  out  of  range  of  the 
gunboat  fire ;  some  specify  the  loss  so  suffered. 
Some  examples  of  these  reports  are  as  follows : 
General  Clark,  commanding  a  division,  says  that 
at  the  close  of  the  day  he  was  about  to  aid  in  fol 
lowing  up  the  National  troops,  but  was  checked 
by  the  fire  of  the  gunboats.  General  Gibson  says 
he  was  ordered  to  retire  his  brigade  from  the  fire 
of  the  gunboats,  in  which  movement  considerable 
disorder  ensued.  General  Patton  Anderson  took 
his  brigade  into  a  hollow  for  shelter,  in  moving 
from  which  he  lost  several  killed  and  many  wound 
ed.  Colonel  John  C.  Moore,  Second  Texas,  re 
ports  that  two  of  his  men  were  mortally  wounded 
by  a  shell.  Captain  Poole,  commanding  a  Florida 
battalion,  says  :  "  One  or  two  of  my  command  were 
either  killed  or  mortallv  wounded  while  under  this 
fire."  General  S. A.M. Wood,  coming  under  the  fire 


76  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

of  the  gunboats,  "  pressed  forward  to  a  position 
most  secure  from  the  shelling,"  in  which  position 
he  had  ten  killed  and  many  wounded  by  the  shells. 
General  Trabue  says :  "  We  endured  a  most  ter 
rific  cannonade  and  shelling  from  the  enemy's  gun 
boats.  My  command,  however,  had  seen  too  much 
hard  fighting  to  be  alarmed,  and  the  Fourth  Ken 
tucky  stood  firm,  while  some  of  our  troops  to  the 
front  fell  back  through  their  lines  in  confusion. 
In  Company  D  of  this  regiment  I  lost  at  this  place 
eleven  men,  and  Lieutenant  Keller,  of  the  Fifth 
Regiment,  was  wounded/'  Colonel  Venable,  of  the 
Fifth  Tennessee,  says  that  the  gunboat  fire  was  un 
bearable,  killing  and  wounding  several  of  his  men. 
There  has  been  much  controversy  as  to  the  re 
sponsibility  for  establishing  the  troops  on  the  west 
bank  of  the  river,  and  for  the  position  of  the  camps. 
Sherman,  receiving  from  General  Smith,  in  the 
forenoon  of  March  I4th,  an  order  to  go  on  the  ex 
pedition  to  Yellow  Creek,  wrote  to  him :  "  I  would 
suggest  as  a  precautionary  measure,  after  I  pass 
up  the  river  with  one  gunboat  and  my  division, 
that  the  other  gunboat  and  one  division — say  Hurl- 
but's  or  Wallace's — move  up  to  Pittsburg  Landing 
and  there  await  my  return.  ...  If  the  force  at 
Corinth  be  already  large,  Cheatham  may  remain  at 
or  near  Pittsburg  Landing  and  embarrass  our  re 
turn."  Returning  to  Pittsburg  Landing  on  the 
i6th,  he  wrote  to  General  Smith's  assistant  adju 
tant  general  on  the  I7th:  "  I  will  be  governed  by 
your  orders  of  yesterday  to  occupy  Pittsburg 
strongly."  On  the  same  day  Sherman  made  an 
order  that  "  General  Hurlbut  will  disembark  and 
establish  his  camp  on  a  line  perpendicular  to  the 
road  about  a  mile  from  the  river."  Sherman's  di 
vision  did  not  move  out  to  occupy  the  ground 
which  he  had  designated  for  it  till  the  ipth,  and,  as 
two  of  his  brigades  temporarily  occupied  the 
ground  designated  by  him  to  Hurlbut,  the  latter 
did  not  move  till  the  2Oth. 


THE   BATTLE   OF   SIIILOH.  77 

General  Grant,  being  reinstated,  arrived  at  Sa 
vannah  the  evening  of  the  I7th,  and  next  day  sent 
thence  to  Pittsburg  Landing  all  the  steamboats, 
to  debark  there  all  the  troops  on  them,  including 
Smith's  division,  and  return  at  once  to  Paducah. 
General  Smith  being  in  command  at  Pittsburg 
Landing,  Sherman  on  the  2Oth  wrote  to  General 
Lauman,  temporarily  in  command  of  Hurlbut's  di 
vision  :  "  General  Smith  is  on  the  Hiawatha  unwell, 
and  requests  that  I  should  give  the  necessary  di 
rections  for  camping  the  troops  as  they  arrive.  I 
direct  that  you  select  a  line  parallel  to  the  river, 
or  nearly  so,  about  one  mile  distant  from  the  river, 
and  encamp  them  by  brigades,  so  that  they  can 
promptly  form  into  line  of  battle  and  move  out  as 
such  by  the  road  leading  into  the  interior." 

On  the  1 8th  General  Grant  wrote  to  General 
Halleck  from  Savannah  :  "  I  arrived  here  last  even 
ing,  and  found  that  Generals  Sherman's  and  Hurl 
but's  divisions  were  at  Pittsburg,  partially  de 
barked  ;  General  Wallace  at  Crump's  Landing,  six 
miles  below,  same  side  of  the  river;  General  Mc- 
Clernand's  division  at  this  place  encamped ;  and 
General  Smith's  division,  with  unattached  regi 
ments,  on  board  transports  also  here.  ...  I  shall 
go  to-morrow  to  Crump's  Landing  and  Pittsburg, 
and  if  I  think  any  change  of  position  for  any  of  the 
troops  needed  I  will  make  the  change.  Having 
full  faith,  however,  in  the  judgment  of  General 
Smith,  who  selected  the  present  points  of  debarka 
tion,  I  do  not  expect  any  change  will  be  made. 
There  are  no  intermediate  points  where  a  steamer 
can  land  at  the  present  stage  of  water."  General 
Smith  ordered  the  occupation  of  Pittsburg  Land 
ing  and  Crump's  Landing ;  General  Sherman, 
under  authority  from  General  Smith,  selected  there 
the  camp  grounds  of  Sherman's  and  Hurlbut's  di 
visions.  General  Grant,  as  well  as  Smith  and  Sher 
man,  approved  such  occupation  .and  selection. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

FROM    CORINTH    TO    MEMPHIS. 

TUESDAY  morning,  April  8th,  General  Sher 
man,  with  the  brigades  of  Buckland  and  Hilde- 
brand,  all  the  regiments  being  present  and  ranks 
well  filled,  and  accompanied  by  the  Fourth  Illinois 
Cavalry,  went  out  by  order  of  General  Grant  to 
examine  the  roads.  General  T.  J.  Wood,  of  Gen 
eral  Buell's  army,  went  out  by  another  road  with 
two  brigades  of  his  division.  Four  or  five  miles 
out  the  Confederate  cavalry  by  a  sudden  charge 
stampeded  the  Seventy-seventh  Ohio,  but  was  in 
turn  driven  back  and  followed  up  more  than  a 
mile.  General  Sherman  found  much  property  and 
stores,  wagons  and  gun  carriages,  and  a  hospital 
camp,  but  did  not  penetrate  to  or  gain  knowledge 
of  Breckenridge's  camp  at  Mickey's,  where  he  re 
mained  until  Thursday. 

It  is  agreed  on  both  sides  that  the  reported 
number  of  missing  includes  many  killed  and 
wounded.  This  is  especially  true  of  the  Confed 
erate  reports,  as  they  could  not  be  verified  by  in 
spection  of  the  field  of  battle.  The  number  of'men 
buried  there  within  a  few  days  must  have  been 
quite  four  thousand,  and  this  number  was  rapidly 
increased  by  ensuing  deaths.  About  five  hundred 
horses  were  interred.  Constant  rains  saturated  the 
soil.  The  earth,  the  streams,  the  air,  were  filled 
with  poison.  The  hospitals  were  moved  out  be 
yond  the  old  picket  line,  and  the  camps  were  trans 
ferred  beyond  the  hospitals.  The  entire  territory 
"  73 


FROM   CORINTH    TO   MEMPHIS.  79 

of  the  battlefield  was  uninhabited  except  by  a  small 
force  at  the  landing  and  the  Twentieth  Ohio  on  a 
spur  overlooking  the  crossing  of  Owl  Creek,  near 
the  site  of  the  old  camp  of  Sherman's  first  brigade. 
Immediately  after  the  battle  General  Halleck 
ordered  General  Pope  to  abandon  the  expedition 
against  Fort  Pillow  and  proceed  up  the  Tennessee, 
called  strenuously  upon  the  Government  for  re- 
enforcements,  and  went  himself  to  Pittsburg  Land 
ing  to  take  command  in  person.  General  Halleck 
reached  reached  the  landing  April  nth;  General 
Pope  reported  to  him  there  April  2ist,  and  was 
ordered  to  disembark  his  command  at  Hamburg 
Landing.  The  force  collected  under  Halleck 
amounted  to  one  hundred  thousand  men,  and  was 
organized  with  right,  center,  left,  and  reserve.  The 
Army  of  the  Mississippi  constituted  the  left.  The 
Army  of  the  Ohio,  except  General  Thomas's  di 
vision,  formed  the  center.  Sherman's  and  Hurl- 
but's  divisions,  with  two  new  divisions  commanded 
by  Generals  Davies  and  McKean,  made  up  of  the 
remains  of  the  divisions  of  Prentiss  and  W.  H.  L. 
Wallace,  filled  up  by  newly  arrived  regiments,  to 
gether  with  Thomas's  division,  commanded  by 
General  T.  W.  Sherman,  composed  the  right,  under 
the  command  of  General  Thomas.  General  Mc- 
Clernand  had  the  reserve,  being  his  own  and  Lewis 
Wallace's  divisions.  General  Pope  divided  his 
command  into  two  wings,  commanded  respectively 
by  General  Rosecrans  and  Schuyler  Hamilton. 
General  Grant  was  second  in  command  to  the  col 
lective  army,  without  any  specific  command.  Of 
the  officers  subordinate  to  General  Halleck,  nine 
were  already,  or  afterward  became,  army  com 
manders — Grant,  Sherman,  Sheridan,  Buell,  Pope, 
Thomas,  Rosecrans,  McPherson,  and  Logan.  Gen 
eral  Beauregard,  re-enforced  immediately  after  his 
return  to  Corinth  by  Van  Dorn  and  Price  with  a 
force  containing  seventeen  thousand  effectives, 


go  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

summoned  from  Arkansas  after  their  disastrous  de 
feat  at  Pea  Ridge  by  Curtis,  and  by  all  the  troops 
and  new  levies  which  the  Confederate  Government 
could  raise,  mustered  an  army  of  one  hundred  and 
twelve  thousand  men  on  the  rolls  on  the  28th  of 
May,  while  by  reason  of  sickness,  caused  by  "  bad 
food,  neglect  of  police  duty,  inaction,  and  labor, 
and  especially  the  water,  insufficient  and  charged 
with  magnesia  and  rotten  limestone,"  the  effective 
total  was  reduced  to  fifty-two  thousand  seven  hun 
dred  and  six. 

General  Buell  states  that  the  average  distance 
of  the  National  lines  from  Corinth  was  fifteen  miles. 
The  soft  ground  from  the  camps  to  the  landing 
was  cut  and  churned  by  trains  into  a  morass  almost 
impassable  for  saddle  horses  and  a  despair  to 
wagon  teams.  The  army  was  absorbed  in  the  prob 
lem  of  getting  supplies  to  the  front,  and  paralyzed 
by  the  order  reiterated  by  General  Halleck  to  avoid 
being  drawn  into  a  general  engagement.  The  Con 
federate  outposts  and  patrols  covered  the  country 
up  to  the  National  picket  line. 

On  the  27th  of  April  General  Pope  moved  about 
five  miles  out  from  the  river.  Next  day  a  recon- 
noitering  party  discovered  that  Monterey  was  held 
in  force  by  the  enemy.  On  the  2Qth  an  expedition 
commanded  by  General  Stanley  found  Monterey 
evacuated ;  destroyed  the  tents  and  stores  left  be 
hind,  followed  General  Anderson  some  miles  south 
to  the  farther  side  of  a  creek,  and  returned  to  camp. 
On  the  2d  and  3d  of  May  General  Buell  crossed 
Lick  Creek  and  advanced  to  within  twelve  miles 
of  Corinth.  On  the  4th  General  Thomas  moved 
and  intrenched.  On  the  7th  Buell  and  Thomas 
made  another  advance  and  intrenched.  General 
Pope  sent  a  reconnoissance  to  Farmington  on  the 
3d  of  May,  leading  to  a  sharp  engagement,  which 
resulted  in  the  enemy  being  driven  with  loss  into 
Corinth,  and  next  day  moved  his  command  to  a 


FROM   CORINTH    TO   MEMPHIS.  8 1 

strong  position  within  five  miles  of  Corinth.  On 
the  9th  of  May  two  of  his  brigades  had  a  hot  en 
counter  with  a  large  force  near  Farmington,  but 
\vere  recalled  to  camp  to  avoid  the  necessity  for  a 
general  engagement.  The  army  advanced,  mov 
ing,  halting,  intrenching,  and  remaining  in  posi 
tion  while  building  roads  and  bridges  for  another 
advance.  General  Sherman,  on  the  extreme  right, 
in  some  well-planned  movements,  executed  with 
spirit,  carried  successively  several  commanding 
positions.  On  the  evening  of  the  I7th  Buell  and 
Pope  advanced  to  a  road  running  parallel  with  the 
enemy's  works,  and  two  miles  distant  from  them, 
and  intrenched.  Two  creeks,  a  marshy  valley,  and 
thick  woods  intervened  between  this  line  and  Beau- 
regard's  works.  Every  day  some  force  skirmished 
forward  and  fortified,  until  by  the  28th  some  points 
were  so  held  within  one  thousand  yards  of  them. 

General  Beauregard  made  an  order  on  the  26th 
preparing  for  evacuation,  and  began  moving  his 
sick  and  his  stores.  His  troops  left  on  the  night  of 
the  29th.  The  field  batteries  marched  a  mile  to 
the  rear  on  the  various  roads  at  sunset.  The  heavy 
guns  were  taken  out  from  the  fortifications  at  8 
p.  M.  and  loaded  upon  cars.  Besides  the  traveled 
roads,  numerous  ways  had  been  cut  through  the 
woods,  and  by  means  of  all  the  infantry,  moving 
out  at  10  P.  M.,  quickly  evacuated  the  place.  The 
rear  guard  followed  at  midnight,  and  the  cavalry 
pickets  remained  on  post  until  morning.  Loco 
motives  whistled  at  times  through  the  night,  and 
the  troops  remaining  cheered,  as  if  welcoming  ar 
riving  re-enforcements.  But  little  of  value  was  left 
undestroyed.  The  smoke  and  explosions  toward 
morning  of  stores  set  on  fire  and  abandoned  ex 
cited  suspicion  in  the  besiegers,  and  by  seven 
o'clock  Corinth  was  entered  by  parties  from  the 
right,  center,  and  left. 

As  soon  as  it  was  ascertained  that  Corinth  was 


82  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

abandoned,  General  Pope  started  in  pursuit.  Beau- 
regard  halted  at  Baldwin,  nine  miles  south  of 
Booneville.  Preparation  was  completed,  and  a  de 
tailed  order  was  issued  on  the  5th  of  June  for  at 
tack  on  the  next  day,  but  was  countermanded  by 
General  Halleck  by  telegraph.  Beauregard  re 
sumed  his  retreat  on  the  7th,  and  went  into  camp 
at  Tupelo ;  the  pursuing  force  returned  to  camps 
in  the  neighborhood  of  Corinth.  General  Hal- 
leek's  march  of  fourteen  miles  in  twenty-five  days 
seemed  more  like  the  practice  of  a  military  school 
than  an  actual  campaign.  Officers  and  men  learned 
much  of  discipline,  making  of  reports  and  returns, 
picket  duty,  and  the  construction  of  earthworks, 
roads,  and  bridges.  They  became  soldiers  in  fact 
as  well  as  in  name.  And  the  capture  of  Corinth, 
permanently  depriving  the  Confederacy  of  the 
route  to  the  east  from  Memphis  to  Chattanooga, 
confining  communication  to  the  southern  route  by 
Vicksburg,  Meridian,  and  Mobile,  isolated  Mem 
phis  and  determined  its  fall.  Fort  Pillow  was  aban 
doned  on  the  ist  of  June.  The  Confederate  fleet 
was  annihilated  in  an  engagement  with  the  na 
tional  gunboats  and  rams  in  front  of  Memphis  on 
the  6th,  and  on  the  same  day  the  detachment  left 
by  General  Pope  with  the  fleet  entered  Memphis 
and  took  possession. 

General  Pope  telegraphed  to  General  Halleck 
on  June  3d  :  "  The  roads  for  miles  are  full  of  strag 
glers  from  the  enemy.  Not  less  than  ten  thousand 
men  are  thus  scattered  about  who  will  come  in 
within  a  day  or  two."  On  the  8th  he  reported : 
"  They  have  lost  by  desertion  of  Tennessee,  Ken 
tucky,  and  Arkansas  regiments  near  twenty  thou 
sand  men  since  they  left  Corinth."  General  Buell 
reported  on  the  Qth  :  "  The  loss  of  the  enemy  in 
the  retreat  has  undoubtedly  been  very  great  from 
disasters,  sickness,  etc.  The  deserters  all  esti 
mate  at  from  twentv  to  thirty  thousand."  General 


FROM   CORINTH   TO    MEMPHIS.  83 

Halleck,  on  receiving  General  Pope's  first  report, 
dispatched  to  the  Secretary  of  War :  "  General 
Pope  with  forty  thousand  men  is  thirty  miles  south 
of  Corinth,  pushing  the  enemy  hard.  He  already 
reports  ten  thousand  prisoners  and  deserters  from 
the  enemy,  and  fifteen  thousand  stand  of  arms  cap 
tured."  This  was  understood  to  mean  that  Pope 
had  captured  ten  thousand  armed  men.  Secretary 
Stanton  telegraphed  it  as  such  to  every  State,  and 
it  was  published  in  the  newspapers  all  over  the 
country.  It  was  soon  known  that  the  number  of 
men  captured  was  inconsiderable,  and  Pope  suf 
fered  in  public  opinion,  being  believed  to  have 
made  a  statement  which  he  never  made  or  author 
ized  or  contemplated. 

General  Grant,  reprimanded  and  put  in  quasi 
arrest  after  the  capture  of  Fort  Donelson,  and  de 
prived  of  active  command  and  ignored  after  the 
battle  of  Shiloh,  was  entirely  disheartened,  and 
found  the  situation  unbearable.  He  obtained  leave 
of  absence  and  resolved  to  get  away.  General 
Sherman,  hearing  of  it,  went  immediately  to  him, 
and,  telling  first  his  own  experience,  remonstrated 
so  earnestly  and  effectively  that  Grant  reconsidered 
his  purpose  and  remained. 

General  Halleck  had  about  Corinth  over  one 
hundred  thousand  men  present  for  duty,  besides 
Mitchell's  division  of  sixty-five  hundred  marching 
toward  Chattanooga,  all  ably  officered,  elated  with 
success,  and  ready  to  undertake  any  enterprise. 
General  Beauregard  had  in  cantonment  at  Tupelo 
less  than  sixty  thousand  effectives,  dispirited  by 
repeated  loss  and  successive  retreats,  and  encum 
bered  by  eighteen  thousand  sick.  If  Halleck  had 
followed  up  with  his  army,  embracing  Grant,  Sher 
man,  Sheridan,  Pope,  Buell,  Thomas,  Rosecrans, 
McPherson,  and  Logan,  Beauregard  would  have 
given  battle  and  been  crushed  and  destroyed,  or 
would  have  continued  his  retreat  until  his  army 


84  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

melted  away,  scattered  and  dissipated.  But  a  vig 
orous  protracted  pursuit  of  a  defeated  army  was 
the  last  lesson  learned  in  the  war,  and  Halleck  was 
the  person  least  ready  to  undertake  to  learn  the 
lesson.  At  that  time,  when  the  South  was  strain 
ing  every  nerve  to  recuperate  and  re-enforce  its 
debilitated  corps,  and  in  the  early  summer  months, 
the  most  favorable  season  for  a  campaign,  the  very 
worst  thing  that  could  be  done  with  the  National 
army  was  to  keep  it  idle  in  camp.  And  that  is 
what  General  Halleck  did. 

But  on  the  3d  of  June  McClernand  with  his 
own  and  Lewis  Wallace's  division  was  ordered 
to  Bolivar  and  Jackson,  and,  a  little  later,  Wal 
lace's  division  was  sent  to  Arkansas ;  on  the  Qth 
Sherman  with  his  own  and  Hurlbut's  divisions  was 
sent  along  the  railroad  toward  Memphis ;  and 
Buell  with  his  army,  including  Thomas  and  his 
division,  was  ordered  to  advance  along  the  rail 
road  to  Chattanooga.  Pope  was  called  East  to 
serve  in  Virginia,  leaving  his  command  to  Rose- 
crans,  and  then  two  of  the  divisions  were  sent  to 
Buell,  leaving  three  with  Rosecrans.  On  the  i8th 
of  July  Halleck  went  to  Washington  to  take  com 
mand  of  the  armies  of  the  United  States. 

Meanwhile  after  a  thorough  inspection,  together 
with  an  investigation,  had  been  made  into  the  con 
dition  of  the  Confederate  troops  at  Tupelo  by 
order  of  President  Davis,  General  Beauregard  was 
relieved  and  General  Bragg  was  appointed  in  his 
place.  Bragg  was  a  very  able  soldier,  sagacious, 
prompt,  resolute,  and  a  rigid  disciplinarian.  But 
he  was  unpopular,  and  had  few  intimate  acquaint 
ances.  He  was  reserved,  positive,  and  uncompro 
mising  in  disposition,  and  abrupt  and  brusque  in 
manner.  It  has  been  said,  however,  that  he  was 
not  unpopular  with  the  rank  and  file,  and  was  so 
with  the  superior  officers  because  he  was  as  im 
perious  to  them  as  he  was  to  enlisted  men.  He 


FROM    CORINTH    TO    MEMPHIS.  85 

quickly  improved  the  health,  tone,  and  discipline 
of  the  army  at  Tupelo,  and  on  the  22d  of  July  he 
rapidly  moved  by  rail  about  thirty-five  thousand 
of  the  troops  via  Mobile  to  Chattanooga.  After 
securing  re-enforcements,  he  started  about  the 
middle  of  August  for  the  Ohio  River,  and  Gen 
eral  Buell,  who  was  still  toiling,  repairing  railroad, 
and  rebuilding  bridges  from  Corinth  toward  Chat 
tanooga,  was  obliged  to  quit  this  work  and  march 
with  all  possible  diligence  to  save  Cincinnati  and 
Louisville  from  capture. 

General  Grant  was  left  in  command  of  the 
troops  in  West  Tennessee,  about  forty-two  thou 
sand  for  duty.  The  Memphis  and  Chattanooga 
Railroad,  running  along  his  front  two  hundred 
miles,  was  ruined  beyond  repair  by  any  resources  at 
his  command  between  Chewalla  and  Grand  Junc 
tion,  and  exposed  to  incessant  raids  throughout  its 
whole  extent,  and  could  not  be  used.  Communica 
tion  between  Memphis  and  Corinth  was  through 
Jackson,  a  railroad  intersection  far  to  the  rear. 
General  Bragg  left  about  sixteen  thousand  men, 
under  the  command  of  General  Earl  Van  Dorn, 
guarding  the  Mississippi  River,  and  about  the 
same  number  under  General  Price  at  Tupelo.  Van 
Dorn  was  skillful  and  enterprising;  Price  was  a 
pertinacious  fighter. 

The  position  of  the  small  posts  along  the  rail 
road  became  so  precarious  that  in  August  all  west 
of  Grand  Junction  were  withdrawn  "by  General 
Sherman  to  Memphis  ;  the  post  at  Grand  Junction 
was  withdrawn  to  Bolivar,  and  by  the  middle  of 
September  all  detachments  to  the  eastward  of  Cor 
inth  retired  to  that  point,  except  that  Colonel  Mur 
phy  remained  with  his  regiment  at  luka  to  protect 
the  shipment  thence  of  the  depot  of  quartermaster, 
commissary,  and  ordnance  supplies.  At  the  end 
of  August  General  Armstrong  with  two  brigades 
of  cavalry,  numbering  four  thousand  men,  ad- 


86  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

vanced  into  Tennessee.  Colonel  Leggett,  with  two 
regiments  of  infantry,  two  guns,  and  four  com 
panies  of  cavalry,  met  them  five  miles  from  Bolivar, 
and  opposed  them  so  audaciously  that  Armstrong, 
having  suffered  considerable  loss,  withdrew  from 
the  field  after  a  contest  of  seven  hours.  General 
Armstrong  came  upon  Colonel  Dennis  marching 
on  Britton's  Lane  with  two  regiments,  two  guns, 
and  two  companies  of  cavalry;  Colonel  Dennis 
took  position  on  a  wooded  hill  commanding  the 
lane.  General  Armstrong  made  repeated  charges 
upon  the  hill,  suffering  repulse  each  time,  and 
finally  withdrew,  leaving  one  hundred  and  sixty- 
nine  killed  and  many  wounded  on  the  field.  He 
returned  to  Mississippi  after  doing  some  trifling 
injury  to  the  railroad.  Colonel  Leggett  and  Colo 
nel  Dennis,  as  well  as  Colonel  Crocker,  commander 
of  the  post  at  Bolivar,  were  promoted  to  the  rank 
of  brigadier  general  for  their  success. 

General  Grant  was  anxiously  watching  for  in 
dications  of  the  design  of  the  enemy,  and  by  the 
nth  of  September  became  satisfied  that  an  attack 
would  be  made  on  Corinth  by  Van  Dorn  and 
Price.  He  at  once  had  the  garrisons  of  Tuscumbia 
and  luka  called  into  Corinth,  the  troops  at  Bolivar 
moved  to  Corinth,  and  a  force  transferred  from 
Memphis  to  Bolivar.  Price  and  Van  Dorn,  in  fact, 
proposed  to  capture  Corinth  and  force  Grant  back 
into  Kentucky,  but  Van  Dorn  was  not  ready.  Gen 
eral  Price  occupied  luka,  which  Colonel  Murphy 
abandoned  without  making  any  attempt  to  destroy 
the  great  store  of  supplies  remaining  there.  Con 
fident  that  he  could  retake  luka  and  get  back  to 
Corinth  before  Van  Dorn  could  appear  before  it, 
Grant  dispatched  Rosecrans  to  approach  luka  from 
the  south,  occupying  both  of  the  roads  running 
from  the  town  to  the  south,  while  Ord  with  an 
other  column  should  reach  the  town  from  the 
northwest.  Ord  was  in  place  on  time.  Rosecrans, 


FROM   CORINTH    TO    MEMPHIS.  g/ 

delayed  at  first  by  difficulties  in  the  road,  made  up 
by  forced  marching,  so  that  late  in  the  afternoon 
of  the  I9th  his  advance  division,  Hamilton's,  en 
countered  one  of  Price's  divisions,  Little's,  within 
two  miles  of  Itika.  A  fierce  fight  ensued.  Hamil 
ton  lost  one  fourth  of  his  command  in  killed  and 
wounded — seven  hundred  out  of  twenty-eight  hun 
dred.  Price  reported  eighty-six  killed  and  four 
hundred  and  eight  wounded ;  while  Rosecrans's 
provost  marshal  certified  that  he  had  buried  two 
hundred  and  sixty-five  of  Price's  men  who  were 
found  dead  on  the  field  of  battle,  and  a  hundred 
and  twenty  more,  being  a  portion  of  the  wounded 
whom  Price  had  left  behind  and  who  died  in  hos 
pital.  In  the  course  of  the  night  Rosecrans  ad 
vised  Grant,  who  was  with  Ord,  of  the  engage 
ment,  and  of  his  intention  to  attack  Price  in  the 
morning.  When  morning  came  it  was  discovered 
that  the  bird  had  flown.  Rosecrans  had  occupied 
only  one  of  the  roads,  and  Price  had  moved  out 
through  the  night  by  the  other  and  was  already 
beyond  pursuit.  The  troops  immediately  moved 
back  to  their  respective  quarters  at  Corinth,  Jack 
son,  and  Bolivar. 

General  Price,  reaching  Baldwin  on  the  23d, 
reported  by  letter  to  Van  Dorn  at  Holly  Springs. 
Five  days  later  they  joined  forces  at  Ripley,  num 
bering  together  twenty-three  thousand  muskets. 
Van  Dorn  assumed  command,  and,  moving  next 
day,  reached  Pocahontas  on  the  ist  of  October,  and 
was  near  Corinth  on  the  2d.  On  the  morning  of 
the  3d  Van  Dorn  advanced,  skirmishing  with  the 
National  outposts,  and  at  ten  o'clock  came  upon 
Rosecrans's  four  divisions  in  line  about  two  miles 
in  advance  of  the  works  recently  constructed  on 
the  outskirts  of  the  town.  Attack  was  made  with 
vigor,  and  was  met  with  equal  courage.  A  hot 
engagement  ensued,  which  lasted  without  inter 
mission  through  the  day.  When  it  ceased,  at  nearly 
7 


88  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

6  P.  M.,  the  National  troops  were  within  the  new 
works,  and  the  assailants  were  halted  a  few  hun 
dred  yards  from  them. 

Assault  upon  the  works  was  made  at  nine 
o'clock  next  morning.  The  assault  was  made  with 
great  determination.  The  National  line  was  pierced, 
and  Battery  Powell  was  carried,  but  after  a  hand- 
to-hand  fight  the  assailants  were  driven  out  and 
the  redoubt  reoccupied.  Later  Fort  Robinett  was 
entered.  After  a  conflict  of  fury  and  desperation 
it  too  was  regained,  and  the  temporary  captors — 
what  was  left  of  them — withdrew  in  disorder.  Far 
ther  to  the  National  left  a  portion  of  Maury's  di 
vision  of  Price's  corps  overcame  Davies's  division 
and  forced  their  way  into  the  town.  There  they 
were  subjected  to  fire  in  front  and  both  flanks,  with 
artillery  and  musketry,  and  retired  with  heavy  loss. 
The  attack  on  Corinth  had  been  planned  with  skill 
and  delivered  with  special  gallantry.  It  had  been 
met  with  indomitable  resolution  and  had  failed. 
By  noon  General  Van  Dorn  with  his  Confederates 
had  left  the  field  and  was  in  full  retreat,  spending 
the  night  at  Chewalla. 

The  National  loss  was  three  hundred  and  fif 
teen  killed,  eighteen  hundred  and  twelve  wounded, 
and  two  hundred  and  thirty-two  missing ;  total, 
twenty-three  hundred  and  fifty-nine.  The  Confed 
erate  returns  make  their  loss  five  hundred  and  five 
killed,  twenty-one  hundred  and  fifty  wounded, 
twenty-one  hundred  and  eighty-three  missing ; 
total,  forty-eight  hundred  and  thirty-eight.  Gen 
eral  Rosecrans's  medical  director  reported  that 
after  the  battle  fourteen  hundred  and  twenty-three 
Confederate  soldiers  were  buried  on  the  field. 
Among  the  killed  were  Brigadier-General  Hackle- 
man  and  Colonel  Kirby  Smith,  of  the  Forty-third 
Ohio,  a  young  officer  of  the  regular  army  of  most 
brilliant  promise.  On  the  Confederate  side,  Colo 
nel  Rogers,  of  the  Second  Texas,  a  notably  gal- 


FROM   CORINTH    TO    MEMPHIS.  89 

lant  officer,  was  killed  in  the  bloody  struggle  within 
Fort  Robinett. 

General  Rosecrans,  from  consideration  of  the 
fatigue  of  his  command,  decided  not  to  begin 
pursuit  till  next  morning.  General  McPherson, 
who  arrived  at  Corinth  in  the  afternoon,  was  or 
dered  to  lead  in  the  pursuit  in  the  morning.  Gen 
eral  Ord,  who  had  been  sent  by  General  Grant 
with  his  own  division  and  General  Hurlbut's  to 
intercept  the  expected  retreat  of  Van  Dorn,  ar 
rived  at  the  north  bank  of  the  Hatchie,  at  the 
bridge  near  Pocahontas,  on  the  morning  of  the 
4th.  On  the  morning  of  the  5th  Van  Dorn  left 
Chewalla  and  marched  to  Pocahontas.  His  ad 
vance  obtained  possession  of  the  bridge.  Ord 
drove  them  from  it,  and,  following  closely,  gained 
the  other  bank.  He  attacked  with  spirit  the  more 
numerous  but  fatigued  and  somewhat  disordered 
Confederate  force,  and  repelled  them  from  the 
bridge.  Van  Dorn  turned  south,  found  another 
crossing  six  miles  below,  where  he  took  his  com 
mand  over  the  river  in  the  night  and  then  con 
tinued  to  Holly  Springs.  Rosecrans  left  Corinth 
the  morning  of  the  5th,  and  only  reached  Chewalla 
that  night.  He  joined  Hurlbut  next  day,  Ord 
being  wounded,  and  traveled  as  far  as  Ripley  over 
the  road  by  which  Van  Dorn  had  escaped.  The 
Confederate  force  in  Mississippi  was  too  much 
crippled  by  these  repeated  disasters  to  think  of 
resuming  the  offensive.  President  Davis  sent 
Lieutenant-General  Pemberton  to  take  command, 
and  his  active  command  was  largely  re-enforced  by 
returned  prisoners  of  war  and  new  levies.  Grant, 
relieved  from  apprehension  of  attack,  immediately 
began  to  project  plans  for  invading  Mississippi. 

General  Sherman,  while  engaged  in  his  strictly 
military  functions,  keeping  advised  of  the  position 
of  General  Van  Dorn  and  ascertaining  his  plans, 
and  carrying  on  the  erection  of  Fort  Pickering, 


9o 


GENERAL   SHERMAN. 


was  also  occupied  with  the  more  trying  task  of 
regulating  the  civil  administration  of  Memphis. 
Arriving  there  in  July,  he  found  all  civil  adminis 
tration  suspended  and  the  population  disloyal.  He 
restored  the  mayor  to  his  office,  defining  with 
precision  his  jurisdiction  and  authority;  suggested 
the  re-establishment  of  courts,  prescribing  what 
jurisdiction  they  should  exercise,  and  stating  in 
what  cases  the  military  would  aid  in  the  enforce 
ment  of  civic  authority.  He  permitted  the  publi 
cation  of  newspapers,  but  defined  the  manner  in 
which  the  publication  should  be  conducted.  He 
regulated  in  great  detail  the  manner  in  which  the 
use  of  land  and  houses  belonging  to  disloyal  per 
sons  should  be  appropriated.  He  corresponded 
with  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  combating  the 
policy  of  the  Government  in  permitting  dealers  to 
purchase  cotton  from  within  the  enemy's  lines.  In 
all  these  communications  his  grasp  of  the  subject 
in  hand  and  his  directness  and  precision  of  state 
ment  are  very  notable.  His  argument  to  the  Secre 
tary  of  the  Treasury  as  a  statement  of  the  military 
question  was  unanswerable ;  the  Government  could 
not  deny  that,  but  avoided  it  by  consideration  of 
the  pressing  need  of  some  means  of  paying  the  ob 
ligations  of  the  United  States  to  Europe. 

HEADQUARTERS  FIFTH  DIVISION, 
MEMPHIS,  TENN.,  July  27,  1862. 

JOHN  PARK,  Mayor  of  Memphis,  Present. 

SIR  :  Yours  of  July  24th  is  before  me,  and  has  received,  as 
all  similar  papers  ever  will,  my  careful  and  most  respectful 
consideration.  I  have  the  most  unbounded  respect  for  the 
civil  law,  courts,  and  authorities,  and  shall  do  all  in  my 
power  to  restore  them  to  their  proper  use — viz.,  the  protec 
tion  of  life,  liberty,  and  property.  Unfortunately,  at  this 
time,  civil  war  prevails  in  the  land,  and  necessarily  the  mili 
tary,  for  the  time  being,  must  be  superior  to  the  civil  au 
thority,  but  it  does  not  therefore  destroy  it.  Civil  courts 
and  executive  officers  should  still  exist  and  perform  duties, 


FROM   CORINTH    TO   MEMPHIS.  91 

without  which  civil  or  municipal  bodies  would  soon  pass 
into  disrespect — an  end  to  be  avoided.  I  am  glad  to  find 
in  Memphis  a  mayor  and  municipal  authorities  not  only  in 
existence,  but  in  the  co-exercise  of  important  functions,  and 
I  shall  endeavor  to  restore  one  or  more  civil  tribunals  for 
the  arbitration  of  contracts  and  punishment  of  crimes,  which 
the  military  have  neither  the  time  nor  the  inclination  to  in 
terfere  with.  Among  these,  first  in  importance  is  the  main 
tenance  of  order,  peace,  and  quiet  within  the  jurisdiction  ot 
Memphis.  To  insure  this,  I  will  keep  a  strong  provost  guard 
in  the  city,  but  will  limit  their  duty  to  guarding  public  prop 
erty  held  or  claimed  by  the  United  States,  and  for  the  arrest 
and  confinement  of  State  prisoners  and  soldiers  who  are 
disorderly  or  improperly  away  from  their  regiments.  This 
guard  ought  not  to  arrest  citizens  for  disorder  or  minor 
crimes.  This  should  be  done  by  the  city  police.  I  under 
stand  that  the  city  police  is  too  weak  in  numbers  to  accom 
plish  this  perfectly,  and  I  therefore  recommend  that  the  City 
Council  at  once  take  steps  to  increase  this  force  to  a  number 
which,  in  their  judgment,  day  and  night  can  enforce  your 
ordinances  as  to  peace,  quiet,  and  order,  so  that  any  change 
in  our  military  dispositions  will  not  have  a  tendency  to  leave 
your  people  unguarded.  I  am  willing  to  instruct  the  provost 
guard  to  assist  the  police  force  when  any  combination  is 
made  too  strong  for  them  to  overcome,  but  the  city  police 
should  be  strong  enough  for  any  probable  contingency.  The 
cost  of  maintaining  this  police  force  must  necessarily  fall 
upon  all  citizens  equitably. 

I  am  not  willing,  nor  do  I  think  it  good  policy,  for  the 
city  authorities  to  collect  the  taxes  belonging  to  the  State 
and  county,  as  you  recommend  ;  for  these  would  have  to  be 
refunded.  Better  meet  the  expenses  at  once  by  a  new  tax 
on  all  interested.  Therefore,  if  you,  on  consultation  'with 
the  proper  municipal  body,  will  frame  a  good  bill  for  the  in 
crease  of  your  police  force  and  for  raising  the  necessary 
means  for  their  support  and  maintenance,  I  will  approve  it 
and  aid  you  in  the  collection  of  the  tax.  Of  course  I  can  not 
suggest  how  this  tax  should  be  laid,  but  I  think  that  it  should 
be  made  uniform  on  all  interests,  real  estate,  and  personal 
property,  including  money  and  merchandise.  All  who  are 
protected  should  share  the  expenses  in  proportion  to  the  in 
terests  involved. 

1  am,  with  respect,  your  obedient  servant, 

W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Major-General  commanding. 


92  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

HEADQUARTERS  FIFTH  DIVISION, 
MEMPHIS,  TENN.,  August  u,  1862. 

Hon.  S.  P.  CHASE,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury. 

SIR:  Your  letter  of  August  2d,  just  received,  invites  my 
discussion  of  the  cotton  question.  I  will  write  plainly  and 
slowly,  because  I  know  you  have  no  time  to  listen  to  trifles. 
This  is  no  trifle  :  when  one  nation  is  at  war  with  another,  all 
the  people  of  the  one  are  enemies  of  the  other ;  then  the 
rules  are  plain  and  easy  of  understanding.  Most  unfortu 
nately,  the  war  in  which  we  are  now  engaged  has  been  com 
plicated  with  the  belief  on  the  one  hand  that  all  on  the  other 
are  not  enemies.  It  would  have  been  better  if,  at  the  outset, 
this  mistake  had  not  been  made,  and  it  is  wrong  longer  to 
be  misled  by  it.  The  Government  of  the  United  States  may 
now  safely  proceed  on  the  proper  rule  that  all  in  the  South 
are  enemies  of  all  in  the  North  ;  and  not  only  are  they  un 
friendly,  but  all  who  can  procure  arms  now  bear  them  as 
organized  regiments  or  as  guerrillas.  There  is  not  a  gar 
rison  in  Tennessee  where  a  man  can  go  beyond  the  sight  of 
the  flagstaff  without  being  shot  or  captured.  It  so  happened 
that  these  people  had  cotton,  and,  whenever  they  appre 
hended  our  large  armies  would  move,  they  destroyed  the 
cotton  in  the  belief  that,  of  course,  we  would  seize  it  and 
convert  it  to  our  use.  They  did  not  and  could  not  dream 
that  we  would  pay  money  for  it.  It  had  been  condemned  to 
destruction  by  their  own  acknowledged  government,  and 
was  therefore  lost  to  their  people  ;  and  could  have  been, 
without  injustice,  taken  by  us  and  sent  away,  either  as  abso 
lute  prize  of  war  or  for  future  compensation.  But  the  com 
mercial  enterprise  of  the  Jews  soon  discovered  that  ten  cents 
would  buy  a  pound  of  cotton  behind  our  army,  that  four 
cents  would  take  it  to  Boston,  where  they  could  receive  thirty 
cents  in  gold.  The  bait  was  too  tempting,  and  it  spread 
like  fire  when  here  they  discovered  that  salt,  bacon,  powder, 
firearms,  percussion  caps,  etc.,  were  worth  as  much  as  gold  ; 
and,  strange  to  say,  this  traffic  was  not  only  permitted  but 
encouraged.  Before  we  in  the  interior  could  know  it  hun 
dreds,  yea  thousands,  of  barrels  of  salt  and  millions  of  dollars 
had  been  disbursed,  and  I  have  no  doubt  that  Bragg's  army 
at  Tupelo,  and  Van  Dorn's  at  Vicksburg,  received  enough 
salt  to  make  bacon,  without  which  they  could  not  have 
moved  their  armies  in  mass,  and  from  ten  to  twenty  thou 
sand  fresh  arms  and  a  due  supply  of  cartridges  have  also 
been  got,  I  am  equally  satisfied.  As  soon  as  I  got  to  Mem 
phis,  having  seen  the  effect  in  the  interior,  I  ordered  (only  as 


FROM   CORINTH    TO   MEMPHIS.  93 

to  my  command)  that  gold,  silver,  and  Treasury  notes  were 
contraband  of  war,  and  should  not  go  into  the  interior,  where 
all  were  hostile.  It  is  idle  to  talk  about  Union  men  here  : 
many  want  peace,  and  fear  war  and  its  results,  but  all  prefer 
a  Southern,  independent  government,  and  are  fighting  or 
working  for  it.  Every  gold  dollar  that  was  spent  for  cotton 
was  sent  to  the  seaboard  to  be  exchanged  for  banknotes  and 
Confederate  scrip,  which  will  buy  goods  here  and  are  taken 
in  ordinary  transactions.  I  therefore  required  cotton  to  be 
paid  for  in  such  notes,  by  an  obligation  to  pay  at  the  end  ot 
the  war,  or  by  a  deposit  of  the  price  in  the  hands  of  a  trustee 
— viz.,  the  United  States  quartermaster.  Under  these  rules 
cotton  is  being  obtained  about  as  fast  as  by  any  other  pro 
cess,  and  yet  the  enemy  receives  no  "  aid  or  comfort."  Un 
der  the  "  gold  "  rule  the  country  people  who  had  concealed 
their  cotton  from  the  burners,  and  who  openly  scorned  our 
greenbacks,  were  willing  enough  to  take  Tennessee  money, 
which  will  buy  their  groceries  ;  but  now  that  trade  is  to  be 
encouraged  and  gold  paid  out,  I  admit  that  cotton  will  be 
sent  in  by  our  own  open  enemies,  who  can  make  better  use 
of  gold  than  they  can  of  their  hidden  bales  of  cotton. 

I  may  not  appreciate  the  foreign  aspect  of  the  question, 
but  my  views  on  this  may  be  ventured.  If  England  ever 
threatens  war  because  we  don't  furnish  her  cotton,  tell  her 
plainly  if  she  can't  employ  and  feed  her  own  people  to  send 
them  here,  where  they  can  not  only  earn  an  honest  living, 
but  soon  secure  independence  by  moderate  labor.  We  are 
not  bound  to  furnish  her  cotton.  She  has  more  reason  to 
fight  the  South  for  burning  that  cotton  than  us  for  not  ship 
ping  it.  To  aid  the  South  on  this  ground  would  be  hypoc 
risy  which  the  world  would  detect  at  once.  Let  her  make 
her  ultimatum,  and  there  are  enough  generous  minds  in 
Europe  that  will  counteract  in  the  balance.  Of  course  her 
motive  is  to  cripple  a  power  that  rivals  her  in  commerce  and 
manufactures  that  threaten  even  to  usurp  her  history.  In 
twenty  more  years  of  prosperity  it  will  require  a  close  calcu 
lation  to  determine  whether  England,  her  laws  and  history, 
claim  for  a  home  the  continent  of  America  or  the  isle  of 
Britain.  Therefore,  finding  us  in  a  death  struggle  for  exist 
ence,  she  seems  to  seek  a  quarrel  to  destroy  both  parts  in  de 
tail.  Southern  people  know  this  full  well,  and  will  only  accept 
the  alliance  of  England  in  order  to  get  arms  and  manufac 
tures  in  exchange  for  their  cotton.  The  Southern  Confed 
eracy  will  accept  no  other  mediation,  because  she  knows  full 
well  that  in  old  England  her  slaves  and  slavery  will  receive 
no  more  encouragement  than  in  Nmu  England.  France 


94 


GENERAL   SHERMAN. 


certainly  does  not  need  our  cotton  enough  to  disturb  her 
equilibrium,  and  her  mediation  would  be  entitled  to  a  more 
respectful  consideration  than  on  the  part  of  her  present 
ally.  But  I  feel  assured  the  French  will  not  encourage 
rebellion  and  secession  anywhere  as  a  political  doctrine. 
Certainly  all  the  German  states  must  be  our  ardent  friends, 
and,  in  case  of  European  intervention,  they  could  not  be  kept 
down.  With  great  respect,  your  obedient  servant, 

W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Major-General. 

On  the  24th  of  October  the  War  Department 
by  order  transferred  General  Rosecrans  to  super 
sede  General  Buell  in  the  command  of  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland,  and  transmuted  the  force  under 
General  Grant's  command  into  an  army  corps,  en 
titled  Thirteenth  Army  Corps.  The  force  at  that 
time  numbered  about  forty-eight  thousand  five 
hundred  men.  On  the  4th  of  November  General 
Grant  assembled  at  Grand  Junction  and  La  Grange 
two  divisions  from  Bolivar,  under  command  of 
General  J.  B.  McPherson,  and  three  divisions  from 
Corinth,  under  General  C.  S.  Hamilton,  prepara 
tory  to  making  an  advance  into  Mississippi.  Two 
weeks  later,  by  order  of  General  Grant,  General 
Sherman  met  him  at  Columbus,  Ky.,  and  they  con 
ferred  upon  the  mode  of  carrying  out  the  move 
ment,  the  ultimate  object  of  which,  General  Grant 
said,  was  the  capture  of  Vicksburg.  Grant  moved 
south  through  Holly  Springs  with  the  force  which 
he  had  assembled,  Sherman  advanced  from  Mem 
phis  with  three  divisions,  and  General  Steele,  with 
a  division  from  the  troops  stationed  at  Helena, 
Ark.,  advanced  from  the  Mississippi  toward  Gren 
ada.  Pemberton,  finding  his  rear  threatened  by 
Steele,  abandoned  his  fortified  line  along  the  Tal- 
lahatchie,  fell  back  to  Grenada,  and  took  up  a  new 
line  along  the  Yallabusha.  General  Grant  reached 
the  Tallahatchie  at  the  railroad  crossing  on  the  1st 
of  December,  and  General  Sherman  arrived  at  a 
point  a  few  miles  west  next  day,  to  find  the  cross 
ings  undefended. 


FROM   CORINTH   TO   MEMPHIS.  95 

On  the  8th  General  Sherman,  in  obedience  to 
a  letter  from  General  Grant,  met  him  at  Oxford, 
and  again  conferred  upon  the  plan  of  campaign. 
After  Grant  had  fully  stated  his  plans,  and  before 
Sherman  left,  Grant  sent  to  General  Halleck  by 
telegraph :  "  General  Sherman  will  command  the 
expedition  down  the  Mississippi.  He  will  have  a 
force  of  about  forty  thousand  men,  will  land  above 
Vicksburg  (up  the  Yazoo  if  practicable),  and  cut 
the  Mississippi  road  and  the  road  running  east  from 
Vicksburg,  where  they  cross  Black  River.  I  will 
co-operate  from  here,  my  movements  depending 
on  those  of  the  enemy.  With  the  large  cavalry 
force  at  my  command,  I  will  be  able  to  have  them 
show  themselves  at  different  points  on  the  Talla- 
hatchie  and  Yallabusha,  and  when  an  opportunity 
occurs  make  a  'real  attack.  After  cutting  the  two 
roads,  General  Sherman's  movements  to  secure  the 
end  desired  will  necessarily  be  left  to  his  judg 
ment.  I  will  occupy  this  road  to  Coffeeville." 

To  this  Halleck  replied  at  once,  approving  the 
plan,  but  adding,  "  The  President  may  insist  upon 
designating  a  separate  commander."  Sherman  left 
for  Memphis  next  day,  taking  with  him  one  divi 
sion,  Morgan  L.  Smith's,  and  hastened  prepara 
tions  for  the  expedition  down  the  Mississippi.  The 
situation  in  Mississippi  was  becoming  so  serious 
that  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston  was  appointed  to 
supreme  command  between  the  Alleghany  Moun 
tains  and  the  Mississippi  River,  and  he  hardly 
reached  Chattanooga  to  confer  with  General  Bragg 
before  Jefferson  Davis  arrived  and  accompanied 
General  Johnston  to  Mississippi,  having  first  or 
dered  Bragg  to  send  re-enforcements,  numbering 
nine  thousand  men,  to  Pemberton. 

By  order  of  General  Bragg,  General  Forrest, 
on  the  nth  of  December,  left  Columbia,  Tenn., 
and,  crossing  the  Tennessee  at  Clifton  on  the  I4th 
and  1 5th  by  means  of  an  old  flatboat,  succeeded 


96  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

in  substantially  wrecking  the  railroad  and  telegraph 
between  Columbus  and  Humboldt,  and  eluding  or 
defeating  all  troops  sent  to  meet  him,  except  in  the 
fight  at  Parker's  Cross  Roads,  where  he  was  de 
feated  with  severe  loss  by  General  Sullivan.  On 
the  ist  of  January  he  raised  the  old  flatboat,  which 
had  been  sunk,  and  recrossed  to  Clifton. 

On  the  1 9th  of  December,  while  General  Grant's 
cavalry  were  absent  on  an  expedition  to  destroy 
the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad  at  Tupelo,  General 
Van  Dorn,  having  assembled  all  the  cavalry  of  the 
Confederate  army,  started  upon  a  raid  upon  the 
roads  in  General  Grant's  rear.  General  Grant  ad 
vised  by  telegraph  the  commanders  of  posts  along 
the  railroad,  and  ordered  them  to  be  prepared  to 
resist  attack.  Colonel  Robert  C.  Murphy,  who  had 
abandoned  the  stores  at  luka  to  Price,  was  com 
manding  at  Holly  Springs,  where  the  supplies  for 
General  Grant  for  the  winter  were  accumulated. 
He  received  the  warning,  paid  no  heed  to  it,  gave 
no  information  of  it  to  his  command,  but  permitted 
Van  Dorn  with  his  troops  to  enter  and  occupy  the 
town,  unmolested  save  by  the  sporadic,  spontane 
ous  fire  of  some  of  the  men  who  saw  the  columns 
in  gray  marching  by  their  tents.  Van  Dorn  spent 
a  day  burning  up  the  vast  stores,  and  then  pro 
ceeded  to  feel  the  roads  at  other  points — Bolivar, 
Middleburg,  Grand  Junction,  and  Davis's  Mills — 
but  was  repelled  at  every  attack.  Murphy  was 
court-martialed  and  cashiered.  An  investigation 
was  made,  which  brought  to  light  such  a  taint  of 
treasonable  disloyalty  in  several  regiments  that 
other  courts-martial  followed,  more  officers  were 
dismissed  from  the  service,  and  non-commissioned 
officers  were  transferred  to  other  regiments  and 
surrounded  by  more  wholesome  influences. 

General  Grant  had  advanced  to  the  Yokana- 
patafa  River,  with  Colonel  Leggett's  brigade  at 
Water  Valley  as  advanced  post.  Upon  learning 


FROM    CORINTH    TO    MEMPHIS. 


97 


of  the  disaster  at  Holly  Springs,  he  immediately 
put  the  army  on  short  rations  and  fell  back  behind 
the  Tallahatchie,  leaving  Leggett  south  of  the  river 
as  rear  guard.  Part  of  the  force  was  withdrawn 
in  December  to  repair  the  railroad  from  Memphis 
to  Corinth.  McPherson's  command  remained  till 
General  Grant  was  advised  by  General  Halleck  of 
the  repulse  of  Sherman  near  Vicksburg,  and  was 
ordered  to  re-enforce  the  river  expedition  with  all 
disposable  troops  at  his  command. 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE    MISSISSIPPI. 

GENERAL  SHERMAN  went  energetically  to  work 
on  reaching  Memphis.  He  organized  the  new 
troops  sent  forward  by  General  McClernand  into 
two  divisions,  under  command  of  General  A.  J. 
Smith  and  General  G.  W.  Morgan,  and  added  them 
to  the  division  of  M.  L.  Smith  and  the  division  at 
Helena,  commanded  by  General  F.  Steele.  The 
fleet  of  transports  arriving  on  the  io,th,  he  began 
embarking  on  the  same  day.  He  sailed  next  day, 
and,  stopping  on  the  way  to  take  up  Steele's  di 
vision,  reached  Milliken's  Bend  on  the  25th.  Gen 
eral  Halleck  notified  General  Grant  by  telegraph 
on  the  1 8th  that  the  President  had  appointed  Gen 
eral  McClernand  to  command  the  expedition  down 
the  river.  General  Grant  sent  copies  of  the  dis 
patch  to  both  Sherman  and  McClernand  via  Co 
lumbus,  the  only  telegraph  route ;  but  Forrest  hav 
ing  just  cut  the  line,  the  copies  never  reached  their 
destination. 

The  fortification  of  Vicksburg  was  begun  by 
direction  of  General  Beauregard  in  April,  1862. 
After  the  surrender  of  New  Orleans,  General  Mar 
tin  L.  Smith,  an  accomplished  engineer  officer,  was 
put  in  charge,  and,  pushing  the  work  day  and 
night,  had  six  batteries  completed  with  their  arma 
ment  when  the  advance  of  Farragut's  fleet  ap 
peared  in  the  latter  part  of  May.  General  Wil 
liams,  commanding  the  detachment  of  troops  with 
the  fleet,  deciding  that  nothing  could  be  done 
98 


THE   MISSISSIPPI. 


99 


against  the  completed  works  with  his  command, 
Farragut  returned,  reaching  New  Orleans  about 
the  ist  of  June.  Here  he  found  urgent  orders  from 
the  Navy  Department  to  capture  Vicksburg,  and 
so  clear  the  Mississippi  River.  Commodore  Far 
ragut  arrived  before  Vicksburg  on  the  25th  of  June 
with  his  fleet,  accompanied  by  Commodore  Por 
ter  and  his  mortar  fleet,  and  carrying  General  Wil 
liams  with  four  thousand  men.  Commodore  Davis 
arrived  at  the  same  time  from  Memphis  with  his 
fleet.  General  Williams  set  some  twelve  hundred 
negroes  to  work  attempting  to  cut  a  canal  across 
the  neck  of  the  peninsula  opposite  Vicksburg.  The 
fleets  bombarded  with  their  guns  and  mortars,  and 
General  Williams  with  his  fieldpieces.  All  the  ten 
batteries  originally  designed  by  General  Beaure- 
gard  had  now  been  completed,  and  their  guns  on 
the  summit  of  the  lofty  bluffs  fired  composedly  on 
the  vessels  far  below.  The  damage  to  the  batteries 
and  their  defenders  was  slight ;  the  injury  to  the 
fleet  was  not  serious.  The  27th  of  July  Farragut 
sailed  down  the  river  and  Davis  left  for  Memphis. 
On  the  26th  of  December  General  Sherman, 
leaving  A.  J.  Smith's  division  at  Milliken's  Bend 
to  destroy  the  railroad  leading  to  the  West  from 
Vicksburg,  proceeded  with  the  other  three  divi 
sions  thirteen  miles  up  the  Yazoo  to  attack  the 
batteries  above  Vicksburg  and  gain  the  plateau  be 
hind  the  city.  The  land  between  the  Yazoo  at 
that  place  and  the  bluffs  which  were  to  be  assailed 
was  low,  flat,  subject  to  overflow,  intersected  with 
ponds,  bayous,  and  morasses,  covered  with  forest, 
undergrowth,  and  fallen  timber,  and  under  full 
view  throughout  from  the  bluffs.  The  ground 
chosen  was  bordered  on  the  westerly  side,  on  Sher 
man's  right  as  he  faced  the  enemy,  by  a  large  arm 
of  the  Yazoo,  or  a  bayou,  called  Old  River ;  on  the 
left,  and  about  four  miles  distant,  Chickasaw  Bayou 
extended  from  the  Yazoo  to  the  front ;  while  along 


100  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

the  front  stretched  a  chain  of  ponds,  constituting 
an  ancient  abandoned  bed  of  the  river. 

On  the  2/th  and  28th  the  command  advanced 
to  the  chain  of  ponds  and  reconnoitered.  Steele's 
division  was  on  the  left,  beyond  Chickasaw  Bayou ; 
Morgan  next,  toward  the  right,  separated  from 
Steele  by  Chickasaw  Bayou ;  on  Morgan's  right 
was  Morgan  L.  Smith ;  and  on  the  extreme  right 
was  A.  J.  Smith,  who  had  rejoined  the  command 
the  night  of  the  i6th.  Steele's  route  was  blocked 
by  a  large  pond,  which  communicated  at  one  end 
with  the  Yazoo  and  at  the  other  with  Chickasaw 
Bayou.  He  was  marched  back  to  the  Yazoo,  fer 
ried  down  stream,  landed,  and  sent  to  the  front, 
still  forming  the  extreme  left,  but  now  between 
Chickasaw  Bayou  and  G.  W.  Morgan.  Morgan 
L.  Smith  was  severely  wounded,  and  General  D. 
Stuart  succeeded  to  the  command  of  the  division. 
The  road  to  Vicksburg  in  front  of  A.  J.  Smith  was 
found  to  be  obstructed  by  unfordable  waterways, 
from  which  the  bridges  had  been  removed,  and  by 
impassable  swamps.  Morgan  used  the  only  pon 
toon  train  in  the  expedition  to  cross  a  small  pond, 
supposing  it  to  be  the  main  chain  of  ponds  in 
front,  but,  on  arriving  at  the  main  pond,  called 
'  The  Lake/'  he  was  so  fortunate  as  to  find  a  prac 
ticable  crossing.  A  narrow  sandbar  extended 
across  "  The  Lake  "  in  front  cf  M.  L.  Smith's  di 
vision,  but  beyond  it  was  a  high  levee,  above  which 
on  the  slope  of  the  bluff  was  a  battery.  A.  J.  Smith 
with  the  greater  part  of  his  division  was  moved 
up  to  M.  L.  Smith's  division,  now  commanded  by 
General  David  Stuart.  The  troops  bivouacked  in 
the  assigned  position  during  the  night  of  the  28th. 
The  enemy's  batteries  were  near  the  foot  of  the 
bluff,  from  three  to  five  hundred  yards  from  Sher 
man's  line. 

About    noon    of    the    2Qth    General    Sherman 
opened  with  artillery  along  his  line.    A.  J.  Smith's 


THE    MISSISSIPPI.  101 

division  on  the  extreme  right  made  a  demonstra 
tion  out  on  the  Vicksburg  road.  The  Sixth  Mis 
souri,  of  M.  L.  Smith's  division,  temporarily  com 
manded  by  D.  Stuart,  crossed  the  narrow  sand 
bar  and  reached  the  high  levee.  Unable  to  sur 
mount  this,  and  subjected  to  a  vertical  fire  to  which 
they  could  make  no  return,  they  scooped  hollows 
into  the  face  of  the  levee  and  squatted  in  this  con 
strained  shelter  until  night  gave  them  opportunity 
to  slip  back  to  camp  one  by  one.  De  Courcy's 
brigade  from  Morgan's  division  and  Blair's  brigade, 
together  with  the  Fourth  Iowa  of  Thayer's  bri 
gade,  made  their  way  through  a  wilting  fire  to  the 
Confederate  works.  Morgan  and  Steele  with  the 
rest  of  their  respective  divisions  failed  to  follow,  and 
the  crippled  brigades,  unsupported,  made  no  effec 
tive  lodgment,  and  returned  with  shattered  ranks. 
The  assault  failed.  It  was  a  desperate  assault  to  un 
dertake,  but  General  Sherman  thought  that  if  Mor 
gan  had  heartily  supported  Blair  a  lodgment  could 
have  been  made  which  would  have  opened  the  way 
for  the  rest  of  the  force  and  insured  success.  Gen 
eral  Sherman's  loss  was  nineteen  hundred  and 
twenty-nine,  of  which  number  one  hundred  and 
ninety-one  were  killed,  nine  hundred  and  eighty- 
two  wounded,  and  seven  hundred  and  fifty-six 
missing.  The  loss  of  Blair's  brigade  was  seven 
hundred  and  forty-three.  The  Confederate  loss 
during  the  two  days  of  skirmishing  and  the  as 
sault  on  the  29th  was  fifty-seven  killed,  one  hun 
dred  and  twenty  wounded,  and  ten  missing. 

General  "Sherman,  failing  here,  determined  to 
attempt  an  assault  at  Raines's  Bluff,  farther  up  the 
Yazoo,  and  on  the  night  of  the  3Oth  General  Steele 
was  sent  with  his  division  and  a  brigade  to  make 
the  attack  under  cover  of  Porter's  fleet.  General 
Sherman  was  to  resume  the  assault  by  Chickasaw 
Bayou  when  he  should  hear  the  guns  of  Steele's 
attack.  Steele  sent  word  before  night  that  a  fog 


102  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

prevented  movement  by  the  boats.  Next  day  word 
was  received  that  the  moon  would  be  shining  all 
night  and  disclose  the  landing.  Meanwhile  it  being 
obvious  that  the  Confederates  were  receiving  re- 
enforcements,  General  Sherman  re-embarked  the 
expedition  on  the  2d  of  January,  1863. 

He  went  immediately  to  the  mouth  of  the  river 
on  learning  that  General  McClernand  was  there. 
McClernand  showed  the  order  of  the  Secretary  of 
War,  with  the  approval  of  the  President  endorsed, 
appointing  him  to  command  the  expedition.  Sher 
man  turned  over  the  command,  made  report  of 
what  had  been  done,  learned  of  the  loss  of  Holly 
Springs  and  the  retreat  of  Grant,  and,  by  direction 
of  McClernand,  brought  the  transports  with  the 
troops  to  Milliken's  Bend.  On  the  4th  of  Janu 
ary  General  McClernand  issued  his  order  organ 
izing  the  expeditionary  force  into  two  army  corps, 
the  first  comprising  the  divisions  of  G.  W.  Mor 
gan  and  A.  J.  Smith,  and  commanded  by  General 
Morgan ;  the  second  commanded  by  General  Sher 
man,  and  comprising  the  division  of  Stuart,  for 
merly  of  M.  L.  Smith,  and  that  of  Steele.  On  the 
same  day  General  Sherman  called  upon  General 
McClernand  on  his  boat  and  urged  that  an  expedi 
tion  be  sent  to  capture  Fort  Hindman,  or  Arkan 
sas  Post,  on  a  bend  of  the  Arkansas,  about  forty 
miles  from  its  mouth.  They  visited  the  admiral 
on  his  boat  in  the  night,  and  it  was  finally  agreed 
that  McClernand  would  take  the  whole  of  his 
command  and  that  Porter  would  go  with  his 
fleet. 

The  fort,  a  square  work  with  a  bastion  at  each 
corner,  surrounded  by  a  ditch,  stood  on  a  bluff  at 
the  head  of  a  sharp  bend  of  the  Arkansas,  and 
commanded  the  river  with  its  guns  for  more  than 
a  mile  along  each  arm  of  the  bend.  It  was  armed 
with  seventeen  guns  and  defended  by  five  thou 
sand  troops,  commanded  by  General  T.  J.  Church- 


THE    MISSISSIPPI. 


103 


ill.  It  could  be  approached  from  the  Mississippi 
either  by  entering  the  Arkansas  at  its  mouth,  or, 
by  a  shorter  route,  entering  the  White  River  at 
its  mouth  and  passing  thence  by  a  cut-off  to  the 
Arkansas.  The  fleet  reached  the  mouth  of  White 
River  on  the  8th  ;  the  troops  disembarked  on  the 
morning  of  the  loth,  about  three  miles  below  the 
fort,  and  advanced  toward  it,  Sherman  having  the 
right  and  Morgan  the  left.  The  opposing  troops 
fell  back  slowly,  halting  toward  evening  in  a  line 
with  the  north  face,  extending  from  the  northwest 
bastion  to  an  impassable  swamp  and  bayou.  Sher 
man  and  Morgan  followed,  and  formed  a  line  ex 
tending  from  the  bayou  to  the  river  below  the  fort. 
General  Sherman  in  person  during  the  night  cau 
tiously  advanced  under  cover  of  timber  till  he  was 
near  enough  to  hear  the  hum  of  voices,  with  the 
sound  of  tearing  down  wooden  buildings,  ham 
mering,  and  other  noises  indicating  the  construc 
tion  of  works,  and  remained  listening  till  the  bugle 
call  of  reveille  in  the  Confederate  camp  notified 
him  it  was  time  to  withdraw.  While  McClernand's 
force  was  getting  into  position,  Porter  moved  his 
fleet  close  to  the  fort  and  opened  a  fire  so  heavy 
and  destructive  that  the  garrison  could  not  reply, 
but  could  only  seek  shelter. 

Next  morning  the  National  line  moved  forward 
to  about  four  hundred  yards  from  the  fort  and  the 
line  of  infantry  intrenchments,  about  a  mile  in 
length,  which  the  Confederates  had  thrown  up  in 
the  night.  At  noon  Porter  opened  with  his  whole 
fleet  at  a  few  hundred  yards'  distance;  his  heavy 
ordnance  plowed  deep  furrows  in  the  ramparts, 
broke  up  the  guns,  and  tore  open  the  bombproofs. 
The  garrison  had  to  take  refuge  in  the  ditch  of 
the  fort.  At  the  same  time  the  forty-five  field- 
pieces  disposed  along  McClernand's  line  bom 
barded  the  new  works  thrown  up  in  the  night. 
When  they  ceased,  Sherman's  and  Morgan's  men 

8 


104  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

sprang  forward  to  the  assault,  and  the  Confederate 
artillery  and  infantry  met  them  with  continuous 
volleys  at  short  range  and  over  bad  ground.  When 
the  assaulting  line  had  reached  to  about  one  hun 
dred  yards  of  the  works,  a  large  white  flag  and 
sundry  small  ones  were  raised  above  the  works, 
and  a  cry  ran  along  the  Confederate  line,  "  Run 
up  the  white  flag,  by  order  of  General  Churchill !  " 
One  of  the  Confederate  brigade  commanders  re 
fused  to  stack  arms,  and  held  his  men  to  the  para 
pet  in  position  to  defend  it.  He  said  he  had  re 
ceived  no  order  to  surrender.  Steele's  division, 
facing  the  front  of  the  parapet,  were  held  halted 
by  Major  Hammond,  of  General  Sherman's  staff, 
till  General  Churchill  came  up  with  General  Sher 
man  and  gave  the  order  to  surrender.  General 
Churchill  denied  having  given  any  previous  order 
to  surrender,  while  Colonel  Garland,  who  surren 
dered  first,  told  General  Churchill  that  he  received 
the  order  to  surrender  from  one  of  General  Church 
ill's  staff.  The  question  who  first  gave  the  order 
was  never  settled. 

The  Confederates  lost  about  one  hundred  killed 
and  a  greater  number  wounded ;  prisoners  number 
ing  forty-seven  hundred  and  ninety-one  were  sent 
North  next  day.  This  number  includes  an  Arkan 
sas  regiment  which  marched  into  the  fort  some 
hours  after  the  surrender,  unaware  of  the  fact.  The 
National  loss,  killed,  wounded,  and  missing,  was 
ten  hundred  and  sixty-one.  Seventeen  guns,  more 
or  less  damaged,  and  a  large  amount  of  stores — 
quartermaster,  commissary,  and  ordnance — was 
captured.  General  McClernand  remained  three 
days  shipping  the  captured  stores  and  leveling  tha 
fort.  General  McClernand  received  on  the  I5th 
an  order  from  General  Grant  to  return  to  Milli- 
ken's  Bend  unless  he  had  some  object  not  visible 
from  a  distance.  The  expedition  was  all  at  Napo 
leon  by  the  i7th.  General  Grant  made  a  visit  of 


THE    MISSISSIPPI.  105 

two  days  and  returned  to  Memphis,  and  the  expe 
dition  proceeded  to  Milliken's  Bend. 

When  the  first  rumor  was  heard  of  a  separate 
expedition  down  the  Mississippi,  General  Halleck 
telegraphed  in  reply  to  a  dispatch  of  inquiry  from 
General  Grant,  November  6,  1862:  "You  have 
command  of  all  troops  sent  to  your  department." 
General  McClernand,  on  the  8th  of  January,  1863, 
while  proceeding  to  Arkansas  Post,  sent  a  letter 
to  General  Grant,  in  which  he  said  something  about 
going  beyond  and  co-operating  with  General  Cur- 
tis's  force  in  Arkansas.  General  Grant  wrote  in 
reply,  ordering  him  to  return  to  the  Mississippi 
unless  he  was  acting  under  orders  of  superior  au 
thority.  He  telegraphed  to  General  Halleck,  and 
received  reply :  "  You  are  hereby  authorized  to  re 
lieve  General  McClernand  from  command  of  the 
expedition  against  Vicksburg,  giving  it  to  the  next 
in  rank  or  taking  it  yourself."  An  order  of  the 
War  Department,  dated  December  18,  1862,  di 
rected  all  the  troops  in  General  Grant's  command 
to  be  organized  into  four  army  corps,  to  be  num 
bered  Thirteenth,  Fifteenth,  Sixteenth,  and  Seven 
teenth,  to  be  commanded  respectively  by  McCler 
nand,  Sherman,  Hurlbut,  and  McPherson. 

The  new  organization  of  the  Army  of  the  Ten 
nessee  gave  to  General  McClernand  the  command 
of  the  corps  which  had  been  Morgan's,  with  the 
addition  of  the  troops  at  Helena.  Sherman  con 
tinued  in  command  of  his  corps,  increased  by  a 
brigade  commanded  by  Hugh  Ewing.  The  corps 
of  McPherson  comprised  the  divisions  of  McAr- 
thur,  Logan,  and  Quinby.  All  the  remaining 
troops  in  northern  Mississippi,  West  Tennessee, 
and  west  Kentucky  in  General  Grant's  department 
composed  Hurlbut's  command,  and  were  classified 
as  Sixteenth  Corps. 

The  result  of  General  Grant's  inquiries  during 
the  visit  at  Napoleon  impressed  him  more  clearly 


106  GENERAL  SHERMAN. 

with  the  difficulty  of  his  undertaking  and  the  neces 
sity  for  a  large  and  well-equipped  force.  To  at 
tack  Vicksburg  from  the  front  was  impossible. 
The  land  north  of  the  city,  the  low  tract  between 
the  Yazoo  and  the  Mississippi,  was  under  water. 
The  land  to  the  south  was  dry,  the  bluffs  of  Vicks 
burg  continuing  down  the  river.  The  only  visible 
chance  was  to  cross  the  Mississippi  below  the  city 
and  its  fortifications,  and  a  canal  across  the  tongue 
of  land  in  Louisiana  running  out  toward  Vicksburg 
seemed  the  most  available  means  of  getting  the 
army  below  the  city.  When  Grant  so  reported  in 
a  letter  written  on  the  2Oth  of  January,  the  Presi 
dent  and  Halleck  cordially  approved  the  scheme. 

Some  years  before  the  war  the  State  of  Louisi 
ana  began  to  cut  a  canal  across  this  peninsula. 
General  Beauregard,  in  drafting  his  scheme  for  the 
defense  of  Vicksburg,  laid  stress  upon  the  erection 
of  batteries  placed  so  as  to  prevent  the  construc 
tion  of  such  a  canal.  And  General  Williams,  com 
manding  the  land  force  with  Farragut's  second  ex 
pedition,  excavated  the  entire  length  of  the  canal, 
though  not  to  an  available  depth.  When  General 
Grant  arrived  on  the  3Oth  of  January,  and  found 
the  Thirteenth  and  Fifteenth  Corps  at  work  on  a 
canal  beginning  in  an  eddy  above  the  point  and 
ending  in  an  eddy  below,  where  there  would  be  no 
aid  from  the  river  current,  he  saw  the  task  was 
hopeless,  but  allowed  the  work  to  co'ntinue  as  giv 
ing  occupation  to  the  men.  Work  continued  till 
the  7th  of  March,  when  high  water  broke  bounds 
and  flooded  the  peninsula,  making  further  work, 
except  by  dredge  boats,  impracticable.  Soon  after 
the  batteries  at  Warrenton  were  armed  with  heavy 
guns,  and  reached  with  their  fire  the  whole  length 
of  the  canal,  and  it  \vas  definitely  abandoned. 

Another  project  was  to  make  a  way  by  means 
of  Lake  Providence,  an  ancient  abandoned  chan 
nel  of  the  Mississippi,  and  separated  from  it  by 


THE   MISSISSIPPI. 


107 


the  river  levee.  A  little  thread  of  a  stream  led 
from  the  end  of  the  lake  through  a  forest  for  six 
miles,  most  of  the  way  being  obstructed  by  stand 
ing  timber,  and  part  of  the  way  being  lost  in  a 
marsh.  But  at  the  end  of  six  miles  it  connected 
with  Bayou  Macon,  a  navigable  stream.  Having 
once  reached  this  point,  a  boat,  by  dextrously  fol 
lowing  the  meshes  of  a  network  of  bayous  for  two 
hundred  miles,  would  reach  the  Mississippi,  one 
hundred  and  fifty  miles  below  Vicksburg.  This 
work  of  cleaning  out  Baxter  Bayou,  and  making  a 
navigable  channel  from  Lake  Providence  to  Bayou 
Macon,  was  assigned  to  General  McPherson.  On 
the  1 8th  of  March  he  cut  the  levee  which  separated 
the  lake  from  the  river  to  fill  up  the  little  Bayou 
Baxter,  so  that  proper  implements  could  be  floated 
to  accomplish  certain  work  which  could  be  suc 
cessfully  done  only  by  machinery,  and  reported 
that  the  passage  would  be  ready  for  use  by  the  end 
of  the  month.  Before  that  time  arrived,  however, 
it  had  become  unnecessary. 

The  great  levee  of  the  Mississippi  filled  and 
blocked,  nearly  opposite  Helena,  the  entrance  to 
a  bayou  which  had  been  a  navigable  channel,  and 
had  been  used  as  a  portion  of  an  inland  waterway 
from  Memphis  via  the  Coldwater,  the  Tallahatchie, 
and  the  Yazoo  Rivers.  On  the  23d  of  January  the 
Confederates  sent  troops  to  obstruct  this  channel, 
which  was  easily  done,  as  the  bayou  called  Yazoo 
Pass  was  narrow  and  flowed  through  a  thick  for 
est.  General  Grant,  learning  of  this  route,  sent 
Colonel  James  H.  Wilson  of  his  staff  to  cut  through 
the  levee,  which  was  accomplished  two  days  later 
by  exploding  a  mine.  The  Confederates  con 
structed  a  work  called  Fort  Pemberton.  filling  the 
space  between  the  Tallahatchie  and  the  Yallabusha, 
where  they  approach  within  five  hundred  yards  of 
each  other,  five  miles  above  the  point  where  their 
junction  forms  the  Yazoo.  Levees  were  cut  and 


I08  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

the  land  in  front  of  the  fort  flooded,  making  it  in 
accessible  to  infantry. 

After  vexatious  delays,  owing  to  the  difficulty 
of  obtaining  steamboats  small  enough  to  navigate 
the  narrow  and  tortuous  streams,  it  was  the  23d 
of  February  by  the  time  that  General  Ross  left 
Helena  with  the  first  detachment;  and  it  was  the 
2d  of  March  when  his  battered  boats  emerged  from 
Yazoo  Pass  into  the  Coldwater,  ten  miles  in  a  di 
rect  line  from  the  Mississippi;  and  the  nth  of 
March  when  the  expedition  arrived  before  Fort 
Pemberton.  After  a  futile  bombardment,  the  ex 
pedition  withdrew.  General  Grant,  on  receiving 
report  of  the  actual  rinding  of  a  navigable  water 
way  to  the  highland  in  rear  of  Vicksburg,  ordered 
General  McPherson  to  gather  up  his  corps  from 
Lake  Providence,  Memphis,  and  afloat  on  trans 
ports  moving  with  his  whole  command  as  fast 
as  suitable  boats  could  be  procured.  General 
Quinby,  pushing  forward  with  the  first  detach 
ment,  met  Ross  retreating,  and  took  him  back  to 
participate  in  another  attempt.  After  a  vain  search 
for  dry  land  on  which  his  men  could  camp,  he  pro 
posed  to  march  over  to  the  Yallabusha,  farther 
back,  cross  the  Yallabusha  on  a  bridge,  and  pass 
down  the  farther  bank  to  the  rear  of  Fort  Pember 
ton.  The  boat,  returning  to  Helena  for  necessary 
supplies  and  material,  met  on  the  1st  of  April  a 
messenger  bringing  an  order  for  the  abandon 
ment  of  the  expedition. 

General  Sherman  received  a  letter  from  General 
Grant  on  the  morning  of  the  i6th  of  March,  stat 
ing  that  he  had  just  returned  from  a  reconnois- 
sance  up  Steele's  Bayou  with  Admiral  Porter,  and 
directing  Sherman  to  have  at  the  landing  his 
pioneer  corps  and  one  regiment  to  cut  away  trees, 
and  to  report  in  person  for  further  instruction.  In 
an  hour  General  Giles  A.  Smith  with  the  required 
detail  was  at  the  landing,  and  General  Sherman 


THE   MISSISSIPPI.  109 

took  the  tug  sent  for  him.  After  a  conference  Gen 
eral  Grant  directed  General  Sherman  to  "  proceed 
as  nearly  as  practicable  up  Steele's  Bayou  through 
Black  Bayou  to  Deer  Creek,  and  thence  with  the 
gunboats  there  by  any  route  they  may  take  to  get 
into  the  Yazoo  River,  for  the  purpose  of  determin 
ing  the  feasibility  of  getting  an  army  through  that 
to  the  east  bank  of  that  river,  and  at  a  point  from 
which  they  can  act  advantageously  against  Vicks- 
burg,"  and  added  some  detailed  instructions. 

The  proposed  route  by  Steele's  Bayou,  Black 
Bayou,  Deer  Creek,  Rolling  Fork,  Sun  Flower 
River,  and  Yazoo  River  was  two  hundred  miles, 
and  was  tortuous  beyond  description.  Up  to  Deer 
Creek  the  thin  rim  of  bordering  bank  hardly  sepa 
rated  it  from  the  expanse  of  water  and  swamp, 
dotted  with  clumps  of  dry  earth  and  covered  by 
thick  forest  and  undergrowth.  Admiral  Porter, 
with  his  fleet  of  five  ironclads,  four  mortar  boats, 
and  two  tugs,  found  that  the  waterway  was  so  nar 
row  that  his  boats  could  net  turn ;  some  of  the 
bends  were  so  sharp  that  steering  was  not  prac 
ticable,  and  the  bow  and  stern  of  the  boats  had  to 
be  controlled  by  hawsers  from  the  shore ;  the  water 
in  places  was  so  filled  with  a  growing  plant  that 
the  propellers  became  clogged  and  useless,  and 
could  be  released  only  by  backing  and  partially 
unwinding  the  impediment ;  overhanging  trees 
swept  off  smokestacks,  pilot  houses,'  and  all  ex 
posed  woodwork;  and  felled  trees  floating  in  the 
river  were  such  obstructions  that  the  boats  were 
used  as  rams  and  butted  them  against  the  bank. 

General  Sherman  sent  Giles  A.  Smith's  brigade 
and  Kirby  Smith's  brigade  up  the  Mississippi  to 
Gwin's  plantation,  where  Steele's  Bayou,  making 
a  bend,  approaches  within  a  mile  of  the  Missis 
sippi,  and  proceeded  himself  on  the  i/th  with  his 
staff  up  the  bayou.  He  overtook  Porter  just  as  the 
fleet  was  emerging  from  the  difficulties  of  Black 


1 10  GENERAL  SHERMAN. 

Bayou  into  the  broader  stream  of  Deer  Creek, 
which  flowed  through  land  mostly  solid  and  par 
tially  occupied  by  plantations.  Sherman  continued 
with  Porter  a  few  miles,  and  returned  in  a  tug 
loaned  to  him  by  the  admiral  to  comply  with  the 
admiral's  request  to  have  Black  Bayou  cleared. 
Setting  the  Eighth  Missouri  to  work,  he  sent  the 
two  small  steamboats  which  had  brought  up  this 
regiment  and  the  pioneers  back  to  Gwin's  planta 
tion,  and  brought  up  Giles  A.  Smith  with  two  more 
regiments.  During  the  iQth  Porter's  heavy  guns 
were  heard,  and  in  the  night  a  messenger  arrived 
with  a  letter  from  Porter  stating  that  he  was 
blocked  and  beset,  and  asking  for  speedy  aid. 
Sherman  immediately  sent  Giles  A.  Smith  forward 
with  all  the  force  at  hand,  and  preceded  himself 
in  a  canoe  down  stream  in  the  night  for  re-enforce 
ments.  He  met  one  of  the  steamboats  coming  up 
with  a  second  load  of  soldiers.  He  filled  an  empty 
coal  barge  with  others  who  were  detailed  to  work 
on  the  bayou,  and,  towing  it  with  a  navy  tug,  re 
turned  up  stream.  When  the  boats  could  proceed 
no  farther  in  the  darkness,  he  landed  and  marched 
through  canebrake  and  swamp  with  the  troops, 
carrying  lighted  candles,  till  they  reached  open 
land  by  Deer  Creek,  and  there  lay  down  to  rest. 
Resuming  the  march  at  daylight,  stimulated  by 
the  nearer  sound  of  the  navy  guns,  they  hurried 
on  till  they  met  a  party  of  Giles  A.  Smith's  com 
mand  sent  down  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  ob 
structing  the  channel  in  the  rear  of  the  gunboats. 
General  Sherman  came  just  in  time  to  encounter 
a  Confederate  detachment  arriving  for  that  pur 
pose,  and,  after  a  sharp  skirmish,  drove  them  off. 

Admiral  Porter,  after  Sherman  left  him,  had 
continued  pushing  slowly  up  Deer  Creek  until  he 
arrived,  on  the  i8th,  nearly  to  Rolling  Fork,  en 
countering  obstacles,  but  seeing  no  enemy.  On 
the  I9th  a  field  battery  opened  upon  his  boats,  and 


THE   MISSISSIPPI.  in 

sharpshooters,  dispersed  everywhere  under  cover, 
shot  every  man  on  them  who  oppeared  outside 
of  shelter.  Unable  to  get  his  men  out  to  remove 
obstructions  while  the  enemy  sunk  a  coal  boat  in 
rear  of  the  fleet,  he  thought  of  blowing  up  his  ves 
sels,  but  first  sent  to  Sherman  for  relief.  When 
the  relief  came  the  sunk  coal  boat  was  removed, 
and  the  vessels,  backing  down  stream  with  slow, 
toilsome,  and  aided  progress,  made  thirty  miles 
in  three  days  and  escaped  the  toils.  The  expe 
dition  failed',  and  was  so  reported  to  Grant  on 
the  27th. 

These  futile  efforts  demonstrated  that  the  army 
could  not  be  conveyed  across  the  submerged  low 
land  that  lay  between  the  Yazoo  and  the  Missis 
sippi,  extending  from  Vicksburg  nearly  to  Mem 
phis,  and  that  Vicksburg  could  not  be  turned  by 
the  north.  To  attack  it  in  front  was  impossible. 
It  only  remained  to  march  overland  to  the  south 
and  find  some  crossing  below,  or  else  to  abandon 
the  expedition,  return  to  Memphis,  rebuild  the  rail 
road,  and  march  down  Central  Mississippi,  keep 
ing  his  line  of  communication  and  supply  pro 
tected.  General  Sherman  preferred  the  latter  plan. 
Military  authorities  generally  agree,  at  least  that, 
considering  the  great  risk  of  defeat  and  the  disas 
trous  consequences  of  defeat  below  Vicksburg,  the 
approach  by  land  from  Memphis  should  have  been 
made  in  the  first  place.  General  Grant,  always  te 
nacious  of  purpose,  thought  it  better  to  take  the 
risk  than  demoralize  his  army  and  shock  the  peo 
ple  by  confession  of  failure.  And  he  trusted  some 
thing  to  disconcerting  the  enemy  by  the  boldness 
of  an  attack  from  the  south.  General  Sherman 
wrote  General  Grant  a  letter  giving  his  view.  Gen 
eral  Grant  made  no  reply,  pursued  his  own  plan, 
and  long  after  the  campaign  was  completed  re 
turned  the  letter  without  comment.  General  Sher 
man,  having  done  his  part  by  giving  his  views, 


H2  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

supported  his  chief  as  loyally  and  as  heartily  as  if 
his  own  suggestion  had  been  accepted. 

HEADQUARTERS  FIFTEENTH  ARMY  CORPS, 
CAMP  NEAR  VICKSBURG,  April  8,  1863. 

Colonel].  A.  RAWLINS, 

Assistant  Adjutant-General  to  General  Grant. 
SIR  :  I  would  most  respectfully  suggest  (for  reasons 
which  I  will  not  name)  that  General  Grant  call  on  his  corps 
commanders  for  their  opinions,  concise  and  positive,  on  the 
best  general  plan  of  a  campaign.  Unless  this  be  done,  there 
are  men  who  will,  in  any  result  falling  below  the  popular 
standard,  claim  that  their  advice  was  unheeded,  and  that 
fatal  consequence  resulted  therefrom.  My  own  opinions  are  : 

1.  That  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  is  now  far  in  advance 
of  the  other  grand  armies  of  the  United  States. 

2.  That  a  corps  from  Missouri  should  forthwith  be  moved 
from  St.  Louis  to  the  vicinity  ot  Little  Rock,  Ark.,  supplies 
collected  there  while  the  river  is  full,  and  land  communica 
tion  with  Memphis  opened  via  Des  Arc  on  the  White  and 
Madison  on  the  St.  Francis  River. 

3.  That  as  much  of  the    Yazoo   Pass,  Coldwater,    and 
Tallahatchie  rivers  as  can  be  gained  and  fortified,  be  held, 
and  the  main  army  be  transported  thither  by  land  and  water  ; 
that  the  road  back  to  Memphis  be  secured  and  reopened, 
and,  as  soon  as  the  waters  subside,  Grenada  be  attacked,  and 
the  swamp  road  across  to  Helena  be  patrolled  by  cavalry. 

4.  That  the  line  of  the  Yallahusha  be  the  base  from  which 
to  operate  against  the  points  where  the  Mississippi  Central 
crosses    Big   Black,   above    Canton ;  and    lastly,  where   the 
Vicksburg  and  Jackson  Railroad  crosses  ,the  same  river  (Big 
Black).     The  capture  of  Vicksburg  would  result. 

5.  That  a  minor  force  be  left  in  this  vicinity,  not  to  ex 
ceed  ten  thousand  men,  with  only  enough  steamboats  to  float 
and  transport  them   to  any  desired   point ;  this  force  to  be 
held  always  near  enough  to  act  with  the  gunboats  when  the 
main  army  is  known  to  be  near  Vicksburg — Haines's  Bluff, 
or  Yazoo  City. 

6.  I  do  not  doubt  the  capacity  of  Willow  Bayou  (which  I 
estimate  to  be  fifty  miles  long  and  very  tortuous)  as  a  mili 
tary  channel  to  supply   an   army  large    enough   to  operate 
against    Jackson,    Miss.,    or  the    Black    River   Bridge  ;  and 
such  a  channel  will  be  very  vulnerable  to  a  force  coming 
from  the  west,  which  we  must  expect.     Yet  this  canal  will 
be  most  useful  as  the  way  to  convey  coals  and  supplies  to  a 


THE    MISSISSIPPI. 


113 


fleet  that  should  navigate  the  lower  reach  of  the  Mississippi 
between  Vicksburg  and  the  Red  River. 

7.  The  chief  reason  for  operating  solely  by  water  was  the 
season  of  the  year  and  high  water  in  the  Tallahatchie  and 
Yallabusha  Rivers.  The  spring  is  now  here,  and  soon  these 
streams  will  be  no  serious  obstacle,  save  in  the  ambuscades  of 
the  forest,  and  whatever  works  the  enemy  may  have  erected 
at  or  near  Grenada.  North  Mississippi  is  too  valuable  for 
us  to  allow  the  enemy  to  hold  it  and  make  crops  this  year. 

I  make  these  suggestions  with  the  request  that  General 
Grant  will  read  them,  and  give  them,  as  I  know  he  will,  a  share 
of  his  thoughts.  1  would  prefer  that  he  should  not  answer 
this  letter,  but  merely  give  it  as  much  or  little  weight  as  it 
deserves.  Whatever  plan  of  action  he  may  adopt  will  receive 
from  me  the  same  zealous  co-operation  and  energetic  sup 
port  as  though  conceived  by  myself.  I  do  not  believe  that 
General  Banks  will  make  any  serious  attack  on  Port  Hudson 
this  spring.  1  am,  etc., 

W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Major-General. 

General  Sherman  had  trouble  again  with  the 
newspapers.  Thomas  W.  Knox,  correspondent  of 
the  New  York  Herald,  accompanied  Sherman's 
expedition  to  Helena,  knowing  it  was  against  or 
ders,  and  published  in  his  correspondence  a  state 
ment  of  the  organization  of  the  expedition  and 
personal  abuse  of  the  general.  In  conversation  he 
said  he  had  no  personal  ill  will,  but  that  he  had 
tried  to  break  General  Sherman  down  because  he 
was  opposed  to  newspaper  men.  A  court-martial 
in  February  found  that  Knox  had  willfully  dis 
obeyed  orders  in  accompanying  the  expedition,  but 
the  court  attached  no  criminality  thereto;  found 
that  he  had  published  the  organization  of  the  ex 
pedition,  but  also  found  that  he  had  not  thereby 
given  information  to  the  enemy;  found  that  he 
was  guilty  of  violation  of  orders  of  the  War  De 
partment  by  publishing  correspondence  concern 
ing  the  operations  of  the  army  without  sanction  by 
the  general  in  command,  and  sentenced  him  to  be 
removed  beyond  the  lines  of  the  army,  not  to  re 
turn  again  under  pain  of  imprisonment.  On  ap- 


114  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

peal,  President  Lincoln,  on  the  2Oth  of  March, 
revoked  the  sentence  so  far  as  to  permit  Knox 
to  return  and  to  stay  if  General  Grant  should  con 
sent;  otherwise  to  leave.  General  Grant,  on  the 
6th  of  April,  refused  to  give  permission  unless  Gen 
eral  Sherman  would  first  consent ;  and  Knox,  hav 
ing  made  neither  retraction  nor  apology,  nor  ex 
pressed  regret,  Sherman  refused. 

General  Sherman  did  not,  perhaps,  recognize 
a  difference  between  a  government  carrying  on  a 
war  on  behalf  of  a  people  and  a  people  aroused 
carrying  on  a  war  through  the  instrumentality  of 
the  government.  He  did  not  appreciate  the  crav 
ing  for  information  of  a  people  wrought  to  a  fever 
of  enthusiasm.  He  was  military  in  every  fiber. 
His  care  was  to  make  his  army  efficient.  He  saw 
that  the  presence  of  any  non-combatant  was,  to 
some  extent,  an  incumbrance,  and  the  presence  of 
a  stirrer  up  of  disaffection  was  a  mischief.  When 
clearly  satisfied  as  to  what  his  duty  was,  no  oppo 
sition,  no  fear  of  consequences,  would  deter  him 
from  performing  it.  The  letters  of  Lincoln,  Grant, 
and  Sherman  in  this  ease  are  characteristic. 

EXECUTIVE  MANSION, 
WASHINGTON,  March  20,  1863. 
Whom  it  may  concern  : 

Whereas  it  appears  to  my  satisfaction  that  Thomas  W. 
Knox,  a  correspondent  of  the  New  York  Herald,  has  been, 
by  the  sentence  of  a  court-martial,  excluded  from  the  military 
department  under  command  of  Major-General  Grant,  and 
also  that  General  Thayer,  president  of  the  court-martial 
which  rendered  the  sentence,  and  Major-General  McCler- 
nand,  in  command  of  a  corps  of  that  department,  and  many 
other  respectable  persons,  are  of  opinion  that  Mr.  Knox's  of 
fense  was  technical  rather  than  willfully  wrong,  and  that  the 
sentence  should  be  revoked  ;  now,  therefore,  said  sentence  is 
hereby  so  far  revoked  as  to  allow  Mr.  Knox  to  return  to 
General  Grant's  headquarters,  and  to  remain  if  General 
Grant  shall  give  his  express  assent,  and  to  again  leave  the 
department  if  General  Grant  shall  refuse  such  assent. 

A.  LINCOLN. 


THE   MISSISSIPPI.  115 

BEFORE  VICKSBURG,  April  6t  t86j. 
THOMAS  W.  KNOX,  Correspondent  New   York  Herald: 

The  letter  of  the  President  of  the  United  States  author 
izing  you  to  return  to  these  headquarters,  and  to  remain  with 
my  consent,  or  leave  it  such  consent  is  withheld,  has  been 
shown  me.  You  came  here  first  in  positive  violation  of  an 
order  from  General  Sherman.  Because  you  were  not  pleased 
with  his  treatment  of  army  followers  who  had  violated  his 
order,  you  attempted  to  break  down  his  influence  with  his 
command  and  to  blast  his  reputation  with  the  public.  You 
made  insinuations  against  his  sanity,  and  said  many  things 
which  were  untrue,  and,  so  far  as  your  letter  had  influence, 
calculated  to  affect  the  public  service  unfavorably.  Gen 
eral  Sherman  is  one  of  the  ablest  soldiers  and  purest  men 
in  the  country.  You  have  attacked  him  and  been  sen 
tenced  to  expulsion  from  this  department  for  the  offense. 
While  I  would  conform  to  the  slightest  wish  of  the  President 
where  it  is  formed  upon  a  fair  representation  of  both  sides  of 
any  question,  my  respect  for  General  Sherman  is  such  that 
in  this  case  I  must  decline,  unless  General  Sherman  first 
gives  his  consent  to  your  remaining. 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Major-General. 

HEADQUARTERS  FIFTEENTH  ARMY  CORPS, 
CAMP  NEAR  VICKSBURG,  Aptil  8, 1863. 

Major-General  GRANT  : 

DEAR  SIR:  I  received  last  night  the  copy  of  your  answer 
to  Mr.  Knox's  application  to  reside  near  your  headquarters. 
I  thank  you  for  the  manner  and  substance  of  that  reply. 
Many  regard  Knox  as  unworthy  the  notice  he  has  received. 
This  is  true,  but  I  send  you  his  letter  to  me  and  my  answer. 
Observe  in  his  letter  to  me,  sent  long  before  I  could  have 
heard  the  result  of  his  application  to  you,  he  makes  the  as 
sertion  that  you  had  no  objection,  but  rather  wanted  him 
back,  and  only  as  a  matter  of  form  required  my  assent. 
He  regretted  a  difference  between  a  "  portion  of  the  army 
and  the  press."  The  insolence  of  these  fellows  is  insupport 
able.  I  know  they  are  encouraged,  but  I  know  human  na 
ture  well  enough,  and  that  they  will  be  the  first  to  turn 
against  their  patrons.  Mr.  Lincoln,  of  course,  fears  to  incur 
the  enmity  of  the  Herald,  but  he  must  rule  the  Herald  or 
the  Herald  will  rule  him  ;  he  can  take  his  choice. 

I  have  been  foolish  and  unskillful  in  drawing  on  me  the 
shafts  of  the  press.  By  opposing  mob  law  in  California  I 
once  before  drew  down  the  press,  but  after  the  smoke 


Il6  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

cleared  off,  and  the  people  saw  where  they  were  drifting  to, 
they  admitted  I  was  right.  If  the  press  be  allowed  to  run 
riot,  and  write  up  and  write  down  at  their  pleasure,  there  is 
an  end  to  a  constitutional  government  in  America  and  an 
archy  must  result.  Even  now  the  real  people  of  our  country 
begin  to  fear  and  tremble  at  it,  and  look  to  our  armies  as  the 
anchor  of  safety,  of  order,  submission  to  authority,  bound 
together  by  a  real  government,  and  not  by  the  clamor  of  a 
demoralized  press  and  crowd  of  demagogues. 

As  ever,  your  friend,  W.  T.  SHERMAN. 


TURNING  OPERATION 

TICKSBUBG   CAMPAIGN 
1863 


CHAPTER   VI. 

VICKSBURG. 

THE  plan  to  attack  Vicksburg  from  the  south 
had  no  possible  chance  of  success  except  by  first 
obtaining  control  of  the  river  below  the  city  and 
then  by  veiling  in  some  degree  the  point  of  real 
attack.  The  Confederates  had  on  the  25th  of  Feb 
ruary  in  their  fleet  below,  the  Queen  of  the  West, 
the  most  powerful  ram  on  the  Mississippi,  and  the 
Indianola,  which  had  the  heaviest  armament,  both 
of  them  captured  from  the  National  command.  The 
Indianola,  captured  on  the  24th,  was  sunk  near 
the  Mississippi  shore,  being  repaired  from  the  in 
juries  received  at  the  time  of  capture.  Admiral 
Porter  had  an  imitation  monitor  constructed — a 
flatboat  covered  with  a  deck,  having  a  slight  frame 
turret  with  a  huge  wooden  gun  projecting  from 
it.  Some  barrels,  placed  one  above  another,  made 
a  stack,  whence  issued  smoke  from  burning  wet 
straw ;  all  was  painted  black.  It  was  set  adrift 
just  before  dawn  on  the  morning  of  the  26th  of 
February.  All  the  batteries  along  the  river  poured 
their  hottest  fire  into  the  little  craft  as  it  seemed 
to  steam  leisurely  by,  contemptuously  secure  in 
its  own  invulnerability.  Telegrams  were  sent  down 
the  river  and  to  Richmond,  excitedly  announcing 
the  passage  down  stream  of  a  monitor.  As  it 
turned  the  point,  the  Queen  of  the  West  was  just 
rounding  the  bend  below,  ascending.  At  the  sight 
of  the  strange  vessel  emerging  unharmed  from  the 
furious  cannonade,  the  Queen  of  the  West  fled 

117 


Il8  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

down  stream,  joined  by  her  consorts,  entered  one 
of  the  western  affluents  of  the  river,  and  took  no 
further  part  in  the  war.  The  mock  monitor  was 
carried  by  an  eddy  to  the  right  bank,  and,  lying 
there  with  the  stern  ashore,  seemed  to  be  survey 
ing  the  Indianola  opposite  and  lower  down.  Then 
pushed  out  by  some  of  General  McClernand's  men 
who  were  bivouacking  near  by,  it  was  carried  by 
the  current  directly  toward  the  Indianola.  The 
workmen  wrecked  the  guns  and  set  fire  to  the  hull, 
and  the  Confederate  fleet  vexed  the  river  no  more. 

About  10  P.  M.,  April  i6th,  Admiral  Porter 
started  with  seven  gunboats  and  three  loaded  trans 
ports.  The  enemy  illumined  the  river  with  bon 
fires  on  both  shores.  The  batteries  maintained 
continuous  cannonade,  while  the  passing  fleet  raked 
the  shore  batteries  at  short  range.  Every  vessel 
was  hit,  but  little  serious  damage  was  done  except 
the  loss  of  one  transport  and  several  coal  barges. 
On  the  22d  of  April  six  transports  loaded  with  sup 
plies,  and  towing  twelve  barges,  all  manned  by 
volunteers  from  the  army,  chiefly  from  Logan's  di 
vision,  passed  down,  losing  only  one  transport. 

Toward  the  end  of  March  Steele's  division  of 
Sherman's  corps  was  sent  to  the  Deer  Creek  coun 
try,  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles  north  of 
Vicksburg,  to  subsist  his  command  on  the  coun 
try  and  destroy  what  he  could  not  use.  On  the 
9th  of  April  General  Pemberton  telegraphed  to 
Richmond  that  Grant's  real  movement  appeared  to 
be  through  Deer  Creek,  while  there  were  rumors 
of  a  movement  across  the  Mississippi,  below  Vicks- 
burg,  which  he  did  not  credit.  He  was  ordered 
by  General  Joseph  Johnston  to  send  some  of  his 
troops  to  Chattanooga.  Toward  the  end  of  April, 
when  Grant  was  about  to  cross  the  river,  Pember 
ton  directed  five  thousand  men  in  Vicksburg  to 
be  held  in  readiness  to  move  to  Grand  Gulf ;  but, 
being  perplexed  by  a  demonstration  which  Sher- 


VICKSBURG.  119 

man  made  up  the  Yazoo  against  Haines's  Bluff, 
and  uncertain  which  was  the  real  movement  and 
which  was  the  demonstration,  he  was  holding  the 
men  in  Vicksbttrg  when  Grand  Gulf  was  evacuated. 

About  the  middle  of  April  detachments  sent 
from  Memphis  and  La  Grange  advanced  slowly 
into  northwestern  Mississippi.  The  Confederate 
troops  in  northern  Mississippi  concentrated  to  op 
pose  them.  The  northeastern  portion  of  the  State 
being  left  bare,  General  Grierson,  with  seventeen 
hundred  cavalry,  dashed  across  the  boundary  and 
was  destroying  railroad  far  within  the  State  before 
there  was  any  suspicion  of  his  movement.  By  rap 
idly  moving  from  place  to  place,  sending  out  de 
tachments  in  diverse  directions  to  destroy  special 
objects,  he  distracted  General  Pemberton,  who, 
having  but  a  scanty  amount  of  cavalry,  was  in  con 
stant  receipt  of  messages  reporting  the  presence 
of  National  troops  at  points  remote  from  each  other 
at  the  same  time.  He  wore  out  brigades,  dispatch 
ing  and  recalling  them,  and  hurrying  them  to  points 
where  they  were  too  late  or  were  never  needed. 
Grierson  reached  the  National  force  at  Baton  Rouge 
on  the  2d  of  May  with  slight  loss,  having  destroyed 
much  railroad  and  other  property,  and  withdrawn 
General  Pemberton's  attention  from  Grant  at  the 
very  time  that  Grant  was  pushing  for  the  passage 
of  the  Mississippi. 

On  the  20th  of  April  the  first  order  to  march 
was  issued.  At  that  time  McClernand's  four  di 
visions  were  assembled  near  New  Carthage;  two 
of  McPherson's  divisions  at  Milliken's  Bend,  with 
third  on  the  way  thither  from  Lake  Providence; 
two  of  Sherman's  divisions  just  below  Milliken's 
Bend,  and  the  third,  Steele's,  in  the  northern 
Yazoo  country,  but  under  orders  to  rejoin  the 
corps.  Portions  of  the  route  lay  through  saturated 
ooze,  in  which  wheels  sunk  to  the  hub,  and  which 
gave  no  purchase  to  the  struggling  teams.  In 
9 


120  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

places  doubled  teams  barely  moved  a  single  field- 
piece,  and  the  way  was  strewn  with  fragments  of 
wagons  and  their  contents.  A  futile  effort  was 
made  by  the  fleet  on  the  2Qth  of  April  to  disman 
tle  the  works  which  crowned  the  summit  of  the 
bluff  at  Grand  Gulf,  which  was  there  over  one 
hundred  feet  high,  and  the  army  continued  to 
march  to  a  point  opposite  Bruinsburg,  an  imagi 
nary  village  at  the  mouth  of  Bayou  Pierre.  Mc- 
Clernand  began  moving  his  corps  across  the  river 
at  daylight  of  April  3Oth,  and  finished  at  noon. 
Four  hours  were  then  taken  for  issue  of  rations 
before  the  march  began. 

The  bottom  land  at  Bruinsburg  is  but  little 
above  high  water.  The  bluff  is  a  hundred  feet 
high.  The  ascent  was  by  a  roadway  cut  into  the 
bluff.  The  tenacious  soil  preserved  the  perpen 
dicularity  of  the  side  walls  of  the  cut,  so  that  the 
roadway  was,  in  fact,  a  narrow  trench  with  lofty 
vertical  sides.  A  small  party  could  have  prevented 
an  army  from  ascending  by  it.  Fortunately  no  de 
fender  was  present  or  near.  McClernand's  corps, 
once  in  motion,  advanced  with  vigor  till  after  mid 
night,  when  the  advance  encountered  the  enemy 
within  four  miles  of  Port  Gibson.  After  a  slight 
skirmish,  the  troops  lay  down  to  wait  for  daylight. 

Green's  brigade  (Confederate)  was  just  arriv 
ing  at  Port  Gibson  when  it  encountered  McCler 
nand's  advance.  When  Tracy's  brigade  arrived, 
a  little  before  break  of  day  of  the  ist  of  May,  they 
took  position  about  three  miles  from  Port  Gibson, 
across  the  two  roads  into  which  the  road  from 
Bruinsburg  forks,  Green  taking  the  southern  fork 
and  Tracy  the  northern.  The  country  was  a  con 
fused  jumble  of  sharp  ridges,  with  deep  intervening 
valleys  filled  with  impenetrable  thickets  of  cane 
and  brush,  through  which  it  was  difficult  for  a  man 
to  force  his  way,  and  over  which  it  was  impossible 
to  preserve  alignment  or  formation.  General  Me- 


VICKSBURG.  121 

demand  early  in  the  morning  led  the  attack  on 
Green's  brigade  with  Hovey's  and  Carr's  divisions, 
and  sent  Osterhaus  to  assault  Tracy.  About  nine 
o'clock  a  persistent  charge  carried  the  hill,  cap 
turing  two  guns  and  four  hundred  prisoners.  Just 
then  Baldwin  arrived  and  posted  his  brigade  ad 
vantageously  on  a  ridge  a  mile  in  the  rear,  and 
Green  fell  back  and  joined  him.  Osterhaus  early 
had  a  slight  success,  and  was  able  to  make  no  far 
ther  advance.  About  noon  Colonel  Cockerell  ar 
rived  with  three  regiments,  two  of  which  were 
assigned  to  Baldwin  and  one  to  Tracy.  In  the 
afternoon  Logan  arrived  with  two  brigades,  ac 
companied  by  Grant  and  McPherson.  Stevenson 
was  sent  to  McClernand  upon  his  demand  for  aid, 
and  J.  E.  Smith  was  sent  to  strengthen  Osterhaus. 
The  Confederates  fought  with  judgment  and  gal 
lantry.  Forced  from  one  position,  they  retired  to 
another  and  continued  the  conflict.  It  was  sunset 
before  they  gave  up  the  field,  and  dark  before  Grant 
entered  Port  Gibson.  The  Confederate  force  was 
eighty-five  hundred ;  the  National  army  numbered 
twenty-three  thousand.  According  to  the  Confed 
erate  reports,  their  loss  was  four  hundred  and  forty- 
eight  killed  and  wounded  and  three  hundred  and 
eighty-seven  missing.  The  National  loss  was  eight 
hundred  and  fifty  killed  and  wounded  and  twenty- 
five  missing.  General  Grant  reported  five  hun 
dred  prisoners  taken,  besides  the  wounded. 

On  the  morning  of  the  3d  of  May  General  Mc 
Pherson  moved  for  Hankinson's  Ferry,  on  the  Big 
Black  River.  At  the  same  time  General  Bowen, 
having  evacuated  Grand  Gulf,  was  pushing  for  the 
same  point.  McPherson  arrived  in  time  to  drive 
away  a  rear  guard  who  were  beginning  the  de 
struction  of  the  frail  bridge  over  which  the  Con 
federate  troops  had  just  crossed.  Stevenson's  di 
vision,  which  had  been  held  in  Vicksburg  by  fear 
that  Sherman's  demonstration  at  Raines's  Bluff 


122  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

was  the  real  attack,  had  finally  reached  the  ferry, 
tired  and  worn,  only  in  time  to  be  ordered  to  re 
trace  their  steps  in  haste. 

While  McPherson  rested  three  days  at  the  ferry, 
and  McClernand  at  Willow  Springs,  army  wagons 
were  sent  back  for  ammunition  and  captured  wag 
ons  for  rations.  Officers'  blankets  were  carried  on 
captured  mules,  and  officers  and  men  slept  with 
out  tents.  Sherman  received  on  the  3Oth  of  April 
an  order  from  Grant  to  cease  his  demonstration 
before  Haines's  Bluff  and  follow  McPherson,  leav 
ing  one  division  to  guard  trains  and  supplies. 
Leaving  General  Blair  to  convoy  the  supply  trains 
when  they  should  be  ready,  he  pushed  along  the 
road  obstructed  by  wagons  of  the  Seventeenth 
Corps,  and  crossed  the  river  at  Grand  Gulf  on  the 
7th  of  May. 

According  to  information  received,  Pemberton 
had  drawn  his  detachments  into  Vicksburg,  and 
General  Joe  Johnston  was  assembling  a  new  force 
at  Jackson.  On  the  7th  General  McClernand 
moved  by  the  direct  road  toward  Edwards'  Sta 
tion,  on  the  railroad  between  Vicksburg  and  Jack 
son,  to  be  followed  by  Sherman,  and  McPherson 
proceeded  toward  Jackson  by  Utica  and  Raymond. 
In  the  morning  of  the  I2th  Logan,  having  the  ad 
vance  of  McPherson's  corps,  met  parties  of  mount 
ed  men,  who  fell  back  firing,  compelling  him  to  de 
ploy  two  regiments,  one  on  each  side  of  the  road, 
to  push  them  back.  Gregg's  brigade,  just  arrived 
from  Port  Hudson,  was  discovered  on  the  farther 
side  of  a  small  creek  supporting  two  batteries. 
Both  lines  advanced.  The  Eighth  Michigan  Bat 
tery  was  run  forward  to  the  bridge  over  which  the 
road  crossed  the  creek ;  the  Second  Brigade  rushed 
to  the  creek,  using  the  farther  bank  as  a  breast 
work,  while  on  its  right  the  Confederates  took  pos 
session  of  the  creek,  using  it  as  a  cover  against 
the  First  Brigade.  The  Third  Brigade,  on  the  right 


VICKSBURG. 


I23 


of  the  First,  crossed  the  creek  and  turned  the  flank 
of  the  enemy.  Crocker's  division  beginning  to 
come  up,  Gregg  withdrew  his  command  and  re 
treated.  McPherson  advanced  to  Raymond  and 
beyond  before  going  into  bivouac  for  the  night. 
The  National  loss  was  sixty-six  killed,  three  hun 
dred  and  thirty-nine  wounded,  thirty-seven  miss 
ing;  total,  four  hundred  and  forty-two.  Of  these, 
four  hundred  and  forty  were  in  Logan's  division 
and  two  in  Crocker's.  Gregg's  loss,  according  to 
his  reported  statement,  was  seventy-three  killed, 
two  hundred  and  fifty-one  wounded,  and  one  hun 
dred  and  ninety  missing.  Randall  W.  McGavock, 
colonel  of  Tenth  Tennessee,  is  mentioned  in  this 
statement  as  mortally  wounded.  Gregg  in  his  re 
port  of  the  battle  says  McGavock  was  killed. 

Finding  that  a  force  was  gathering  in  Jackson, 
Grant  ordered  McPherson  to  approach  Jackson 
by  way  of  Clinton,  and  Sherman  to  march  thither 
through  Raymond  and  Mississippi  Springs.  Gen 
eral  Joseph  Johnston,  who  had  just  arrived  from 
Chattanooga  to  take  supreme  command,  learning  in 
the  night  of  the  I3th  that  a  force  was  approaching 
from  Mississippi  Springs,  in  addition  to  the  col 
umn  approaching  from  Clinton,  put  General  John 
Adams  in  command  of  the  army  trains,  and  di 
rected  him  to  move  them  out  on  the  road  toward 
Canton.  He  placed  General  Gregg  in  command 
of  the  troops  who  were  to  hold  the  National  force 
in  check  until  the  trains  should  be  out  on  the  road. 
Gregg's  command  comprised  his  own  brigade, 
commanded  by  Colonel  Farquharson ;  Gist's  bri 
gade,  commanded  by  Colonel  Colquit,  General 
Gist  being  detained  east  of  Pearl  River  with  other 
troops ;  Walker's  brigade ;  two  field  batteries ;  and 
Third  Kentucky  mounted  infantry.  General  Gregg 
moved  Colquit  out  beyond  the  fortifications  of  the 
city,  three  miles  toward  Clinton,  and  planted  his 
brigade  on  the  summit  of  rising  ground  which 


124 


GENERAL   SHERMAN. 


sloped  down  to  a  swampy  hollow.  The  open 
ground  extended  in  undulating  meadow  for  a  mile 
to  the  front.  Both  his  flanks  were  protected  by 
woods.  Farquharson  was  posted  off  to  the  right 
of  Colquit,  and  Walker  in  reserve.  The  Third 
Kentucky,  with  a  regiment  and  a  battery  from 
Walker's  brigade,  was  sent  to  guard  the  road  from 
Mississippi  Springs. 

Sherman,  advancing  after  a  brief  conflict,  forced 
his  antagonist  back  into  the  fortifications ;  while 
General  Sherman  engaged  the  works  in  front,  Cap 
tain  Pitman,  engineer,  and  the  Ninety-fifth  Ohio 
found  an  unoccupied  space  on  the  flank.  Steele's 
division,  rapidly  moving  to  this  point,  came  upon 
the  Confederates  from  the  rear,  and  took  two  hun 
dred  and  fifty  prisoners.  The  rest  escaped  and 
joined  the  trains  on  the  Canton  road.  McPherson 
sent  Crocker's  division  against  Colquit.  The  di 
vision  was  deployed  at  nine  o'clock,  but  a  heavy 
downpour  of  rain  delayed  the  movement  till  nearly 
eleven.  Then  the  deployed  line  advanced  as  if  on 
parade,  under  fire  while  on  rising  ground,  and 
pausing  in  the  hollows  to  close  up  gaps  made  by 
casualties  and  dress  the  line.  When  the  steady  ap 
proach  neared  the  works,  Colquit  drew  out  his 
command,  and,  falling  back,  was  joined  by  Walker. 
Farquharson,  being  already  north  of  the  Clinton 
road,  marched  across  the  country  to  the  Canton 
road,  and  all  retreated  with  the  wagon  train  seven 
miles  to  the  north.  Sherman's  loss  was  six  killed, 
twenty-two  wounded,  and  four  missing ;  McPher- 
son's,  thirty-six  killed,  two  hundred  and  twenty- 
nine  wounded,  and  three  missing.  The  casualties 
in  Gist's  brigade,  as  reported  by  Colonel  Colquit, 
were  seventeen  killed,  sixty-four  wounded,  and 
one  hundred  and  eighteen  missing.  There  are  no 
reports  from  the  rest  of  Gregg's  command.  Gen 
eral  McPherson  estimated  the  Confederate  loss  in 
killed,  wounded,  and  missing  at  eight  hundred  and 


VICKSBURG.  125 

forty-five.  The  armament  of  the  fortifications — 
thirty-five  guns  and  their  ammunition — besides 
large  stores  of  public  property,  were  captured. 

General  Grant  learned  in  Jackson  that  Johnston 
had  sent  an  order  to  Pemberton  to  attack  Grant's 
rear.  McPherson  was  ordered  to  move  early  next 
morning,  the  I5th,  back  through  Clinton,  leaving 
Sherman  in  Jackson  to  destroy  public  property. 
McClernand,  whose  divisions  were  on  the  roads 
converging  toward  Edwards's  Station,  was  ordered 
to  advance  cautiously.  Pemberton,  who  for  sev 
eral  days  had  been  making  a  brilliant  display  of  in 
capacity,  had  finally  resolved  to  move  to  the  south 
and  cut  Grant's  communications,  unaware  that 
Grant  had  cut  loose  from  the  Mississippi  and  had 
no  communications,  but  fully  aware  that  this  move 
ment  was  in  flat  disobedience  of  Johnston's  order 
directing  Pemberton  to  move  north  and  effect  a 
junction  with  him. 

On  the  morning  of  the  i6th  Pemberton,  lying 
on  a  crossroad  just  south  of  Champion's  Hill,  re 
ceived  from  Johnston  a  reiteration  of  the  order 
to  join  him,  and  proceeded  to  obey,  first  sending 
his  wagons  by  the  road  over  Champion's  Hill, 
and  ordering  the  troops  to  follow.  Champion's 
Hill  is  an  abrupt  elevation  in  the  plain  a  little  to 
the  east  of  Baker's  Creek ;  it  is  less  than  one  hun 
dred  feet  high,  is  over  one  mile  in  length  from  east 
to  west,  terminates  in  a  point  toward  the  west,  and 
has  a  width  of  more  than  half  a  mile  at  its  eastern 
face.  The  road  running  west  from  Clinton  to 
Vicksburg,  instead  of  continuing  in  the  lowland 
around  the  northern  and  west  slopes  of  the  hill 
to  the  bridge  over  Baker's  Creek,  turns  directly 
to  the  south,  making  a  right  angle,  ascends  the 
northeast  corner  to  the  summit,  and  there,  turn 
ing  again  to  the  west,  follows  the  summit  of  the 
ridge  and  continues  west  to  the  bridge. 

Hovey,  commanding  one  of  McClernand's  di- 


126  GENERAL    SHERMAN. 

visions,  bivouacked  for  the  night  at  Bolton,  on 
the  Clinton  road,  about  four  miles  in  advance  of 
McPherson.  A  crossroad  led  south  to  Osterhaus 
and  Carr,  who  were  on  the  Middle  road  to  Ed- 
wards's  Station.  A.  J.  Smith  was  more  than  a  mile 
farther  south  of  them,  on  the  direct  road  from 
Raymond  to  Edwards's  Station,  and  Blair  was  in 
their  rear  in  Raymond.  Pemberton  lay  in  line 
facing  to  the  east,  his  left  at  the  base  of  the  south 
east  corner  of  Champion's  Hill,  where  a  crossroad 
ascended  that  joined  the  Clinton  road  on  the  sum 
mit,  and  his  right  across  the  southern  or  direct 
Raymond  road  to  Edwards. 

Early  in  the  morning  Pemberton  sent  his  train 
to  cross  Baker's  Creek  on  the  way  to  join  John 
ston.  When  his  column  was  about  to  march,  Lor- 
ing's  pickets  were  attacked  by  A.  J.  Smith's  skir 
mishers,  and  Bowen's  by  Osterhaus's,  and  Pember 
ton  found  he  had  a  battle  on  his  hands.  Hovey's 
skirmishers  met  Stevenson's  pickets  not  far  from 
Champion's  house  about  ten  o'clock,  and  pushed 
them  back  to  the  northeast  base  of  the  hill.  About 
eleven  o'clock  McPherson  arrived  with  General 
Grant.  Hovey  charged  up  the  long  slope,  and 
after  a  fierce  and  stubborn  fight  drove  back  the 
right  wing  of  Stevenson's  division,  carried  the  sum 
mit,  and  captured  eleven  guns.  Meanwhile  two  of 
Logan's  brigades,  J.  E.  Smith's  and  Leggett's, 
were  brought  against  the  steep  and  rugged  north 
ern  face  of  the  hill,  on  Hovey's  right,  and  forced 
the  left  of  Stevenson's  division  back  up  the  slopes. 
Logan  brought  his  Third  Brigade  up  in  extension 
of  his  right,  and  by  a  quick  charge  broke  Steven 
son's  line  and  captured  a  complete  battery.  Ste 
venson,  finding  the  National  troops  were  working 
their  way  dangerously  near  the  road  to  Baker's 
Creek  bridge,  shifted  his  line  to  the  left  to  cover 
the  line  of  retreat.  Pemberton  ordered  Bowen  to 
close  up  to  connect  with  Stevenson.  Bowen  found 


VICKSBURG.  127 

Hovey  in  possession  of  the  summit,  and  fell  upon 
him  with  a  furious  assault.  The  struggle  was  se 
vere,  but  Hovey  was  forced  back  and,  still  fight 
ing,  pushed  down  the  hill,  losing  all  the  captured 
guns  but  two.  Crocker  soon  appearing  with  his 
division,  joined  Hovey's  jaded  but  plucky  men ; 
together  they  surged  up  the  hill  with  irresistible 
onset.  Bowen  was  overcome,  routed,  scattered. 

Loring,  still  in  the  lowland  south  of  the  hill, 
was  hastening  to  Bowen's  relief  when  the  broken 
division,  pouring  down  the  hill,  disordered  his 
ranks.  The  artillery  of  the  pursuers  opened  upon 
him,  and  Osterhaus  attacked  him  in  force.  Bowen 
escaped  across  Baker's  Creek  by  the  ford.  One 
brigade  of  Stevenson's  division  reached  the  bridge. 
Carr's  division  of  McClernand's  corps  by  a  rapid 
movement  then  seized  the  bridge,  forcing  the  re 
mainder  of  Stevenson's  command  to  the  ford. 
Bowen  remained  at  the  ford  to  hold  it  for  Loring 
till  forced  by  the  approach  of  the  National  troops  to 
let  go.  Loring's  wagons  had  gone  forward  with 
the  train.  Wandering  in  the  night  to  find  a  lower 
ford,  he  lost  his  battery  in  a  swamp.  Late  in  the 
night  he  reached  the  ford,  but  there  learned  that 
Edwards's  Station  was  already  occupied  by  Grant. 

The  National  loss  was  four  hundred  and  ten 
killed,  eighteen  hundred  and  forty-four  wounded, 
and  one  hundred  and  eighty-seven  missing,  mak 
ing  a  total  of  twenty-four  hundred  and  forty-one. 
Of  this  loss,  one  hundred  and  fifty  was  sustained 
by  the  four  divisions  under  McClernand's  com 
mand,  and  twenty-two  hundred  and  ninety-one  by 
the  divisions  under  the  immediate  command  of 
Grant  and  McPherson.  The  Confederate  loss,  ac 
cording  to  division  and  brigade  reports,  was : 
Killed,  three  hundred  and  eighty;  wounded,  ten 
hundred  and  eighteen  ;  missing,  twenty-four  hun 
dred  and  forty-one ;  total,  thirty-eight  hundred  and 
thirty-nine.  General  Pemberton  in  his  report  of 


128  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

casualties  omits  Loring's  division,  and  differs  from 
Stevenson  as  to  the  loss  in  his  division.  Where  a 
victory  was  so  vital  and  so  crushing,  it  seems  un 
gracious  to  suggest  that  it  might  have  been  more 
complete.  Yet  the  suggestion  forces  itself  that  if 
the  four  divisions  with  McClernand  had  fought 
with  the  same  alacrity  and  ardor  as  the  other  three, 
the  result  would  have  been  the  capture  of  Pem- 
berton  and  his  entire  command,  and  the  immediate 
completion  of  the  campaign. 

Pemberton's  shattered  legions  trudged  wearily 
to  the  Big  Black  and  crossed  through  the  night. 
The  high  bluff  which  formed  the  west  bank  of  the 
river  and  dominated  the  plain  in  front  was  left  va 
cant,  to  be  occupied  by  Loring's  division  in  sup 
port  of  the  troops  holding  the  bridge  head  on  the 
lowland  east  of  the  river.  But  Loring  was  wander 
ing  about  east  of  Baker's  Creek,  and  never  came. 
Bowen's  division  did  not  cross,  but  remained  to 
aid  Vaughan's  brigade,  fresh  from  Vicksburg,  in 
holding  the  bridge  head.  The  Big  Black  there 
forms  a  deep  re-entrant  curve.  The  bridge  head 
was  a  line  of  earthwork  a  mile  in  length,  running 
north  and  south,  the  northern  end  resting  upon 
the  river  and  the  southern  end  touching  a  cypress 
swamp  which  bordered  on  the  river  below.  Twenty 
guns  were  in  position ;  along  the  front  of  the  works 
and  parallel  to  them  was  a  bayou  extending  from 
the  river  above  to  the  swamp  below.  Trees  and 
boughs  had  been  thrown  into  the  slough,  making 
it  at  once  a  ditch  and  abattis. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  i/th  McClernand 
moved  from  Edwards's  Station.  Osterhaus  in  front, 
followed  by  A.  J.  Smith,  advanced  over  the  rolling, 
cultivated  land  along  the  south  side  of  the  road, 
and  deployed  when  near  the  Confederate  intrench- 
ments.  Smith  deployed  on  his  left.  Artillery 
opened  fire,  and  skirmishers  pushed  forward  and 
engaged.  While  this  mild  combat  was  going  on, 


VICKSBURG. 


I29 


Carr's  division  advanced  through  woods  that  bor 
dered  the  north  side  of  the  road,  extending  to  the 
river,  near  the  northern  extremity  of  the  intrench- 
ments.  While  the  defenders  of  the  works  were 
engaged  with  the  force  in  their  front,  Carr's  com 
mand,  leaping  from  the  woods,  rushed  over  the 
intervening  ground,  plunged  through  the  bayou, 
clambered  over  the  works,  and  was  within  them. 
The  Confederate  troops  were  dismayed.  The  fear 
of  being  cut  off  from  retreat  made  a  panic.  There 
was  a  mad  rush  for  the  bridges.  Osterhaus  and 
Smith  hastened  up.  Eighteen  of  the  twenty  guns, 
with  their  ammunition,  fourteen  hundred  muskets, 
and  seventeen  hundred  and  fifty-one  prisoners  were 
captured.  The  bridges  prepared  for  combustion 
were  fired,  and  the  battle  was  over  by  nine  o'clock. 
McClernand's  loss  was  thirty-nine  killed,  two  hun 
dred  and  thirty-seven  wounded,  and  three  missing ; 
all  but  ten  killed,  twenty-one  wounded,  and  two 
missing  were  of  Carr's  division.  Neither  Bowen 
nor  Vaughan  made  reports,  and  the  number  of 
killed,  wounded,  and  drowned  is  not  known. 

General  Sherman,  in  Jackson,  on  the  morning 
of  the  1 6th,  received  order  from  General  Grant  to 
send  forward  one  division  immediately,  and  to  fol 
low  \vith  the  other  as  soon  as  his  work  of  destroy 
ing  railroad  and  other  public  property  should  be 
accomplished.  In  pursuance  of  this  order,  Sher 
man  arrived  at  Bolton  after  dark,  and  was  there 
informed  by  one  of  General  Grant's  staff  that  he 
was  to  go  to  Bridgeport  and  there  cross  the  Big 
Black.  Sherman  reached  Bridgeport  at  noon  next 
day.  General  Blair,  who  had  arrived  with  the  sup 
ply  train  at  Raymond  on  the  i5th,  and  been  at 
tached  to  McClernand's  command  on  the  i6th,  ar 
rived  at  Bridgeport  a  few  hours  earlier.  Sherman 
having  the  only  pontoon  train  in  the  army,  his 
bridge  was  laid  by  night,  and  two  divisions  of  his 
corps  were  over  by  daybreak  of  the  i8th.  Captain 


130 


GENERAL   SHERMAN. 


Hickenlooper,  chief  engineer  of  the  Seventeenth 
Corps,  and  Captain  Tresilian,  chief  engineer  of 
Logan's  division,  constructed  a  bridge  for  the  Sev 
enteenth  Corps.  A  framework  of  stout  timbers, 
filled  with  cotton  bales  standing  on  end  and  tightly 
compressed,  and  the  whole  covered  by  a  flooring, 
was  built  on  the  shore,  launched,  and  held  in  place 
by  cables.  A  twenty-pound  Parrott  gun  sank  the 
structure  fourteen  inches,  leaving  an  excess  of 
buoyancy  of  sixteen  inches. 

General  Sherman,  starting  early  in  the  morning 
of  the  1 8th,  approached  the  northeast  corner  of  the 
defenses  of  Vicksburg,  and,  by  order  of  General 
Grant,  moved  into  position  facing  the  north  front 
of  the  works,  from  the  Grave  Yard  road  to  the 
river.  Pemberton,  finding  the  line  occupied  by 
his  command  too  extended  for  his  force,  withdrew 
his  troops,  in  the  night  of  the  i8th,  to  his  inner 
line,  being  not  only  shorter  but  also  much  stronger. 
In  the  morning  of  the  I9th  Sherman  occupied  the 
abandoned  line,  and  sent  a  cavalry  regiment  out 
to  Haines's  Bluff.  The  works  were  found  aban 
doned,  fourteen  heavy  guns  in  position  uninjured, 
and  the  magazines  full  of  ammunition  and  stores. 
The  cavalry  colonel  signaled  to  a  gunboat  in  the 
Yazoo  River,  turned  over  the  place  to  the  com 
mander,  and,  having  opened  communication  with 
the  fleet,  returned  to  camp. 

McClernand  and  McPherson  began  to  arrive 
toward  evening  of  the  i8th,  and  were  placed  facing 
the  east  front  of  the  Confederate  line,  McPherson 
next  to  Sherman  and  McClernand  on  McPherson's 
left.  The  works  were  attacked  the  afternoon  of 
the  igth.  Assault  was  made  at  the  Grave  Yard 
road  by  Blair's  division  of  the  Thirteenth  Corps. 
The  road  was  swept  by  a  crossfire  of  artillery  and 
musketry.  Tuttle's  brigade  was  held  in  reserve  by 
the  road,  while  Ewing's  and  Giles  Smith's  brigades 
charged  on  the  right  of  the  road  and  Kilby  Smith's 


VICKSBURG.  I3I 

on  the  left.  The  charging  lines  descended  the  gul 
lied  bank  of  the  ravine,  pushed  through  thickets 
and  entanglement  of  felled  trees,  clambered  up  the 
farther  side,  and  reached  the  base  of  the  parapet, 
but  could  get  no  farther.  They  remained  there  till 
night,  and  were  then  withdrawn.  The  Fifteenth 
and  Seventeenth  Army  Corps  advanced  toward  the 
works  and  engaged  them  with  musketry  and  field 
artillery,  but  did  not  assault.  The  loss  of  the  as 
sailants  in  killed  and  wounded  was  nine  hundred 
and  thirty-four.  Of  these,  seven  hundred  and  five 
were  in  Sherman's  corps. 

The  defensive  line  of  Vicksburg  was  a  continu 
ous  ridge,  forming  a  natural  rampart  encircling 
the  city,  resting  upon  the  river  above  the  city,  and 
three  miles  below  it.  The  ridge  was  of  uniform 
height,  making  a  level  summit,  narrow  except 
where  projecting  spurs  added  width.  General 
Pemberton  said  the  length  of  the  line  was  eight 
miles.  General  Grant's  engineers  after  the  siege 
estimated  it  at  five  and  a  half  miles.  Beginning 
at  Fort  Hill,  the  site  of  an  early  Spanish  fort,  a 
high  point  overlooking  the  river  north  of  the  city, 
it  ran  due  east  for  a  mile,  then  turning  abruptly 
to  the  south,  and  continuing  in  that  direction  to 
the  Jackson  Railway,  it  there  began  to  curve  west 
ward,  and  finally  ran  west  before  reaching  the  river 
below  the  city.  The  front  of  the  first  mile,  facing 
the  north,  was  precipitous,  in  places  vertical,  mak 
ing  a  wall  one  hundred  feet  high,  rising  from  the 
sloping  bottom  of  a  deep  valley.  Along  the  east 
front  ran  a  deep  ravine,  crossed  in  three  places  by 
ridges  forming  natural  causeways,  over  which  ran 
three  roads  leading  out  from  the  city.  The  Grave 
Yard  road  was  a  little  distance  south  of  the  north 
east  angle,  the  Baldwin  road  was  close  by  the 
Jackson  Railway,  and  the  Jackson  road  nearly  mid 
way  between  the  other  two.  Opposed  to  the  north 
front  was  a  ridge  of  very  irregular  contour,  the 


132  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

summit  being  from  four  hundred  to  six  hundred 
yards  from  the  Confederate  works.  The  land  to 
the  east  of  the  city  was  a  labyrinth  of  ridges  and 
ravines,  preventing  any  movements  in  line,  but 
protecting  the  camps  of  the  investing  army  from 
the  fire  of  the  besieged. 

Batteries,  mostly  open  to  the  rear,  but  some 
inclosed,  were  erected  on  commanding  points,  and 
were  connected  by  massive  infantry  intrenchments, 
continuous  along  the  entire  line  except  at  one  place. 
Just  south  of  the  railroad  Waul's  Texas  Legion 
occupied  a  wooded  portion  of  the  main  ridge,  un 
fortified  until  after  the  22d  of  May,  which  was  pro 
tected  by  a  fortified  spur  projecting  to  the  east 
along  the  railroad  and  then  turning  to  the  south, 
forming  a  valley  between  it  and  Waul's  line. 
Smith's  division  held  the  northern  front,  and 
around  the  angle  to  and  across  the  Grave  Yard 
road.  Forney's  division,  with  the  battery  of  Waul's 
Legion,  and  re-enforced  in  case  of  attack  by  Bow- 
en's  reserve  division,  extended  from  Smith  to  the 
railroad.  S.  D.  Lee's  brigade  of  Stevenson's  di 
vision,  with  the  Texas  Legion,  filled  the  line  from 
the  railroad  to  Garrett's  Fort,  and  Stevenson's 
other  three  brigades  continued  from  Garrett's  Fort 
to  the  river.  Sherman  covered  Smith's  front, 
Steele's  division  beginning  at  the  river,  Blair's  con 
tinuing  around  across  the  Grave  Yard  road,  and 
Tuttle  in  reserve.  McPherson  was  opposed  to 
Forney.  Ransom's  brigade,  detached  from  McAr- 
thur's  division,  was  next  to  Blair ;  Logan's  division 
next  to  Ransom,  crossing  the  Jackson  turnpike 
road ;  and  Quinby,  who  had  resumed  command  of 
his  division,  temporarily  commanded  by  Crocker, 
between  Logan  and  McClernand's  right.  Logan 
and  Quinby  held  each  one  brigade  in  reserve.  Mc- 
Clernand  had  one  brigade  north  of  the  railroad, 
in  front  of  Forney's  right.  The  rest  of  his  com 
mand  was  in  front  of  S.  D.  Lee,  extending  from 


VICKSBURG. 


133 


the  railroad  to  Garrett's  Fort.  From  McClernand 
to  the  river,  a  distance  of  more  than  two  miles,  the 
ground  was  unoccupied.  When  casualties  and 
sickness  diminished  the  number  of  defenders,  For 
ney  contracted  his  division  toward  the  south  and 
Smith  his  to  the  west,  leaving  a  vacant  space  about 
the  Grave  Yard  road.  Green's  brigade  of  Bowen's 
reserve  division  rilled  the  vacancy.  The  day  on 
which  General  Green  moved  in  he  raised  his  head 
to  look  over  the  parapet  and  see  the  ground  in 
front.  A  rifle  ball  passed  through  his  head,  killing 
him  instantly. 

The  experience  of  the  iQth  showed  that  the  de 
fenses  could  not  be  carried  by  a  dash,  and  that 
the  veteran  troops  within  the  works  had  recovered 
their  accustomed  spirit.  General  Grant  ordered  a 
prepared  assault  to  be  made  at  10  A.  M.  on  the  22d. 
All  the  guns  in  position  opened  fire  in  the  morn 
ing.  At  ten  o'clock  the  bombardment  ceased,  and 
the  assaulting  parties  with  their  supports  leaped 
forward.  A  spur  with  rugged  surface,  projecting 
from  the  north  face  of  the  defensive  line,  gave  a 
possible  though  hardly  practicable  approach  to  the 
works.  Wood's  brigade  of  Steele's  division  at 
tempted  the  ascent.  As  they  toiled  up,  clambering 
over  the  rough  ascent,  exposed  to  fire  from  the 
whole  line,  the  ranks  were  thinned  at  every  step. 
A  detachment  made  their  way  to  the  base  of  the 
works,  but  finally  the  rest  had  to  seek  shelter  in 
hollows  and  behind  fallen  timber.  Blair  again  at 
tacked  by  the  Grave  Yard  road.  A  way  had  been 
cut  down  into  and  across  the  ravine  below  the 
road.  The  division  charged  in  column  of  fours. 
When  the  troops  emerged  from  the  ravine  on  to 
open  ground,  a  fire  blazed  from  the  parapet  of  the 
fort  and  the  infantry  intrenchments.  A  portion 
of  Ewing's  brigade  rushed  on  to  the  right  and 
gained  the  ditch  of  the  fort,  and  planted  their  colors 
in  the  face  of  the  parapet.  Giles  Smith  moved  his 


134  GENERAL  SHERMAN. 

brigade  along  the  main  ravine  to  the  left,  and  from 
cover  engaged  the  intrenchments.  Kilby  Smith 
found  a  ridge,  from  behind  which  he  supported 
Ewing  by  firing  at  the  defenders  who  showed  them 
selves  above  the  parapet. 

Ransom,  whose  brigade  formed  the  right  of 
McPherson's  corps,  pushed  through  the  tangle 
which  filled  the  lower  part  of  the  main  ravine  and 
ascended  till  they  met  a  fire  through  which  they 
could  not  advance.  He  fell  back  behind  a  swell 
of  ground,  where  the  brigade  returned  the  fire  of 
the  enemy.  Logan  assailed  the  massive  work  at 
the  Jackson  road  and  the  intrenchments  to  the 
south  of  it.  The  fort  stood  upon  a  rising  ground, 
and  so  dominated  the  vicinage  that  the  Seventeenth 
Corps  called  it  Fort  Hill,  making  some  confusion 
in  the  reports.  The  hill  was  too  steep  to  afford 
room  for  a  ditch.  The  face  was  scarped  a  depth  of 
twenty  feet  from  the  summit  and  surmounted  by 
a  rampart  ten  feet  high,  presenting  a  front  thirty 
feet  high.  A  portion  of  the  assaulting  force  reached 
the  base  of  the  fort ;  the  rest  were  driven  by  the 
murderous  fire  to  halt  in  sheltered  hollows.  Ste 
venson,  having  more  open  ground  to  pass  over,  was 
unable  to  reach  the  long  line  of  intrenchments  in 
his  front,  and,  placing  his  command  under  cover 
in  a  ravine,  fired  at  heads  that  appeared  above  the 
works.  Of  Quinby's  division  there  is  but  scanty 
report.  He  lay  in  front  of  a  long  line  of  intrench 
ments,  protected  by  heavy  abattis.  The  slope  was 
open  and  cut  up  by  ravines.  His  troops  advanced 
steadily,  hewed  their  way  through  the  abattis,  but 
met  a  withering  fire  which  prevented  their  reaching 
the  works.  Finding  shelter,  they  maintained  their 
position,  returning  the  fire  of  the  enemy. 

Benton's  brigade,  the  right  of  McClernand's 
corps,  was  immediately  north  of  the  railroad,  facing 
the  right  of  Forney's  division.  In  their  front  was 
a  redan,  having  two  heavy  guns  and  manned  by 


VICKSBURG.  135 

the  Second  Texas,  besides  artillerists.  One  gun 
was  disabled  by  the  bombardment.  Benton,  sup 
ported  by  Burbridge's  brigade,  made  a  vigorous 
charge  and  reached  the  front  of  the  fort.  The 
assailants  poured  such  a  fire  through  the  torn  and 
widened  embrasures  that  the  Texans  lay  on  the 
ground,  except  one  rank  that  stood  close  against 
the  parapet.  Two  regiments  came  to  re-enforce 
the  defenders.  A  fieldpiece  was  dragged  up  the 
hill  by  the  assailants.  The  Texans  drew  their  gun 
back  into  the  fort,  loaded  it,  and  ran  it  to  an  em 
brasure,  but  the  gunners  were  killed  before  they 
could  fire.  More  re-enforcements  came  to  the  fort, 
and  Boomer's  brigade  of  Quinby's  division,  with 
drawn  from  McPherson's  front,  arrived  to  aid  Ben- 
ton  and  Burbridge.  Colonel  Boomer  was  killed 
while  moving  into  position.  The  assailants  could 
not  be  driven  away ;  but  the  ditch  was  ten  feet 
deep  and  the  parapet  rose  ten  feet  above  the  escarp, 
and  they  could  not  effect  an  entrance.  So  the 
combat  raged  till  dark,  when  the  assailants  with 
drew,  Boomer's  brigade  taking  down  the  gun 
which  McClernand's  men  had  left  behind. 

Lawler's  brigade,  supported  by  Landrum's,  as 
saulted  the  redoubt  immediately  south  of  the  rail 
road  on  the  projecting  spur,  defended  by  the  Twen 
tieth  and  Thirtieth  Alabama.  The  bombardment 
had  battered  away  the  upper  part  of  an  angle  of 
the  parapet,  making  a  breach.  The  Twenty-second 
Iowa,  taking  advantage  of  favorable  depressions, 
gained  the  front  of  the  fort.  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Graham  and  most  of  the  regiment  occupied  the 
ditch,  while  two  sergeants  and  fifteen  men  clam 
bered  over  the  breach  into  an  inclosed  space  formed 
by  the  parapets  and  a  traverse.  An  officer  and 
thirteen  men  were  in  this  confined  space ;  the  rest 
of  the  garrison  fled,  abandoning  the  adjoining  in 
fantry  intrenchments  as  well  as  the  forts.  Sergeant 
Griffith  took  the  captured  party  to  General  McCler- 
10 


136  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

nand,  while  Sergeant  Messenger  and  the  men  re 
mained  in  the  fort.  General  Lee  commanded, 
urged,  entreated  the  two  fugitive  regiments  to  re 
possess  the  work.  But  nothing  could  move  them. 
If  Lawler  and  Landrum  could  have  assembled 
their  brigades  just  then  and  pushed  forward,  noth 
ing  could  have  prevented  their  piercing  the  Con 
federate  line.  But  Colonel  Stone,  of  the  Twenty- 
second  Iowa,  while  standing  on  the  summit,  look 
ing  across  the  little  valley  at  the  wooded  ridge  held 
by  Waul's  Legion,  was  wounded  and  left  the  field, 
and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Dunlap,  of  the  Twenty-first 
Iowa,  standing  with  him  was  killed.  The  assault 
ing  troops  were  dispersed  over  the  slopes  and  in 
the  hollows.  Two  companies  of  Waul's  Legion 
volunteered  to  retake  the  fort.  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Pettus,  who  was  in  temporary  command  of  the 
Twentieth  Alabama,  taking  a  musket,  went  with 
them  as  a  volunteer.  After  a  short  conflict,  the 
Iowa  men  were  killed.  The  redoubt  was  recap 
tured  at  twelve  o'clock,  an  hour  after  it  had  been 
abandoned,  and  the  chance  of  piercing  the  line  was 
lost.  Lighted  shells  thrown  over  the  parapet  killed 
many  of  those  who  were  in  the  ditch.  At  nightfall 
some  escaped.  The  rest,  including  Colonel  Graham, 
were  taken  prisoners. 

About  noon  it  was  manifest  that  the  assault 
along  the  line  had  failed.  General  McClernand, 
unaware  of  the  fact  that  Sherman's  men  were  in 
the  ditch  of  the  fort  at  Grave  Yard  road,  with  their 
colors  planted  on  the  slope  of  the  parapets  and 
McPherson's  men  at  the  base  of  the  rampart  on 
the  Jackson  road,  also  that  Blair,  Ransom,  and 
Logan  were  waging  desperate  conflict,  began  at 
11.15  A-  M->  and  continued  through  the  day,  send 
ing  to  General  Grant  sanguine  accounts  of  his  suc 
cess,  and  urgent  appeal  to  push  the  attack  at  other 
points  and  send  re-enforcements  to  him.  As  late 
as  3.15  P.  M.  he  reported,  "  My  men  are  in  two  of 


VICKSBURG. 


137 


the  enemy's  forts."  Grant  directed  McPherson  to 
send  him  two  of  Quinby's  brigades,  and,  yielding 
his  own  judgment,  ordered  the  assault  to  be  re 
newed  at  three  o'clock.  Re-enforcements  were 
sent  to  the  front  from  the  reserves.  There  was 
another  rush  and  another  repulse ;  a  useless  at 
tack,  a  fruitless  slaughter.  The  troops  could  not 
retreat,  and  lay  where  shelter  could  be  found  till 
night,  and  then  withdrew.  The  National  loss  in 
the  day  was  five  hundred  and  two  killed,  twenty- 
five  hundred  and  fifty  wounded,  and  one  hundred 
and  forty-seven  captured ;  total,  thirty-one  hun 
dred  and  ninety-nine.  The  Confederate  loss  is  not 
reported.  In  Forney's  division  it  was  forty-two 
killed  and  one  hundred  and  seventeen  wounded. 
In  Cockrell's  brigade  of  Bowen's  division,  twenty- 
eight  killed  and  ninety-five  wounded.  The  total 
probably  did  not  much  exceed  five  hundred. 

Sherman  and  McPherson  were  sorely  aggrieved 
by  the  insistence  of  McClernand  in  causing  the  dis 
astrous  assault  in  the  afternoon.  They,  as  well 
as  Rawlins  and  Logan,  had  frequently  before  com 
plained  to  General  Grant  of  his  absorption  of  the 
achievements  of  the  army  and  insubordinate  con 
duct.  On  the  3Oth  of  May  he  made  a  congratu 
latory  order  to  his  corps,  filled  with  extravagant 
laudation  of  his  own  command,  and  ungratefully 
as  well  as  unjustly  reflecting  on  the  conduct  of 
the  other  corps  on  the  22d.  In  violation  of  orders, 
this  was  published  in  the  newspapers  without  being 
first  submitted  to  headquarters.  Grant  relieved 
him  of  his  command,  and  ordered  him  to  repair 
to  Springfield,  111.,  and  there  report  to  the  adjutant 
general  of  the  army  by  letter.  McClernand,  dis 
regarding  party  ties,  had  promptly  insisted  on  the 
validity  of  the  election  of  Lincoln  as  President, 
and  offered  his  services  to  the  country  at  the  first 
outbreak  of  the  war.  He  had  been  constantly  on 
duty,  and  was  ambitious  of  distinction.  President 


1 38  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

Lincoln,  grateful  for  his  stand  at  the  beginning, 
appointed  him  by  a  personal  order  commander  of 
the  expedition  down  the  Mississippi  River.  When 
General  Grant,  with  the  approval  of  General  Hal- 
leek,  exercising  his  authority  as  commander  of  the 
military  department  within  which  the  expedition 
was  to  operate,  made  McClernand's  command  an 
integral  part  of  the  army  which  Grant  organized 
against  Vicksburg,  and  McClernand  found  himself 
a  subordinate  instead  of  a  separate  commander,  and 
the  President  refused  to  interfere  further  in  his 
behalf,  he  was  exasperated  and  restive.  But,  after 
all,  as  is  manifest  from  McClernand's  reports,  the 
trouble  was  largely  due  to  his  exuberant  egotism, 
which  exaggerated  his  own  exploits  and  belittled 
the  achievements  of  others. 

The  night  of  the  22d  was  a  night  of  toil  along 
the  Confederate  lines.  The  entire  force  of  engi 
neers,  with  large  working  parties,  strove  through 
the  night,  repairing  the  battered  works,  strengthen 
ing  weak  points,  filling  up  and  obliterating  the  em 
brasures  in  the  lunette  north  of  the  railroad,  re 
moving  disabled  guns,  and  bringing  other  pieces 
in  their  place.  As  long  as  the  siege  lasted  the 
nights  were  employed  in  repairing  damage  done 
through  the  day  and  constructing  new  works  in 
rear  of  exposed  points. 

The  assailants,  satisfied  that  Vicksburg  could 
not  be  carried  by  storm,  settled  down  cheerfully  to 
the  task  of  regular  siege.  Regular  approaches  by 
sap,  wide  enough  for  the  passage  of  artillery,  were 
begun  in  front  of  all  the  works  assaulted  on  the 
22d.  The  saps  by  the  Grave  Yard  road  and  the 
Jackson  road  were  pushed  with  special  vigor.  The 
besieging  batteries  bombarded  every  day.  Sharp 
shooters  on  both  sides  watched  through  loopholes 
for  every  head  that  appeared  above  the  opposing 
parapets.  At  times  a  general  fire  of  musketry 
sheeted  the  Confederate  parapets  with  their  mis- 


VICKSBURG.  139 

silcs.  Under  this  continued  hail  of  fire  the  guns 
of  the  Confederates  were  gradually  disabled  or  si 
lenced,  till  few  continued  to  reply.  The  National 
batteries  were  advanced  from  ridge  to  ridge  till 
they  were  planted  close  to  the  line  of  defense. 

When  the  saps  came  near,  the  Confederates 
fired  turpentine  balls,  that  set  fire  to  the  sap  rollers 
and  stopped  the  work  till  new  rollers  were  con 
structed  so  covered  as  to  be  protected  from  fire. 
When  the  base  of  the  works  was  reached,  lighted 
shells  were  thrown  over,  killing  the  men  of  the 
working  party.  John  W.  Friend,  of  the  Twentieth 
Ohio,  in  General  Logan's  pioneer  corps,  devised 
wooden  mortars  from  a  section  of  a  tree  trunk, 
bored  and  strapped  with  iron.  They  were  easily 
carried  to  the  front,  and,  with  a  small  charge  of 
powder,  would  lift  a  shell  over  the  enemy's  parapet 
and  drop  it  within  the  work.  Countermines  were 
started,  and  one  was  successfully  exploded,  blow 
ing  up  the  sap  by  the  Grave  Yard  road. 

Meanwhile  batteries  were  established  on  the 
peninsula  in  front  of  the  city.  Sharpshooters  hid 
den  in  the  brush  fired  across  the  river.  Admiral 
Porter  placed  a  battery  of  heavy  mortars  behind 
the  peninsula,  which  exploded  their  huge  shells 
over  the  city.  A  hundred-pounder  gun  was  planted, 
which  General  Pemberton  and  the  commander  of 
the  river  batteries  reported  to  be  "  very  destruc 
tive."  Gunboats  guarded  the  river  above  and  below 
the  city.  General  Lauman's  division  arrived  on  the 
25th  of  May  and  occupied  a  portion  of  the  space 
between  McClernand  and  the  river.  General  Her- 
ron  reported  with  his  division  on  the  i5th  of  June; 
Lauman  shifted  to  the  right,  and  connected  with 
McClernand;  Herron  extended  from  Lauman  to 
the  river.  The  investment  of  the  city  was  com 
plete.  About  the  ist  of  June  the  meat  ration  was 
reduced  one  half,  and  the  ration  of  sugar,  rice,  and 
beans  was  largely  increased.  About  the  ist  of 


140 


GENERAL   SHERMAN. 


July  General  Pemberton  reports :  "  Our  stock  of 
bacon  having  been  about  exhausted,  the  experi 
ment  of  eating  mule  meat  as  a  substitute  was  tried, 
it  being  issued  only  to  those  who  desired  to  use 
it,  and  I  am  gratified  to  say  it  was  found  by  both 
officers  and  men  not  only  nutritious,  but  very  pal 
atable,  and  every  way  preferable  to  poor  beef." 
He  states  in  his  report  that  at  the  time  of  the  sur 
render  the  commissary  had  in  store  forty  thou 
sand  pounds  of  pork  and  bacon,  fifty-one  thousand 
two  hundred  and  forty-one  pounds  of  rice,  five 
thousand  bushels  of  peas,  ninety-two  thousand  two 
hundred  and  thirty-four  pounds  of  sugar.  He  also 
says,  "  There  was  at  no  time  any  absolute  suffer 
ing  for  want  of  food.  .  .  .  The  question  of  subsist 
ence,  therefore,  had  nothing  whatever  to  do  with 
the  surrender  of  Vicksburg."  But  the  surrender  or 
capture  of  Vicksburg  was  only  a  question  of  time, 
unless  some  exterior  force  should  compel  the  rais 
ing  of  the  siege. 

General  Johnston,  learning  on  the  night  of  the 
1 7th  of  May  that  Pemberton  had  fallen  back  into 
Vicksburg,  immediately  sent  to  him :  "  If  you  are 
invested  in  Vicksburg,  you  must  ultimately  sur 
render.  Under  such  circumstances,  instead  of 
losing  both  place  and  troops,  we  must  if  pos 
sible  save  the  troops.  If  it  is  not  too  late,  evacu 
ate  Vicksburg  and  its  dependencies  and  march 
to  the  northeast."  To  this  Pemberton  replied, 
with  the  unanimous  concurrence  of  his  general 
officers,  it  was  impossible  to  withdraw  the  army 
with  such  morale  and  material  as  to  be  of  further 
service  to  the  Confederacy,  and  that  he  decided 
to  hold  Vicksburg  as  long  as  possible.  It  was 
impossible,  for  while  the  council  was  considering 
Grant's  army  was  moving  into  position  around 
the  city. 

General  Johnston  was  now  confronted  with  the 
task  of  raising  the  siege  or  by  attack  or  maneuver 


VICKSBURG. 


141 


aiding  Pemberton  to  break  out  and  escape.  He  at 
once  demanded  re-enforcements,  and  the  authori 
ties  in  Richmond  promptly  sent  all  troops  that 
could  be  taken  from  Bragg's  army  in  Tennessee 
and  from  South  Carolina  and  Georgia.  There  was 
controversy  between  him  and  Richmond  as  to  the 
numbers  under  his  command.  Finally,  he  reported 
that  from  actual  returns  his  effective  force  was 
twenty-four  thousand  and  fifty-three.  This  did  not 
include  Jackson's  cavalry,  which  did  not  reach  him 
till  the  4th  of  June,  nor  did  it  include  some  irregu 
lar  cavalry,  a  few  hundred  in  number.  His  regu 
lar  field  return  sent  to  Richmond  on  the  25th  of 
June  includes  the  force  present  on  the  2d  of  June, 
and  also  Jackson's  command  and  the  irregulars — 
present  for  duty,  thirty-one  thousand  two  hundred 
and  twenty-six ;  total  present,  thirty-six  thousand 
three  hundred  and  fifteen.  Deducting  Jackson  and 
the  irregulars,  leaves  the  force  present  on  the  2d 
of  June :  Present  for  duty,  twenty-seven  thousand 
one  hundred  and  eleven ;  total  present,  thirty-one 
thousand  three  hundred  and  forty-eight,  and  at 
the  same  time  the  "  effective  present "  was  twenty- 
four  thousand  and  fifty-three.  On  the  2Qth  of  May 
Pemberton  dispatched  to  Johnston,  "  I  have  eight 
een  thousand  men  to  man  the  lines  and  river  front ; 
no  reserves,"  meaning,  of  course,  "  effectives."  At 
that  time  he  had  over  thirty  thousand  officers  and 
men  present.  After  making  the  largest  allowance 
for  sick,  special  duty,  and  detached  service,  the 
residue  present  for  duty  must  have  exceeded  eight 
een  thousand  by  several  thousand.  When  the  Con 
federate  reports  name  the  force  engaged  in  a  cam 
paign,  whether  or  not  expressly  stating  "  effec 
tive,"  it  appears  that  the  number  intended  is  the 
number  of  muskets  present  for  duty,  counting  artil 
lerists  as  muskets,  or  the  number  of  armed  enlisted 
men  prepared  for  action,  excluding  officers.  Gen 
eral  J.  D.  Cox  and  Colonel  E.  C.  Dawes,  after  a 


I42  GENERAL  SHERMAN. 

thorough  study  of  the  Atlanta  campaign,  arrived 
at  the  same  conclusion. 

Earnest  as  Johnston  was  to  collect  a  force  to 
raise  the  siege,  Grant  was  equally  diligent  in  ob 
taining  re-enforcements  to  resist  the  attempt. 
Hurlbut  having  already  sent  Lauman's  division, 
now  early  in  June  added  two  divisions,  under  Gen 
eral  Washburne ;  Burnside  sent  from  Ohio  two  di 
visions  of  the  Ninth  Corps  under  General  Parke ; 
and  Schofield  sent  Herron's  division  from  Mis 
souri.  Johnston  having  sent  a  division  to  Yazoo 
City,  Parke  and  Washburne  were  retained  at 
Haines's  Bluff.  Johnston's  accumulation  of  force 
becoming  formidable,  an  army  of  observation  was 
formed  under  the  command  of  General  Sherman, 
comprising  the  force  at  Haines's  Bluff  and  three 
other  divisions,  one  from  the  Thirteenth,  Fifteenth, 
and  Seventeenth  Corps  each. 

The  Big  Black  south  of  the  railroad  was  bor 
dered  on  both  shores  from  the  railroad  to  the  Mis 
sissippi  by  dense  forest.  There  was  neither  bridge 
nor  ford,  and  the  roads  leading  to  the  three  ferries, 
miles  apart,  were  rough  and  narrow  ways  through 
the  woods.  An  army  which  should  lay  bridges  at 
the  ferries,  and  cross  over  into  the  angle  formed  by 
the  Mississippi  and  the  Big  Black,  would  have  to 
conquer  or  be  captured.  Sherman  accordingly 
traced  his  line  of  defense  from  the  railroad  cross 
ing  of  the  Big  Black  to  Haines's  Bluff,  on  the 
Yazoo.  Osterhaus  with  his  division  at  the  rail 
road  crossing  fortified  the  high  bluff  which  rises 
vertically  from  the  shore  of  the  river  and  dominated 
the  country  beyond ;  very  strong  and  extensive 
fortification  was  constructed  at  Haines's  Bluff,  and 
works  thrown  up  at  key  points  along  the  line.  The 
roads  leading  from  this  line  to  the  Big  Black  ran 
for  the  most  part  upon  narrow  ridges,  separated  by 
valleys  filled  with  impassable  thickets.  Recon- 
noitering  parties  sent  up  the  country  between  the 


VICKSBURG. 


143 


Yazoo  and  the  Big  Black,  and  across  the  Big 
Black  toward  Jackson,  kept  Sherman  advised  as 
to  the  dispositions  of  Johnston. 

During  the  entire  siege  Johnston  and  Pember- 
ton  were  in  constant  communication  by  messen 
gers.  On  the  29th  of  May  Johnston  wrote :  "  I 
am  too  weak  to  save  Vicksburg.  Can  do  no 
more  than  attempt  to  save  you  and  your  gar 
rison."  Again  on  the  I4th  of  June,  "  All  that  we 
can  attempt  is  to  save  you  and  your  garrison." 
On  the  22d  of  June  he  sent  word,  "  If  I  can 
do  nothing  to  relieve  you,  rather  than  surrender 
the  garrison,  endeavor  to  cross  the  river  at  the 
last  moment  if  you  and  General  Taylor  com 
municate." 

On  the  25th  of  June  the  mine  under  the  work 
on  the  north  side  of  the  Jackson  road  was  ex 
ploded,  blowing  out  a  portion  of  the  parapet.  Six 
men  working  in  a  countermine,  besides  others  in 
the  fort,  were  buried  and  killed.  Legget's  brigade 
was  standing  by  under  cover.  The  Forty-fifth  Illi 
nois  rushed  into  the  breach  and  scrambled  upon 
the  loose  earth  before  the  smoke  cleared  away.  The 
garrison  retired  behind  an  inner  parapet  which  had 
been  constructed  fifteen  feet  in  rear  of  the  salient. 
The  colonel  of  the  Sixth  Missouri,  bringing  his 
regiment  up  in  re-enforcement,  was  instantly  killed. 
The  Confederates  from  behind  the  new  line  poured 
down  volleys,  and  threw  do\vn  lighted  shells  upon 
the  Illinois  men  crowded  in  the  cavity.  A  wooden 
barricade  was  erected  for  their  shelter,  but  was 
soon  shattered  by  a  gun  brought  into  play  by  the 
Missourians.  After  two  hours  of  desperate  fight 
ing  without  gaining  the  inner  defense,  the  Forty- 
fifth  \vas  relieved  by  the  Twentieth  Illinois. 
Through  the  night  the  regiments  were  relieved 
every  two  hours,  and  at  daylight  the  attempt  to 
scale  was  given  up  and  the  assaulting  party  with 
drawn.  The  Confederate  loss  by  the  explosion  and 


144 


GENERAL   SHERMAN. 


the  subsequent  fighting  was  twenty-one  killed  and 
seventy-three  wounded. 

On  the  ist  of  July  a  larger  mine  was  sprung 
under  the  fort  on  the  south  side  of  the  road,  mak 
ing  a  cavity  fifty  by  thirty  feet  across  and  twenty 
feet  deep,  almost  destroying  the  redan  and  badly 
shattering  the  inner  defense.  A  large  number  of 
the  men  manning  the  work  were  killed  or  wounded. 
Immediately  after  the  explosion  a  heavy  fire  of 
artillery  and  musketry  and  a  mortar  was  opened 
upon  the  breach.  Engineer-in-Chief  Lockett  says 
that,  in  the  hour  that  he  spent  there  after  the  ex 
plosion,  "  at  least  a  dozen  of  its  garrison  were 
killed  or  wounded  by  the  mortar  alone."  Seven 
men  were  thrown  within  the  National  lines.  Six 
were  killed,  but  the  seventh,  a  negro,  was  only 
stunned.  He  went  to  General  Logan's  headquar 
ters  as  a  servant,  and  remained  there  until  the  di 
vision  left  Vicksburg. 

The  same  day  Pemberton  asked  the  general 
officers  for  their  opinion  as  to  the  practicability 
of  an  evacuation.  The  agreeing  response  was,  the 
men  were  so  debilitated  that  there  was  no  chance 
of  an  evacuation.  Thereupon  he  wrote  to  General 
Grant,  proposing  surrender,  and  the  garrison 
stacked  arms  on  the  4th  of  July. 

The  National  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was : 


Killed. 

Wounded. 

Aggregate. 

Assault  on 

loth  of  May 

A'l 

IQd. 

Assault  on 

22d  of  May 

CQ2 

2  c  en 

May  i8th  t 

o  July  4th  

147 

6n 

692 

3,357 

4,047 

The  loss  from  the  ist  of  May  to  July  4th,  in 
cluding  skirmishes  by  Sherman's  force,  was: 
Killed,  fifteen  hundred  and  fourteen ;  wounded, 
seventy-three  hundred  and  ninety-five ;  aggregate, 


VICKSBURG.  145 

eighty-nine  hundred  and  nine.  The  surrender  com 
prised  twenty-one  hundred  and  sixty-six  officers, 
twenty-seven  thousand  two  hundred  and  thirty  en 
listed  men,  and  one  hundred  and  fifteen  citizen  em 
ployees  ;  in  all,  twenty-nine  thousand  five  hundred 
and  eleven.  General  Pemberton  gives  the  totals  of 
killed,  wounded,  and  missing  during  the  siege  of 
two  divisions,  but  nothing  of  the  others  or  the  river 
batteries.  The  compilers  of  the  war  records  have 
made  a  computation  of  the  loss  so  far  as  can  be 
found  in  the  reports  that  are  preserved,  making 
the  number  of  killed  eight  hundred  and  five.  But 
the  materials  are  incomplete.  The  report  of  Ste 
venson's  division  comes  down  only  to  the  i3th  of 
June,  two  weeks  after  Lauman  appeared  in  his  front 
and  before  Herron  arrived.  No  report  is  included 
of  two  of  the  brigades  in  Smith's  division  or  of  the 
river  batteries.  The  number  of  killed  must  have 
been  over  four  hundred,  making  loss  by  death  over 
fifteen  hundred.  The  morning  report  of  the  medi 
cal  director  for  the  4th  of  July  shows  under  medi 
cal  treatment  that  day  twenty-one  hundred  and 
thirteen  wounded  and  thirty-seven  hundred  and 
sixty-five  sick ;  total,  fifty-eight  hundred  and  sev 
enty-eight.  While  the  above  is  the  number  of 
killed  as  calculated  from  the  reports  now  on  file, 
two  observations  may  fairly  be  made :  One  is,  the 
brigade  and  division  reports,  supported  by  regi 
mental  returns,  have  larger  numbers  reported  killed 
than  those  which  give  only  lumping  sums  for  a 
division  or  brigade.  The  other  is,  that  General 
Pemberton  during  the  siege  understood  his  loss  to 
be  much  greater  than  what  is  given  above.  He 
dispatched  to  General  Johnston  on  the  29th  of 
May :  "  Since  investment  we  have  lost  about  one 
thousand  men — many  officers."  And  he  added, 
June  loth,  "  We  are  losing  many  officers  and  men." 
The  report  of  one  hundred  and  twenty-nine 
total  missing  is  obviously  incorrect.  Moore's  bri- 


146  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

gade  is  reported  as  losing  none,  while  one  of  his 
regiments — Second  Texas — reports  fifteen.  Lee's 
brigade  reports  seven  up  to  the  I3th  of  June,  while 
one  regiment  lost  fourteen  captured  on  the  22d  of 
May.  Herron's  division,  in  skirmishes  after  the 
1 3th  of  June,  the  date  of  Stevenson's  report,  cap 
tured  thirty-eight  from  Stevenson's  division.  The 
number  of  deserters  was  large.  Assistant-Secre- 
tary-of-War  Dana,  in  his  daily  reports  to  Secretary 
Stanton,  continually  mentions  the  arrival  of  de 
serters.  Sometimes  he  speaks  of  a  party  of  them 
coming,  and  once  he  mentions  the  arrival  of  two 
parties.  There  seems  to  have  been  a  stream  of 
them  along  the  river  bank  to  the  south,  until 
stopped  by  Colonel  Clark,  Thirty-fourth  Iowa, 
moving  his  regiment  to  the  bank  of  the  river.  He 
reports,  "  Rebel  deserters  were  brought  in  every 
day  in  large  numbers  by  the  pickets."  General 
Osterhaus,  stationed  at  the  Big  Black  bridge,  says, 
in  his  report  of  the  3Oth  of  May,  the  Eighth  Ken 
tucky  "  left  Vicksburg  six  hundred  strong  on  May 
1 9th,  and  marched  by  way  of  Cayuga  and  Chrystal 
Springs  to  Meridian,  where  it  was  mounted  and 
marched  back  by  Jackson."  The  Eighth  Kentucky 
belonged  to  Loring's  division.  At  all  events,  Pem- 
berton  must  have  had  about  thirty-two  thousand 
officers  and  men  present  when  Grant  undertook  to 
invest  the  place  with  about  forty  thousand. 

In  compliance  with  a  request  from  General 
Johnston,  General  Taylor,  commanding  a  district 
in  Louisiana,  sent  a  division  to  attack  the  National 
troops  encamped  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Missis 
sippi,  near  Vicksburg.  The  attack  was  made  on 
the  7th  of  June,  entirely  failed,  and  the  defeated 
assailants  were  pursued  to  the  interior  of  the  State. 
Later  it  was  determined  to  capture  Helena  and 
strongly  fortify  it,  with  the  view  of  aiding  John 
ston  to  prevent  the  capture  of  Vicksburg;  or,  if 
that  failed,  to  block  the  navigation  of  the  Missis- 


VICKSBURG.  147 

sippi,  and  so  neutralize  the  loss  of  Vicksburg.  Gen 
eral  Price  assaulted  the  defenses  of  Helena  on  July 
4th,  and  was  repulsed  with  heavy  loss  in  killed, 
wounded,  and  captured.  Port  Hudson,  besieged  by 
General  Banks  since  the  2ist  of  May,  capitulated 
on  the  8th  of  July.  General  Gardner's  return  for 
the  3Oth  of  June  was :  Present  for  duty,  twenty- 
eight  hundred  and  three;  aggregate  present,  four 
thousand  and  ninety-eight;  yet  upon  the  surren 
der  fifty-nine  hundred  and  fifty-three  officers  and 
men  gave  individual  paroles,  each  one  counter 
signed  by  General  Gardner,  besides  several  hundred 
sick  in  hospital  who  gave  no  parole.  The  Missis 
sippi  was  regained.  Its  navigation  was  free  from 
its  source  to  its  mouth.  The  Confederate  armies 
east  of  the  river  could  no  longer  draw  re-enforce 
ments  or  supplies  from  the  region  to  the  west.  Lee 
abandoned  the  field  of  Gettysburg  and  began  his 
retreat  to  Virginia  on  the  4th  of  July.  The  dawn 
of  final  victory  illumined  the  horizon. 

Johnston  gave  orders  to  his  army  on  the  28th 
of  June  to  advance  and  concentrate  opposite  the 
fords  above  the  railroad  bridge.  On  the  night  of 
the  3d  of  July  he  sent  a  messenger  to  advise  Pem- 
berton  that  he  would  make  a  diversion  by  attack  on 
the  7th.  He  learned  in  the  night  of  the  4th  of  the 
surrender,  and  started  forthwith  for  Jackson.  Sher 
man,  advised  by  Grant  on  the  3d  of  the  probable 
surrender  next  day,  put  his  force  in  motion  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  4th.  Bridges  were  constructed 
across  the  Big  Black.  Ord  with  the  Thirteenth 
Corps  and  Steele  with  the  Fifteenth  completed  their 
crossing  on  the  6th ;  Parke  with  the  Ninth  fol 
lowed.  Johnston  reached  Jackson  on  the  evening 
of  the  7th.  Sherman  arrived  on  the  Qth,  and  made 
his  investment  on  the  loth. 

The  fortifications  inclosed  the  city,  resting  upon 
the  river  above  and  below.  Sherman's  line  was 
formed  \vith  Ord  on  the  right,  Steele  in  the  cen- 


148  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

ter,  and  Parke  on  the  left,  the  flanks  resting  upon 
the  river.  Moving  into  position  on  the  I2th,  Lau- 
man  incautiously  advanced  close  to  the  enemy's 
works,  and  in  such  direction  as  to  uncover  and  ex 
pose  his  flank.  A  crossfire  from  the  batteries  in 
flicted  severe  loss  before  he  could  extricate  his  di 
vision.  General  Ord,  commanding'  the  Thirteenth 
Corps,  relieved  General  Lauman  from  his  command 
next  day.  General  Sherman  approved  the  order 
relieving  him,  giving  as  his  reason  his  policy  of 
sustaining  the  authority  of  his  corps  commanders. 
General  Sherman  was  not  willing  to  waste  the 
lives  of  his  men  in  open  assault  over  level  ground 
upon  formidable  works,  well  constructed  and  well 
armed.  His  supply  of  ammunition  was  inadequate 
for  a  siege,  and  a  train  of  empty  wagons  was  sent 
back  to  Vicksburg  for  more.  Meanwhile  the  troops 
were  employed  in  constructing  batteries  and  in- 
trenchments  and  keeping  up  a  moderate  fire.  At 
the  same  time  parties  were  sent  out  daily  to  gather 
subsistence  and  forage,  and  expeditions  to  thor 
oughly  destroy  the  railroad  as  far  north  as  Canton 
and  as  far  south  as  Brookhaven.  Johnston's  bat 
teries  returned  the  fire,  and  the  skirmishers  kept 
up  the  rattle  of  small  arms.  In  all  this  racket  the 
besiegers  could  not  hear  the  constant  rumble  of 
wagons  carrying  sick  and  wounded  and  stores  from 
the  beleaguered  city  across  the  river  to  the  rail 
way  on  the  farther  side.  Sherman's  ammunition 
arrived  in  the  night  of  the  i6th.  Men  with  spades 
and  picks  could  be  heard  at  work  strengthening 
the  defenses  till  midnight.  But  when  morning 
came  it  was  found  that  Johnston's  army  was  gone 
and  the  bridges  destroyed.  Sherman's  loss  during 
the  siege  was  one  hundred  and  twenty-nine  killed, 
seven  hundred  and  sixty-two  wounded,  two  hun 
dred  and  thirty-one  missing ;  total,  eleven  hundred 
and  twenty-two.  Of  these,  five  hundred  and  nine 
teen  were  in  Lauman's  division.  Johnston  reported 


VICKSBURG.  149 

his  loss  as  "  estimated  at  seventy-one  killed,  five 
hundred  and  four  wounded,  and  about  twenty-five 
missing."  But  Sherman  captured  and  took  to 
Vicksburg  seven  hundred  and  sixty-five  prisoners. 
General  Steele,  having  repaired  a  bridge,  crossed, 
and  with  three  brigades  advanced  to  Brandon, 
thirteen  miles,  pushing  Jackson's  jaded  cavalry  be 
fore  him. 

Johnston  had  set  fire  to  a  building  filled  with 
commissary  stores  which  he  could  not  carry  away. 
The  country  tramped  over  by  both  armies  for  two 
months  was  stripped  and  desolate.  Citizens  of 
Jackson  and  Canton  appealed  to  General  Sherman 
to  afford  relief  and  save  the  people  from  famine. 
He  obtained  authority  from  General  Grant  to  give 
two  hundred  barrels  of  flour  and  one  hundred  bar 
rels  of  pork  to  Jackson,  and  fifteen  thousand  rations 
to  Canton.  These  were  delivered  at  Big  Black 
River  to  committees,  who  gave  their  pledge  that 
the  supplies  should  be  distributed  equitably  to  the 
needy,  and  that  no  part  of  them  should  be  applied 
to  any  other  purpose.  The  committees  were  taken 
from  the  best  men  in  the  two  cities.  Among  those 
constituting  the  Jackson  committee  were  Chief- 
Justice  Sharkey  and  William  Yerger,  men  of  rare 
excellence. 

The  railroad  running  north  and  south  through 
Jackson  was  utterly  destroyed  for  a  distance  of  one 
hundred  miles,  and  Jackson  ceased  to  be  a  strategic 
point  for  the  rest  of  the  war.  The  men,  worn  out 
with  fatigue,  loss  of  sleep,  and  nervous  strain  for 
two  months,  now  that  the  campaign  wras  over  and 
the  fervid  heat  of  summer  had  come,  lost  their 
strength  and  yearned  for  home.  Sherman  returned 
across  the  Big  Black  by  easy  marches.  Herron's 
division  returned  to  Missouri,  and  Parke  to  Gen 
eral  Banks.  The  Thirteenth  Corps  was  sent  to 
Texas.  Grant  was  made  major  general,  and  Sher 
man  and  McPherson  brigadier  generals  in  the  regu- 


GENERAL   SHERMAN. 


lar  army,  and  promotions  were  freely  given  to  of 
ficers  of  the  volunteers.  Leaves  of  absence  and 
furloughs  thinned  the  camps.  Sherman  with  the 
four  divisions  of  his  corps  occupied  the  west  bank 
of  the  Big  Black,  while  Armstrong's  division  of 
Confederate  cavalry  watched  on  the  opposite  side. 


CHAPTER   VII. 

CHATTANOOGA   AND    MERIDIAN. 

THE  city  of  Chattanooga  lay  in  a  bend  of  the 
Tennessee  River  on  its  southern  bank.  The  river 
above  the  city  flows  to  the  west  of  south,  then  turn 
ing  to  the  north  of  west,  around  the  city,  turns 
again  to  the  south,  continuing  beyond  the  limits 
of  the  city,  till  it  strikes  the  northern  point  of  Look 
out  Mountain,  and  again  turns  sharply  to  the 
north.  This  sharp  bend  of  the  river  enfolds  a  long, 
narrow  point,  called  Moccasin  Point.  At  the  neck 
of  this  point  is  Brown's  Ferry,  nine  miles  from  the 
city  by  water,  while  it  is  little  more  than  a  mile 
overland  from  the  ferry  to  the  northern  bank  of 
the  river  opposite  the  city.  The  river  continues  to 
the  north  till  it  strikes  the  base  of  Walden's  Ridge, 
turns  again  to  the  southwest,  between  Walden's 
Ridge  and  Raccoon  Mountain,  and  passes  Kelly's 
Ferry.  By  land  it  is  nine  miles  from  Kelly's  to 
Brown's  Ferry. 

Missionary  Ridge  and  the  range  of  Lookout 
Mountain,  running  south  from  the  river,  about  four 
miles  apart,  inclose  Chattanooga  Valley  between 
them.  The  northern  extremity  of  Missionary 
Ridge  does  not  strike  the  river,  but,  passing  by  the 
bend  which  is  immediately  above  the  city,  it  con 
tinues  to  the  north  of  east,  parallel  to  the  river, 
and  about  a  mile  and  a  half  distant  from  it.  The 
northern  end  of  the  ridge  is  intersected  by  cuts, 
making  a  group  of  precipitous  hills ;  thence  south 
ward  it  is  a  continuous -ridge,  with  a  narrow  crest 
ii  151 


152  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

rising  a  little  over  four  hundred  feet  above  the 
plain.  The  northern  extremity  of  Lookout  Moun 
tain  rises  steeply  from  the  river  five  hundred  feet 
to  a  broad  plateau,  then  occupied  as  a  farm.  The 
plateau  extends  back  to  a  cliff  which  rises  vertically 
to  the  level  summit  of  the  range,  fifteen  hundred 
feet  above  the  plain.  A  road  scarped  along  the 
eastern  face  of  the  mountain  descended  toward  the 
north  till  it  nearly  reached  the  plateau,  and  there, 
turning  abruptly  toward  the  south,  continued  to 
the  valley  below.  Lookout  Creek  flows  north  to 
the  river  along  the  western  base  of  Lookout  Moun 
tain,  making  a  deep,  narrow  valley  between  the 
mountain  and  high  hills  rising  from  its  western 
bank.  Chickamauga  River  flows  to  the  north,  near 
the  eastern  base  of  Missionary  Ridge,  till,  curving 
around  the  northern  end  of  the  ridge,  it  flows  due 
west  to  tfie  river. 

When  General  Rosecrans  fell  back  to  Chatta 
nooga  after  the  battle  of  Chickamauga,  he  removed 
the  troops  posted  on  Lookout  Mountain  down  into 
the  city,  and  began  at  once  to  fortify.  A  strongly 
intrenched  line  was  constructed  in  the  form  of  an 
arc  of  a  circle,  covering  the  city,  the  flanks  rest 
ing  upon  the  river,  and  the  curved  front  extending 
out  into  the  valley.  In  the  eastern  portion  of  the 
line  was  a  commanding  eminence  projecting  like  a 
great  bastion,  and  crowned  by  Fort  Wood.  Gen 
eral  Bragg  followed  closely  up  and  constructed  a 
line  of  connected  batteries  along  the  crest  of  Mis 
sionary  Ridge,  together  with  a  secondary  line  of 
intrenchment  along  its  base.  A  curved  line  of 
works,  parallel  to  the  National  defense  and  two 
miles  distant  from  it,  stretched  across  the  valley 
from  Missionary  Ridge  to  Lookout.  Opposite  to 
Fort  Wood,  and  about  halfway  between  it  and  the 
base  of  Missionary  Ridge,  was  a  high,  rocky  hill, 
with  a  rough  ridge  extending  to  the  south,  called 
Orchard  Knob,  and  also  Indian  Hill.  This  Bragg 


CHATTANOOGA   AND    MERIDIAN.  ^3 

occupied  and  planted  a  battery  upon  it.  He  placed 
troops,  batteries,  and  a  signal  station  on  the  sum 
mit  of  Lookout,  and  constructed  a  line  of  intrench- 
ments  and  rifle-pits  along  the  western  face  of  the 
mountain,  down  on  the  slope  below  the  cliff.  The 
principal  camp  and  important  defensive  works  were 
upon  the  plateau  at  the  northern  extremity. 

The  railroad  from  Nashville  to  Chattanooga 
crosses  the  Tennessee  River  at  Bridgeport,  and 
thence,  passing  around  the  southern  base  of  Rac 
coon  Mountain  and  down  Lookout  Valley,  skirts 
the  base  of  the  north  extremity  of  Lookout  Moun 
tain,  and  so  enters  the  city.  When  Bragg  occu 
pied  Lookout,  he  cut  Chattanooga  off  from  rail 
road  communication  with  the  north.  There  was  a 
road  along  the  northern  bank  of  the  river  from 
Bridgeport  to  Chattanooga.  Bragg  posted  a  line 
of  sharpshooters  along  the  southern  bank  from 
Lookout  Mountain  to  a  point  opposite  Walden's 
Ridge,  who  commanded  the  road  and  prevented  its 
use.  The  only  access  from  Bridgeport  to  Chatta 
nooga  remaining  was  by  wagons  over  a  road  up 
the  Sequachie  Valley  to  Anderson's  crossroads, 
thence  by  an  almost  impracticable  route  over  the 
rocks  and  through  the  forest  of  Walden's  Ridge, 
and  then  down  to  the  city,  a  distance  of  sixty  miles. 
Over  this  route,  even  if  it  were  unmolested  and 
the  weather  continued  dry,  it  would  be  utterly  im 
possible  to  convey  supplies  sufficient  to  subsist 
Rosecrans's  command.  Bragg,  well  aware  of  the 
fact,  sat  in  grim  quiet  within  his  works,  refusing 
to  waste  the  lives  of  his  men  in  needless  conflict 
while  famine  was  doing  his  work  for  him. 

A  large  amount  of  supplies  in  wagon  trains  ac 
cumulated  at  Anderson's.  General  Bragg,  to 
hasten  the  period  of  starvation,  directed  General 
W^heeler  to  destroy  the  stores  at  Anderson's,  and 
then,  in  conjunction  with  Roddy  and  Lee,  who 
were  to  cross  the  river  at  points  below  Bridgeport, 


154  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

to  destroy  thoroughly  the  railroad  from  Bridgeport 
as  far  toward  Nashville  as  practicable.  On  the  ist 
of  October  General  Wheeler  crossed  the  Tennessee 
below  Washington,  about  fifty  miles  above  Chatta 
nooga,  moved  rapidly  over  to  Anderson's  cross 
roads,  and  next  day  fell  upon  the  parked  trains. 
The  little  train  guard  made  a  gallant  defense,  but 
were  soon  overcome.  Wheeler  burned  three  hun 
dred  loaded  wagons  and  killed  many  mules.  Leav 
ing  a  detachment  to  complete  the  destruction,  he 
moved  up  the  valley  with  one  division  and  sent  the 
other  to  destroy  the  railroad.  Colonel  E.  M.  Mc- 
Cook,  leaving  Bridgeport  early  in  the  morning  of 
the  2(1,  came  upon  the  burning  trains  in  the  after 
noon,  drove  the  Confederate  force,  rescued  eight 
hundred  mules,  and  saved  a  remnant  of  the  train. 
Pressing  on,  he  overtook  Wheeler's  rear  guard, 
and  with  a  saber  charge  drove  them  upon  the  main 
body.  Wheeler,  dividing  his  force  into  detach 
ments,  approached  many  points  at  the  same  time, 
and  succeeded  in  sacking  and  burning  McMinn- 
ville,  Shelbyville,  and  some  smaller  settlements,  and 
hastily  damaging  the  railroad.  Mitchell,  Morgan, 
and  Crook,  with  separate  commands,  as  well  as 
McCook,  followed  the  marauding  parties  night  and 
day,  and  gave  them  no  rest.  Mitchell  severely 
routed  Wheeler  near  Shelbyville,  as  Crook  did  at 
Farmington,  and  there  were  encounters  every  day. 
Wheeler  lost  all  his  captures,  four  of  his  guns,  and 
most  of  his  command.  The  worn-out  remnant 
escaped  across  the  river,  near  Rogersville,  on  the 
9th  of  October.  General  Roddy  crossed  the  Ten 
nessee  near  Guntersville,  but  accomplished  noth 
ing,  and  Lee  did  not  cross  the  river. 

The  rainy  season  set  in.  The  diminished  sup 
ply  trains  were  still  diminishing,  as  the  half-fed 
mules  toiled  wearily,  hauling  loaded  wagons  slowly 
over  the  slippery  rocks  of  Walden's  Ridge,  and 
died  in  their  traces.  Rations  in  Chattanooga  were 


CHATTANOOGA  AND   MERIDIAN.  155 

cut  down  till  hunger  was  a  pain.  But  the  feeble 
bodies  inclosed  stout  hearts,  and  the  resolve  to 
hold  the  place  never  wavered.  General  Thomas 
telegraphed  to  Grant  on  the  19th  of  October  that 
he  had  two  hundred  and  four  thousand  rations  in 
store  and  expected  ninety  thousand  more  next  day, 
and  to  General  Halleck  on  the  22d,  "  We  are  get 
ting  supplies  enough,  notwithstanding  the  bad  con 
dition  of  the  roads." 

In  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  out  in  Virginia  the 
Eleventh  Corps,  commanded  by  General  Howard, 
lay  in  camp,  and  the  Twelfth  Corps,  General  Slo- 
cum,  was  out  on  picket,  on  the  24th  of  September, 
when  orders  came  from  Washington  that  the  two 
corps  should  be  ready  to  embark  on  trains  of  cars 
next  day.  On  the  same  day  General  Hooker  was 
assigned  to  command  the  two  corps,  and  dispatches 
were  sent  to  quartermaster  generals,  masters  of 
transportation,  and  railroad  presidents  from  Wash 
ington,  Baltimore,  and  Philadelphia  to  St.  Louis 
and  Nashville  for  organization,  equipment,  and. 
movement  of  trains  from  Virginia  to  Bridgeport, 
on  the  Tennessee.  Over  five  hundred  cars  carried 
the  troops  to  Bellaire,  where  the  soldiers  marched 
over  a  bridge  constructed  after  they  had  begun 
the  journey,  and  found  other  trains  awaiting  them 
on  the  Ohio  shore.  At  Indianapolis  they  again  dis 
embarked,  marched  across  the  city  to  another  relay, 
and,  on  reaching  the  Ohio  River,  they  were  fer 
ried  over  and  found  the  fourth  provision  of  cars 
ready  for  them.  The  Government  took  possession 
of  the  road  from  Louisville  to  Bridgeport  and  the 
entire  equipment,  and  changed  the  gauge  of  the 
road  from  Louisville  to  Nashville,  and  of  all  its 
rolling  stock.  The  Eleventh  Corps  was  at  Bridge 
port  on  the  2d  of  October,  and  the  Twelfth  Corps 
halted  at  Stevenson  immediately  after. 

On  the  1 6th  of  October  the  President  made  an 
order  combining  the  Departments  of  the  Cumber- 


156  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

land  and  the  Tennessee  into  a  military  division — the 
Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi — appointing 
General  Grant  commander  of  the  division,  reliev 
ing  General  Rosecrans  from  command  of  the  De 
partment  of  the  Cumberland,  and  appointing  Gen 
eral  Thomas  in  his  place.  On  the  I9th  Grant  and 
Thomas  assumed  their  respective  commands. 

General  Grant  reached  Chattanooga  on  the 
23d  of  October.  At  midnight  of  the  27th  the  bri 
gades  of  Generals  Hazen  and  Turchin  were  roused. 
General  Hazen  with  eighteen  hundred  men  em 
barked  in  sixty  boats,  thirty  in  each  boat,  and  at 
3  A.  M.  cast  loose  and  floated  down  the  river,  while 
the  rest  of  the  brigade  marched  across  the  neck 
of  Moccasin  Point  to  Brown's  Ferry,  carrying  ma 
terials  for  a  bridge.  The  floating  party,  keeping 
close  to  the  right  bank  of  the  river,  and  maintain 
ing  absolute  silence,  escaped  notice  by  the  Con 
federate  pickets  who  lined  the  left  bank.  At  about 
4.30  A.  M.  the  head  of  the  flotilla  reached  the  left 
bank  where  the  road  to  Brown's  Ferry  comes  down 
to  the  river.  The  men  were  fired  on  by  the  pickets 
as  they  landed,  but  dashed  up  the  high  and  steep 
hills  on  each  side  of  the  road  and  gained  posses 
sion.  The  boats  ferried  over  the  other  troops.  An 
attack  by  a  force  called  by  the  firing  was  repulsed, 
and  the  position  fortified.  The  boats  were  floated 
into  position,  and  before  noon  a  bridge  was  con 
structed. 

General  Hooker  crossed  the  river  at  Bridgeport 
on  the  27th  with  the  Eleventh  Corps  and  part  of 
Geary's  division  of  the  Twelfth  Corps.  Early  in 
the  morning  of  the  28th  he  marched  toward  Look 
out  Valley.  The  Eleventh  Corps  halted  at  5  P.  M. 
near  the  mouth  of  Lookout  Creek.  Geary,  form 
ing  the  rear  of  the  column,  halted  at  Wauhatchie, 
three  miles  up  the  valley.  At  midnight  Longstreet 
made  a  fierce  attack  upon  Geary.  The  opposing 
lines  fired  at  the  flashes  of  each  other's  guns.  The 


CHATTANOOGA  AND    MERIDIAN.  157 

conflict  lasted  three  hours,  when  the  enemy  with 
drew.  A  brigade  sent  by  General  Howard  to 
Geary's  aid  came  upon  another  detachment  and  de 
feated  it.  Longstreet  recalled  his  troops  across 
the  creek  and  burned  the  bridge,  leaving  Hooker 
in  possession  of  all  west  of  the  creek.  Geary  re 
ported  that  his  parties  buried  one  hundred  and 
fifty-three  Confederates  in  his  front,  captured  fifty- 
two  wounded  and  fifty  unhurt  prisoners,  and  three 
hundred  and  fifty  muskets. 

A  road  was  constructed  from  Kelly's  Ferry  to 
Brown's,  eight  or  nine  miles.  The  stores  accumu 
lated  at  Stevenson  were  transported  on  two  steam 
boats  to  Kelly's,  and  carried  thence  by  the  short 
haul  to  Chattanooga.  The  blockade  was  raised. 
Abundant  supplies  had  easy  access  to  the  be 
leaguered  city. 

General  Sherman,  seated  with  his  family  in  his 
pleasant  quarters  on  a  plantation  near  the  Big 
Black  River,  was  startled  by  receiving  from  Gen 
eral  Grant  on  the  22d  of  September  an  order  to 
send  a  division  to  Chattanooga  immediately.  Os- 
terhaus's  division  broke  camp,  marched  to  Vicks- 
burg,  arriving  the  same  evening,  and  embarked  for 
Memphis.  Next  day  Sherman,  summoned  to 
Vicksburg,  found  Grant  still  in  bed  ill,  and  learned 
from  him  that  on  the  previous  day  dispatches  had 
arrived  from  Washington,  and  that  he  had  sent 
orders  to  Hurlbut  at  Memphis  to  organize  two  di 
visions  from  the  troops  in  his  district  and  send 
them  to  Rosecrans;  had  sent  an  order  to  General 
John  E.  Smith,  who  with  his  division  of  the  Sev 
enteenth  Corps  had  gone  to  Arkansas  to  aid  Gen 
eral  Steele,  to  abandon  that  design  and  hasten  to 
Chattanooga ;  to  General  Banks,  who  was  impor 
tuning  for  re-enforcements,  that  none  could  be 
sent,  for  he  could  make  no  disposition  of  troops 
that  could  endanger  the  success  of  Rosecrans ;  and 
that  he  had  ordered  the  seizure  of  all  boats  on  the 


158  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

river  to  facilitate  transportation.  Finally,  Grant 
told  Sherman  to  go  in  person,  taking  his  corps, 
leaving  one  of  his  divisions  at  Vicksburg,  and  tak 
ing  in  its  place  John  E.  Smith's  division,  which  was 
already  on  the  way.  General  Sherman  returned 
to  camp  on  the  25th,  and  selected  the  divisions  of 
Giles  A.  Smith  and  John  M.  Corse  to  go  and  Gen 
eral  Tuttle  to  remain.  The  last  of  the  command 
was  in  Vicksburg  for  embarkation  on  the  28th. 

The  general's  daughter  Minnie  had  been  very 
ill,  but  was  convalescent.  On  the  boat  his  son 
Willie,  the  darling  of  his  heart,  was  seen  to  be  un 
well.  On  the  way  up  the  river  he  grew  worse,  and 
the  disease  was  found  to  be  typhoid  fever.  The 
best  medical  aid  in  Memphis  was  called,  but  the 
boy  died  soon  after  landing.  When  the  boat  left 
for  Ohio,  bearing  the  dear  corpse  and  the  pros 
trate  family,  Sherman's  grief  was  agony.  But  the 
pressing  duty  of  the  hour  required  instant  action. 
General  Halleck  dispatched  that  the  road  from 
Nashville  must  be  reserved  absolutely  to  carry  sup 
plies  to  Rosecrans,  and  Sherman  must  repair  the 
road  from  Memphis  as  he  advanced,  and  rely  on 
it  till  a  rise  in  the  Ohio  and  Tennessee  would  allow 
boats  to  -ascend  the  river. 

The  railroad  was  in  good  condition  as  far  as 
Corinth,  though  ill  supplied  with  rolling  stock. 
V/hen  Sherman  left  Memphis  on  the  nth  of  Octo 
ber  on  a  train  with  his  headquarters  and  a  battalion 
of  the  Thirteenth  regular  infantry,  Osterhaus  and 
John  E.  Smith  were  already  at  Corinth,  Giles  Smith 
well  on  his  way,  and  General  Corse's  division  had 
just  started  on  foot.  Arriving  at  Colliersville, 
twenty-six  miles  from  Memphis,  about  noon,  he 
learned  that  a  large  cavalry  force  with  artillery  was 
approaching  the  post.  The  clerks  and  orderlies 
were  armed,  and  with  the  Thirteenth  Infantry  and 
the  garrison  manned  the  works.  All  preparations 
were  completed  before  the  advance  of  the  enemy 


CHATTANOOGA   AND   MERIDIAN.  j  59 

appeared.  A  brisk  skirmish  began  and  lasted 
through  the  afternoon,  till  the  approach  of  Corse's 
division,  hastened  by  telegrams  sent  by  Sherman 
on  the  first  news  of  the  danger,  caused  the  enemy 
to  withdraw.  The  locomotive  and  train,  damaged 
by  artillery  fire,  were  repaired  next  day,  and  pro 
ceeded  to  Corinth.  Here  General  Ewing,  who  ac 
companied  Sherman,  superseded  Corse  in  the  com 
mand  of  the  fourth  division. 

S.  D.  Lee,  joined  by  Wheeler,  commanded  a 
large  cavalry  force.  Tearing  up  the  railroad  and 
continually  skirmishing  with  the  head  of  the  col 
umn  impeded  the  advance.  Osterhaus  and  Smith, 
repairing  the  road  and  pushing  back  the  cavalry, 
continued  their  slow  advance,  and  reached  Tus- 
cumbia  on  the  27th.  Sherman  reached  luka  on  the 
1 9th,  and  learned  next  day  of  the  arrival  of  two 
gunboats  at  Eastport,  and  a  few  days  later  received 
news  of  Grant's  appointment  to  command  the  mili 
tary  division  and  his  own  appointment  to  command 
the  Department  and  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee. 
General  Blair  was  placed  in  command  of  the  Fif 
teenth  Corps.  General  Hurlbut  was  ordered  to 
select  eight  thousand  men  to  form  two  divisions, 
to  be  called  Sixteenth  Corps,  to  be  commanded 
by  Dodge,  and  to  march  as  far  east  as  Athens. 

General  Ewing  crossed  the  river  by  the  aid  of 
the  gunboats  on  the  24th,  and  moved  east  on  the 
north  side  of  the  river.  On  the  27th  Sherman  re 
ceived  orders  from  Grant  to  drop  all  work  on  the 
railroad  and  hurry  eastward  with  all  possible  dis 
patch  toward  Bridgeport.  General  Blair,  having 
just  reached  Tuscumbia  on  the  27th,  began  his  re 
turn  to  Eastport  on  the  28th.  General  Roddy — who 
had  been  on  the  north  of  the  Tennessee  unmolested 
for  two  weeks,  whose  locality  was  a  mystery  and 
whose  personality  almost  a  myth  ;  who  was  always 
in  no  particular  place,  but  just  somewhere  else ; 
whom  many  had  heard  of,  but  no  one  had  seen — 


l6o  GENERAL  SHERMAN. 

finally  recrossed  the  Tennessee  in  time  to  join  S. 
D.  Lee  on  the  27th,  and  worry  General  Blair's 
flank  on  the  march  on  the  28th.  The  three  remain 
ing  divisions  crossed  by  boat  at  Eastport  and 
hastened  to  overtake  Ewing.  Sherman  crossed  on 
the  ist  of  November.  Elk  River  being  found  to 
be  swollen  by  rain  and  not  fordable,  the  command 
marched  up  stream  to  the  stone  bridge  at  Fayette- 
ville.  Here  Sherman  received  another  dispatch 
from  Grant  to  push  his  advance.  Dividing  the 
troops  over  three  roads  to  expedite  the  march,  he 
rode  to  Bridgeport  with  his  staff,  arriving  on  the 
1 3th  of  November. 

At  Bridgeport  he  found  an  order  to  leave  his 
troops  and  report  in  person  immediately  at  Chatta 
nooga.  Taking  a  little  steamboat,  he  went  up  the 
river  in  the  night  to  Kelly's  Ferry,  where  he  found 
an  orderly  and  horses  awaiting  him.  A  ride  over 
the  road  to  Brown's  Ferry  and  to  Chattanooga 
brought  him  into  the  city  in  the  morning.  He 
walked  out  with  Grant  and  Thomas  to  Fort  Wood, 
and  from  that  commanding  height  surveyed  the 
situation.  Grant  told  him  that  he  had  proposed  to 
assault  Missionary  Ridge  with  the  force  then  in 
hand,  but  that  a  thorough  reconnoissance  showed 
that  to  be  impracticable.  And  it  appears  in  the 
records  that  General  Grant  dispatched  to  General 
Burnside  on  the  7th  of  November,  "  I  have  ordered 
an  immediate  movement  from  here  to  carry  Mis 
sionary  Ridge  " ;  and  on  the  8th,  "  Thomas  will 
not  be  able  to  make  the  attack  of  which  I  tele 
graphed  you  until  Sherman  gets  up." 

Sherman  went  then  to  the  north  side  of  the 
river  to  see  the  part  allotted  to  him.  General  W. 
F.  Smith,  known  as  Baldy  Smith,  chief  of  engineers 
to  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  who  had  planned 
the  capture  of  Brown's  Ferry,  was  of  the  party. 
He  was  making  a  large  number  of  pontoons  in 
Chattanooga,  which  were  to  be  carried  over  the 


CHATTANOOGA   AND   MERIDIAN.  j6l 

river,  and  hidden  from  view  by  a  range  of  hills,  to 
a  creek  emptying  into  the  river  from  the  north, 
four  miles  above  the  mouth  of  the  Chickamauga. 
The  boats  were  to  be  kept  hid  some  miles  up  the 
creek  until  the  time  for  attack.  Sherman's  com 
mand  was  to  cross  by  the  bridge  at  Brown's  Ferry 
and  bivouac  out  of  view  behind  the  hills.  When 
the  attack  was  to  be  delivered  a  detachment  would 
fill  the  boats  and  in  the  night  float  down  the  creek 
and  the  river  and  disembark.  The  boats  would 
then  bring  the  rest  of  the  troops  across  the  river, 
and  be  immediately  built  into  a  pontoon  bridge. 
The  route  was  explored.  The  secret  harbor  in  the 
creek,  the  points  of  embarkation,  and  the  site  of 
.the  bridge  were  visited,  and  from  cover  of  shrub 
bery  on  the  river  bank  the  place  of  landing  on  the 
farther  shore  and  the  point  proposed  for  assault 
were  reconnoitered. 

General  Sherman  remounted  his  horse  and  rode 
back  to  Kelly's  Ferry.  The  steamboat  was  gone. 
He  took  a  rough  boat  with  some  soldiers  to  pull 
the  oars.  They  were  unused  to  the  work,  and  Sher 
man  from  time  to  time  relieved  one  or  another  of 
the  inexperienced  oarsmen  by  taking  a  pull  him 
self.  Reaching  Shellmound  at  midnight,  a  good 
crew  was  obtained,  and  Bridgeport  was  reached  by 
daylight.  Ewing's  division  was  immediately  put  in 
motion  and  directed  to  approach  Lookout  Moun 
tain  by  the  road  leading  to  Trenton,  threatening 
to  gain  or  cross  the  mountain  far  to  the  rear  of 
the  force  which  held  the  summit.  The  movement 
caused  some  anxiety  to  the  Confederate  com 
mander,  and  parties  were  sent  out  to  reconnoiter 
the  country  about  Trenton  after  Ewing  had  passed 
down  Lookout  Valley  and  reached  Brown's  Ferry. 
The  hastily  constructed  bridge  at  Bridgeport  gave 
only  impeded  passage  to  the  troops,  and  the  worn- 
out  road,  encumbered  by  slow-moving  trains,  made 
the  march  toilsome  and  difficult.  The  other  three 


!62  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

divisions  of  the  corps  were  strung  along  the  poad 
from  Wauhatchie  to  Bridgeport.  Friday,  the  2Oth, 
General  Grant's  order  issued  Wednesday,  the  i8th, 
for  a  combined  attack  on  Missionary  Ridge  by 
Sherman  and  Thomas  early  Saturday  morning,  the 
2ist,  was  found  to  be  impossible  of  execution. 
Sherman  finally  had  three  divisions  in  place  hidden 
behind  the  hills  on  the  23d,  and  when  night  came 
he  sent  Giles  Smith  with  his  brigade  (for  Morgan 
L.  Smith  had  reported  and  taken  command  of  the 
division)  to  the  secreted  pontoon  boats.  General 
Osterhaus  not  being  able  to  cross  at  Brown's,  the 
bridge  being  carried  away  by  the  freshet,  Jeff  C. 
Davis's  division  of  Palmer's  corps  was  temporarily 
assigned  to  Sherman's  command  and  Osterhaus's 
to  General  Hooker's. 

Reports  that  Bragg  was  evacuating  were  so 
positive  and  direct  that  General  Grant,  early  on 
the  23d,  ordered  General  Thomas  to  make  a  dem 
onstration  to  test  the  report.  Granger's  corps,  two 
divisions,  formed  in  line  with  skirmishers  in  front, 
and  Howard's  two  divisions  massed  in  reserve  in 
the  rear,  stood  on  the  plain  as  if  on  parade,  while 
Generals  Grant  and  Thomas,  the  Assistant-Secre- 
tary-of-War  Dana,  Quartermaster-General  Meigs, 
and  a  brilliant  array  of  officers  viewed  the  spectacle 
from  Fort  Wood,  and  a  more  numerous  body,  the 
Confederate  army,  leaned  upon  their  intrenchments 
and  gazed  with  complacent  interest,  as  if  the  dis 
play  were  for  their  entertainment.  At  command 
the  array  moved  forward  with  precision,  captured 
the  advanced  pickets,  and  while  the  enemy,  now 
aroused,  poured  a  fire  of  artillery  and  musketry 
from  all  the  intrenchments,  pushed  with  greater 
speed  and  with  one  great  rush  surmounted  and 
captured  the  fortified  high  rugged  hill,  Orchard 
Knob,  and  the  long  rocky  ridge  extending  from 
it  to  the  south,  about  halfway  between  Fort  Wood 
and  the  base  of  Missionary  Ridge.  A  battery  of 


CHATTANOOGA   AND   MERIDIAN.  163 

six  guns  was  taken  to  the  summit,  and  the  hill  and 
ridge  intrenched  and  occupied  by  General  Gran 
ger's  corps,  the  divisions  of  Thomas  J.  Wood 
and  Sheridan. 

In  the  morning  General  Cleburne  was  at  Chick- 
amauga  station,  getting  on  to  trains  his  own  di 
vision  and  Buckner's  division,  then  commanded 
by  Bushrod  Johnson,  under  orders  to  proceed  to 
re-enforce  General  Longstreet  in  front  of  Knox- 
ville.  All  of  Johnson's  division  except  Reynolds's 
brigade  had  embarked  when  order  was  received 
from  General  Bragg :  "  The  general  commanding 
desires  that  you  will  halt  such  portions  of  your 
command  as  have  not  left  Chickamauga ;  such  as 
may  have  left  halt  at  Charleston."  Two  of  John 
son's  brigades  had  gone ;  one,  Reynolds's,  re 
mained  with  Cleburne.  The  arrangements  had 
hardly  been  made  and  dispatch  to  Johnson  sent  be 
fore  another  dispatch  came :  "  Order  Johnson's 
troops  at  Charleston  back  here.  Move  up  rapidly 
to  these  headquarters."  And  a  few  minutes  later : 
"  We  are  heavily  engaged.  Move  rapidly  to  these 
headquarters."  Reynolds's  brigade  was  put  into 
the  intrenchment  at  the  base  of  Missionary  Ridge 
just  south  of  Bragg's  headquarters,  and  Cleburne's 
division  went  into  bivouac  in  rear  of  the  ridge.  At 
dawn  of  the  24th  Cleburne  set  his  division  erect 
ing  new  intrenchments  and  batteries  along  the  crest 
of  the  ridge  from  Bragg's  headquarters  toward  the 
south.  Before  this  work  was  completed  he  was 
informed  that  the  national  troops  had  crossed  the 
Tennessee  above  and  below  the  mouth  of  the 
Chickamauga,  and  was  ordered  to  send  a  brigade 
and  a  battery  to  the  bridge  over  the  Chickamauga. 

At  midnight  of  the  23d  Giles  Smith  embarked 
his  brigade,  floated  silently  down  the  creek  and 
down  the  river,  landed  two  regiments  above  the 
mouth  of  Chickamauga  River  to  gather  up  the 
Confederate  pickets,  and  construct  a  bridge  across 


164  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

that  stream  near  its  mouth,  and  landed  the  rest 
of  his  brigade  below.  The  boats,  aided  later  in 
the  day  by  a  steamboat,  used  such  expedition 
under  the  immediate  supervision  of  General  W.  F. 
Smith  that  by  noon  General  Sherman  with  the  three 
divisions  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps  with  the  batteries 
were  across,  and  General  Jeff  C.  Davis  following 
close  upon  them. 

The  landing  was  upon  a  square  plain,  about  a 
mile  and  a  half  to  a  side.  The  northern  end  of 
Missionary  Ridge  runs  parallel  to  the  Tennessee 
River,  and  about  a  mile  and  half  from  it,  the  course 
of  both  being  nearly  north  and  south.  The  Chicka- 
mauga,  which  with  many  curves  has  a  general 
course  to  the  north  along  the  eastern  base  of  the 
ridge,  turns  sharp  to  the  west  around  its  northern 
terminus,  and  continues  west  to  the  Tennessee.  A 
short  spur  extends  east  from  the  northern  extrem 
ity  of  the  ridge  to  the  Chickamauga,  its  perpen 
dicular  face  of  rock  rising  sheer  from  the  water  of 
the  stream,  securing  the  position  from  risk  of  being 
turned.  The  railroad  turned,  pierced  the  ridge 
about  a  mile  and  a  half  south  of  the  northern  ex 
tremity,  passing  under  a  depression  or  valley,  and 
just  north  of  this  depression  is  Tunnel  Hill,  the 
highest  point  in  the  locality.  Standing  aloof  in 
front  of  the  main  ridge  is  an  isolated  hill,  long 
and  narrow,  parallel  to  the  main  ridge  and  sepa 
rated  from  it  by  a  deep  hollow.  A  cleft  in  the  main 
ridge,  wide  enough  to  give  passage  to  a  road,  gave 
communication  from  the  exterior  to  a  small  valley 
inclosed  by  the  main  ridge  and  spurs  extending 
from  its  rear. 

General  Sherman  reports  his  advance  with  the 
three  divisions  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps :  "  A  light 
drizzling  rain  prevailed  and  the  clouds  hung  low, 
cloaking  our  movements  from  the  enemy's  tower 
of  observation  on  Lookout  Mountain.  We  soon 
gained  the  foothills ;  our  skirmishers  crept  up  the 


CHATTANOOGA   AND   MERIDIAN.  ^5 

face  of  the  hills,  followed  by  their  supports,  and 
at  2.30  P.  M.  we  had  gained,  with  no  loss,  the  de 
sired  point.  A  brigade  of  each  division  was  pushed 
rapidly  to  the  top  of  the  hill,  and  the  enemy  for 
the  first  time  seemed  to  realize  the  movement,  but 
too  late ;  we  were  in  possession.  He  opened  with 
artillery,  but  Ewing  soon  got  some  of  Captain 
Richardson's  guns  up  the  steep  hill  and  gave  back 
artillery,  and  the  enemy's  skirmishers  made  one  or 
two  ineffectual  dashes  at  General  Lightburn,  who 
had  swept  around  and  got  a  farther  hill,  which  was 
the  real  continuation  of  the  ridge.  From  studying 
the  maps,  I  had  inferred  that  Missionary  Ridge  was 
a  continuous  hill,  but  we  found  ourselves  on  two 
high  points,  with  a  deep  depression  between  us 
and  the  one  immediately  over  the  tunnel,  which 
was  my  chief  objective  point.  The  ground  we  had 
gained,  however,  was  so  important  that  I  could 
leave  nothing  to  chance,  and  ordered  it  to  be  forti 
fied  during  the  night.  One  brigade  of  each  divi 
sion  was  left  on  the  hill,  one  of  General  Morgan 
L.  Smith's  closed  up  the  gap  to  Chickamauga 
Creek,  two  of  General  John  E.  Smith's  were  drawn 
back  to  the  base  in  reserve,  and  General  Ewing's 
right  was  extended  down  into  the  plain,  thus  cross 
ing  the  ridge  in  a  general  line,  facing  southeast." 

General  Howard  reported  to  General  Sherman 
in  the  evening  with  two  brigades,  and,  leaving  one 
to  take  part  in  the  assault,  and  the  other  to  make 
connection  between  the  armies  of  Sherman  and 
Thomas,  returned  to  his  corps.  The  brigades  of 
Jeff  C.  Davis  were  disposed  to  protect  communica 
tion  between  the  assaulting  force  and  the  bridge. 
Word  was  received  from  Grant  that  Sherman  was 
to  attack  at  dawn  and  Thomas  would  attack  early 
in  the  day. 

General  Bragg  had  not  apprehended  attack  on 
the  northern  extremity  of  Missionary  Ridge.  But 
perceiving  indications  of  some  movement  in  that 


1 66  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

direction,  he  took  General  Hardee  from  Lookout 
Mountain  on  the  afternoon  of  the  23d  and  trans 
ferred  him  to  the  extreme  right  of  his  army,  at 
the  same  time  transferring  Walker's  division  from 
Lookout  with  him.  In  the  night  Folk's  brigade 
and  a  battery  were  detached  from  Cleburne's  divi 
sion  on  Missionary  Ridge  and  reported  to  Hardee. 
In  the  morning  of  the  24th  Wright's  brigade  of 
Cheatham's  division,  summoned  from  Charleston 
by  telegraph,  arrived,  was  sent  to  the  mouth  of 
the  Chickamauga  to  see  if  any  National  troops  were 
attempting  to  cross,  and,  if  so,  to  prevent  them. 
He  found  an  unexpected  number  already  across 
and  withdrew,  retiring  to  the  hills.  At  2  p.  M.  Cle 
burne's  division  was  taken  from  Missionary  Ridge 
and  hurried  to  Hardee,  and  placed  on  his  right, 
next  to  the  Chickamauga.  At  midnight  Lewis's 
brigade  was  taken  from  Bate's  division  on  Mis 
sionary  Ridge  and  sent  to  report  to  Cleburne.  A 
little  later  Stevenson's  division,  evacuating  Look 
out  Mountain,  marched  to  the  right  and  reported 
to  Hardee,  and  Cheatham  with  his  three  brigades 
from  Lookout  Mountain  reported  to  Hardee  in  the 
morning  of  the  25th,  and  was  placed  in  line  between 
the  force  engaged  about  Tunnel  Hill  and  Ander 
son's  division  on  Missionary  Ridge. 

While  Bragg  was  hurrying  troops  to  meet 
Sherman's  attack,  he  was  sustaining  a  sore  defeat 
at  the  other  extremity  of  his  line.  Longstreet  soon 
after  his  night  attack  on  Hooker  had  been  sent  by 
General  Bragg  up  into  East  Tennessee  to  capture 
or  defeat  General  Burnside.  General  Hardee  be 
came  commander  of  the  point  with  three  divisions. 
When  General  Hardee  was  transferred  to  confront 
Sherman,  and  took  one  division  with  him,  the  com 
mand  at  Lookout  Mountain  devolved  upon  Gen 
eral  Stevenson,  with  his  own  division  and  three 
brigades  of  Cheatham's  division.  General  Howard 
having  moved  by  Brown's  Ferry  over  into  Chat- 


CHATTANOOGA   AND    MERIDIAN.  167 

tanooga,  General  Hooker's  command  in  Lookout 
\  alley  consisted  of  General  Geary's  division  of  the 
Twelfth  Corps,  two  brigades  of  General  Cruft's  di 
vision  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  and  Osterhaus's  divi 
sion  of  two  brigades  from  the  Fifteenth  Corps. 

About  dawn  Osterhaus,  having  the  extreme 
left  of  the  command,  drove  off  the  Confederate 
pickets  near  the  partially  destroyed  bridges  across 
Lookout  Creek  and  repaired  them.  Cruft  with  one 
brigade  moved  up  the  stream  and  built  another 
bridge.  His  other  brigade  reported  to  Geary,  who 
marched  some  miles  up  the  valley  and  built  bridges 
there  for  his  crossing.  The  enemy,  occupied  with 
Osterhaus  and  Cruft,  did  not  perceive  the  move 
ment  of  Geary.  An  observer  on  the  high  summit 
of  Lookout  heard  the  sound  of  Geary's  pioneers 
chopping  down  trees,  but  noticed  that  the  pickets 
paid  no  attention.  Geary's  command  passed  over 
the  completed  bridges  and  formed  a  line  stretch 
ing  from  the  palisade,  the  vertical  cliff  of  rock, 
do\vn  toward  the  creek.  The  troops  of  the  ex 
tended  Confederate  line  posted  along  the  west  slope 
of  the  mountain,  finding  themselves  unexpectedly 
assailed  on  the  flank  and  in  rear,  fell  back  in  con 
fusion.  The  fire  of  Hooker's  batteries  planted  on 
the  heights  west  of  the  creek  prevented  their  at 
tempting  to  rally.  The  guns  on  the  summit  of 
the  mountain  could  not  be  sufficiently  depressed  to 
reach  the  pursuers,  and  the  heavy  clouds  of  mist 
that  settled  on  the  summit  prevented  the  sharp 
shooters  from  taking  any  part.  Cruft  crossed  his 
bridges  as  Geary  approached,  and  joined  him  in 
gathering  up  prisoners  and v  pushing  back  those 
who  were  not  captured.  The  guns  of  the  heavy 
batterv  on  Moccasin  Point  and  a  battery  near  Gen 
eral  Hooker's  headquarters  with  their  crossfire  en 
filaded  all  the  works  upon  the  plateau  and  slopes 
of  the  northern  point  of  the  mountain,  and  made 
them  untenable.  Osterhaus  crossed  and  mounted 


1 68  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

to  the  plateau  in  time  to  join  Geary  as  he  arrived. 
On  the  plateau  opposing  lines  were  formed  and 
the  Confederates  forced  back,  till  about  2  p.  M., 
when  the  cloud  of  mist  settling  down  from  the 
summit,  enveloping  the  combatants,  closed  the  con 
test.  There  was  some  irregular  firing  into  the  fog, 
but  the  battle  was  over.  Hooker  had  pushed  his 
way  dangerously  near  to  the  road  which  descended 
from  the  mountain  to  the  Chattanooga  Valley,  and 
Carlin,  who  with  his  brigade  had  crossed  Chatta 
nooga  Creek  near  the  city,  and  was  engaged  with 
the  Confederate  troops  near  the  base  of  the  east 
ern  slope  of  the  point,  was  also  approaching  the 
road.  General  Bragg  ordered  evacuation.  Through 
the  night  until  after  midnight  the  defenders  were 
descending  the  winding  road  to  the  plain  and  mov 
ing  on  their  way  to  Bragg's  extreme  right  to  op 
pose  the  assault  of  Sherman.  The  troops  in  the 
intrenchments  in  the  valley,  the  divisions  of  Stew 
art  and  Bate,  constituting  Breckenridge's  corps, 
moved  to  Missionary  Ridge.  A  detachment  of  the 
Eighth  Kentucky  climbed  to  the  summit  of  Look 
out  Mountain,  and  at  dawn  planted  their  colors 
in  view  of  the  valley  below. 

At  sunrise  of  the  25th  both  armies  caw  the  Na 
tional  flag  floating  over  the  summit  of  Lookout, 
and  the  long  line  of  Confederate  intrenchments 
traversing  the  valley  and  encircling  the  city  aban 
doned.  General  Bragg,  who  five  weeks  before 
held  Thomas's  army  in  his  grip,  and  grimly  refused 
to  waste  the  lives  of  his  men  in  useless  attack,  pre 
ferring  to  let  famine  surely  do  the  work  without 
loss  to  him,  now  saw  his  grip  shaken  off,  his  be 
sieging  works  captured,  his  whole  force  contracted 
on  to  Missionary  Ridge,  and  more  than  one 
half  of  it  congested  on  the  northern  extremity,  not 
to  threaten  his  antagonist,  but  to  defend  a  vital 
point  from  assault. 

In  the  forenoon  of  the  25th  Hardee  assembled 


CHATTANOOGA   AND    MERIDIAN.  169 

and  placed  his  command  :  Clcburne  with  his  four 
brigades  and  Wright's  brigade,  brought  down  from 
Charleston,  and  Lewis's  brigade  of  Bate's  division 
occupied  from  the  tunnel  to  the  northern  ex 
tremity  of  the  ridge.  Stevenson  with  his  four  bri 
gades  was  on  Cleburne's  left ;  next  was  Walker 
with  three  brigades ;  and  finally  Cheatham  with 
three  brigades,  reaching  nearly  to  the  right  of  the 
line  facing  Chattanooga.  Here  Anderson's  four 
brigades  occupied  all  the  space  north  of  Bragg's 
headquarters,  except  an  interval  left  vacant  im 
mediately  north  of  Bragg's  headquarters,  upon  re 
quest  of  General  Anderson,  in  order  that  Reynolds's 
brigade,  when  obliged  to  leave  the  works  at  the 
base  of  the  ridge,  might  take  position  there.  Im 
mediately  south  of  Bragg's  headquarters  was 
Adams's  brigade  of  Stewart's  division  temporarily 
assigned  to  and  constituting  part  of  Anderson's 
command.  Next  was  General  Bate  with  his  own 
brigade,  commanded  by  Colonel  Tyler  and  two 
regiments  of  his  Florida  brigade,  and  on  his  left 
Stewart  with  two  of  his  brigades.  In  the  trenches 
at  the  base  were  Reynolds's  brigade,  one  of  Stew 
art's,  three  regiments  of  Bate's  Florida  brigade 
and  details  from  Anderson's  division.  General 
Sherman  had  eight  brigades  in  his  own  three  divi 
sions — five  brigades  in  General  Howard's  two  di 
visions  and  three  in  General  Jeff  C.  Davis's  divi 
sion.  General  Thomas  had  in  his  line  Baird's  di 
vision,  three  brigades,  and  Johnson's  division,  two 
brigades  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps,  and  the  divisions 
of  T.  J.  Wrood  and  Sheridan  of  the  Fourth  Corps, 
three  brigades  each.  Hooker  was  on  the  way  from 
Lookout  Mountain  around  by  the  way  of  Ross- 
ville  Gap  to  take  the  southern  extremity  of  the 
ridge  with  the  three  divisions  of  Osterhaus,  Geary, 
and  Cruft. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  25th  General  Sher 
man  disposed  his  force.     His  own  three  divisions, 


GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

Buschbeck's  brigade  of  the  Eleventh  Corps,  and 
Plant's  battery  from  Jeff  C.  Davis's  division  consti 
tuted  the  attacking  force ;  Davis  continued  pro 
tecting  communication  with  the  Tennessee  River, 
and  General  Howard,  who  arrived  in  the  morning 
with  the  rest  of  his  corps,  guarded  the  rear  toward 
the  Chickamauga.  Batteries  were  hauled  up  to 
the  summits  of  the  isolated  ridge  held  by  Ewing 
and  the  hill  held  by  Lightburn.  While  these  two 
points  were  held  in  force,  Colonel  Loomis  advanced 
to  assault  the  tunnel  gorge,  Corse  the  northern 
slope  of  Tunnel  Hill,  and  Morgan  L.  Smith's  di 
vision  the  ridge  north  of  Tunnel  Hill. 

Corse  passed  across  the  deep  hollow,  carrying 
a  line  of  intrenchments  thrown  up  by  Smith's 
Texas  brigade,  climbing  the  steep  hillside,  almost 
gaining  the  summit.  A  persistent  and  obstinate 
engagement  ensued.  Corse  was  wounded  and  car 
ried  off.  Walcutt  took  his  place  and  continued  the 
struggle.  He  could  not  get  his  men  over  the  edge 
of  the  crest,  and  the  defenders  could  not  dislodge 
them  from  the  slope.  The  National  batteries  on 
the  two  hills  played  upon  Swett's  battery  on  the 
summit  of  Tunnel  Hill,  so  that  no  defensive  work 
could  be  thrown  up  for  its  protection ;  the  officers 
of  the  battery  were  disabled,  and  command  de 
volved  upon  a  corporal,  and  so  many  of  the  gun 
ners  were  killed  or  wounded  that  infantry  had  to 
be  detailed  to  work  the  guns,  and  finally  the  bat 
tery  was  relieved  by  another  and  retired.  Colonel 
Loomis,  out  in  the  open  plain,  was  ordered  to  ad 
vance  and  take  position  in  front  of  the  tunnel  gorge. 
Brushing  away  the  hostile  skirmishers,  he  advanced 
under  heavy  fire,  and  taking  the  position  assigned 
in  face  of  the  opposing  line,  which  extended  along 
beyond  his  right  as  far  as  he  could  discern  the 
ridge,  made  his  command  throw  up  such  cover 
as  was  practicable,  and  maintained  his  position. 
His  left  flank  being  threatened  by  a  force  issuing 


CHATTANOOGA   AND    MERIDIAN. 


171 


from  the  tunnel  gorge,  he  procured  re-enforce 
ments  from  Buschbeck's  brigade  and  drove  back 
the  assailants.  Being  still  pressed,  General  John 
E.  Smith  sent  two  brigades,  Mathias  and  Raum. 
These  joined  in  the  assault  upon  Tunnel  Hill,  and, 
aided  by  a  fire  from  troops  in  the  works  captured 
from  the  Texans,  succeeded  in  pressing  nearly  to 
the  summit  of  the  hill.  Hardee  sent  a  brigade  in 
aid,  but  it  retired  after  an  ineffective  effort.  Colo 
nel  McConnell  led  his  Georgia  regiment  up  to  take 
part ;  McConnell  was  shot  through  the  head  and 
his  regiment  withdrew.  A  brigade  from  Steven 
son's  division  and  from  Walker's  reported  in  sup 
port.  General  Cummings  with  two  Georgia  regi 
ments  made  two  abortive  charges.  Finally,  a  force 
suddenly  appearing  upon  the  flank  took  the  gal 
lant  brigades  in  flank  and  rear.  The  surprise  broke 
their  order,  and  they  fell  back  in  confusion,  pur 
sued  by  their  assailants  down  into  the  plain.  The 
Confederates  in  their  ardor  followed  them  past  the 
isolated  hill  held  by  Ewring.  Being  now  in  turn 
taken  in  flank  and  rear  by  Ewing  and  Loomis,  they 
hastily  returned  to  the  ridge,  followed  by  the  ral 
lied  brigades  of  Mathias  and  Raum,  though  Raum 
was  too  severely  wounded  to  return  with  them. 

General  Sherman  had  been  anxiously  waiting 
for  the  attack  by  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland, 
promised  by  General  Grant  to  be  made  early  in  the 
day.  At  half  past  two  o'clock  he  saw,  far  off  down 
the  ridge,  puffs  of  white  smoke ;  then  the  distant 
roar  of  artillery,  and  he  knew  that  the  assault  was 
begun.  Grant's  order  of  the  i8th  for  a  joint  as 
sault  on  Missionary  Ridge  on  the  23d  had  not  been 
revoked,  but  only  postponed  to  the  25th ;  and  on 
the  evening  of  the  24th  General  Thomas  directed 
his  command  to  "  have  everything  ready  for  an  of 
fensive  movement  early  to-morrow  morning." 
News  coming  on  the  morning  of  the  25th  of  the 
evacuation  of  Lookout  Mountain,  leaving  Hooker 


172  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

free,  he  was  ordered  to  march  up  the  valley,  cross 
Chattanooga  Creek,  proceed  to  Rossville  Gap,  the 
southern  terminus  of  the  ridge,  and  sweep  up  the 
ridge  upon  Bragg's  left  flank.  The  time  of  Thom 
as's  assault  was  held  for  Hooker's  co-operation. 
It  was  learned  that  the  destruction  of  the  bridge 
across  the  creek  delayed  his  march.  To  build  a 
new  one  took  three  hours.  Word  came  that  the 
bridge  was  finished  and  Hooker  was  crossing.  His 
approach  was  assured,  and  the  time  for  attack  had 
come. 

Grant  and  Thomas,  with  a  splendid  group  of 
generals  and  dignitaries,  were  on  Orchard  Knob, 
whence  a  complete  survey  was  enjoyed  of  the  val 
ley,  the  heights,  and  of  the  plain  on  which  Sher 
man  had  formed  his  command.  The  four  divisions, 
comprising  eleven  brigades,  had  been  deployed, 
Baird's  division  on  the  left,  T.  J.  Wood  on  his  right, 
then  Sheridan,  and  Johnson  on  the  extreme  right. 
Each  brigade  had  a  front  of  two  to  four  regi 
ments  in  line,  with  skirmishers  in  front,  and  the 
remaining  regiments  in  column  in  support,  mak 
ing  a  battle  array  three  miles  in  front.  The  mag 
nificent  splendor  of  the  spectacle  impressed  both 
friend  and  foe.  General  Bate  says  in  his  report : 
'  The  enemy,  like  a  huge  serpent,  uncoiled  his 
massive  folds  into  shapely  lines  in  our  immediate 
front,"  and  "  seemed  confidently  resting,  as  a  giant 
in  his  strength."  The  eight  brigades  and  two  regi 
ments  in  the  works  on  the  summit  being  deployed 
in  line  without  reserves,  extended  on  both  flanks 
beyond  the  line  of  assault.  The  order  to  deliver 
the  assault  was  verbal.  General  Grant  says  in  his 
report  that  Hooker's  "  approach  was  intended  as 
the  signal  for  storming  the  center  in  strong  col 
umns,"  and,  on  being  satisfied  that  Hooker  was 
on  his  way  from  Rossville,  "  Thomas  was  accord 
ingly  directed  to  move  forward  his  troops  .  .  . 
and  carry  the  rifle-pits  at  the  foot  of  Missionary 


CHATTANOOGA   AND   MERIDIAN.  173 

Ridge,  and  when  carried  to  reform  his  lines  on  the 
rifle-pits,  with  a  view  to  carry  the  top  of  the  ridge." 
General  Thomas  says  only  that  as  soon  as  Baird 
got  into  position  "  orders  were  then  given  him  to 
move  forward  on  Granger's  left  and  within  sup 
porting  distance  against  the  enemy's  rifle-pits  on 
the  slope  and  at  the  foot  of  Missionary  Ridge. 
General  Baird  says :  "  A  staff  officer  from  General 
Thomas  brought  me  verbal  orders  to  move  for 
ward  to  the  edge  of  the  open  ground  which  bor 
dered  the  foot  of  Missionary  Ridge,  within  striking 
distance  of  the  rebel  rifle-pits  at  its  base,  so  as  to  be 
ready  at  a  signal,  which  would  be  the  firing  of 
six  guns  from  Orchard  Knob,  to  dash  forward 
and  take  those  pits.  He  added :  This  was  intended 
as  preparatory  to  a  general  assault  on  the  moun 
tain,  and  that  it  was  doubtless  designed  by  the 
major  general  commanding  that  I  should  take  part 
in  the  movement,  so  I  would  be  following  his  wishes 
were  I  to  push  to  the  summit."  The  order  re 
ceived  by  General  Johnson  was  "  to  form  my  com 
mand  in  two  lines,  resting  my  left  on  the  right 
of  General  Sheridan's  division,  and  to  conform  to 
his  movements.*"  The  order  reached  the  Fourth 
Corps  in  a  different  form.  General  Granger  says : 
"  General  Sherman  was  unable  to  make  any  prog 
ress  in  moving  along  the  ridge  during  the  day,  as 
the  enemy  had  massed  in  his  front ;  therefore,  in  or 
der  to  relieve  him,  I  was  ordered  to  make  a  demon 
stration  on  the  works  of  the  enemy  directly  in  my 
front,  at  the  base  of  Missionary  Ridge."  And  being 
ordered  to  make  a  demonstration  upon  the  rifle- 
pits,  "  I  accordingly  directed  Major-General  Sheri 
dan  and  Brigadier-General  Wood  to  advance  their 
divisions  at  a  given  signal,  moving  directly  forward 
simultaneously  and  briskly  to  attack  the  enemy, 
and,  driving  him  from  his  rifle-pits,  to  take  pos 
session  of  them." 

Upon  the  signal,  the  firing  of  six  guns  on  Or- 


174 


GENERAL   SHERMAN. 


chard  Knob,  the  entire  line  moved  forward  with 
precision  and  brushed  away  the  Confederate 
skirmishers.  The  furious  fire  of  all  the  batteries 
of  the  ridge  incited  the  line  to  a  double-quick ;  as 
they  neared  the  intrenchments,  musketry  was 
added.  But  the  charge  continued  so  solid  and  bal 
anced  that  the  works  were  reached  by  unbroken 
ranks,  that  swept  as  an  avalanche  over  the  barriers. 
A  staff  officer  sent  by  General  Sheridan  brought 
back  answer  from  General  Granger  that  it  was  the 
works  at  the  base  of  the  ridge  that  were  to  be  car 
ried.  This  answer  brought  back  some  who  were 
on  their  way  to  the  summit.  But  immediately  Cap 
tain  W.  L.  Avery,  Granger's  aid,  brought  word  to 
Sheridan  to  carry  the  works  on  the  summit  if  he 
thought  he  could.  Granger  sent  all  his  staff  to 
Wood  and  Sheridan  with  the  same  order,  fearing 
some  might  miscarry. 

There  was  no  need  to  reform.  There  were  no 
broken  ranks ;  there  were  no  laggards.  There  was 
no  need  of  order  to  advance.  Some  with  order, 
some  without  order,  some  against  order,  but  all  in 
unison,  all  aflame,  in  one  mighty  upheaval  surged 
up  the  mountain  side.  The  ascent  was  steep, 
rugged,  and  encumbered.  The  stout  color  bearers 
mostly  pushed  foremost.  The  stronger  gathered 
about  them ;  the  weaker  followed  as  they  could,  till 
regiments  assumed  the  form  of  wedges,  apex  in 
front.  Clambering  up  over  works  and  gullies, 
through  the  murderous  fire  from  above,  they  ap 
proached  the  crest,  panting  and  jaded.  It  seems 
that  the  fresh  defenders  of  the  ridge  might  have 
fixed  bayonets,  and  with  an  impetuous  charge  have 
swept  the  exhausted  assailants  down  the  slope.  But 
dazed  by  the  audacity  and  unexpectedness  of  the 
assault,  unnerved  by  the  impressive  mass  covering 
the  mountain  side,  depleted  by  the  large  detach 
ments  sent  to  re-enforce  the  right  against  Sher 
man's  persistent  attack,  and  discouraged  by  the 


CHATTANOOGA  AND  MERIDIAN.  ^5 

sight  of  Lookout  Mountain  and  the  sweep  of  in 
vestment  works  across  the  valley,  abandoned  and 
captured,  they  stood  irresolute  till  the  bold  assail 
ants  were  in  their  midst. 

Hazen's  brigade,  or  perhaps  the  two  brigades 
of  Hazen  and  Willich,  first  climbed  over  the  works 
in  Anderson's  division,  just  north  of  Dent's  bat 
tery,  and  north  of  Bragg's  headquarters.  Facing 
to  the  right  and  left,  and  turning  Dent's  guns  upon 
their  late  support,  they  drove  the  Confederate 
troops  along  and  down  the  eastern  slope  of  the 
ridge.  General  Bate,  ordered  by  General  Bragg 
to  go  to  Anderson's  aid,  gathered  up  the  frag 
ments  of  Reynolds's  brigade,  which  had  streamed 
up  from  the  captured  works  at  the  base,  formed 
them  in  his  rear,  led  them  as  far  as  they  could  ad 
vance  north  of  Bragg's  headquarters,  and,  leaving 
them,  returned  to  his  own  hard-pressed  command. 
The  line  was  breaking  farther  south  and  farther 
north,  as  brigade  after  brigade  impetuously  rushed 
over  the  works.  The  end  had  come.  Bragg  or 
dered  Bate,  who  had  the  only  coherent  force  within 
reach,  to  cover  the  retreat  to  the  bridge  over  the 
Chickamauga.  General  Bragg  says  in  his  report : 
"  A  panic  which  I  had  never  before  witnessed 
seemed  to  have  seized  upon  officers  and  men,  and 
each  seemed  struggling  for  his  personal  safety,  re 
gardless  of  his  duty  or  character.  .  .  .  Those  who 
reached  the  ridge  did  so  in  a  condition  of  exhaus 
tion  from  the  great  physical  exertion  in  climbing 
which  rendered  them  powerless,  and  the  slightest 
effort  would  have  destroyed  them." 

General  Turchin,  commanding  the  right  bri 
gade  of  Baird's  division,  reached  the  summit  first 
in  the  division.  Part  of  the  Confederate  troops  es 
caped  down  the  eastern  slope,  part  retired  toward 
the  north,  over  a  depression  in  the  ridge,  to  a  forti 
fied  position  still  held  in  front  of  Vanderveer's  bri 
gade,  which  was  approaching  it.  There  was  a  short 


176  GENERAL  SHERMAN. 

conflict,  another  retreat.  The  forces  on  both  sides 
continually  increased  as  the  Confederates  fell  back 
upon  supports,  and  finally  Phelps's  brigade  com 
pleted  the  ascent.  Hardee,  alarmed  at  the  steady 
approach  toward  his  position,  made  Cheatham 
change  front  of  his  division,  so  as  to  face  to  the 
south,  striding  the  ridge.  Brown's  brigade  and 
Cummings's  were  brought  up  to  support  Cheat- 
ham,  and  the  struggle  continued  at  this  point  till 
dark.  This  line  remained  in  position  while  Hardee 
was  drawing  the  rest  of  his  command  across  the 
Chickamauga,  and  then  followed. 

General  Hooker,  having  constructed  his  bridge 
and  crossed,  Osterhaus  in  advance,  found  a  consid 
erable  force  with  artillery  posted  in  Rossville  Gap, 
and  quickly  routed  it.  Osterhaus  was  sent  through 
the  gap,  then  north  along  the  eastern  base  of  Mis 
sionary  Ridge,  Cruft  north  along  the  crest  of  the 
ridge,  and  Geary  by  the  western  base.  They  en 
countered  and  surprised  a  portion  of  Stewart's  di 
vision  on  its  way  to  escape  by  Rossville  Gap,  and 
captured  substantially  the  whole  force. 

Sherman's  army  went  into  bivouac  where  they 
lay,  and  Thomas  on  Missionary  Ridge,  except  that 
Sheridan  with  a  portion  of  his  command  followed 
Bate,  who  was  covering  the  retreat  from  Bragg's 
headquarters,  and  having  combats,  when  Bate 
found  opportunity  to  stand,  until  dark.  At  mid 
night  he  resumed  pursuit,  and  pressed  Bate  to  and 
across  the  Chickamauga,  saving  the  bridge  and 
capturing  a  large  quantity  of  stores.  The  Con 
federates  trudged  wearily  through  the  night,  aided 
by  the  full  light  of  the  moon,  dropping,  as  they 
trudged,  guns,  caissons,  wagons,  small  arms,  and 
all  the  debris  of  a  rout. 

In  the  night  General  Grant  ordered  pursuit  by 
all  the  forces  of  both  armies,  except  the  portion  de 
tailed  to  march  to  the  relief  of  Knoxville.  Hooker 
marched  in  the  morning  with  Palmer's  corps  added 


CHATTANOOGA   AND    MERIDIAN. 


177 


to  his  command,  and,  delayed  by  destroyed  bridges 
and  occasional  skirmishes,  halted  for  the  night 
about  five  miles  from  Ringgold.  Next  day  he  over 
took  Cleburne  at  Ringgold,  posted  in  a  very  deep 
and  narrow  gorge,  a  cleft  in  the  mountain,  and  on 
the  heights  on  each  side.  He  charged,  Osterhaus 
leading,  and  after  a  severe  engagement,  with  heavy 
loss  on  both  sides,  Cleburne  retired  to  Dalton. 
Hooker,  in  pursuance  of  orders,  remained  in  ob 
servation  toward  Tunnel  Hill  till  the  3Oth  of  No 
vember,  and  then  returned  to  Chattanooga. 

General  Davis,  of  Sherman's  command,  crossed 
the  Chickamauga  near  its  mouth  before  dawn  of 
the  26th,  and  was  followed  by  Howard  and  Blair. 
Next  morning,  after  a  brisk  skirmish,  a  Confed 
erate  force  that  was  destroying  the  stores  of  the 
depot  at  Chickamauga  station  was  driven  off  and 
a  portion  of  the  stores  saved.  On  the  27th  Gen 
eral  Sherman  sent  Howard  to  Red  Clay  to  destroy 
the  railroad  there,  and  the  next  day  Blair  per 
formed  the  same  work  on  the  track  from  below 
Graysville  north  to  the  State  line.  On  the  29th 
Howard,  Blair,  and  Davis  moved  from  Graysville 
by  different  roads  to  Cleveland,  and  there  com 
pleted  the  destruction  of  railroad  which  had  already 
been  extensively  wrought  by  General  Long  and 
his  cavalry  brigade.  The  trains  and  artillery  hav 
ing  gone  direct  to  Chattanooga,  the  command 
reached  Charleston,  on  the  Hiawassee,  on  the  3Oth, 
without  trains  or  tents,  provisions  or  baggage. 
The  Confederate  troops  posted  there  left  too  hastily 
to  destroy  the  bridges  completely,  and  leaving  five 
carloads  of  subsistence.  On  the  same  day  Bragg 
was  relieved  from  command  by  President  Davis 
upon  his  own  request.  The  campaign  was  ended. 

The  casualties  in  the  five  days — 23d  to  the  27th 
of  November,  both  inclusive — were :  In  Sherman's 
force,  killed,  one  hundred  and  twenty;  wounded, 
eight  hundred  and  fifty-three ;  missing,  one  him- 


j 78  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

dred  and  thirty-nine ;  total,  eleven  hundred  and 
twelve.  In  Thomas's  immediate  command,  killed, 
five  hundred  and  five ;  wounded,  thirty-one  hun 
dred  and  twenty-three ;  missing,  one  hundred  and 
sixty-five ;  total,  thirty-seven  hundred  and  ninety- 
three.  Hooker,  killed,  one  hundred  and  twenty- 
eight  ;  wounded,  seven  hundred  and  forty-six ; 
missing,  forty-five ;  total,  nine  hundred  and  nine 
teen.  Total  killed,  seven  hundred  and  fifty-three ; 
wounded,  forty-seven  hundred  and  twenty-two; 
missing,  three  hundred  and  forty-nine ;  aggregate, 
fifty-eight  hundred  and  twenty-four.  The  Confed 
erate  loss  reported  by  General  Hardee :  Killed, 
three  hundred  and  sixty-one ;  wounded,  twenty-one 
hundred  and  eighty;  missing,  forty-one  hundred 
and  forty-six ;  total,  sixty-six  hundred  and  eighty- 
seven.  But  General  Grant  states  in  his  report  the 
number  of  prisoners  captured  was  sixty-one  hun 
dred  and  forty-two,  of  whom  two  hundred  and 
thirty-nine  were  officers,  and  in  his  indorsement 
upon  General  Hooker's  report  objects  to  the  state 
ment  therein  that  Hooker's  command  captured 
sixty-five  hundred  and  forty-seven  prisoners.  Be 
sides  forty  pieces  of  artillery,  sixty-nine  gun  car 
riages,  and  seven  thousand  small  arms,  wagons, 
and  supplies  captured,  there  was  a  vast  loss  by 
burning,  breaking  up,  and  casting  away  of  every 
thing  pertaining  to  the  equipment  of  an  army.  The 
camps  and  all  the  roads  from  Missionary  Ridge  to 
Ringgold,  and  as  far  beyond  as  reconnoissance  was 
pushed,  were  a  pitiful  chaos  of  wreck. 

In  one  of  General  Cleburne's  reports — the  re 
port  of  his  fight  with  Hooker  at  Ringgold — is  a 
sentence  which  throws  some  light  upon  what  is 
meant  by  the  statement  in  Confederate  reports  of 
the  number  of  men  in  a  command.  The  statement 
is :  "I  took  into  the  fight  in  Folk's  brigade,  five 
hundred  and  forty-five ;  Lowry's  brigade,  thirteen 
hundred  and  thirty ;  Smith's  (Texas)  brigade, 


CHATTANOOGA   AND    MERIDIAN. 


179 


twelve  hundred  and  sixty-six ;  Liddell's  brigade, 
ten  hundred  and  sixteen  effective  men,  making  a 
total  of  forty-one  hundred  and  fifty-seven  bayo 
nets."  "  Effectives,"  then,  means  men  who  carry 
bayonets,  and,  unless  the  contrary  is  stated,  the 
number  of  men  given  means  the  number  of  bayo 
nets.  The  same  appears  from  abstracts  of  returns 
of  the  army.  The  abstract  of  returns  of  the  3ist  of 
October  shows  sixteen  officers  and  no  enlisted  men 
present  for  duty  at  army  headquarters,  and  shows 
no  effectives.  It  is  the  same  for  corps  headquar 
ters.  In  the  return  of  effectives,  all  headquarters 
report  none,  there  being  only  officers  and  detailed 
men  at  headquarters.  The  returns  of  divisions  go 
further.  The  first  division  in  the  abstract  gives, 
present  for  duty,  four  hundred  and  forty-two  offi 
cers  and  forty-six  hundred  and  fifty-three  men,  and 
gives  effective  total  present,  forty-five  hundred  and 
thirty-one.  Deducting  all  the  officers  and  one  hun 
dred  and  twenty-two  men  from  the  present  for 
duty,  gives  the  total  effective  present.  The  same 
appears  in  the  other  divisions,  and  in  the  abstract 
of  returns  of  the  loth  of  December.  There  is  no 
objection  to  such  report;  it  has  some  advantages; 
but  as  it  is  different  from  the  mode  of  stating  the 
numbers  used  in  the  National  army,  it  is  worth 
bearing  in  mind. 

From  the  beginning  President  Lincoln  had  been 
solicitous  about  East  Tennessee,  Abdiel  of  the  se 
ceding  States.  He  required  military  considera 
tions  to  bend  before  the  sacred  duty  of  guarding 
the  loyal  mountaineers  from  rapine.  After  the  cap 
ture  of  Corinth  by  Halleck,  he  insisted  that  the 
security  of  East  Tennessee  must  be  a  feature  of 
whatever  plan  of  campaign  was  adopted.  When 
Grant  repaired  to  Chattanooga,  he  seldom  received 
a  telegram  from  the  President  or  General  Halleck 
which  did  not  contain  a  reminder  of  Knoxville  and 
Burnside.  Accordingly,  \vhen  the  assault  of  Mis- 


!8o  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

sionary  Ridge  was  about  to  be  delivered,  Grant 
directed  General  Thomas  to  send  a  force,  consist 
ing  of  Granger's  corps  and  enough  other  troops  to 
make  twenty  thousand  men,  to  the  relief  of  Burn- 
side,  then  closely  besieged  in  Knoxville.  In  the 
order  for  the  pursuit  of  Bragg,  made  in  the  night 
of  the  25th,  this  relieving  column  was  excepted 
from  the  order  to  march  in  the  pursuit. 

Grant  returned  to  Chattanooga  in  the  night  of 
the  28th,  and  found  that  Granger  had  not  started 
and  was  not  ready.  He  made  an  order  requiring 
General  Sherman  to  go  with  his  command,  in  ad 
dition  to  Granger's  column,  and  take  command  of 
the  expedition.  He  sent  a  copy  of  Granger's  in 
structions,  and  also  stated  that  the  latest  informa 
tion  from  Burnside  was  that  his  provisions  would 
last  only  until  the  3d  of  December.  General  Wil 
son  arrived  at  Charleston  and  delivered  the  papers 
on  the  3Oth  of  November.  Colonel  Orlando  Smith, 
under  direction  of  General  Howard,  began  imme 
diately  the  repair  and  reconstruction  of  the  bridges. 
Before  dawn  of  the  ist  of  December  the  troops 
began  to  cross,  and  marched  to  Athens  before  halt 
ing  for  the  night.  Next  day  Howard  pushed  for 
Loudon  and  its  environs  by  night ;  Blair  marched 
to  Philadelphia. 

In  the  night  Sherman  ordered  General  Long 
to  select  the  best  of  his  cavalry  and  make  ail  speed 
to  Knoxville,  forty  miles  away,  regardless  of  dif 
ficulty  or  opposition,  and  reach  Knoxville  with  his 
command  or  a  fragment  of  it,  and  communicate 
with  General  Burnside  by  night.  General  Howard 
made  a  bridge  supported  by  wrecked  wagon  beds 
repaired,  and  General  Wilson  with  General  Blair 
made  a  bridge  some  miles  farther  up.  The  river 
was  crossed  on  the  4th,  and  Granger's  force  met 
Sherman's  command  at  Marysville  on  the  5th. 
Here  an  officer  of  General  Burnside's  staff  ap 
peared  and  announced  that  Longstreet  had  aban- 


CHATTANOOGA   AND    MERIDIAN.  jgl 

doned  the  siege  and  withdrawn  from  Knoxville  the 
previous  night.  He  brought  an  invitation  from 
General  Burnside  to  General  Sherman  for  a  per 
sonal  interview. 

General  Granger's  corps,  the  original  relieving 
force,  was  ordered  to  continue  to  Knoxville,  the 
rest  to  remain  at  Marysville.  General  Sherman 
rode  to  Knoxville  on  the  6th.  General  Burnside 
said  he  would  not  require  more  than  Granger's 
corps  to  aid  him  in  the  pursuit  of  Longstreet. 
Sherman  marched  the  rest  of  his  command  back 
to  Chattanooga,  where  the  tired  men  returned  to 
their  proper  commands,  enjoyed  with  the  relish 
of  long  abstinence,  food,  clothing,  shelter,  and 
rest. 

General  Grant  established  his  headquarters  at 
Nashville ;  General  Thomas  remained  at  Chatta 
nooga;  General  Sherman  distributed  the  Fifteenth 
Corps,  now  commanded  by  General  Logan,  along 
the  railroad  from  Stevenson  to  Decatur,  and  the 
portions  of  the  Sixteenth  Corps,  under  the  com 
mand  of  General  Dodge,  from  Decatur  to  Nash 
ville,  to  prepare  the  roads  for  the  heavy  draught 
that  was  to  be  made  upon  their  capacity.  The 
Seventeenth  Corps  at  Vicksburg,  commanded  by 
General  McPherson,  and  the  large  body  of  troops 
in  Memphis  and  West  Tennessee,  under  command 
of  General  Hurlbut,  called  the  Sixteenth  Corps, 
\vere  on  garrison  duty,  protecting  the  navigation 
of  the  Mississippi  from  incursions  by  the  Confed 
erate  force  in  Mississippi.  The  railroads  running 
east  and  west  through  Jackson  and  Meridian  to 
Mobile,  and  north  and  south  the  length  of  the 
State  through  Jackson  and  also  through  Meridian, 
gave  the  Confederates  facilities  for  rapid  transporta 
tion  of  infantry  and  supplies,  and  constituted  a 
continual  menace.  The  destruction  of  the  rail 
roads  would  be  such  a  relief  that  a  large  part  of 
the  garrisons  of  Vicksburg  and  Memphis  could 


182  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

be  removed  to  fields  where  they  were  needed  for 
active  operations. 

General  Sherman  went  to  Nashville  to  consult 
with  General  Grant,  and  then  took  a  leave  to  spend 
Christmas  with  his  family  at  Lancaster.  The  visit 
was  as  brief  as  it  was  happy,  and  on  the  3d  of  Jan 
uary  he  was  at  Cairo  on  his  way  down  the  Missis 
sippi.  It  was  the  famous  cold  January  of  1864. 
As  low  down  the  river  as  Vicksburg  ice  floated 
in  the  river.  Many  Northern  ladies  were  then  vis 
iting  their  husbands,  officers  in  the  army.  They 
received  calls  on  New  Year's  Day,  as  was  then 
their  usage  at  home,  and  one  of  the  mots  of  the 
day  was,  "  Even  the  climate  is  putting  on  North 
ern  airs."  General  McArthur  and  his  staff  gave 
a  ball  New  Year's  night.  The  supper  was  served 
in  a  suite  of  hospital  tents  adjoining  headquarters, 
and  another  suite  was  floored  for  dancing.  The 
cold  was  so  extreme  that  guests  made  brief  visits 
to  the  supper  tents,  and  the  dancers  quickly  ad 
journed  to  the  headquarters  building. 

It  was  the  determined  purpose  of  the  Govern 
ment  and  General  Grant  to  make  the  ensuing  cam 
paign  decisive.  But  they  were  confronted  by  the 
appalling  fact  that  the  term  of  service  of  the  men 
who  in  the  first  half  of  1861  enlisted  for  three  years, 
and  who  not  only  constituted  numerically  a  large 
proportion  of  the  troops  in  the  field,  but  were  also 
the  seasoned,  disciplined  corps  d' elite  of  the  army, 
would  expire  in  the  coming  summer,  in  the  mid 
dle  of  the  campaign.  It  was  clearly  better  to  have 
a  temporary  disbandment  of  the  army  before  the 
campaign  than  risk  a  total  disbandment  in  the  mid 
dle  of  it.  Accordingly,  the  Government  offered  a 
furlough  of  thirty  days  a'nd  a  bounty  of  three  hun 
dred  dollars  to  every  man  who,  having  enlisted  for 
three  years,  and  having  only  ten  months  or  less  to 
serve,  should  re-enlist  for  the  remainder  of  the  war. 
The  mass  of  those  who  were  entitled  re-enlisted. 


CHATTANOOGA   AND    MERIDIAN.  183 

The  main  stimulus  was  a  sober,  relentless  purpose 
to  carry  the  war  to  a  successful  termination  ;  but  the 
proposed  visit  home  made  it  easier,  and  various 
motives  co-operated.  A  regiment  in  a  brigade  en 
camped  on  the  Big  Black  River  held  back.  A  ser 
geant,  vigorous,  handsome,  a  born  leader,  but  will 
ful,  took  umbrage  at  something  and  refused.  The 
other  men  generally  followed  his  example.  An 
order  was  made  in  the  brigade  that  men  who  had 
re-enlisted  as  veterans  might  be  permitted  to  shoot 
at  wild  ducks  on  a  pond  beyond  the  river,  and  just 
outside  of  the  picket  line.  The  sergeant,  not  know 
ing  the  limitation,  asked  for  leave  and  was  refused, 
and  told  the  reason.  He  would  not  submit  to  see 
ing  others  enjoy  a  privilege  from  which  he  was 
debarred,  and  at  once  re-enlisted.  The  rest  of  the 
regiment  with  great  satisfaction  did  the  same. 

General  Sherman  put  General  William  Sooy 
Smith  in  command  of  all  the  cavalry  in  the  De 
partment  of  the  Tennessee,  and  directed  him  with 
a  selected  force,  which  he  estimated  would  be  seven 
thousand  men,  to  start  from  Memphis  the  ist  of 
February,  crush  Forrest,  tear  up  the  Mobile  and 
Ohio  Railroad,  and  join  Sherman  at  Meridian  about 
the  loth  of  February.  General  Hurlbut  was  sent 
to  Vicksburg  with  two  divisions.  With  these,  and 
General  McPherson  with  two  divisions  of  the  Sev 
enteenth  Corps  and  Winslow's  cavalry,  Sherman 
left  Vicksburg  on  the  3d  and  crossed  the  Big  Black 
the  same  day.  A  brigade  of  Armstrong's  cavalry 
hovered  about  the  front  in  observation.  On  the 
morning  of  the  5th  a  well-served  battery  posted 
upon  a  hill  in  front  fired  fatally  upon  the  advance 
of  McPherson's  corps  as  it  moved  out  from  biv 
ouac,  and  falling  back,  but  halting  and  firing  from 
each  successive  vantage  ground,  scarcely  impeded 
the  steady  march.  Hurlbut  came  up  on  the  flank 
of  the  Confederates,  and  they  summarily  withdrew. 
A  brigade  of  the  Seventeenth  Corps  pushed  on  to 
13 


1 84  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

Jackson  and  occupied  it  in  the  night.  The  roads 
beyond  Jackson  were  execrable.  Swamps,  quag 
mires,  holes,  gullies,  and  rocks  often  kept  the  rear 
of  the  column  till  after  midnight  before  going  into 
tentless  bivouac.  The  reports  of  the  Confederate 
cavalry  officers  especially  complain  of  the  difficulty 
of  the  roads. 

General  Sherman  was  again  near  being  cap 
tured.  Halting  at  a  house  by  the  wayside  at  a 
crossroads  as  the  rear  of  the  Sixteenth  Corps  was 
passing,  he  detached  the  rear  regiment  to  remain 
until  the  Seventeenth  Corps  should  come  up.  The 
colonel  of  the  regiment,  seeing  some  of  General 
McPherson's  staff  coming  up  the  road,  took  for 
granted  that  the  corps  was  at  hand,  and  resumed 
his  march.  General  Armstrong,  who  was  on  the 
crossroad  with  part  of  his  force,  seeing  the  oppor 
tunity,  charged  upon  the  wagons  and  the  mules. 
The  sound  of  the  firing  and  of  bullets  startled  Sher 
man  and  his  attendants.  They  gathered  what  fire 
arms  they  could  find  and  barricaded  themselves  in 
an  outbuilding,  while  an  aid-de-camp  scurried 
down  the  road  and  brought  back  the  regiment  upon 
a  full  run. 

On  the  1 4th  of  February  there  was  an  interest 
ing  encounter  between  infantry  and  cavalry.  Gen 
eral  McPherson  on  the  afternoon  of  the  I3th  or 
dered  General  Leggett  to  leave  his  first  brigade  at 
a  point  four  miles  in  rear  of  the  corps,  to  proceed 
at  daylight  next  morning  to  the  railroad  crossing 
over  Chunky  River,  eight  miles  to  the  south,  and 
destroy  the  bridge.  At  6  A.  M.  the  brigade,  re- 
enforced  by  two  companies  of  cavalry,  began  the 
march.  On  the  way  information  was  received  from 
inhabitants  that  General  S.  D.  Lee  was  at  the  sta 
tion  with  the  cavalry  brigades  of  Wirt  Adams  and 
P.  B.  Starke.  This  information  is  shown  by  the 
records  to  be  correct,  except  that  General  Lee  had 
left  the  command  about  daylight,  summoned  to  a 


CHATTANOOGA  AND   MERIDIAN.  185 

personal  interview  with  General  Polk  at  Meridian. 
A  mile  and  a  half  from  the  station  a  heavy,  fresh 
trail  came  into  the  road  from  the  west,  cut  so  deep 
into  the  earth  as  to  show  that  a  large  body  of  cav 
alry  had  passed.  There  was  no  chance  for  any  suc 
cess  except*  by  surprise.  The  command  loaded, 
and  were  ordered  to  move  with  absolute  silence. 
The  captain  commanding  the  cavalry  reported  that 
his  advance  had  discovered  a  picket  on  post  with 
out  being  observed,  and  stated  that  his  men  had 
no  sabers  and  could  not  make  a  charge.  Without 
pausing  in  their  march,  the  first  two  regiments  of 
infantry  deployed  on  a  double-quick,  one  on  each 
side  of  the  road,  while  skirmishers  were  thrown 
out  to  the  front  on  a  full  run.  The  line,  advancing 
at  double-quick,  emerged  from  the  timber  and  saw 
the  hostile  cavalry  at  hand  along  the  bank  of  the 
river.  The  Confederates,  startled  at  seeing  with 
out  warning  the  long  ranks,  perfectly  aligned  and 
rapidly  advancing,  sounded  their  bugles ;  but  be 
fore  they  could  form  the  charging  line  was  upon 
them,  and  drove  them  in  confusion  across  the 
stream.  A  quick  fire  scattered  them,  and  then 
the  other  two  regiments,  left  behind  by  the  rapid 
movement  of  the  deployed  line,  appeared  in  col 
umn  of  fours  debouching  from  the  woods.  The 
enemy,  supposing  a  large  force  was  at  hand,  with 
drew.  Starke  with  his  brigade  reached  the  out 
skirts  of  Meridian  in  time  to  engage  Sherman's 
advance  on  the  eastern  environs  of  the  city,  his  ar 
tillery  went  to  the  south,  toward  Enterprise,  with 
the  other  brigade.  Seven  loaded  baggage  wagons, 
which  were  not  harnessed,  were  captured,  and  the 
railroad  bridge  was  burned. 

General  Smith,  obeying  what  he  says  was  the 
express  verbal  order  of  General  Sherman,  waited 
in  Memphis  for  the  brigade  of  Colonel  Waring, 
which  was  detained  up  the  Mississippi  by  ice,  and 
did  not  reach  Memphis  till  the  nth.  The  plan  of 


1 86  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

his  campaign  was  deranged.  He  did  not  crush 
Forrest,  did  not  destroy  the  railroad,  and  did  not 
join  Sherman  at  Meridian.  He  had  an  unsuccess 
ful  engagement  with  Jackson  at  West  Point,  and 
retreated,  followed  by  Jackson  with  daily  combats, 
in  which  both  lost  men,  and  Smith  lost  artillery. 

General  Polk  evacuated  Meridian  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  1 4th  of  February.  Sherman  entered 
later  in  the  day,  and  immediately  spread  his  forces 
out  along  the  railroads  in  all  directions,  and  prose 
cuted  the  work  of  destruction  until  the  2Oth. 
Tracks,  culverts,  and  bridges  were  so  largely  extir 
pated  that  to  a  large  extent  the  roads  were  not 
used  again  for  military  purposes  during  the  war. 
Meanwhile  nothing  was  heard  of  General  Smith. 
After  anxious  waiting  and  inquiry,  the  expedition, 
having  accomplished  its  purpose,  turned  home 
ward,  the  Seventeenth  Corps  taking  the  most  di 
rect  route  to  Canton,  Hurlbut  coming  farther  to 
the  north,  and  the  cavalry  swinging  still  farther 
northward,  in  the  hope  of  joining  Smith  or  getting 
news  of  him.  All  converged  at  Canton  on  the 
26th,  without  having  gained  any  information.  Gen 
eral  Sherman  left  Canton  for  Vicksburg  on  the 
27th  of  February.  Hurlbut  brought  the  expedition 
in  on  the  3d  of  March.  The  re-enlisted  veterans 
left  Vicksburg  to  spend  their  thirty  days'  furlough 
in  visiting  home,  and  then  go  to  new  fields. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

MILITARY    DIVISION    OF    THE    MISSISSIPPI. 

GENERAL  SHERMAN  reached  Vicksburg  at  the 
end  of  his  Meridian  campaign  on  the  last  day  of 
February,  and,  finding  there  letters  from  Grant  di 
recting  him  to  co-operate  in  an  expedition  up  the 
Red  River,  to  be  conducted  by  General  Banks,  in 
whose  Department  of  the  Gulf  the  theater  of  opera 
tions  lay,  he  took  steamer  at  once  for  New  Orleans. 
Reaching  that  city  on  the  2cl  of  March,  he  spent  a 
couple  of  days  in  consultation  with  Banks,  and, 
with  his  usual  restless  energy,  was  on  his  way  back 
to  Vicksburg  on  the  4th,  not  wraiting  for  the  cere 
monies  which  were  to  inaugurate  on  that  day  a 
loyal  State  government  for  Louisiana. 

The  plan  arranged  with  Banks  included  a  loan 
for  thirty  days  from  the  7th  of  March  of  two  divi 
sions  from  the  Department  of  the  Tennessee — one, 
under  General  Mower,  from  the  Sixteenth  Corps, 
and  one  from  the  Seventeenth  Corps,  under  Gen 
eral  Kilby  Smith,  the  two  constituting  a  temporary 
corps,  under  General  A.  J.  Smith.  The  expedition 
was  to  be  a  mixed  military  and  naval  one,  a  fleet 
of  gunboats  under  Admiral  Porter  co-operating 
with  the  land  forces,  and  convoying  the  numerous 
transports.  It  was  expected  that  a  column  under 
General  Steele,  commanding  the  Department  of 
Arkansas,  should  meet  Banks  at  Shreveport,  some 
three  hundred  miles  up  the  Red  River,  and  that 
this  junction  of  forces  should  release  Smith's  corps, 

187 


1 88  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

which  would  then  immediately  return  to  Sherman, 
who  was  hurrying  his  preparations  to  have  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee  in  North  Alabama  ready 
to  open  the  general  campaign  under  Grant  before 
the  ist  of  May. 

With  fullest  confidence  in  the  good  faith  and 
right  purposes  of  General  Banks,  Sherman  knew 
so  well  the  difficulty  of  reclaiming  a  detachment 
once  committed  to  a  distant  expedition,  that  he 
sought  by  most  explicit  written  arrangements  with 
Banks  and  directions  to  Smith  to  secure  the  prompt 
return  of  his  two  divisions  at  the  appointed  time.* 
But  the  expedition  did  not  turn  out  successfully, 
the  junction  with  Steele  at  Shreveport  was  not 
made,  and  upon  his  retreat  Banks  could  not  spare 
Smith's  corps  until  the  army  reached  the  Missis 
sippi  again.  The  Atlanta  campaign  had  then 
opened,  and  through  the  whole  of  it  the  Army 
of  the  Tennessee  was  weaker  by  the  two  divisions 
than  Sherman  had  meant  to  have  it. 

Still  greater  changes  were  in  store  for  him. 
On  his  way  to  Memphis  he  was  met,  on  the  loth 
of  March,  by  a  letter  from  Grant  announcing  his 
own  promotion  to  the  rank  of  lieutenant  general. 
Four  days  later  Grant,  on  his  return  from  a  rapid 
journey  to  Washington,  summoned  Sherman  to 
meet  him  at  Nashville.  The  visit  of  the  lieutenant 
general  to  Washington  was  followed  by  his  assign 
ment,  on  March  I2th,  to  the  command  of  the  armies 
of  the  United  States  under  the  President.  General 
Halleck  was  announced  as  chief  of  staff  in  Wash 
ington,  Sherman  succeeded  to  the  Military  Division 
of  the  Mississippi,  and  McPherson  to  the  Depart 
ment  and  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  f  The  same  day 
Grant  started  westward  again  to  meet  Sherman  at 
Nashville,  and  to  have  his  final  consultations  with 
his  subordinates  before  taking  the  field  with  the 

*  O.  R.,  xxxii,  pt.  2,  pp.  494,  514.  f  Id.,  pt.  ?,  p.  58. 


MILITARY   DIVISION   OF   THE   MISSISSIPPI. 


189 


Army  of  the  Potomac,  as  he  had  resolved  to  do. 
Grant's  order  assuming  command  of  all  the  Na 
tional  armies  was  not  issued  until  the  I7th,  from 
Nashville,  and  Sherman's  was  dated  the  i8th,  from 
the  same  place.* 

The  possibility  of  this  change  had,  of  course, 
been  known,  for  the  bill  to  revive  the  rank  of  lieu 
tenant  general  had  been  introduced  by  Mr.  Wash- 
burne  on  the  I4th  of  December,  and  passed  the 
House  of  Representatives  on  the  ist  of  February, 
with  a  recommendation  to  the  President  to  give 
the  appointment  to  Grant.  Although  it  did  not 
pass  the  Senate  and  become  a  law  till  nearly  a 
month  later,  it  was  a  foregone  conclusion,  and 
General  Grant  had  planned  the  spring  campaign 
in  the  West  with  a  view  to  this  contingency.  With 
his  habitual  reticence,  he  kept  his  own  counsels 
as  to  his  personal  part  in  the  next  year's  work, 
though  there  is  little  doubt  that  his  predilection 
was  to  remain  in  the  West.  The  only  thing  he  was 
fully  resolved  on  was,  as  he  said  in  his  letter  of 
March  4th  to  Sherman,  that  he  would  accept  no 
appointment  which  would  require  him  to  make 
Washington  his  own  headquarters.  He  was  de 
termined  to  remain  in  the  field. 

During  most  of  the  winter  the  discussion  of 
the  organization  of  the  principal  Western  army  and 
its  component  parts  had  gone  on,  therefore,  with  a 
more  or  less  clearly  acknowledged  reference  to 
what  became  the  actual  situation  at  the  beginning 
of  March.  At  first  Grant  seems  to  have  thought 
it  possible  that  he  might  lead  the  Western  army 
without  any  intermediate  commander  between  him 
self  and  the  three  department  commanders  of  the 
Cumberland,  the  Tennessee,  and  the  Ohio.  While 
this  point  of  view  prevailed,  he  thought  of  Mc- 
Pherson  for  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio, 

*  O.  R.,  xxxii,  pt.  3,  pp.  83,  87. 


GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

from  which  General  Foster  asked  to  be  relieved 
on  account  of  his  health.  He  had  also  thought  of 
General  W.  F.  Smith  for  the  place,  and  as  early 
as  November  had  asked  to  have  him  booked  for 
the  first  vacancy  in  the  rank  of  major  general.* 
Toward  the  end  of  December  Halleck  had  sug 
gested  General  John  M.  Schofield  for  the  Depart 
ment  of  the  Ohio.  Grant  reserved  his  response  to 
this  till  the  middle  of  January,  after  a  personal  visit 
to  Foster  at  Knoxville,  when  he  renewed  the  recom 
mendation  of  General  Smith,  if  the  latter  might  be 
given  the  appropriate  rank,  to  date  so  as  to  be 
senior  to  other  major  generals  in  the  department. 
He  added  that,  if  it  were  contemplated  to  give  Gen 
eral  Smith  a  still  higher  command,  he  would  be 
content  with  either  of  the  other  general  officers 
named,  or  with  General  J.  G.  Parke,  who  was  with 
the  Ninth  Corps  in  Tennessee. f  The  reference  to 
a  "  still  higher  command "  for  General  Smith  is 
understood  to  mean  that  his  appointment  to  com 
mand  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  been  under 
consideration. 

To  date  back  a  commission  so  as  to  give  an 
officer  formal  seniority  over  others  already  in  serv 
ice  was  several  times  done,  notably  in  the  case  of 
General  Rosecrans,  who  was  thus  made  to  outrank 
Thomas  in  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  but  the 
irritation  it  caused  did  not  commend  it  for  repeated 
use.  It  shows  that  Grant  shared  the  current  mis 
apprehension  among  army  officers  in  regard  to  the 
effect  of  the  date  of  a  general's  commission  when 
the  officer  was  assigned  to  special  duty  by  the 
President.  It  was  frequently  claimed  that  such  as 
signment  could  not  override  mere  seniority  in  com 
mission,  and  the  question  was  several  times  raised 
before  it  was  officially  settled,  in  accordance  with 
the  plain  meaning  of  the  statute,  that  the  assign- 

*  O.  R.,  xxxi,  pt.  3,  pp.  122,  277.  f  Id-.  PP-  529. 57i- 


MILITARY   DIVISION   OF    THE   MISSISSIPPI.     191 

nient  by  the  President  to  a  department,  an  army,  or 
a  corps  gave  precedence  over  all  officers  of  the  same 
grade  not  themselves  thus  specially  assigned. 
When  once  this  principle  was  settled,  our  army 
system  acquired  an  admirable  flexibility,  for  it  en 
abled  the  President  to  select  any  major  general  to 
command  an  army,  giving  to  such  officer  what 
amounted  to  a  temporary  grade  so  long  as  his  com 
mand  actually  lasted.  This  was  a  better  system 
than  that  of  the  Confederates,  and  would  have  left 
nothing  to  desire  if  the  temporary  power  had  been 
accompanied  by  the  temporary  title  of  lieutenant 
general  or  general. 

By  the  end  of  January  Grant  found  the  arrange 
ment  as  to  the  commanders  of  departments  and 
armies  easy  to  settle.  A  plan  was  on  foot  to  trans 
fer  the  Ninth  Corps  to  the  East,  where  Burnside 
should  resume  the  command  of  it,  and  it  should  be 
enlarged  to  a  strength  of  twenty-five  or  thirty  thou 
sand  men,  with  the  prospect  of  becoming  a  separate 
army  on  the  Carolina  coast,  where  it  had  first  won 
renown.  General  Parke  went  with  it,  and  resumed 
his  old  relations  to  Burnside  as  chief  of  staff.  Gen 
eral  W.  F.  Smith  was  also  indicated  for  transfer 
to  the  East.  The  probability  that  McPherson 
would  soon  be  promoted  to  the  head  of  the  Army 
of  the  Tennessee  was  so  great  that  Grant  no  longer 
hesitated  as  to  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  and  on  Janu 
ary  2/th  he  telegraphed  a  request  that  General 
Schofield  be  assigned  to  the  Department  of  the 
Ohio,  which  was  promptly  done.*  Schofield's  serv 
ice  had  been  in  Missouri,  where  he  had  been  upon 
the  staff  of  General  Lyon  at  the  battle  of  Wilson's 
Creek,  and  had  been  on  active  duty  from  the  first 
organization  of  Union  troops  in  that  State.  Since 
May,  1863,  he  had  been  in  command  of  that  de 
partment,  and  had  established  a  high  character  for 

*  O.  R.,  xxxii,  pt.  2,  pp.  229,  230. 


10,2  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

judgment  and  ability  in  administering  its  affairs. 
His  full  sympathy  with  the  President's  conciliatory 
policy  toward  conservative  Union  men  had  brought 
upon  him  the  strenuous  opposition  of  radical  lead 
ers  in  Missouri  and  Kansas,  and  these  had  pre 
vented  the  confirmation  of  his  promotion  to  the 
rank  of  major  general.  Mr.  Lincoln,  well  know 
ing  that  the  contest  was  rather  with  himself  than 
with  Schofield,  had  renewed  the  nomination,  but 
was  not  unwilling  to  find  a  way  of  conciliating  op 
position  by  sending  General  Rosecrans  to  Missouri 
and  transferring  Schofield  to  the  Department  of 
the  Ohio. 

The  Department  and  Army  of  the  Cumberland 
was  by  far  the  larger  part  of  the  combined  forces 
in  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi.  It  was 
reckoned  that  it  would  put  into  the  field  sixty  thou 
sand  soldiers  of  the  hundred  thousand  with  which 
the  active  campaign  would  be  opened.  From  a 
purely  military  point  of  view  this  great  dispropor 
tion  between  the  three  organizations  of  equal  grade 
in  the  grand  army  was  very  objectionable,  but  there 
were  other  considerations  which  overrode  the  ob 
jections.  Each  of  the  armies  had  its  history  and  its 
strong  esprit  de  corps.  Such  pride  in  its  organiza 
tion  is  so  powerful  a  stimulus  to  every  soldier,  from 
the  ranks  upward,  that  the  morale  of  an  army  may 
be  seriously  impaired  by  discouraging  it.  The 
whole  country  had  gloried  in  Thomas's  stubborn 
courage  at  Chickamauga,  and  in  his  assurance 
afterward  that  he  would  hold  Chattanooga  till  the 
army  starved.  A  general  public  sentiment,  which 
no  prudent  administration  or  commander  could  af 
ford  to  ignore,  demanded  that  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,  with  Thomas  at  its  head,  should  re 
main  intact  as  the  preponderant  unit  in  the  Army 
of  the  West.  With  this  sentiment  Grant  was  in  full 
accord.  His  strong,  practical  sense  in  military  mat 
ters  made  him  always  averse  to  meddling  unneces- 


MILITARY   DIVISION   OF   THE    MISSISSIPPI. 


193 


sarily  with  existing  organizations,  and  he  instinc 
tively  felt  that  the  best  way  to  avoid  dissensions  and 
remove  the  jealousies  which  always  spring  up  when 
one  army  is  merged  in  another,  is  to  avoid  every 
change  in  form  which  would  wound  the  pride  of 
the  soldier.  Thomas  was  a  noble  and  patriotic 
man,  but  he  felt  as  keenly  as  any  one  his  personal 
dignity,  and  resented  as  warmly  as  any  a  slight  to 
it.  Grant  respected  and  sympathized  with  this  feel 
ing,  and  does  not  seem  to  have  debated  even  the 
necessity  of  leaving  the  organization  of  the  Cum 
berland  army  as  it  was.  Sherman  fully  agreed  with 
him  in  this,  and  received  the  chief  command  with 
this  question  of  organization  definitively  settled. 

The  War  Department  at  this  time  made  an  at 
tempt  to  relieve  the  army  of  a  congestion  in  the 
upper  grades,  which  gave  little  hope  of  promo 
tion  to  meritorious  officers  in  the  field.  General 
officers  who  for  any  cause  had  dropped  out  of  active 
employment  and  were  awaiting  orders  were  as 
signed  to  the  different  armies,  to  take  any  service 
suitable  to  their  rank.  Major  generals  could  claim 
no  command  greater  than  a  division,  and  briga 
diers  must  be  content  with  a  brigade  if  divisions 
were  not  vacant.  A  few  resigned  rather  than  take 
a  command  of  less  importance  than  that  which  they 
had  last  exercised.  In  the  West  the  most  promi 
nent  officer  in  this  situation  was  General  Buell,  who 
had  been  relieved  from  the  command  of  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland  at  his  own  request,  under  a 
pressure  which  was  much  more  political  than  mili 
tary.  A  court  of  inquiry  had,  in  substance,  justified 
his  conduct  of  the  campaign  of  1862,  and,  though 
he  had  declined  some  overtures  looking  to  active 
service,  Grant  and  Sherman  were  both  disposed  to 
find  an  acceptable  position  for  him.  Sherman,  with 
the  assent  of  Thomas,  had  suggested  that  he  be 
assigned  to  the  Fourteenth  Army  Corps  in  the 
Cumberland  army ;  but,  on  hearing  the  rumor  that 


I94 


GENERAL   SHERMAN. 


Buell  was  to  be  employed,  Andrew  Johnson,  as 
military  governor  of  Tennessee,  protested.  This, 
joined  with  the  strong  hostility  of  Governor  Mor 
ton,  of  Indiana,  made  an  array  of  political  influence 
quite  strong  enough  to  account  for  the  order  of 
the  War  Department  mustering  him  out  of  service 
a  few  weeks  later.* 

The  difficulty  growing  out  of  the  general  order 
assigning  officers  to  active  duty  was  complicated 
by  the  fact  that  a  number  who  had  been  relieved 
from  duty  in  the  Eastern  armies  were  ordered  to 
the  West,  and  reported  to  army  commanders  who 
had  been  sifting  their  own  organizations  to  make 
them  more  efficient,  and  were  anything  but  pleased 
to  assign  to  brigades  and  divisions  men  who  were 
strangers  to  them,  and  against  whom  was  the  pre 
sumption  arising  out  of  the  fact  that  they  were  not 
retained  in  the  army  where  they  had  served  and 
were  known.  When,  therefore,  a  number  of  gen 
eral  officers  were  sent  out  to  Grant,  and  he  asked 
Thomas  whether  he  wanted  any  of  them,  the  latter 
very  frankly  said  he  must  first  know  who  and  what 
they  were — some  men  he  would  be  very  glad  to 
get,  others  he  would  not  choose  to  have  at  all. 
"  The  colonels  I  have  in  command  of  brigades," 
he  said,  "  are  all  efficient  men,  and  I  would  not  care 
to  exchange  them  for  worthless  brigadiers."  He 
afterward  emphasized  this  by  giving  his  reasons 
for  objecting  to  some  who  were  suggested  to  him.f 

Several  changes  were  made  among  the  corps 
commanders  also.  General  Hooker  was  in  com 
mand  of  two  corps — the  Eleventh,  under  Howard, 
and  the  Twelfth,  under  Slocum — which  he  had 
brought  to  the  West  from  the  Army  of  the  Po 
tomac.  The  anomaly  of  having  an  intermediate 
commander  between  the  army  commander  and  the 

*  O.  R.,  xxxii,  pt.  3,  pp.  221,  278,  292,  304,  306,  320,  323. 
t  Id.,  pt.  2,  pp.  131,  142. 


MILITARY   DIVISION   OF   THE    MISSISSIPPI.     195 

heads  of  the  corps  was  a  fruitful  cause  of  chafing, 
and,  after  some  correspondence  with  Washington 
on  the  subject,  it  was  finally  adjusted  by  consolidat 
ing  the  two  corps  into  one,  commanded  by  Hooker, 
and  known  as  the  Twentieth.  Howard  was  trans 
ferred  to  the  Fourth,  which  General  Gordon  Gran 
ger  vacated,  taking  a  leave  of  absence,  and  Slocuin 
was  sent  to  take  command  at  Vicksburg.*  Sheri 
dan  would  have  been  the  natural  successor  to 
Granger  in  the  Fourth  Corps,  where  he  command 
ed  a  division,  but  Grant  had  already  determined  to 
give  him  the  command  of  the  cavalry  in  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac.  In  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  the 
promotion  of  McPherson  and  the  wide  separation 
of  the  column  in  Georgia  from  the  troops  left  in 
the  Mississippi  Valley  led  to  a  partial  reorganiza 
tion,  in  which  General  Logan  was  assigned  to  the 
Fifteenth  and  General  Blair  to  the  Seventeenth 
Corps.  In  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  General  Scho- 
field  retained  the  immediate  command  of  the 
Twenty-third  Corps  in  the  field,  as  well  as  that  of 
the  army,  and  General  Stoneman  was  transferred 
to  the  cavalry  corps  of  that  army.  These  changes 
completed  the  larger  organization  of  the  forces 
before  Grant  went  East,  or  were  made  in  pursu 
ance  of  arrangements  settled  with  him.  Sherman 
retained  the  organization  as  he  found  it,  till  the 
progress  of  the  campaign  naturally  caused  some 
modifications. 

When  Sherman  met  Grant  at  Nashville  on  the 
1 7th  of  March,  he  learned  authoritatively  the  pur 
pose  of  the  lieutenant  general  to  take  the  field  with 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  that  the  independent 
command  of  the  western  army  would  fall  upon  his 
shoulders.  To  save  time  for  consultation,  he  ac 
companied  Grant  to  Cincinnati,  as  the  latter  was 

*  O.  R.,  xxxi,  pt.  3,  p.  397  ;  xxxii,  pt.  2,  pp.  313-315 ;  Id.,  pt. 
3,  P-  258. 


IQ6  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

in  haste  to  get  back  to  Washington.  Far  from 
showing  any  wish  to  assume  the  higher  position, 
Sherman  had  urged  that  Grant  should  stay  with 
the  army  at  Chattanooga  and  personally  lead  it. 
The  letters  which  passed  between  them  when  Grant 
sent  the  news  of  his  promotion  (so  often  quoted) 
reveal  their  close  relations  of  friendship  and  confi 
dence  as  nothing  else  can  do.*  Grant's  departure 
from  his  habitual  reticence  to  speak  of  his  indebt 
edness  to  Sherman  and  McPherson  was  a  remark 
able  exhibition  of  feeling  on  his  part.  The  warmth 
of  Sherman's  reply  does  not  surprise  us  or  seem 
so  unexpected,  but  it  was  no  less  sincere.  He 
opened  a  window  into  the  recesses  of  his  heart  and 
mind  when  he  said,  "  Until  you  had  won  Donelson, 
I  confess  I  was  almost  cowed  by  the  terrible  array 
of  anarchical  elements  that  presented  themselves 
at  every  point,  but  that  admitted  the  ray  of  light 
which  I  have  followed  since."  His  wishes  for  the 
future  he  puts  in  frankest  and  strongest  form,  and 
the  vehemence  of  feeling  grows  as  he  writes : 
"  Don't  stay  in  Washington.  Halleck  is  better 
qualified  than  you  to  stand  the  buffets  of  intrigue 
and  policy.  Come  West;  take  to  yourself  the 
whole  Mississippi  Valley.  Let  us  make  it  dead 
sure,  and  I  tell  you  the  Atlantioslopes  and  the  Pa 
cific  shores  will  follow  its  destiny  as  sure  as  the 
limbs  of  a  tree  live  or  die  with  the  main  trunk. 
.  .  .  For  God's  sake  and  your  country's  sake,  come 
out  of  Washington !  I  foretold  to  General  Halleck 
before  he  left  Corinth  the  inevitable  result,  and  I 
now  exhort  you  to  come  out  West.  Here  lies  the 
seat  of  the  coming  empire,  and  from  the  West, 
when  our  task  is  done,  we  will  make  short  work 
of  Charleston  and  Richmond  and  the  impoverished 
coast  of  the  Atlantic." 

Grant's  impulses  urged  him  in  the  same  direc- 

*  O.  R.,  xxxii,  pt.  3,  pp.  18,  49. 


MILITARY   DIVISION   OF   THE   MISSISSIPPI.     107 

tion,  but  his  visit  to  Washington  had  given  him 
conclusive  public  reasons  why  he  should  lead  the 
great  army  in  Virginia.  It  was  the  logical  result 
of  this  that  Sherman  should  command  the  com 
bined  armies  of  the  West.  The  time  had  passed 
when  he  shrunk  from  responsibility.  A  laudable 
ambition  would  prompt  him  to  rejoice  at  the  op 
portunity  to  conduct  the  western  campaign.  But 
he  was  not  even  consulted.  Friendship  and  a  high 
estimate  of  Sherman's  capacity  united  to  fix  Grant's 
choice.  There  was  neither  hesitation  nor  second 
thought.  At  his  request  the  appointment  was 
made,  and  the  notice  of  it  was  the  official  order 
promulgated  by  the  War  Department  on  the  I2th 
of  March. 

Sherman  and  General  George  H.  Thomas  were 
old  friends  and  classmates.  Thomas's  appointment 
as  brigadier  general  of  vohmteers  had  been  decided 
by  Sherman's  influence.  He  served  in  Kentucky, 
in  1861,  under  Sherman's  command.  The  fortunes 
of  war  reversed  the  relation,  and  put  Sherman  sub 
ordinate  to  Thomas  after  the  battle  of  Shiloh.  They 
had  again  been  equal  department  commanders 
under  Grant  at  Missionary  Ridge,  and  now  Sher 
man  was  again  to  become  the  commanding  officer 
over  his  friend.  Sherman  often  said  that,  had  such 
been  the  order,  he  would  have  served  with  com- 
pletest  content  and  cheerfulness  under  Thomas  in 
these  final  campaigns.  In  their  private  intercourse 
they  were  the  schoolmates  of  boyhood,  and  the 
cadet  nicknames  were  those  they  used  to  each 
other.  Their  friendship  was  ended  only  by  death. 

There  were  not  wanting  to  Thomas  admiring 
friends  who  thought  he  was  u  overslaughed  "  in  the 
new  assignments  to  duty,  and  these  were  not  al 
ways  judicious  in  expressing  themselves.  They 
found  a  mouthpiece  in  Andrew  Johnson,  who  tele 
graphed  to  the  President  his  opinion  that  Thomas 
ought  to  be  independent  in  his  command  and  re- 


198  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

port  direct  to  Washington.*  This  would  mean,  of 
course,  a  scheme  of  separate  small  campaigns,  such 
as  had  so  often  been  disastrous  in  the  past,  instead 
of  the  strong  combined  effort  which  Grant  had 
planned.  There  is  no  evidence  that  Thomas  fa 
vored  such  folly  for  a  moment. 

The  two  men,  both  very  able,  were  very  un 
like  in  temperament.  Sherman  was  impulsive  and 
demonstrative ;  Thomas  was  impassive  and  phleg 
matic.  Sherman  was  lithe  and  wiry ;  Thomas  was 
massive  and  slow  of  motion.  Sherman  was  rest 
less  and  aggressive;  Thomas  was  deliberate  and 
inclined  to  the  defensive.  Sherman  grew  more 
quiet  when  the  excitement  of  a  crisis  in  battle  gave 
vent  to  his  nervous  strain,  as  escaping  steam  stops 
when  the  engine  begins  its  motion;  Thomas  was 
quickened  by  such  a  crisis  into  more  active  move 
ment  of  mind  and  body.  They  supplemented  each 
other  admirably,  but  there  can  now  be  little  doubt 
that  Sherman's  restless  energy,  his  physical  in 
ability  to  tolerate  a  standstill,  was  the  quality  which 
made  it  possible  to  continue  the  advance  in  Georgia, 
where  the  army  was  dependent  on  a  single  line  of 
communications  reaching  to  the  Ohio  River,  four 
hundred  miles  away.  It  is  not  worth  while  to  dis 
cuss  the  possible  results  of  a  different  choice  of 
commanders.  Sherman's  selection  was  justified  by 
the  best  of  all  possible  military  tests — a  glorious 
ending  of  the  campaign  and  of  the  war. 

The  plan  of  campaign  which  Grant  had  outlined 
for  himself  before  his  transfer  to  the  East  was  com 
municated  to  Thomas  as  early  as  the  ipth  of  Janu 
ary,  in  a  letter  which  said,  "  I  look  upon  the  line 
for  this  army  to  secure  in  its  next  campaign  to  be 
that  from  Chattanooga  to  Mobile,  Atlanta  and 
Montgomery  being  the  important  intermediate 

*  O.  R.,  xxxii,  pt.  3,  p.  105. 


MILITARY   DIVISION   OF   THE    MISSISSIPPI. 


I99 


points/'  *  This  had  been  fully  discussed  by  Grant 
and  Sherman,  and,  when  the  latter  succeeded  to 
the  command,  Atlanta  remained  the  goal  to  be  first 
reached,  though  Grant  was  explicit  in  saying  that, 
beyond  indicating  Johnston's  army  as  the  true  ob 
jective,  he  left  his  subordinate  free  to  execute  his 
work  in  his  own  way.f  Sherman  had  been  ex 
pected  to  concentrate  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee 
at  Huntsville,  Ala.,  Thomas  that  of  the  Cumber 
land  at  Chattanooga,  and  Schofield  to  bring  the 
Army  of  the  Ohio  to  Cleveland,  Tenn.,  still  farther 
to  the  east.  A  converging  advance  upon  Rome, 
Ga.,  had  been  indicated  as  the  opening  movement. 
In  writing  to  General  Robert  Allen,  chief  quarter 
master  at  Louisville,  Ky.,  Sherman  had  said,  on 
March  24th,  that  his  principal  depots  would  be  at 
Nashville,  Chattanooga,  Huntsville,  and  Decatur, 
the  first  two  the  principal  ones.  In  the  same  letter 
he  said,  "  We  are  on  the  offensive,  and  should  not 
think  of  any  defensive  measure;"!  an  expression 
very  like  one  which  brought  upon  General  Pope 
unmeasured  and  unmerited  criticism  in  1862. 

Could  the  army  be  supplied  by  the  line  of  rail 
road?  That  was  the  burning  question.  From 
Louisville  on  the  Ohio  to  Chattanooga  through 
Nashville  was  three  hundred  and  thirty-seven  miles. 
From  Chattanooga  to  Atlanta  would  be  a  hundred 
and  thirty-five  more — four  hundred  and  seventy- 
two  in  all,  a  single  track,  and  every  mile  of  it  liable 
to  raids  by  the  enemy's  cavalry.  Of  course,  Nash 
ville  and  Chattanooga,  the  principal  depots,  must 
be  fortified  and  garrisoned,  so  that  supplies  and 
munitions  could  be  accumulated  there  as  a  reserve 
in  case  of  any  interruption  of  communication  be 
tween  these  places  and  the  base.  Colonel  D.  C. 
McCallum,  the  general  manager  of  military  rail- 

*  O.  R.,  xxxii,  pt.  2,  p.  143.  f  Id.,  pt.  3,  p.  246. 

\  Id.,  pt.  3,  p.  142. 

14 


200  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

ways,  had  come  West  in  January  to  study  the  situ 
ation,  and  great  improvements  had  been  made  in 
the  railway  management  before  the  military  divi 
sion  was  turned  over  to  Sherman.*  But  the  best 
estimates  of  the  number  of  cars  and  locomotives 
lacking  were  so  great  that  the  problem  seemed  al 
most  insoluble.  More  than  a  hundred  locomotives 
and  twenty-five  hundred  cars,  in  addition  to  the  ex 
isting  rolling  stock,  were  necessary,  the  experts 
said,  to  insure  the  delivery  at  the  front  of  the  one 
hundred  and  fifty  carloads  per  day,  which  were  the 
measure  of  the  wants  of  an  army  of  a  hundred  thou 
sand  men.  The  purchase  or  construction  of  the 
extra  equipment  during  the  winter  and  spring  was 
out  of  the  question. 

Sherman  took  the  matter  in  hand  with  char 
acteristic  vigor.  The  management  of  the  railways 
was  connected  directly  with  his  own  headquarters. 
He  limited  the  use  of  the  trains  to  the  absolute 
necessities  of  the  army.  Private  trade  and  trans 
portation  must  find  other  channels.  Passenger 
traffic  was  strictly  limited.  Strangers  and  visitors 
were  not  permitted  to  come  to  the  front.  The  full 
motive  power  and  the  car  space  were  devoted  to 
military  work.  The  issue  of  army  rations  to  citi 
zens  at  military  posts  had  grown  into  a  great  abuse. 
This  was  stopped.  Colonel  Adna  Anderson,  mas 
ter  of  railway  transportation,  zealously  and  untir 
ingly  enforced  Sherman's  orders,  but  it  was  not 
yet  enough.  The  general  then  quietly  arranged 
with  Mr.  Guthrie,  the  president  of  the  Louisville 
and  Nashville  Railway,  to  keep  on  the  line  south 
of  the  Ohio  the  rolling  stock  received  from  North 
ern  railways,  and,  while  the  "  car  accountants " 
were  gradually  finding  out  that  their  equipment 
did  not  come  back  to  their  roads,  and  were  fuming 
over  the  delay,  the  depots  at  Nashville  and  Chatta- 

*  O.  R.,  xxxii,  pt.  2,  p.  143. 


MILITARY   DIVISION   OF   THE    MISSISSIPPI.     2OI 

nooga  were  accumulating  rations  and  ammunition. 
No  one  enjoyed  the  humorous  side  of  a  situation 
more  than  Sherman,  and  his  eyes  twinkled  with 
fun  as  he  reckoned  up  the  profits  of  his  ruse  in  the 
growing  possibilities  of  an  early  opening  of  the 
spring  campaign. 

Of  course,  there  was  an  outcry.  "  Imploring 
appeals  "  to  Mr.  Lincoln  moved  his  kind  heart  to 
ask  Sherman  whether  he  could  not  modify  his 
order.  The  latter  answered :  "  It  is  demonstrated 
that  the  railroad  can  not  supply  the  army  and  the 
people  too.  One  or  the  other  must  quit,  and  the 
army  don't  intend  to  unless  Joe  Johnston  makes 
us."  *  Sherman  was  stoutly  backed  at  Washing 
ton  by  General  Meigs,  the  quartermaster  general, 
and  was  allowed  to  have  his  way.f  He  foresaw, 
what  turned  out  to  be  true,  that  the  private  busi 
ness  of  the  country  could  accommodate  itself  to  the 
situation  with  but  little  individual  suffering  if  his 
system  was  firmly  and  honestly  carried  out.  The 
supply  problem  was  solved  if  the  army  itself  could 
be  kept  from  overburdening  itself  with  impedimenta, 
as  every  army  is  prone  to  do.  Writing  to  General 
Thomas  on  this  subject,  Sherman  said :  "  When 
we  move  we  will  take  no  tents  or  baggage,  but  one 
change  of  clothing  on  our  horses  or  to  be  carried 
by  the  men,  and  on  pack  animals  by  company  of 
ficers,  with  five  days'  bacon,  twenty  days'  bread, 
and  thirty  days'  salt,  sugar,  and  coffee ;  nothing 
else  but  arms  and  ammunition  proportioned  to  our 
ability/'  J  As  the  campaign  lengthened,  this  scale 
had  to  be  modified,  but  it  was  the  standard  for  use 
in  the  frequent  instances  when  the  railway  had  to 
be  left  for  some  turning  or  flanking  movement. 

On  the  Confederate  side,  General  Joseph  E. 
Johnston  had  been  in  command  since  the  middle 

*  O.  R.,  xxxviii,  pt.  4,  pp.  25,  33.        f  Id.,  xxxii,  pt.  3,  p.  434- 
\  Id.,  xxxii,  pt.  3,  p.  323. 


202  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

of  December,  and  his  troops  were  in  the  strong 
intrenched  camp  in  front  of  Dalton,  about  forty 
miles  from  Chattanooga.  General  Polk  had  a  small 
army  in  Alabama  and  Mississippi,  and  Longstreet 
another  on  the  confines  of  Virginia  and  East  Ten 
nessee.  President  Davis  began  urging  an  aggres 
sive  winter  campaign  as  soon  as  Johnston  assumed 
command,  and  indicated  his  preference  for  a  plan 
by  which  Johnston  should  turn  Thomas's  position 
at  Chattanooga  by  moving  to  the  eastward  of  it 
by  way  of  Cleveland,  Tenn.,  while  Longstreet  came 
down  the  Holston  Valley  and  united  with  him  for 
a  dash  through  the  mountains  into  middle  Tennes 
see.  There  were  strong  reasons  in  favor  of  this 
plan,  and  it  was  supported  by  the  authority  of 
General  Lee.  It  was  reckoned  that  by  re-enforce 
ments  from  Polk  and  from  Beauregard's  forces  on 
the  Atlantic  seacoast  Johnston's  column  could 
start  seventy-five  thousand  strong,  and  be  increased 
to  nearly  a  hundred  thousand  by  the  junction  with 
Longstreet.* 

Johnston's  real  preference  was  for  the  defensive 
policy,  tempting  Sherman  to  assault  his  impreg 
nable  position  at  Dalton,  and  watching  for  a  favor 
able  opportunity  for  a  decisive  return  blow  when 
his  opponent's  impetuosity  should  have  led  to  some 
disaster  to  the  National  army.  He  presented  with 
force  the  objections  to  the  plan  proposed  to  him, 
the  need  of  assured  supplies  for  the  opening  steps 
of  such  a  campaign,  and  expressed  a  preference 
for  a  line  of  operations  by  Rome,  Guntersville, 
and  Huntsville,  by  which  he  should  turn  Thomas's 
position  by  the  south  and  west,  instead  of  the  east 
and  north.  His  own  choice,  however,  would  have 
been  to  go  still  farther  west  and  make  northern 
Mississippi  his  base  of  operations  if  he  must  aban- 

*  O.  R.,  xxxi,  pt.  3,  pp.  843,  856  ;  xxxii,  pt.  3,  pp.  592,  594, 
614. 


MILITARY   DIVISION   OF   THE    MISSISSIPPI. 


203 


don  the  waiting  and  defensive  strategy  which  he 
thought  wisest  of  all.* 

The  strained  relations  which  notoriously  ex 
isted  between  Davis  and  Johnston  gave  to  this  cor 
respondence  a  very  formal  air  on  the  part  of  the 
general  at  least,  and  one  is  impressed  in  reading  it 
with  the  conviction  that  the  latter  was  willing  to 
gain  time  by  the  discussion,  and  let  the  delay  bring 
about  the  adoption  of  his  own  plan.  Anyhow, 
this  was  what  happened,  and  Grant  and  Sherman 
were  allowed  to  use  the  winter  for  the  Meridian 
expedition  and  in  the  preparations  for  a  spring 
campaign.  Johnston  remained  quietly  within  his 
formidable  lines  at  Dalton,  only  sending  Hardee 
with  re-enforcements  for  Polk  when  Sherman 
threatened  to  march  from  Meridian  into  Alabama. 
As  the  spring  approached,  Longstreet  was  ordered 
to  join  Lee  in  Virginia,  and  any  thought  of  his 
again  uniting  with  Johnston  was  given  up.  Polk 
prepared  to  carry  a  corps  of  fourteen  thousand  men 
to  Johnston  as  soon  as  active  operations  should 
begin.  Regiments  and  brigades  were  carefully 
culled  out  from  garrisons  on  the  Gulf  coast,  and 
within  the  first  week  from  the  beginning  of  Sher 
man's  operations  in  May,  Johnston  had  in  hand  the 
seventy-five  thousand  men  which  the  Richmond 
government  had  calculated  upon  as  the  maximun 
force  that  could  be  furnished  him.f  Sherman  had 
estimated  very  accurately  the  numbers  under  the 
Confederate  colors  in  April,  but  was  not  fully  aware 
of  the  extent  to  which  re-enforcements  were  ready 
to  reach  his  adversary  in  the  first  weeks  of  May. 
He  was  entirely  free  from  the  too  common  fault  of 
exaggerating  the  forces  of  an  opponent.  He  did 
not  magnify  his  task  for  the  sake  of  greater  glory 
in  success,  nor  did  he  see  lions  in  his  path. 

*  O.  R.,  xxxii,  pt.  2,  pp.  510,  559,  644. 

f  Id.,  pt.  3,  p.  866  ;  xxxviii,  pt.  4,  pp.  670,  737,  740. 


CHAPTER    IX. 

CAMPAIGN    OF    ATLANTA. 

GENERAL  GRANT  had  planned  a  simultaneous 
advance  of  the  National  armies  early  in  May,  and 
on  the  4th  of  the  month,  as  the  Army  of  the  Po 
tomac  was  crossing  the  Rapidan,  Schofield's  Army 
of  the  Ohio  was  crossing  the  boundary  of  Georgia, 
coming  out  of  Tennessee  to  become,  at  Red  Clay, 
the  left  of  Sherman's  line.  Thomas  was  concen 
trating  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  with  his  cen 
ter  at  Ringgold,  some  twenty  miles  in  front  of 
Chattanooga,  his  left  at  Catoosa  Springs,  and  his 
right  feeling  its  way  southward  toward  Trickum. 
The  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  under  McPherson, 
was  moving  from  Chattanooga  by  the  rear  of 
Thomas's  army,  to  come  into  position  as  Sherman's 
right  wing  near  Villanow. 

Several  parallel  mountain  ridges,  running  from 
northeast  to  southwest,  lay  between  Chattanooga 
and  Dalton,  a  small  town  in  the  valley  of  the  Con- 
nasauga  River,  where  the  Confederate  forces  under 
Johnston  lay.  The  last  of  these  ridges.  Rocky 
Face,  was  an  almost  perpendicular  barrier,  cleft 
by  the  deep  gorge  of  Mill  Creek,  down  which  ran 
the  Atlanta  Railroad  after  piercing  the  ridge  of 
Tunnel  Hill.  On  the  7th  Thomas  demonstrated 
against  Tunnel  Hill  with  Palmer's  corps  (Four 
teenth),  while  his  left,  under  Howard  (Fourth 
Corps),  turned  the  position  on  the  north  and  forced 
the  enemy  to  retire  within  their  Rocky  Face  lines 
through  the  crooked  and  fortified  gorge,  with  the 
204 


CAMPAIGN  OF  ATLANTA.  205 

precipitous  heights  of  Buzzard's  Roost  looking 
down  upon  it. 

For  two  days  Sherman  tested  the  strength  of  his 
adversary's  position  from  the  west  and  north  in 
sharp  combats,  in  which  only  small  bodies  could 
find  foothold.  He  was  convinced  that  he  could 
not  carry  Johnston's  lines  from  this  side  without 
very  great  loss  of  life,  and  pressed  the  march  of 
McPherson's  army  in  a  flanking  movement  by  his 
right,  according  to  the  general  plan  which  he  had 
announced  to  Grant  on  taking  the  field.*  McPher- 
son  was  sent  through  Villanow  to  Snake  Creek 
Gap,  an  almost  unknown  pass  and  ravine  turning 
the  south  end  of  Rocky  Face  ridge,  twelve  or  fif 
teen  miles  below  Dalton,  and  leading  to  the  town 
of  Resaca,  in  the  angle  at  the  junction  of  the  Con- 
nasauga  with  the  Oostanaula  River.  Sherman 
hoped  that  McPherson  would  be  able  to  reach  and 
disable  the  railroad,  but  Resaca  was  found  in 
trenched  and  garrisoned  by  four  thousand  men 
under  General  Cantey,  and,  after  a  strong  recon- 
noissance,  McPherson  retired  and  went  into  posi 
tion  at  the  eastern  mouth  of  the  gap  in  Sugar 
Valley. 

Without  wasting  time  in  regrets,  Sherman  has 
tened  the  transfer  of  his  whole  army  to  McPher 
son's  position,  leaving  Howard's  corps  and  the 
cavalry  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  under  Stoneman 
to  cover  the  communications  with  Chattanooga. 
Johnston  meanwhile  \vas  equally  busy  in  retreating 
from  Dalton  on  Resaca  by  the  shorter  interior 
route,  and  in  throwing  up  fieldworks  on  lines  pre 
viously  marked  out  by  his  engineer,  extending  the 
Resaca  intrenchments  northward  on  the  line  of 
hills  between  the  Connasauga  River  and  Camp 
Creek. 

The  passage  of  a  large  army  through  a  narrow 

*  O.  R.,  xxxviii,  pt.  4,  p.  25. 


206  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

and  wild  defile,  where  the  road  was  a  mere  track 
in  the  bed  of  a  mountain  stream,  was  a  tedious  op 
eration,  but  by  keeping  it  full  night  and  day  the 
army  was  able  to  deploy  forward  from  Sugar  Val 
ley  on  Saturday  the  I4th.  McPherson,  who  knew 
the  way  to  the  town,  was  ordered  to  push  forward 
on  the  right,  the  two  corps  with  Thomas  to  form 
next  in  the  center,  and  Schofield  to  swing  two  di 
visions  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  by  a  long  half 
wheel  across  the  rough  country  into  position  on 
the  left.  Howard  had  entered  Dalton  as  Johnston 
withdrew  from  it,  and  followed  the  enemy's  rear 
guard  southward.  His  coming  within  supporting 
distance  of  Schofield's  flank  was  to  be  the  signal 
for  attack  from  our  left,  with  a  view  to  outflank  the 
Confederates,  while  the  whole  line  should  then 
advance. 

A  little  before  noon  on  the  I4th  Howard's  skir 
mish  fire  was  heard  approaching,  and  the  signal 
for  attack  was  given.  Stubborn  resistance  was 
made  by  the  enemy's  outposts,  but  advantages 
were  gained  at  points  along  the  line.  Schofield's 
left  division  carried  a  line  of  intrenchments  with 
severe  loss,  but  his  right  was  badly  handled,  and 
suffered  heavily  without  compensatory  gain.* 
Howard  continued  the  advance  on  the  extreme  left, 
but  was  not  able  to  reach  beyond  the  enemy's 
flank.  Thomas  and  McPherson  closely  invested 
Resaca.  A  pontoon  bridge  was  thrown  across  the 
Oostanaula  at  Lay's  Ferry,  and  the  cavalry,  sup 
ported  by  a  division  from  General  Dodge's  (Six 
teenth)  corps,  was  sent  by  Sherman  to  threaten 
Calhoun,  the  next  important  village  on  the  railroad 
south  of  Resaca. 

The  next  day  the  engagement  was  continued. 
McPherson  gained  some  hills  on  the  right,  close 
to  the  river,  from  which  he  commanded  the  rail- 

*  O.  R.,  xxxviii,  pt.  4,  p.  243. 


MAP  No.  I 

ATLANTA   CAMPAIGN 

SCALE  OF  MILES 


0123      4       5 


EXPLANATION: 

Union  Work,  /V\ 

Confederate  Works  ^V^- 

LINES  OF  MARCH  PURSUED  BY 
THE  SEPARATE  ARMIES 

Army  of  the  Ohio 

"        "     Tennessee 

'<        «     Cumberland 


CAMPAIGN  OF  ATLANTA.  207 

road  and  trestle  bridges.  Hooker's  corps  was 
taken  from  the  center  and  passed  to  the  extreme 
left.  Howard  stretched  his  line  so  as  to  relieve  the 
Twenty-third  Corps  troops  on  his  right,  and  these 
were  marched  to  Hooker's  support  on  the  flank, 
together  with  Schofield's  reserve  division.  Step 
by  step  this  flank  pushed  forward,  till  near  night 
it  gained  advantages  which  threatened  the  enemy's 
rear.  Threatened  now  on  both  flanks,  with  a  river 
behind  him,  Johnston  was  again  forced  to  retreat. 
He  had  laid  a  pontoon  bridge  in  the  night  of  the 
I4th  above  the  others,  and  out  of  McPherson's 
range.  All  these  were  put  to  use  in  the  night  of 
the  1 5th,  and  next  morning  the  National  troops 
entered  the  place.  A  thousand  prisoners  and  two 
batteries  of  artillery  were  among  the  trophies,  but 
the  lists  of  Sherman's  killed  and  wounded  approxi 
mated  four  thousand.* 

The  railway  bridge  at  Resaca  had  been  burned, 
but  the  wagon  bridge  was  uninjured,  and  Sherman 
had  laid  two  pontoon  bridges  across  the  Oostanaula 
below  the  mouth  of  Snake  Creek.  He  pressed  the 
pursuit  in  several  columns,  first  sending  a  division 
of  the  Fourteenth  Corps  to  support  the  cavalry 
far  on  the  right  in  a  direct  movement  on  Rome. 
He  saw  with  unwillingness  his  long  line  of  com 
munications  growing  longer,  and  ordered  his  sub 
ordinates  to  attack  without  delay  if  Johnston  any 
where  made  a  stand,  trusting  to  his  ability  to  con 
centrate  in  time  to  make  a  success  of  any  battle 
when  once  it  was  opened.  The  country  between 
the  Oostanaula  and  the  Etowah  was  an  open  one 
compared  with  the  mountainous  region  north  of 
Resaca,  and,  though  Johnston  had  thought  of  of 
fering  battle  at  Adairsville,  about  halfway  between 
the  streams,  he  found  on  inspection  that  it  was 
too  open  a  situation,  and  continued  his  retreat  to 

*  O.  R.,  xxxviii,  pt.  4,  pp.  201,  202. 


2o8  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

Cassville,  where  he  issued  formal  orders  for  battle 
on  the  1 9th. 

Sherman's  center,  under  Thomas,  had  followed 
the  "  broad  trail  "  of  the  enemy  along  the  railroad 
to  Kingston,  where  it  turned  sharply  to  the  east. 
Schofield's  line  of  march,  four  or  five  miles  east 
ward,  led  more  nearly  in  the  direction  of  Cassville, 
and  he  was  ordered  to  move  straight  on  that  place. 
McPherson,  equally  far  away  on  the  west,  was 
called  in  to  Kingston,  while  the  center  took  roads 
which  would  meet  Schofield  in  front  of  the  enemy. 
Johnston's  position  at  Caasville  was  on  a  com 
manding  ridge  behind  the  town,  but  Polk  and 
Hood,  who  held  the  center  and  right  of  his  line, 
protested  so  vigorously  that  the  center  was  en 
filaded  by  the  artillery  of  Sherman's  left  that  John 
ston  yielded  his  opinion,  and  ordered  a  continua 
tion  of  the  retreat  across  the  Etowah,  where  the 
railway  passes  through  the  defile  of  Allatoona. 
Johnston  tells  us  that  he  never  ceased  to  regret  that 
he  did  not  give  battle  as  he  first  intended.*  Sher 
man  also  regretted  it,  for  his  policy  was  to  bring 
the  campaign  to  a  decisive  issue  as  soon  as  possible. 

Sherman  followed  the  enemy  through  Carters- 
ville  with  a  division  of  Schofield's  corps,  and  when 
the  railway  bridge  was  found  to  be  burned  he 
quickly  turned  his  columns  toward  Kingston,  and 
secured  crossings  of  the  river  above  and  below  that 
place.  The  Resaca  bridge  was  already  rebuilt,  and 
Kingston  was  made  the  field  depot  of  supplies. 
Twenty  days'  rations  were  in  the  wagons,  herds 
of  cattle  were  driven  near  the  columns,  and  the 
army  plunged  into  the  wild  and  tangled  country 
between  the  Etowah  and  the  Chattahoochee.  The 
gorge  of  Allatoona,  Kennesaw  Mountain,  and  Lost 
Mountain  made  a  group  of  strong  positions  around 
the  town  of  Marietta,  and  Johnston  planned  to 

*  O.  R.,  xxxviii,  pt.  3,  p.  616. 


CAMPAIGN   OF   ATLANTA. 


209 


make  of  them  a  new  intrenched  camp,  while  he 
would  meet  Sherman  on  advanced  lines  westward, 
near  Dallas  and  along  Pumpkin  Vine  Creek. 

On  the  25th  of  May  the  National  columns  were 
converging  on  Dallas,  intending  to  follow  the 
main  road  from  that  place  to  Marietta.  Johnston 
was  also  in  motion  for  the  same  place.  At  the 
crossing  of  the  Pumpkin  Vine  near  Owen's  Mills, 
Hooker,  who  had  the  advance  in  the  center,  found 
the  bridge  burning,  and  indications  of  a  strong 
force  on  the  road  to  New  Hope  Church.  The  fire 
was  put  out,  the  bridge  quickly  repaired,  and  his 
head  of  column  turned  in  that  direction  from  the 
Dallas  road.  It  was  Hood's  corps  of  the  Confed 
erates  which  was  going  into  position  around  the 
church  on  the  heights  east  of  the  valley.  Hooker 
made  a  headlong  attack,  but  was  met  with  a  wither 
ing  fire,  which  checked  his  advanced  division.  The 
rest  of  the  corps  went  in  to  the  support  of  their 
comrades,  but  it  was  already  late  in  the  afternoon, 
a  heavy  downpour  of  rain  delayed  the  approaching 
columns,  and  the  affair  was  limited  to  a  bloody 
combat  between  the  two  corps. 

During  the  night  Sherman  hurried  forward  his 
troops,  while  Johnston  was  doing  the  same,  and 
the  next  day  found  the  two  armies  facing  each 
other  across  a  narrow  valley  from  Dallas  north 
east  in  the  direction  of  Ackworth  on  the  railroad. 
Then  began  a  systematic  warfare  of  intrenched 
lines,  with  only  occasional  serious  efforts  at  direct 
attack,  in  which  the  assailing  party  pretty  uniformly 
got  the  worst  of  it.  Sherman  steadily  pushed  for 
ward  and  extended  his  left,  seeking  to  renew  his 
connection  with  the  railroad  at  Ackworth.  Each 
day  the  cavalry  would  feel  for  the  end  of  the  ene 
my's  line  in  the  dense  forest  and  thickets,  and  the 
infantry  would  advance  to  a  brisk  skirmishing  at 
tack,  pushing  the  Confederates  back  and  intrench 
ing  every  foot  that  was  gained.  For  six  weeks, 


210  GENERAL  SHERMAN. 

amid  the  constant  rains  of  an  unusually  wet  season, 
this  work  continued. 

On  the  27th  of  May  Howard's  corps  tried  the 
fortunes  of  a  direct  attack  upon  a  projecting  angle 
of  the  Confederate  line  near  Pickett's  Mill,  but  was 
repulsed.  On  the  28th  Johnston  sought  to  check 
the  movement  toward  the  left  by  an  attack  upon 
McPherson's  right  at  Dallas,  made  by  Hardee's 
corps.  He  in  turn  suffered  a  bloody  repulse,  and 
Sherman's  transfer  of  troops  from  right  flank  to 
left  went  steadily  on.  On  June  1st  Stoneman's 
cavalry  corps  occupied  the  Allatoona  pass,  and  the 
rebuilding  of  the  Etowah  railway  bridge  was  im 
mediately  begun.  By  the  4th  Sherman's  lines  had 
advanced  so  far  as  to  threaten  Johnston's  connec 
tion  with  Marietta,  and  the  latter  retreated  to  a  new 
line  previously  laid  out  within  the  old,  and  ex 
tending  from  Kennesaw  Mountain  west  to  Pine 
Mountain,  and  thence  south  to  Lost  Mountain. 
A  strip  of  country  several  miles  wide  was  thus  given 
up,  but  Johnston's  new  position  was  wonderfully 
strong,  and  admirably  covered  the  railroad  from 
Kennesaw  to  the  Chattahoochee. 

Sherman  now  made  Schofield's  Army  of  the 
Ohio  his  pivot  on  the  left,  and  passed  around  it 
successively  Thomas's  and  McPherson's  armies. 
McPherson  covered  the  Ackworth  station  on  the 
railroad  on  the  7th  of  June,  and  the  next  day  Gen 
eral  Frank  P.  Blair  joined  him  with  the  Seven 
teenth  Corps,  coming  from  the  north  by  the  way 
of  Rome,  the  only  considerable  re-enforcement 
Sherman  received  during  the  campaign.  A  new 
field  depot  of  supplies  was  soon  established  on  the 
railroad,  McPherson's  lines  were  advanced  close 
to  Kennesaw  on  the  north,  and  a  new  swinging 
movement  by  the  right  now  began,  Thomas  being 
the  center  as  usual,  but  Schofield  being  the  extreme 
right  and  traversing  the  outer  arc  of  the  circle. 

Day  by  day  the  sharp  combats  went  on,  mile 


CAMPAIGN    OF   ATLANTA.  211 

by  mile  the  right  flank  swung  southward,  till  the 
old  Sandtown  road  was  occupied  to  the  crossing 
of  the  highway  from  Marietta  to  Powder  Springs. 
On  the  I4th  of  June  Johnston  found  his  position 
at  Pine  Mountain  untenable,  and  in  the  last  recon- 
noissance  he  made  from  its  summit  General  Polk 
was  killed  at  his  side  by  a  camion  ball.  In  him 
Johnston  lost  not  only  a  stanch  subordinate,  but 
a  friend  who  had  been  the  peacemaker  with  Presi 
dent  Davis.  The  corps  passed  for  a  time  to  the 
command  of  General  Stephen  D.  Lee. 

In  a  day  or  two  Lost  Mountain  had  to  be  left 
to  the  Confederate  cavalry  to  defend  it,  the  infan 
try  line  not  reaching  beyond  the  Powder  Springs 
road,  and  the  flank  being  near  the  upper  waters 
of  Olley's  Creek,  which  runs  southwestward  into 
the  Chattahoochee.  These  movements  had  been 
hastened  by  the  aggressive  vigor  of  Sherman's 
troops,  pushing  from  hill  to  hill,  fording  stream 
after  stream  all  flooded  by  the  constant  rains,  get 
ting  artillery  positions  which  enfiladed  portions  of 
the  intrenchments,  and  making  rushes  for  any 
point  which  seemed  weakened.  Although  no  gen 
eral  engagement  took  place,  these  daily  combats 
often  became  considerable  affairs,  in  which  a  di 
vision  or  a  corps  was  involved. 

Hardee's  corps  was  the  left  of  Johnston's  line 
till  the  21  st,  when  the  extension  of  Sherman's  right 
threatened  to  outflank  the  position  at  the  Powder 
Springs  road,  and  Johnston  ordered  Hood  to 
march  his  corps  in  the  night  from  the  extreme  right 
to  the  left.  In  the  morning  of  the  22d  Hooker's 
corps  was  extending  the  right  of  Thomas's  army 
southward,  and  Schofield,  passing  still  farther  be 
yond,  planted  his  right  at  Cheney's  house,  where 
the  old  Sandtown  road  crossed  that  running  from 
Marietta  to  Powder  Springs.  In  the  afternoon, 
without  orders  from  Johnston,  Hood  made  an  im 
petuous  attack  with  his  whole  corps  upon  the  right 


212  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

of  Hooker  and  left  of  Schofield  at  Gulp's  farm,  on 
the  ridge  between  Noyes's  (commonly  called 
Nose's)  Creek  and  Olley's.  The  vigor  and  per 
sistence  of  the  attack  seemed  to  indicate  that  John 
ston  was  taking  the  aggressive  with  his  whole 
army,  but  it  was  not  followed  up  by  any  other  than 
Hood's  troops,  which  were  repulsed  with  heavy 
loss. 

Sherman  had  hoped  to  advance  his  left  wing 
when  his  adversary  stretched  so  far  in  the  opposite 
direction,  but  the  enemy's  positions  on  Kennesaw 
Mountain  and  Brush  Mountain  were  so  strong  that 
a  small  force  could  hold  them,  and  Johnston  seemed 
able  to  keep  pace  with  the  National  army  in  stretch 
ing  to  the  southwest.  He  had  received  consider 
able  re-enforcements,  and  the  Georgia  militia  had 
been  called  out  and  were  joining  him;  but  Sher 
man  still  felt  himself  superior  in  force,  and  sure 
that  the  enemy  must  be  drawn  out  in  a  very  thin 
line  without  reserves.  The  truth  was  that  the  least 
assailable  parts  of  Johnston's  fieldworks  were  held 
with  strong  skirmish  lines,  'while  reserves  were 
made  of  the  troops  thus  saved,  and  these  were 
placed  at  central  positions  in  support,  so  that  they 
could  be  quickly  hurried  to  any  point  which  might 
be  attacked.  It  had  seemed  to  Sherman,  there 
fore,  that  by  combined  attacks  along  the  line  he 
ought  to  be  able  to  find  the  weak  points  and  break 
through.  He  chafed  at  the  growing  unwillingness 
to  assault,  knowing  that  it  is  when  one's  adversary 
is  broken  that  the  advantages  are  obtained  which 
pay  for  the  losses  in  the  attack.  He  had  steadily 
kept  in  mind  that  the  Confederate  army  was  his 
principal  objective,  and  was  not  content  with  the 
prospect  of  following  it  up  in  slow  and  indefinite 
retreat.  In  deference,  however,  to  the  opinions  of 
his  subordinates,  he  had  arranged  to  transfer  Mc- 
Pherson's  army  from  the  left  to  the  extreme  right, 
so  as  still  more  to  threaten  Johnston's  connection 


CAMPAIGN   OF   ATLANTA.  213 

with  Atlanta  and  force  him  to  retreat.  This  in 
volved  the  accumulation  of  supplies  enough  to  leave 
the  railroad  temporarily,  as  he  had  done  at  Dalton 
and  at  the  Etowah,  but  the  persistent  rains  had 
foundered  the  whole  country,  and  the  wagon  trains 
could  hardly  supply  the  troops  in  their  present 
camps.  Such  a  deadlock  was  intolerable,  and  he 
reverted  to  the  plan  of  a  direct  assault  of  John 
ston's  lines. 

Orders  were  issued  for  an  attack  on  points  to 
be  selected  by  army  commanders,  one  from  Mc- 
Pherson's  front  and  two  from  Thomas's.  Schofield 
was  to  make  a  demonstration  with  his  left,  while 
his  right  made  an  effort  to  find  a  way  to  turn  the 
enemy's  extreme  flank.  The  tactics  of  the  assaults 
were  left  to  the  corps  commanders.  On  Monday, 
June  27th,  the  advance  was  made  with  splendid 
courage  by  the  brigades  detailed  for  the  purpose, 
who  pushed  their  way  through  the  abattis  close  to 
the  enemy's  parapets,  and,  though  they  were  not 
able  to  break  through,  they  held  the  ground  they 
gained,  and  did  not  allow  a  head  to  show  itself 
above  the  breastworks.  Sherman  thought  that  a 
second  line  charging  over  the  first  would  have  en 
tered  the  works,  and  this  was  the  opinion  of  some 
of  the  best  officers  who  took  part  in  the  attack ; 
but  it  was  not  done,  and  the  brave  men  in  the  ad 
vance  made  cover  for  themselves  where  they  lay, 
and  their  positions  were  connected  with  the  lines 
on  right  and  left. 

From  the  right  Schofield  had  advanced  one  of 
his  divisions  over  Olley's  Creek,  had  carried  an 
intrenched  hill  held  by  the  Confederate  cavalry, 
and  seized  a  strong  position  commanding  the 
Nickajack  Valley,  where  the  direct  highway  from 
Marietta  joins  the  Sandtown  road.  From  this  po 
sition  the  topography  showed  that  Johnston's  left 
could  not  be  easily  extended  in  that  direction,  and 
that  a  promising  flanking  movement  there  would 


214 


GENERAL   SHERMAN. 


be  a  much  shorter  one  than  had  been  supposed. 
Sherman  acted  upon  it  at  once.  Hooker's  line  was 
stretched  so  as  to  relieve  part  of  Schofield's  corps, 
and  the  whole  of  this  was  used  to  make  strong  the 
new  position  on  the  flank.  Johnston  saw  that  the 
time  had  come  to  let  go  his  hold  on  Kennesaw,  and 
had  marked  out  new  lines  beyond  the  Nickajack. 
Into  these  he  marched  on  the  night  of  the  2d  of 
July,  while  McPherson  was  transferring  the  Army 
of  the  Tennessee  to  Schofield's  right.  The  attack 
upon  Kennesaw  had  cost  Sherman  twenty-five  hun 
dred  casualties,  a  much  larger  number  than  the 
enemy  had  suffered,  sheltered  as  they  were  behind 
strong  works,  but  the  general  result  had  been  the 
retreat  of  Johnston's  army,  and  the  moral  effect 
on  the  National  forces  was  that  of  victory.  Sher 
man  had  shown  that  he  was  not  discouraged  at 
any  obstacles,  but  that  on  being  checked  in  one 
direction  he  would  find  a  way  to  his  object  in  an 
other. 

On  the  4th  of  July  McPherson's  advance  drove 
the  enemy  from  a  line  of  rifle  pits  on  the  Sandtown 
road,  Thomas's  columns  pushed  through  Marietta 
along  the  railroad,  and  Johnston  retired  within  his 
new  line  of  works,  carefully  prepared  to  cover  the 
crossing  of  the  Chattahoochee  River.  These  in- 
trenchments  began  at  the  river  about  a  mile  above 
the  railway  bridge,  and  followed  the  trend  of  the 
heights  bordering  the  stream,  continued  about  six 
miles  to  the  southwestward,  the  lower  part  being 
along  the  Nickajack  Creek,  which  for  the  last  two 
or  three  miles  of  its  course  is  nearly  parallel  to  the 
Chattahoochee.  Within  this  line  was  a  shorter 
one,  a  bridge-head  covering  the  peninsula  at  the 
crossing,  and  protecting  the  transfer  of  the  army 
to  the  south  side  whenever  it  should  become  neces 
sary. 

These  works  were  too  formidable  for  a  direct 
assault;  their  extension  along  the  river  toward 


CAMPAIGN   OF   ATLANTA.  215 

Sandtown  would  make  difficult  any  attempt  to  turn 
them  on  that  side,  involving  the  uncovering  of  the 
railway  line  and  long  journeys  of  wagon  trains. 
After  careful  reconnoitering,  Sherman  decided  to 
make  his  crossing  by  his  left,  but  kept  up  lively 
cavalry  demonstrations  on  both  flanks  of  his  army 
to  hide  his  purpose.  On  the  7th  of  July  the  rail 
way  had  been  repaired,  so  that  supplies  were  deliv 
ered  at  the  army  lines,  Schofield's  corps  was  at 
Smyrna  camp  ground,  and  he  had  selected  the 
mouth  of  Soap  Creek,  about  six  miles  above  the 
railway  bridge,  as  a  favorable  place  to  force  the 
passage  of  the  river.  The  next  day  the  enemy's 
outpost  there  was  surprised,  two  pontoon  bridges 
were  laid  before  night,  and  Schofield  held  the  hills 
beyond  in  force.  In  the  night  of  the  Qth  Johnston 
retreated  across  the  river  and  burned  the  railway 
bridge,  taking  up  a  line  along  Peach  Tree  Creek 
to  cover  Atlanta. 

Some  days  were  now  used  in  getting  up  sup 
plies  and  loading  wagon  trains  for  another  sepa 
ration  from  the  railway.  Schofield  was  re-enforced 
by  Howard's  corps,  McPherson  took  position  at 
Roswell,  some  ten  miles  farther  up  stream,  while 
threats  of  crossing  below,  near  Sandtown,  were 
also  kept  up.  On  the  I7th  of  July  everything  was 
ready  for  the  advance  by  Sherman,  when  the  Con 
federate  commander  was  more  grievously  sur 
prised  than  by  the  crossing  of  the  Chattahoochee. 
He  received  telegraphic  orders  to  turn  over  the 
command  of  his  army  to  General  John  B.  Hood. 
Dissatisfaction  with  his  defensive  policy  and  con 
tinued  retreat  was  the  reason  assigned.  Hood  was 
known  as  a  sharp  critic  of  his  commander's  meth 
ods,  and  was  himself  regarded  as  a  type  of  aggres 
sive  generalship.  General  Cheatham  took  Hood's 
corps,  and  General  A.  P.  Stewart  succeeded  S.  D. 
Lee  in  command  of  Polk's. 

Johnston  had  himself  planned  to  take  the  ag- 
15 


2i6  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

gressive  as  soon  as  Sherman  should  advance  south 
of  the  river,  and  gave  Hood  the  benefit  of  his  in 
formation  and  purposes.  These  were,  in  substance, 
adopted  by  the  latter.  On  the  i8th  Sherman's  col 
umns  advanced.  Thomas  had  laid  a  pontoon 
bridge  at  Pace's  Ferry,  only  two  or  three  miles 
above  the  railway  bridge,  and  Schofield  replaced 
his  canvas  pontoons  with  a  wooden  trestle.  The 
whole  army  was  to  execute  a  wheel  to  the  right  on 
Palmer's  corps  of  the  Cumberland  army,  Hooker's 
keeping  touch  with  his  right,  Howard's  marching 
on  Buckhead,  Schofield  passing  through  Cross 
Keys  toward  Decatur,  and  McPherson  taking  the 
still  longer  circuit  toward  Stone  Mountain  and  the 
Augusta  railroad,  which  he  cut  before  evening. 

On  the  iQth  the  wheeling  movement  continued, 
Thomas  getting  the  heads  of  each  of  his  three  corps 
across  Peach  Tree  Creek,  with  a  stubborn  opposi 
tion  which  indicated  that  the  enemy's  position  was 
not  far  away.  The  movement  had  opened  a  con 
siderable  gap  between  Sherman's  wings.  Hood 
ordered  Cheatham  to  hold  fast  a  salient  in  this  in 
terval,  near  Jones's  Mill,  on  Clear  Creek,  and  his 
other  two  corps  to  attack  Thomas's  army  obliquely 
on  its  left  flank.  Schofield's  march  that  day  brought 
him  over  the  south  fork  of  Peach  Tree,  about  two 
miles  from  Decatur,  and  one  of  McPherson's  corps 
(Dodge's)  connected  with  his  left.  Wheeler's  cav 
alry  had  tried  in  vain  to  check  their  advance. 

On  the  2Oth  Sherman  continued  the  movement 
of  his  left  wing,  threatening  Cheatham's  flank,  and 
the  whole  Confederate  army  had  to  take  ground 
to  the  right.  The  attack  which  Hood  had  ordered 
for  one  o'clock  was  thus  delayed,  but  soon  after 
three  it  fell  with  great  fury  on  the  left  of  one  of 
Howard's  divisions,  and  progressed  along  the  front 
of  this  and  Hooker's  divisions  in  succession.  The 
battle  was  persistently  renewed  and  stubbornly 
continued  till  nightfall,  but  Thomas's  men  held 


CAMPAIGN   OF    ATLANTA. 

their  ground  and  repulsed  Hood  with  great  loss 
to  him.  Meanwhile  Sherman  was  hurrying  forward 
Schofield  and  McPherson,  and  they  were  rattling 
Wheeler's  cavalry  back  beyond  Cheatham's  flank 
so  fast  that,  although  the  latter  was  stretched  al 
most  to  the  breaking  point,  he  could  not  reach  far 
enough  to  check  the  National  troops,  and  Hood 
was  forced  to  order  away  a  division  from  Hardee 
to  support  the  cavalry  and  hold  the  commanding 
hills  at  the  very  gates  of  Atlanta. 

The  engagement  on  the  Confederate  side  was 
a  general  one,  intended  by  Hood  as  a  decisive  ef 
fort  to  drive  Sherman  back,  and  it  had  failed  with 
a  loss  to  the  Confederates  of  five  or  six  thousand 
men.  As  usual,  the  attacking  columns  suffered 
most,  and  Sherman's  casualties  did  not  exceed  two 
thousand,  of  which  by  far  the  greater  part  was  in 
Hooker's  corps. 

On  the  2  ist  Sherman  closed  in  upon  the  ene 
my's  positions  in  front  of  Thomas  and  Schofield, 
while  he  brought  forward  McPherson's  men  on 
the  left.  Blair's  corps  carried  a  bald  hill,  which 
was  the  extreme  right  of  the  Confederate  line  south 
of  the  Augusta  Railway,  and  intrenched  it.  Gar- 
rard's  cavalry  was  sent  to  destroy  this  railway  more 
thoroughly  for  some  distance  eastward,  as  there 
were  constant  rumors  of  re-enforcements  coming 
to  Hood  that  way. 

Hood  retired  within  the  fortifications  of  Atlanta 
in  the  night,  sending  Hardee's  corps  through  the 
city  and  out  by  roads  leading  to  the  southeast  to 
turn  and  attack  McPherson  in  flank  and  rear. 
Cheatham's  corps  he  held  ready  to  attack  McPher 
son  from  the  city  side  when  Hardee's  battle  should 
be  joined.  Stewart's  corps,  with  the  Georgia  mili 
tia,  held  and  strengthened  the  works  on  the  north 
east  and  north  of  the  place. 

In  the  early  morning  of  the  22d  of  July  the 
National  army  advanced  in  line  over  the  abandoned 


2i8  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

trenches  and  occupied  the  nearest  hills  facing  the 
town.  Thomas's  right  reached  the  Chattanooga 
Railway,  and  covered  the  steps  immediately  taken 
to  rebuild  the  great  Chattahoochee  bridge.  Scho- 
field  continued  the  line  southward  to  the  Howard 
house,  near  the  Augusta  Railway,  and  with  him 
was  Sherman,  who  reconnoitered  close  to  the  town 
till  he  and  his  staff  drew  the  fire  of  the  place.  Mc- 
Pherson  put  in  Logan's  corps  to  extend  the  invest 
ment  and  to  connect  with  Blair  at  Bald  Hill,  and 
Blair's  corps  completed  the  line,  recurving  it  a 
little  where  it  looked  down  into  the  hollow  of  En 
trenchment  Creek.  Dodge's  corps  was  marching 
from  Decatur. 

Hardee  made  his  march  as  appointed,  passed 
completely  behind  McPherson's  two  corps,  then 
faced  northwest,  and  marched  to  the  attack,  the 
temporary  absence  of  our  cavalry  giving  the  ad 
vantage  of  a  surprise.  Dodge's  march,  however, 
had  brought  him  opposite  Hardee's  right,  and, 
facing  southward  quickly,  he  met  and  repulsed  that 
wing  of  the  enemy.  McPherson  was  with  him, 
and,  galloping  across  toward  Blair's  position,  he 
ran  into  the  enemy's  skirmishers  pushing  into  the 
gap,  and  was  shot  down  and  killed.  Hardee's  left 
advanced  behind  Blair's  flank  too  quickly  for  any 
change  of  position,  and  our  men  leaped  the  breast 
works  and  fought  desperately  from  the  other  side. 
For  two  or  three  hours,  beginning  at  noon,  the 
fierce  conflict  continued  in  the  tangled  dense  forest, 
but  Hardee  was  held  at  bay  and  then  repulsed. 

The  roar  of  the  musketry  had  hardly  told  Sher 
man  at  the  Howard  house  that  his  left  was  assaulted 
when  he  got  the  bad  news  of  McPherson's  fall. 
His  remarkable  quality  of  growing  more  composed 
in  peril  now  came  out  in  a  very  marked  way.  With 
serenest  quietness  and  clearness  he  sent  his  orders 
and  suggestions  to  Logan,  who  succeeded  next  in 
rank  to  McPherson,  telling  him  what  steps  would 


MAP  No.  II 

ATLANTA   CAMPAIGN 

SCALE  OF  MILES 


EXPLANATION: 

Union  WorTcs  /^^\ 

10         Confederate  Works    ^V\ 

LINES  OF  MARCH  PURSUED  BY 
THE  SEPARATE  ARMIES 

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CAMPAIGN   OF   ATLANTA. 


2I9 


be  taken  to  support  him  and  of  his  confidence  that 
he  would  make  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  victori 
ous.  A  division  of  Schofield's  was  ordered  to  re- 
enforce  Logan,  part  of  it  going  to  cover  and  pro 
tect  the  army  trains.  Schofield's  line  was  thinned 
out  to  fill  the  gaps  thus  made  in  it,  and  Thomas 
was  directed  to  seize  any  opportunity  to  turn  the 
tables  on  the  enemy's  left. 

About  three  o'clock  Hood  sent  Cheatham's 
corps  forward  to  strike  Blair's  and  Logan's  corps 
in  rear  as  they  were  engaged  with  Hardee  in  front. 
He  was  a  little  too  late.  Hardee  had  been  beaten 
off,  and  the  invincible  troops  in  the  trenches  leaped 
back  to  the  other  side  and  met  Cheatham  as  they 
had  met  Hardee.  A  momentary  break  occurred  at 
the  railroad,  but  Sherman  was  looking  down  upon 
the  spot  from  the  Howard  house,  and,  calling  for 
Schofield's  artillery  to  mass  there,  he  personally 
directed  an  overwhelming  fire  of  canister,  which 
drove  back  the  assailants  and  enabled  Logan  to 
restore  his  line.  Before  nightfall  Hardee  retired, 
and  Hood's  decimated  corps  were  withdrawn  into 
the  city.  The  second  costly  effort  to  take  the  ag 
gressive  had  failed.  The  penalty  was  a  casualty 
list  of  ten  thousand  for  Hood,  of  which  over  three 
thousand  were  killed  and  two  thousand  were  pris 
oners.  On  the  National  side  the  loss  was  thirty- 
five  hundred  killed,  wounded,  and  missing.*  A 
great  part  of  the  enemy's  loss  was  verified  by 
Logan's  formal  delivery  of  the  dead  under  a  flag 
of  truce. 

As  it  became  evident  that  Hood  meant  to  hold 
fast  at  Atlanta,  considerations  of  protecting  the 
line  of  communications  with  the  rear,  and  reach 
ing  by  shortest  direction  the  railways  southwest 
of  the  place,  determined  Sherman  to  extend  his 
line  by  the  right  rather  than  the  left.  The  Augusta 

*  O.  R.,  xxxviii,  pt.  3,  p.  21. 


220  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

Railroad  was  broken  up  for  thirty  miles  eastward, 
and  the  cavalry  on  both  flanks  were  set  to  work 
to  reach  the  railways  beyond  the  city.  General 
Howard  had  succeeded  McPherson  in  command 
of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  and  was  ordered  to 
transfer  it  to  the  extreme  right.  The  three  corps 
passed  behind  the  rest  of  the  army  on  the  27th, 
coming  successively  into  line  on  the  extension 
around  the  city  of  the  works  of  the  Cumberland 
army.  Schofield  was  ordered  to  stretch  the  Army 
of  the  Ohio  so  as  to  make  a  show  of  holding  the 
ground  to  the  Decatur  road  and  the  battlefield  of 
the  22d.  Anticipating  such  a  movement,  Hood's 
engineers  were  already  laying  out  a  new  defensive 
line,  leaving  the  old  at  a  salient  in  the  western 
suburbs  of  the  city  on  the  Lickskillet  road,  and 
running  thence  southwest,  parallel  to  the  Atlanta 
and  Western  Railway,  and  about  a  mile  from  it. 
The  intention  of  this  was,  of  course,  to  protect 
the  railroads  and  prevent  the  complete  investment 
of  the  place. 

Howard's  movement  was  not  completed  on  the 
27th,  but  next  morning  it  was  still  in  progress,  and 
Logan's  corps  was  just  reaching  the  crossroads  at 
Ezra  Church  when  it  was  violently  attacked.  Hood 
had  sent  General  S.  D.  Lee  (now  the  commandant 
of  Hood's  own  corps)  with  his  own  and  part  of 
Stewart's  corps  to  make  another  fierce  effort  to 
roll  back  the  flank  of  the  National  army.  The 
battle  lasted  through  the  afternoon,  but  Logan 
held  his  position  without  difficulty,  and  Howard's 
artillery  and  reserves  completed  the  bloody  repulse 
of  the  enemy.  Toward  sunset  the  discouragement 
of  the  Confederate  troops  was  such  that  regiments 
doggedly  refused  to  follow  their  officers  in  the 
hopeless  and  destructive  charges.  Sherman  and 
Howard  were  both  on  the  ground,  and  the  com 
mander  had  planned  a  return  blow  on  the  flanks 
of  the  disheartened  enemy,  but  the  detached  troops 


CAMPAIGN   OF   ATLANTA.  221 

missed  the  road  and  did  not  arrive.  Again  Hood 
had  lost  more  than  five  thousand  men,  while  How 
ard's  casualties  were  less  than  six  hundred.  The 
Union  troops  were  grimly  exultant  at  the  outcome 
of  the  change  of  tactics  by  the  enemy,  and  proud 
of  the  ability  shown  by  Sherman  in  forcing  the 
abandonment  of  position  after  position  with  losses 
that  had  been  small  in  comparison.  Jefferson 
Davis  began  to  doubt  the  wisdom  of  his  change  of 
Johnston  for  Hood,  and  telegraphed,  "  The  loss 
consequent  upon  attacking  him  (Sherman)  in  his 
intrenchments  requires  you  to  avoid  that  if  prac 
ticable."  * 

The  cavalry  expeditions  had  disappointed  Sher 
man,  and  the  infantry  operations,  patiently  and 
persistently  pushed  forward,  were  his  sole  reliance. 
Schofield's  corps  was  transferred  from  left  to  right, 
Howard's  recurved  right  flank  was  swung  forward, 
and  on  the  new  line  Schofield  reached  the  north 
fork  of  Utoy  Creek.  Sherman  thought  that  two 
corps  operating  as  a  unit  might  seize  the  railroad, 
and  directed  Palmer  to  report  to  Schofield  for  tlr's 
purpose.  Palmer  disputed  Schofield's  seniority  in 
rank,  and,  when  Sherman  decided  against  him,  de 
manded  leave  to  retire  from  the  army.  The  at 
tempted  movement  was  balked  in  consequence,  the 
enemy  had  time  to  intrench  an  advanced  line  on 
the  Sandtown  road,  and  one  of  Schofield's  brigades 
lost  three  hundred  men  in  a  forced  reconnoissance 
of  the  new  position  on  the  6th  of  August. 

Sherman  now  realized,  as  at  Marietta,  that  the 
stretching  of  his  lines  had  gone  about  as  far  as  it 
could.  A  fortnight  was  spent  in  rectifying  posi 
tions,  pushing  back  Hood's  outposts,  and  bring 
ing  our  trenches  as  close  as  possible  to  the  forti 
fications  of  the  place.  Provisions  were  accumu 
lated  in  the  camps,  and  everything  indicated  prepa- 


*  O.  R.,  xxxviii,  pt.  5,  p.  946. 


222  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

ration  for  some  decisive  movement.  For  several 
days  the  place  was  cannonaded  with  heavy  guns. 
Schofield  cautiously  but  steadily  advanced  his 
flanking  division  to  the  crossing  of  the  Campbell- 
town  and  East  Point  roads,  and  on  the  i8th  pushed 
it  three  quarters  of  a  mile  still  farther  forward  to 
ward  East  Point,  where  it  intrenched  in  a  half 
circle,  and  became,  a  week  later,  the  pivot  on 
which  the  army  was  swung  to  the  south  of  At 
lanta. 

Hood's  cavalry  under  Wheeler  was  operating 
on  Sherman's  communications  in  northern 
Georgia,  annoying  small  posts  and  making  mo 
mentary  breaks  in  the  railroad ;  but  Wheeler  now 
marched  into  East  Tennessee,  and  his  absence 
gave  Sherman  the  desired  opportunity  to  move 
with  some  secrecy.  Hooker's  corps  (now  under 
General  Slocum)  was  marched  into  works  covering 
the  Chattahoochee  railway  bridge  on  the  night  of 
the  25th,  and  the  rest  of  the  army  swung  in  a  great 
wheeling  march  behind  Schofield  toward  Jones- 
boro.  Hood  thought  Wheeler  had  seriously  broken 
our  communications,  and  that  want  of  food  was 
forcing  Sherman  to  retreat  by  way  of  Sandtown. 
He  persisted  in  this  illusion  till  the  3Oth,  when, 
instead  of  making  an  attack  on  Schofield's  corps, 
which  was  that  day  three  miles  from  any  supports, 
he  hurried  off  Hardee  with  his  and  Lee's  corps  to 
Jonesboro,  and  ordered  an  attack  there  upon  the 
outer  flank  of  Sherman's  army. 

On  that  day  Howard  had  got  Logan's  corps 
over  Flint  River  after  a  sharp  affair  with  the  Con 
federate  outposts,  and  it  was  intrenched  on  the  high 
ground  between  the  river  and  the  railroad.  The 
other  two  corps  under  Howard  were  in  support 
on  right  and  left,  having  bridges  over  the  river. 
On  the  3  ist  Hardee's  troops  had  assembled  at 
Jonesboro  and  marched  against  Howard.  Lee's 
corps  had  the  brunt  of  the  attack  and  Logan's  of 


CAMPAIGN    OF   ATLANTA. 


223 


the  defense,  and  the  Confederates  were  repulsed, 
leaving  four  hundred  dead  upon  the  field,  and  hav 
ing  probably  two  thousand  wounded.  Sherman 
was  marching  with  Thomas's  columns,  and  did 
not  get  the  news  of  the  enemy's  being  in  force  at 
Jonesboro  till  late  in  the  afternoon. 

Schofield  had  been  pushing  the  left  flank  of 
the  army  forward  that  day  toward  Rough  and 
Ready  station  on  the  railway  by  the  road  through 
Morrow's  Mills,  and  carried  an  intrenched  posi 
tion  a  little  south  of  the  station  in  a  sharp  combat. 
Thinking  Atlanta  was  now  to  be  attacked  from  the 
south,  Hood  ordered  Lee's  corps  to  march  back 
from  Jonesboro  that  night.  As  two  corps  were 
known  to  be  in  Jonesboro  at  nightfall,  the  strange 
recall  of  Lee  was  not  foreseen,  and  Sherman  bent 
all  his  efforts  to  concentrate  upon  them.  Hood's 
movements  of  Lee's  and  Stewart's  corps  in  the 
night  and  next  day  were  thus  unknown,  and  it 
was  not  till  Sherman  joined  Howard  in  the  after 
noon  of  the  ist  of  September  that  the  mysterious 
disappearance  of  Lee's  corps  was  learned.  Then 
he  pressed  everything  to  envelop  and  destroy 
Hardee,  who  was  isolated.  Thomas's  Fourteenth 
Corps  (now  under  General  J.  C.  Davis)  was  first 
up,  and  made  a  brilliant  attack  about  sunset,  carry 
ing  a  salient  of  the  enemy's  works,  killing  over 
three  hundred  and  capturing  nearly  two  thousand, 
including  the  wounded  prisoners.  The  National 
loss  was  one  thousand. 

Getting  better  knowledge  in  the  course  of  the 
day,  Hood  halted  Lee's  corps  between  Jonesboro 
and  Atlanta  to  cover  the  evacuation  of  the  city 
and  the  concentration  at  Lovejoy's  station  on  the 
Macon  road,  which  he  had  now  determined  on. 
His  trains  of  ordnance  stores  and  supplies  were  de 
stroyed,  and,  marching  hard,  he  passed  to  the  east 
ward  of  Sherman's  army  in  the  night  and  reunited 
with  Hardee  at  Lovejoy's  on  the  2d  of  Septem- 


224  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

ber.  His  curious  changes  of  purpose  which  grew 
out  of  his  misconception  of  Sherman's  movements 
had  served  him  better  than  any  ruse,  and  the  time 
necessarily  lost  by  Sherman  in  trying  to  find  out 
what  his  adversary  was  about  had  finally  enabled 
the  latter  to  make  his  hasty  retreat  beyond  Jones- 
boro. 

The  explosions  of  the  ammunition  in  the  night 
had  been  heard  by  Slocum  as  well  as  Sherman, 
and  the  Twentieth  Corps,  approaching  the  city 
from  the  north,  was  met  by  the  mayor,  who  sur 
rendered  Atlanta  to  him  in  form.  Sherman  fol 
lowed  Hood  to  Lovejoy's  station,  and  recon- 
noitered  the  position  there.  The  task  which  had 
been  definitely  allotted  him  was  accomplished  by 
the  capture  of  Atlanta  and  the  disjointing  of  the 
Southern  system  of  railway  connections,  and  he 
felt  the  need  of  mature  study  of  a  new  campaign 
and  of  full  understanding  with  General  Grant  in 
regard  to  it.  He  therefore  determined  to  give  his 
army  a  little  rest,  and  concentrated  his  forces  about 
Atlanta — the  Cumberland  army  in  the  fortifications 
of  the  city,  that  of  the  Tennessee  about  East  Point, 
and  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  at  Decatur.  His  success 
was  hailed  with  popular  exultation  throughout  the 
North,  and  Congress  vied  with  the  President  and 
the  general  in  chief  in  thanks  and  congratulations 
to  Sherman  and  his  army. 


" 


&-<} 


i-S 


•J&^Z-e,    <Z+ 


CHAPTER  X. 

CAMPAIGN     OF     OCTOBER. — DEVELOPMENT     OF     THE 
MARCH   TO   THE  SEA. 

THE  undisguised  discouragement  of  the  Con 
federate  officers  and  men  was  the  best  evidence  of 
the  importance  of  Sherman's  success.  Hood  tele 
graphed  that  his  army  was  no  longer  equal  to  of 
fensive  operations  against  his  opponent,  and  that 
strong  re-enforcements  were  necessary  to  prevent 
the  country  from  being  overrun.  Hardee,  tem 
porarily  separated  from  his  chief,  sent  similar  ill 
tidings  to  the  Confederate  President,  saying, 
"  Never,  in  my  opinion,  was  our  liberty  in  such 
danger."  *  After  the  first  reaction,  Hood  tried  to 
minimize  the  results  of  his  own  errors,  and  re 
curred  to  his  unfortunate  habit  of  seeking  scape 
goats  to  bear  the  blame ;  but  the  fact  was  apparent 
that  a  great  campaign  was  lost,  and  the  future  was 
lowering  with  storm  clouds.  Davis  explained  with 
patient  dignity  that  the  resources  of  the  Confed 
eracy  offered  little  prospect  of  re-enforcement  ex 
cept  by  stringent  measures  to  bring  absentees  back 
to  the  ranks,  f  Hardee  had  for  some  time  been 
urgent  to  be  relieved  from  service  under  Hood, 
but  Davis  had  begged  him  to  waive  his  objec 
tions.  Now,  however,  the  effort  of  Hood  to  hold 
Hardee  responsible  for  defeat  forced  the  issue,  and 
Davis  reluctantly  assigned  the  latter  to  the  De 
partment  of  the  Carolina  and  Georgia  Coast.  J 

Sherman  was  no  sooner  in  position  at  Atlanta 

*  O.  R.,  xxxviii,  pt.  5,  pp.  1016,  1018.  f  Id.,  p.  1021. 

J  Id.,  xxxix,  pt   2,  pp.  832,  880. 

225 


226  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

than  he  opened  with  General  Grant  the  discussion 
of  the  next  campaign.  At  the  beginning  of  the 
one  just  closed  Grant  had  sent  him  a  map  marked 
to  indicate  graphically  his  plans.  On  it  Atlanta 
was  Sherman's  first  local  objective,  and  the  tak 
ing  of  Wilmington,  N.  C,  Savannah,  Ga.,  and  Mo 
bile,  Ala.,  were  indicated  as  the  establishment  of 
bases  from  which  operations  might  be  conducted 
auxiliary  to  Grant's  own  when  Richmond  should 
be  taken,  and  to  Sherman's  after  he  should  reach 
Atlanta.  While  it  was  perfectly  true  that  the  great 
Confederate  armies  were  the  primary  aim  and  ob 
jective,  the  conditions  of  an  insurrectionary  war 
made  territorial  occupation  of  much  greater  im 
portance  than  in  a  war  between  independent  na 
tions.  Crushing  a  rebellion  is,  in  fact,  a  war  of 
territorial  conquest.  To  separate  the  rebellious 
States,  to  cut  their  communications,  to  reduce  the 
limits  from  which  supplies  for  their  armies  must 
be  drawn,  was  upon  land  quite  as  important  as  the 
blockade  by  sea.  To  eliminate  Georgia  and  the 
Gulf  States  from  the  direct  rule  of  the  Confederacy 
and  from  its  sources  of  supply  was  to  kill  the  re 
bellion.  The  Confederate  Government  had  ex 
plicitly  recognized  this  in  pointing  out  to  John 
ston  at  the  beginning  of  the  year  the  vital  impor 
tance  of  carrying  the  war  into  Tennessee.  To  lose 
it  and  Georgia  was,  Davis  said,  to  lose  the  fields 
from  which  the  rations  of  their  armies  came.* 

Sherman's  part  in  the  programme  was  com 
pleted  far  in  advance  of  any  other.  Grant  had 
not  taken  Richmond,  and  neither  Wilmington,  Sa 
vannah,  nor  Mobile  were  in  our  hands.  As  Grant 
wrote  to  Halleck  on  October  4th,  "  When  this 
campaign  was  commenced  nothing  else  was  in 
contemplation  but  that  Sherman,  after  capturing 
Atlanta,  should  connect  with  Canby  at  Mobile."! 

*  O.  R.,  xxxi,  pt.  3,  p.  857.          f  Id-»  xxxix,  pt.  3,  p.  63. 


CAMPAIGN    OF   OCTOBER.  22/ 

It  had  been  assumed  as  a  precedent  condition  of 
Sherman's  further  advance  that  he  should  have  an 
assured  new  base  of  supplies,  either  upon  the  Gulf 
or  on  the  Atlantic.  What  should  be  done  now 
that  neither  was  provided  ? 

On  the  loth  of  September  Sherman  wrote  to 
Grant  succinctly  analyzing  the  situation.  Forrest's 
cavalry  was  breaking  the  railroad  in  Tennessee, 
and  Wheeler's  cavalry  was  not  yet  disposed  of. 
He  could  not  depend  on  the  railroad  for  operations 
further  in  advance.  He  could  march  to  Milledge- 
ville  and  compel  Hood  to  give  up  Augusta  or 
Macon.  But  this  would  be  by  abandoning  his 
communications.  He  could  live  on  the  country  in 
marching,  but  when  he  halted  he  would  starve.  If 
Grant  couM  secure  the  Savannah  River  as  far  up 
from  the  ocean  as  Augusta,  or  the  Chattahoochee 
as  far  from  the  Gulf  as  Columbus,  he  would  sweep 
the  whole  State  of  Georgia,  but  otherwise  his  whole 
army  would  be  imperiled  for  want  of  food  by 
going  far  from  Atlanta.*  The  essence  of  the  prob 
lem  could  not  be  better  put. 

Grant  replied  that  he  saw  plainly  the  difficulty, 
and  the  misfortune  it  was  that  the  collateral  parts 
of  his  general  plan  had  been  unavoidably  delayed. 
He  could  not  see  what  Sherman  was  to  do,  and 
could  only  trust  to  his  fertility  of  resource.  He 
hoped  by  the  5th  of  October  Mobile  or  Savannah 
would  afford  the  necessary  new  base.f  On  the 
2Oth  of  September  Sherman  restated  the  problem 
at  greater  length,  indicating  his  preference  for  a 
march  eastward  if  Savannah  were  first  reduced. 
"  It  once  in  our  possession,"  he  said,  "  and  the 
river  open  to  us,  I  would  not  hesitate  to  cross  the 
State  of  Georgia  with  sixty  thousand  men,  haul 
ing  some  stores,  and  depending  on  the  country  for 
the  balance.  .  .  .  The  possession  of  the  Savannah 

*  O.  R  ,  xxxix,  pt.  2,  p.  355.  f  Id.,  p.  364. 


228  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

River  is  more  than  fatal  to  the  possibility  of  a 
Southern  independence :  they  may  stand  the  fall  of 
Richmond,  but  not  of  all  Georgia."  *  The  march  to 
the  sea  was  taking  definite  shape  in  his  mind,  but 
as  yet  the  reduction  of  Savannah  was  a  condition 
precedent.  It  was  assumed  by  both  generals  that 
Hood  would  be  drawn  by  necessity  into  an  effort  to 
obstruct  the  movement  or  to  follow  it.  But  the 
problem  was  soon  to  take  a  new  shape,  the  ex 
treme  peril  of  the  Confederacy  giving  birth  to  a 
new  and  desperate  effort.  First,  however,  Sher 
man  had  to  dispose  of  some  subordinate  matters. 

In  whatever  direction  he  might  make  his  next 
movement  from  Atlanta,  that  place  must  be  made 
a  fortified  depot,  in  which  supplies  could  be  ac 
cumulated  as  was  done  at  Nashville  and  Chatta 
nooga,  making  the  army  secure  as  to  its  rations  in 
any  temporary  break  the  enemy  might  make  in  the 
railroad.  This  involved  two  things :  First,  the  ex 
tent  of  the  fortifications  must  be  so  reduced  that 
a  comparatively  small  garrison  would  make  it  safe 
from  a  coup  de  main;  and,  second,  that  he  should 
not  have  to  feed  a  resident  population  who  would 
be  shut  off  from  trade  and  manufactures.  The 
first  was  put  into  the  hands  of  Captain  Poe,  the 
chief  engineer.  The  second  was  met  by  sending 
the  civilians  beyond  the  lines  or  to  the  rear,  ac 
cording  to  their  preferences.  The  stern  military 
necessity  for  the  last  was  regretted,  and  the  exe 
cution  of  it  was  made  as  tolerable  for  the  families 
as  possible.  Could  Sherman  have  foreseen  that 
his  adversary  would  soon  make  it  feasible  for  him 
to  discard  any  base  in  northern  Georgia,  the  toil 
of  his  troops  upon  the  new  intrenchments  and  the 
discomfort  of  the  Atlanta  people  would  both  have 
been  spared. 

The  changes  which  he  made  a  month  before  in 

*  O.  R.,  xxxix,  pt.  2,  p.  412. 


CAMPAIGN   OF   OCTOBER.  229 

the  commanders  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee 
and  the  Twentieth  Corps  had  not  been  a  pleasant 
task  for  him,  but  they  showed  his  capacity  to  de 
cide  such  questions  firmly,  according  to  his  view 
of  the  requirements  of  the  public  service,  ignoring 
his  own  predilections  and  the  personal  annoyance 
which  might  incidentally  come  to  himself.  While 
he  thought  that  General  Logan  lacked  the  intel 
lectual  breadth  and  reliable  judgment  necessary  for 
an  independent  command,  he  fully  appreciated  the 
dashing  soldierly  qualities  which  had  made  Logan 
a  brilliant  division  and  corps  commander,  and  was 
willing  to  trust  him  as  McPherson's  successor. 
He  knew  that  Logan  and  Blair  were  antipathetic 
in  character,  and  were  bad  yoke-fellows ;  but  he 
would  still  have  given  Logan  the  command  but 
for  the  vehement  remonstrance  and  protest  of  Gen 
eral  Thomas,  whom  Logan  had  seriously  offended 
before  the  opening  of  the  campaign.*  Hooker, 
as  the  senior  corps  commander  in  the  whole  army, 
was  in  the  order  of  rank,  but  his  vanity  and  queru- 
lousness  made  him  a  difficult  subordinate  and  a 
mischief-maker.  After  canvassing  with  Thomas 
the  major  generals  seriatim,  General  Howard  was 
chosen  as  best  combining  the  experience  and  abil 
ity  required,  with  the  personal  qualities  which  make 
an  officer  reliable  and  cheerful  in  co-operation  and 
subordination.!  It  was  probable  that  Hooker 
would  ask  to  be  relieved  from  service  in  the  army, 
and,  when  he  did  so,  the  appointment  of  General 
Slocum,  as  commandant  of  the  corps,  who  had 
violently  quarreled  with  him  when  formerly  his 
subordinate,  was  in  the  nature  of  a  severe  retort. 
As  early  as  the  6th  of  September  General  For- 

*  See  p.  332. 

f  To  understand  Hooker's  characteristics  it  is  only  necessary 
to  read  his  letters  to  the  War  Department  and  to  Senators  Wilson, 
Wade,  and  Chandler — e.  g.,  O.  R.,  xxxii,  pt.  2,  pp.  467-469  ;  Id., 
xlv,  pt.  2,  pp.  109,  112,  246,  283. 


230 


GENERAL   SHERMAN. 


rest  had  offered  to  make  a  raid  upon  Sherman's 
railways  and  posts  in  Middle  Tennessee,  taking 
four  thousand  cavalry  and  six  guns.*  His  pro 
posal  was  gladly  accepted,  but  his  outfit  was  not 
ready  till  the  2Oth,  by  which  time  Wheeler  joined 
him  at  Tuscumbia,  in  northwest  Alabama,  with  a 
mere  remnant  of  the  force  with  which  he  had  left 
Atlanta  on  the  expedition  which  had  proved  so 
much  more  harmful  to  Hood  than  to  Sherman. 
Wheeler  was  ordered  back  to  Georgia,  and  Hood 
moved  his  army  across  to  Palmetto,  near  the  Chat- 
tahoochee,  about  the  same  distance  from  Atlanta, 
but  where  he  hoped  to  give  Sherman  cause  for 
uneasiness  as  to  his  railway  to  Chattanooga,  while 
Forrest  was  making  mischief  in  Middle  Tennessee. 

Sherman  rated  the  danger  from  Forrest  far 
above  that  from  other  Confederate  raiders,  and 
when  news  came  that  the  daring  cavalryman  was 
over  the  river,  he  sent  a  division  of  the  Fourth 
Corps  to  Chattanooga  and  one  of  the  Fifteenth 
Corps  to  Rome  to  co-operate  with  General  Rous 
seau,  who  was  in  command  at  Nashville.  General 
Thomas  himself  was  sent  to  Chattanooga  on  the 
29th  of  September,  and  two  or  three  days  later  to 
Nashville.  Forrest  was  checked  by  Rousseau  at 
Pulaski  after  he  had  burned  a  number  of  trestle 
bridges  on  the  Decatur  road,  but  no  damage  was 
done  the  direct  line  between  Nashville  and  Chat 
tanooga.  General  Schofield  had  gone  northward 
to  look  after  the  affairs  of  his  department  and  take 
a  short  leave  of  absence.  For  the  time,  therefore, 
the  Army  of  the  Ohio  was  in  command  of  Scho- 
field's  next  in  rank,  General  Cox. 

From  the  27th  onward  there  had  been  growing 
rumors  of  Hood's  crossing  the  Chattahoochee 
below  Campbelltown,  and  on  the  date  named  Sher 
man  had  sent  to  Washington  a  Macon  newspaper 

*  O.  R.,  xxxix,  pt.  2,  pp.  818,  859. 


CAMPAIGN  OF   OCTOBER.  231 

giving  a  report  of  a  speech  there  by  Mr.  Davis  on 
the  22d.  Sherman  was  now  on  the  alert  for  a 
movement  toward  Tennessee,  which  was  foreshad 
owed,  and  on  the  3Oth,  in  giving  Thomas  informa 
tion  of  Hood's  crossing  the  Chattahoochee,  he 
added  that  if  the  latter  moved  his  whole  force  to 
Blue  Mountain,  Ala.,  "  I  will  take  advantage  of  his 
opening  to  me  all  of  Georgia."  *  His  mind  re 
verted  to  the  march  to  the  sea  as  if  drawn  to  it 
by  a  lodestone.  He  instinctively  felt  that  great 
results  lay  that  way.  The  next  day,  in  giving  to 
Generals  Howard  and  Cox  intimations  of  the  work 
before  them,  in  confidential  notes  he  said  that, 
while  he  should  turn  upon  Hood  if  he  aimed  at 
the  railroad  south  of  Kingston,  on  the  other  hand, 
if  Hood  tried  to  get  into  Tennessee  through  Ala 
bama,  he  might  send  back  Thomas's  men  from 
Kingston  and  above,  destroy  Atlanta,  and  make 
for  Savannah  or  Charleston.  "  We  could  make 
Georgia  a  break  in  the  Confederacy  by  ruining 
both  east  and  west  roads,  and  not  run  against  a 
single  fort  till  we  got  to  the  seashore  and  in  commu 
nication  with  our  ships."  f  The  prior  reduction  of 
Savannah  no  longer  seemed  to  him  absolutely 
necessary.  A  few  hours  before  he  had  given  one 
of  these  subordinates  warning  to  be  ready  for 
"  some  quick  countermoves  east  and  southeast," 
adding  that  these  would  "  make  Hood  recall  the 
whole  or  part  of  his  army."  J 

The  plan  needed  the  assent  of  General  Grant, 
and  Sherman  briefly  laid  it  before  him  on  the  ist 
of  October,  urging  that  "  we  can  not  remain  on 
the  defensive."  To  Thomas  he  repeated  the  sub 
stance  of  this,  with  his  belief  that  "  Hood  would 
be  puzzled  and  would  follow  me,  or,  if  he  entered 
Tennessee,  he  could  make  no  permanent  stay."  * 


*  O.  R.,  xxxix,  pt.  2,  p.  532.          i  Id.,  pt.  3,  p.  6. 
\  Id.,  pt.  2,  p.  540.  *  Id.,  pt.  3,  pp.  i,  13. 

16 


232 


GENERAL   SHERMAN. 


Halleck  discussed  the  subject  in  a  long  letter  to 
Grant  on  the  2d,  strongly  urging  the  movement 
toward  southern  Alabama  instead  of  Savannah.  It 
was  to  this  that  Grant  answered,  in  the  words  al 
ready  quoted,  that  Mobile  had  been  assumed  to 
be  the  ultimate  aim  after  Atlanta  should  be  taken ; 
but  he  now  saw  very  strong  reasons  for  thinking 
Sherman's  plan  the  better  one,  as  it  certainly  was 
the  bolder,  and  he  thought  Savannah  might  be 
taken  by  troops  under  General  Foster  on  the  South 
Carolina  coast,  re-enforced  by  a  corps  from  the 
Potomac  army,  but  he  reserved  decision  till  he 
could  visit  Washington  for  consultation.  He 
thought  that  "  whichever  way  Sherman  moves  he 
will  undoubtedly  encounter  Hood's  army."*  The 
discussion  is  a  fine  example  of  clear  thinking  and 
of  noble,  patriotic  aims. 

But  Hood  interrupted  the  discussion.  At  the 
visit  of  President  Davis  to  the  camp  at  Palmetto 
on  the  25th  and  26th  of  September,  Hood's  plan 
of  crossing  the  Chattahoochee  and  operating 
against  Sherman's  communications  had  been  ap 
proved,  but  it  was  followed  by  an  order  making  both 
his  and  General  Taylor's  department  in  Alabama 
and  Mississippi  subordinate  to  General  Beaure- 
gard.  In  his  outline  of  plan  Hood  provided  for 
the  contingency  of  Sherman's  marching  in  the 
other  direction  by  saying  that  in  that  case  "  I  shall 
follow  upon  his  rear.'*  f  He  crossed  the  river  on 
the  ist  of  October,  was  at  Flint  Hill  Church,  five 
or  six  miles  west  of  Powder  Springs,  the  next 
night,  and  on  the  3d  sent  forward  Stewart's  corps 
with  the  cavalry  toward  Ackworth,  on  the  rail 
road.  After  making  a  temporary  break  in  the  rail 
road  and  capturing  a  few  prisoners,  Stewart  on  the 
5th  rejoined  Hood  near  Lost  Mountain. 

Sherman    had   warned   his    garrisons   at   Alla- 

*  O.  R.,  xxxix,  pt.  3,  p.  63.      f  Advance  and  Retreat,  p.  253. 


MAP  No.  Ill 

ATLANTA   CAMPAIGN" 

SCALE  OF  MILES 


01       2346 


s\ 


EXPLANATION: 

Union  Work»  Xv*s 

Confederate  Worle*  ^V%? 
LINES  OF  MARCH  PURSUED  BY 

THE  SEPARATE  ARMIES 
Army  of  the  Ohio    


CAMPAIGN   OF   OCTOBER. 


233 


toona  and  Rome  of  Hood's  being  in  motion,  and 
had  instructed  them  to  concentrate  if  either  posi 
tion  were  attacked.  On  the  3d  the  Twentieth 
Corps  was  made  the  garrison  of  Atlanta  and  of 
the  fortifications  at  the  Chattahoochee  bridge,  and 
the  rest  of  the  forces  in  hand  were  directed  to 
march  northward,  provided  with  ten  days'  rations. 
A  severe  storm  had  set  in,  and  the  streams  were 
up,  the  Chattahoochee  swelling  with  a  freshet. 
This  retarded  movements,  and  Sherman  directed 
the  Army  of  the  Ohio  not  to  break  camp  till  the 
4th,  and  then  to  unite  with  the  rest  of  the  forces  at 
Kennesaw  Mountain  on  the  following  evening. 
He  was  himself  at  Kennesaw  early  in  the  afternoon 
of  the  5th,  and  was  witness  of  the  distant  battle 
at  Allatoona,  where  French's  division  was  attack 
ing  the  fort.  General  Corse  had  followed  his  in 
structions  by  going  in  person  from  Rome  with  one 
of  his  brigades  by  rail  to  the  assistance  of  Colonel 
Tourtelotte,  another  being  ordered  to  follow.  The 
re-enforced  garrison  beat  off  the  Confederates  after 
a  brilliant  and  stubborn  fight,  and  Hood  reassem 
bled  his  army  on  the  6th  near  Dallas.  The  com 
bat  at  Allatoona  had  cost  him  over  two  hundred 
and  thirty  in  killed,  four  hundred  prisoners,  and  a 
large  proportionate  list  of  wounded.  The  casual 
ties  of  the  defenders  were  seven  hundred  and  five 
in  killed  and  wounded. 

On  the  6th  Sherman  sent  the  Twenty-third 
Corps  on  a  reconnoissance  in  force  to  the  west 
ward,  and  learned  from  it  the  actual  position  of 
Hood's  army.  He  watched  the  movement  and  its 
signals  of  smoke  from  the  top  of  Pine  Mountain, 
and  realized  how  perfectly  Johnston  had  watched 
him  from  that  station  four  months  before.  Strong 
details  of  woodsmen  got  out  ties  for  the  railway 
repairs.  Hood  was  moving  westward,  and  Sher 
man  sent  Corse  back  with  his  division  to  hold 
Rome,  and  waited,  intensely  observant,  and  in- 


234 


GENERAL   SHERMAN. 


wardly  wishing  that  his  opponent  would  commit 
himself  to  the  movement  which  he  had  said  would 
leave  him  free  to  put  into  execution  his  own  far- 
reaching  plan.  The  writer  recalls  with  keen  pleas 
ure  a  visit  from  the  commander  at  Allatoona,  when, 
in  conversation  before  the  evening  camp  fire,  the 
general,  with  open  heart  and  genial  frankness, 
talked  of  the  great  prospects  of  gain  to  the  coun 
try's  cause  the  situation  was  opening. 

Hood  had  not  accomplished  what  he  had  hoped 
for,  since  Sherman  held  fast  to  Atlanta,  and  was 
now  at  Allatoona  ready  to  meet  him  either  at  Rome 
or  elsewhere.  The  freshets  had  done  more  dam 
age  to  the  railway  than  the  Confederates,  for  the 
bridge  at  Resaca  was  partly  carried  away,  that  at 
the  Chattahoochee  was  damaged,  and  half  a  dozen 
smaller  ones  were  washed  out.  Colonel  Wright 
with  his  construction  corps  were  busy  as  nailers 
mending  the  breaks.  Sherman  saw  that  Hood  did 
not  want  a  battle,  and  the  wide  scattering  of  an 
noying  raids  looked  like  resort  to  guerrilla  war 
fare,  without  fixed  bases  anywhere.  As  he  tele 
graphed  Grant,  "  The  whole  batch  of  devils  are 
turned  loose,  without  home  or  habitation,"  and  he 
renewed  his  proposal  to  strike  out  for  the  sea.* 
On  the  loth  of  October  he  heard  from  Rome  that 
Hood  was  preparing  to  cross  the  Coosa  a  dozen 
miles  below,  and,  while  waiting  for  Grant's  de 
cision,  he  pushed  his  whole  army  in  that  direction. 

Hood  tells  us  himself  that  the  rest  of  his  cam 
paign  was  an  afterthought,  into  which  he  wras  led 
by  the  apparent  opportunities.  His  professed  in 
tention  had  been  to  offer  a  decisive  battle  to  Sher 
man  when,  as  he  hoped,  the  latter's  forces  would 
be  scattered  by  the  necessities  of  covering  the  rail 
way  lines.  Thus  the  raid  on  Allatoona  led  to  one 
on  Resaca,  and  disappointment  in  this  led  to  the 

*  O.  R.,  xxxix,  pt.  3,  p.  162. 


CAMPAIGN   OF   OCTOBER.  235 

final  and  fatal  move  westward  to  the  border  of  Mis 
sissippi,  hopelessly  abandoning  his  original  purpose 
of  keeping  where  he  could  hang  on  Sherman's  rear 
if  he  turned  toward  the  coast.*  The  unfitness  of 
his  army  to  cope  with  Sherman  was  acknowledged, 
and  he  was  simply  leading  a  dance  that  looked 
merry  enough  for  the  moment,  but  in  which  Sher 
man  was  to  give  new  point  to  the  proverb  that 
"  He  laughs  best  who  laughs  last." 

A  strong  reconnoissance  on  the  I3th  from 
Rome  down  the  Coosa  had  proved  that  Hood  had 
gone  north  in  the  narrow  Chattooga  Valley  west  of 
the  Oostanaula  River,  which  was  also  on  the  ram 
page,  and  Sherman,  sticking  to  his  interior  line  of 
railway  communication,  sped  the  bulk  of  his  force 
toward  Chattanooga.  On  the  I2th  Hood  in  per 
son  with  Lee's  corps  had  appeared  before  Resaca 
and  demanded  its  surrender;  but  when  Colonel 
Weaver  defied  him,  he  did  not  assault,  but  moved 
on  to  Dalton,  where  he  scared  a  small  garrison 
into  surrender,  while  at  Tilton,  Colonel  Archer, 
with  two  hundred  men  in  a  blockhouse,  resisted 
and  delayed  him  for  several  hours,  till  the  wooden 
fort  was  knocked  to  pieces  by  a  cannonade.  But 
Sherman  was  now  upon  his  heels,  and  Schofield, 
on  his  way  back  to  the  army,  was  at  Chattanooga, 
where,  at  Thomas's  request,  he  took  command  of 
the  troops  in  that  vicinity  and  blocked  Hood's  fur 
ther  progress  northward.  The  latter  now  doubled 
the  range  of  Taylor's  ridge  by  the  north  end,  and 
hurried  back  to  Gaylesville,  Ala.,  and  thence  to 
Gadsden,  where  he  had  left  his  wagons  and  most 
of  his  artillery  in  the  last  rapid  expedition.  Sher 
man  cut  out  the  timber  blockade  which  Hood  had 
left  in  Snake  Creek  Gap,  followed  through  that  de 
file,  and  pursued  in  two  columns,  one  by  the  Chat 
tooga  Valley,  in  which  Hood  had  marched,  and 

*  Advance  and  Retreat,  pp.  253,  258. 


GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

the  other  in  the  valley  next  east  of  it.  On  the 
2Oth  Hood  was  at  Gadsden  consulting  with  Beau- 
regard,  and  Sherman  at  Gaylesville,  eagerly  trying 
to  determine  whether  the  time  had  fully  come  for 
him  to  put  his  plan  in  execution. 

In  Hood's  conference  with  Beauregard  at  Gads 
den  it  was  arranged  that  Forrest,  who  was  in  West 
Tennessee  gathering  supplies  and  conscripts, 
should,  after  completing  that  task,  cross  the  Ten 
nessee,  join  Hood  in  the  middle  part  of  the  State, 
and  then  come  under  the  orders  of  the  latter. 
Hood  was  to  cross  the  Tennessee  River  at  Gun- 
tersville  and  carry  the  war  northward.  It  was  as 
sumed  that  this  would  be  followed  by  the  evacua 
tion  of  Decatur  by  the  National  troops,  and  Tus- 
cumbia  would  become  Hood's  depot  of  supplies, 
using  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad  to 
Decatur  or  beyond.*  But  before  leaving  Gadsden 
on  the  22d  of  October,  Hood  made  out  his  orders 
for  his  troops  to  march  by  Blountsville  to  Ole 
ander  on  the  way  to  Decatur,  leaving  the  Gunters- 
ville  road  at  Bennettsville,  a  day's  march  out.f 
He  thus  deliberately  gave  Beauregard  the  slip, 
and,  when  the  latter  hurried  after  him  to  Decatur, 
it  was  too  late  to  resume  the  original  plan.  Beau- 
regard  swallowed  his  wrath  as  best  he  could. 
Hood  was  rebuffed  by  a  stubborn  garrison  at  De 
catur,  and  marched  away  to  Tuscumbia,  where  the 
railroad  approaches  the  Tennessee  River  below 
Muscle  Shoals.  Reaching  there  on  the  3Oth,  he 
promptly  laid  a  pontoon  bridge  at  Florence,  and 
gave  orders  to  cross  the  river  and  begin  the  ad 
vance  on  the  5th  of  November.]:  But  the  news 
he  got  before  that  day  seems  to  have  paralyzed  him 
for  nearly  three  weeks. 

Sherman  was  resolved  that  if  Hood  crossed 
at  Guntersville  he  would  follow,  and,  by  concen- 

*  O.  R..  xxxix,  pt.  3,  pp.  810,  815,  837,  845,  853. 
f  Id.,  p.  841.  \  Id.,  pp.  880,  88i.t 


CAMPAIGN   OF   OCTOBER.  237 

trating  Thomas's  forces  on  the  north,  inclose  and 
destroy  his  adversary.  To  do  this  would  leave 
fewest  contingencies  in  his  subsequent  campaign, 
and  he  strongly  expressed  his  wish  that  Hood 
would  enter  Tennessee  by  this  route.  He  jocu 
larly  told  his  subordinates  to  "  invite  him  in."  * 
Hood  instinctively  shunned  the  danger,  even  at 
the  cost  of  breaking  up  without  permission  a  plan 
deliberately  arranged  with  Beauregard.  On  the 
day  that  the  Confederate  generals  were  in  consulta 
tion  at  Gadsden  Thomas  telegraphed  to  Halleck, 
"  I  feel  confident  that  I  can  defend  the  line  of  the 
Tennessee  with  the  force  General  Sherman  pro 
poses  to  leave  with  me."  f  This  included  the 
Fourth  Corps,  besides  the  troops  already  in  the 
State,  with  about  five  thousand  of  Sherman's  con 
valescents,  the  recruits  arriving,  and  two  divisions 
under  A.  J.  Smith  coming  from  Missouri.  A  few 
days  later  Sherman  determined  to  send  back  the 
Twenty-third  Corps  also,  and  Thomas  then  felt 
that  he  had  "  men  enough  to  ruin  "  his  adversary.^ 
Grant  had  consistently  supported  Sherman's 
plan,  but  on  the  nth  of  October  he  was  obliged 
to  inform  Sherman  that  an  expedition  by  sea  to 
take  Savannah  could  not  be  organized.  The  dif 
ficulties  seemed  to  multiply,  and  he  found  doubts 
recurring  as  to  Thomas's  ability  to  prevent  Hood 
from  going  north.*  Sherman's  courage  rose  with 
the  danger,  and  he  strongly  reviewed  the  situa 
tion.  He  still  thought  Hood  would  have  to  follow 
him,  and  with  characteristic  point  -said :  "  Instead 
of  being  on  the  defensive,  I  would  be  on  the  of 
fensive  ;  instead  of  guessing  at  what  he  means  to 
do,  he  would  have  to  guess  at  my  plans.  The  dif 
ference  in  war  is  full  twenty-five  per  cent."  Grant 
yielded,  saying,  "  If  you  are  satisfied  the  trip  to 
the  seacoast  can  be  made,  holding  the  line  of  the 

*  O.  R  ,  xxxix,  pt.  3,  pp.  311,  333.          f  Id.,  p.  389. 
\  Id.,  p.  756.  *  Id.,  p.  202. 


238  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

Tennessee  firmly,  you  may  make  it,  destroying  all 
the  railroad  south  of  Dalton  or  Chattanooga  as 
you  may  think  best."  *  As  he  thought  upon  it, 
Grant's  strong  military  judgment  went  more  de 
cidedly  with  Sherman.  On  the  I2th  he  tele 
graphed  :  "  On  reflection,  I  think  better  of  your 
proposition.  It  would  be  much  better  to  go  south 
than  to  be  forced  to  come  north."  The  President 
and  Mr.  Stanton  felt  "  much  solicitude,"  and  that 
"  a  misstep  by  General  Sherman  might  be  fatal 
to  his  army."  But  Grant  replied  to  them,  "  On 
mature  reflection,  I  believe  Sherman's  proposition 
is  the  best  that  can  be  adopted,"  and  the  same  day 
he  directed  Halleck  to  provide  vessels  and  sup 
plies  to  meet  Sherman  on  the  Georgia  coast.f 

For  a  few  days  after  the  22d  of  October  Sher 
man  was  uncertain  whether  Hood  would  cross  the 
Tennessee  at  Guntersville,  but  his  quartermaster, 
Colonel  Easton,  was  crowding  the  capacity  of  the 
railroad  to  get  affairs  ready  for  either  contingency. 
Sherman  got  from  Thomas  detailed  statements  of 
the  force  he  had,  of  the  new  troops  arriving,  and 
of  his  estimated  wants.  In  the  evening  of  the  25th 
Thomas,  in  sending  a  long  and  very  detailed  state 
ment,  added :  "  With  Fourth  Corps  and  enough  of 
the  new  regiments  to  make  up  an  active  force  of 
twenty-five  thousand  infantry,  I  will  undertake  to 
clear  the  rebels  out  of  West  Tennessee,  and  draw 
off  enough  of  Hood's  army  from  you  to  enable 
you  to  move  anywhere  in  Georgia  or  Alabama  you 
may  wish  without  difficulty."! 

With  Thomas  thus  confident  of  his  ability  to 
bear  his  end  of  the  burden,  Sherman  felt  that  his 
way  was  clear,  though  he  still  reminded  Thomas 
that  defending  the  line  of  the  Tennessee  was 
Grant's  condition  in  assenting.  Telegraphing  to 
Halleck  on  the  27th,  he  said  he  would  wait  yet  a 

*  O.  R.,  xxxix,  pt.  3,  p.  202.  f  Id.,  pp.  222,  239. 

\  Id.,  p.  433. 


CAMPAIGN   OF   OCTOBER. 


239 


few  days  to  hear  what  head  Hood  might  make 
about  Decatur,  "  and  may  yet  turn  to  Tennessee ; 
but  it  would  be  a  great  pity  to  take  a  step  back 
ward.  I  think  it  would  be  better  even  to  let  him 
ravage  the  State  of  Tennessee,  provided  he  does 
not  gobble  up  too  many  of  our  troops.  General 
Thomas  is  well  alive  to  the  occasion,  and  better 
suited  to  the  emergency  than  any  man  I  have.  He 
should  be  strengthened  as  much  as  possible,  as  the 
successful  defense  of  Tennessee  should  not  be  left 
to  chance."  * 

In  the  anxiety  to  give  Thomas  even  more  than 
the  latter  thought  necessary  Sherman  now  deter 
mined  to  send  back  the  Twenty-third  Corps  also ; 
but  this  was  done  upon  considerations  presented 
by  Schofield,  and  not  by  Thomas,  though  the  latter 
was  very  glad  of  the  increase  of  force,  especially 
after  he  learned  that  there  must  be  some  delay  in 
the  arrival  of  the  re-enforcement  under  A.  J.  Smith. 
Sherman  now  confidentially  informed  Colonel  Beck- 
with,f  his  commissary,  that  he  might  reduce  his 

*  O.  R.,  xxxix,  pt.  3,  pp.  448,  461. 

f  Sherman  to  Beckwith,  id.,  p.  477.  Before  deciding  to  send 
Schofield  back,  the  computation  by  which  Sherman  expected  to 
make  up  his  army  was  the  following,  as  shown  by  the  official  re 
turns  for  the  last  of  October.  (Id.,  pp.  555,  563,  569,  573) : 

„       ,      ,      ,  (  Fourteenth  Corps,   11,053 
FromArmyoftheCumberlandj  Twentieth  Corps,     13,843 

-    25,796 

.,  f  ,     „  (  Fifteenth  Corps,      15,721 

From  Army  of  the  Tennessee -j  geventeenth  Corps>  9>I38 

From  Army  of  the  Ohio  (Cooper's  and  Cox's  divisions),  10,788 

Total  infantry  and  artillery 61,443 

Cavalry  (Kilpatrick's  division) 3>92^ 

Total 65,371 

Deduct  those  sent   back,  fit  for  garrison  duty    (O.   R., 

xxxix,  pt.  3,  p.  408) 5,ooo 

Leaving  the  marching  column 60,371 

But  when  Schofield's  10,788  (infantry  and  artillery)  were  taken 
out,  the  aggregate  was  a  little  under  50,000,  as  Sherman  said  to 


240 


GENERAL   SHERMAN. 


estimates  for  supplies  to  enough  for  fifty  thousand 
men,  though  the  unexpectedly  rapid  return  of  fur- 
loughed  men  crowding  forward  enthusiastically  on 
the  rumor  of  great  things  to  happen  raised  the 
force  again  nearly  to  the  former  point.  He  re 
iterated  to  Thomas  the  strong  advice  to  abandon 
minor  points,  concentrate  his  troops  about  Colum 
bia,  get  together  the  largest  possible  army  from 
his  department,  and  take  the  field  in  person.* 
Once  more  for  a  moment  Grant  hesitated  to  say 
the  word  "  Go,"  but,  upon  Sherman  giving  him 
another  succinct  analysis  of  the  situation,  he  came 
back  to  his  original  sound  judgment  and  said, 
"  Go  as  you  propose."  f 

Finally,  on  the  I2th  of  November,  the  wires 
were  cut,  and  the  march  to  the  sea  was  begun  be 
yond  the  possibility  of  a  recall.  The  conception 
of  the  plan  was  hardly  grander  than  the  faith  which 
had  clung  to  it  for  two  months  in  the  face  of  op 
position,  of  doubt,  and  of  discouragement  from 
quarters  worthy  of  respect.  In  arguing  the  mat 
ter  with  the  authorities,  civil  and  military,  he  care 
fully  confined  himself  to  the  first  part  of  his  task — 
that  of  reaching  the  Atlantic  and  establishing  a 
base  upon  the  coast.  To  his  immediate  subordi 
nates,  however,  he  opened  also  the  final  campaign 
of  the  march  northward  upon  Columbia  and 
Raleigh,  and  the  decisive  results  which  it  involved. 
Military  history  is  full  of  proofs  that  the  responsi- 

Colonel  Beckwith.  The  fine  eagerness  of  men  absent  on  their 
"  veteran  furlough  "  to  join  their  regiments  is  shown  by  the  returns, 
which  were,  for  November  loth,  59,545  ;  for  November  3Oth,  62,- 
204;  for  December  2Oth,  60.598.  (O.  R.,  xliv,  p.  16.)  As  com 
munications  were  cut  on  November  I2th,  the  increase  in  the  three 
days  from  the  roth  to  the  I2th  inclusive  was  that  which  appears 
in  the  return  for  the  3oth.  Comparing  the  aggregates  of  infantry 
and  artillery,  in  which  alone  the  reduction  was  made  by  sending 
back  Schofield's  divisions,  the  totals  were,  for  November  loth, 
54,584,  and  for  November  3Oth,  57,141. 

*  O.  R.,  xxxix,  pt.  3,  pp.  468,  476,  497,  498. 

f  Id.,  pp.  576,  594. 


CAMPAIGN    OF   OCTOBER.  24! 

ble  commander  in  the  field  sees  more  clearly  than 
any  spectator  the  difficulties  of  his  enterprise  and 
the  obstacles  to  be  overcome.  Nothing  is  more 
common  than  to  have  daring  plans  thus  "  sicklied 
o'er  with  the  pale  cast  of  thought."  The  rare 
thing,  the  signal  proof  of  highest  soldierly  quality, 
is  the  steadfast  resolution  which,  weighing  all  the 
risks,  still  sees  the  prize  worth  the  venture,  and 
goes  forward  without  swerving. 

Sherman  had  based  his  purpose  on  sound  and 
broad  military  principles.  He  must  retain  the  ag 
gressive.  He  must  not  allow  his  adversary  to  lead 
him  back  to  Tennessee  and  begin  over  again  the 
work  of  the  past  year.  If  possible,  he  must  find 
a  more  decisive  return  blow  for  the  audacity  of 
Hbod,  providing  reasonably  for  hindering  the  lat 
ter  from  doing  fatal  mischief  meanwhile.  All  these 
are  strictly  military  considerations,  and  placing 
himself  on  the  line  of  communications  of  Lee's 
army  was,  by  common  assent  of  military  experts 
the  world  over,  a  masterpiece  of  strategy.  As  a 
subordinate  consideration,  he  added  to  all  this 
what  he  rightly  called  "  statesmanship  " — the  moral 
effect  to  be  produced  upon  the  Confederacy  by 
the  demonstration  of  the  resistless  power  of  the 
National  Government.* 

Leading  Southern  officers  saw  clearly  that  a 
mortal  blow  had  been  struck  when,  with  the  rail 
ways  of  Georgia  destroyed  behind  him,  Sherman, 
two  months  later,  was  preparing  to  resume  his 
march  northward  from  Savannah,  and  there  was 
no  army  that  could  cope  with  him  between  Georgia 
and  Virginia.  General  Richard  Taylor,  son  of 
President  Zachary  Taylor,  and  brother-in-law  of 
Davis,  thought  "  the  game  was  over."  f  General 
Johnston  says  that  "  the  Southern  cause  must  have 
appeared  hopeless  then  to  all  intelligent  and  dis- 

*  O.  R.,  xxxix,  pt.  3,  pp.  659,  660. 

f  Destruction  and  Reconstruction,  p.  218. 


242  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

passionate  Southern  men."*  General  Lee,  speak 
ing  of  his  own  judgment  at  the  time,  said  of  Sher 
man's  movements,  "  It  was  easy  to  see  that  unless 
they  were  interrupted  I  should  be  compelled  to 
abandon  the  defense  of  Richmond."  f  The  view 
of  competent  critics  across  the  ocean  was  embodied 
in  the  editorial  statement  of  the  London  Times, 
on  getting  the  first  news  of  his  start  from  Atlanta : 
;<  That  it  is  a  most  momentous  enterprise  can  not 
be  denied.  ...  It  may  either  make  Sherman  the 
most  famous  general  of  the  North,  or  it  may  prove 
the  ruin  of  his  reputation,  his  army,  and  even  his 
cause  together. "J 

*  Narrative,  p.  372. 

f  Letter  of  July  27,  1868,  quoted  in  Sherman's  Memoirs,  2d 
ed.,  ii,  p.  467. 

J  London  Times,  December  3,  1864. 


CHAPTER  XL 

THE    MARCH    TO    THE    SEA. 

THE  Twentieth  Corps  being  still  at  Atlanta  and 
the  Fourteenth  about  Kingston,  the  Fifteenth 
Corps  began  march  from  Gaylesville  for  Kings 
ton,  the  Seventeenth  leaving  the  same  day  for  the 
railroad  about  Marietta.  The  march  was  delib 
erate  and  easy.  The  Confederate  cavalry  hovered 
about  the  flanks,  picking  up  many  foragers  and 
making  an  occasional  dash  at  some  unguarded 
wagon.  There  was  nothing  to  call  for  more  than 
ordinary  discipline.  There  was  an  incident  which 
is  worth  mentioning  only  as  bearing  on  the  remark 
that  used  to  be  made.  "  The  western  army  can 
march  and  fight,  but  has  no  discipline."  Every 
night  an  order  was  sent  from  division  to  brigade 
headquarters  prescribing  the  order  of  march  next 
day.  On  the  morning  of  the  2d  of  November  the 
advance  brigade  of  Leggett's  division  moved  out 
on  time,  but  the  brigade  which  was  to  follow  next 
was  not  ready.  An  aid-de-camp  notified  the  com 
mander  to  move  in  five  minutes  or  fall  to  the  rear ; 
at  the  expiration  of  five  minutes  the  tardy  brigade 
was  still  not  ready,  and  the  one  which  was  to  have 
formed  the  rear  took  its  place.  On  reaching  camp 
in  the  evening,  an  order  was  issued  relieving  the 
commander  and  returning  him  to  his  regiment, 
disbanding  the  brigade,  and  assigning  the  regi 
ments  to  one  of  the  other  brigades,  and  directing 
the  headquarters'  records  and  furniture  to  be 
packed  in  a  wagon  in  the  division  train. 

243 


244 


GENERAL   SHERMAN. 


By  the  2d  of  November  Colonel  Wright  with 
fifteen  hundred  men  had  repaired  the  break  of 
fifteen  miles  extending  north  from  Dalton,  and  the 
road  was  open  for  trains  from  Atlanta  to  Chatta 
nooga.  On  that  day  Sherman  received  the  tele 
gram  from  Grant  which  closed  with  "I  do  not  see 
that  you  can  withdraw  from  where  you  are  to  fol 
low  Hood  without  giving  up  all  we  have  gained 
in  territory.  I  say,  then,  go  on  as  you  propose." 
Immediately  the  work  began  of  dismantling  At 
lanta  and  all  posts  to  the  north  of  it,  and  shipping 
to  Chattanooga  garrisons  and  all  munitions  and 
property  that  were  not  to  be  carried  along  in  the 
proposed  campaign. 

The  soldiers  now  became  aware  that  they  were 
about  to  go  upon  an  expedition,  away  from  all  sup 
port  and  to  an  unknown  destination.  Pay  was 
many  months  in  arrears.  Men  were  harrowed  by 
letters  from  their  wives,  who  were  without  means 
of  support  in  the  approaching  winter.  The  pay 
masters  who  arrived  on  the  6th  of  November  were 
welcomed  with  extravagant  joy.  The  work  of 
paying  was  continued  day  and  night,  and  was  bare 
ly  finished  when  the  last  train  left  for  the  North. 
The  Methodist  chaplain  of  the  Thirty-first  Illinois 
and  the  Roman  Catholic  chaplain  of  the  Seven 
teenth  Wisconsin  undertook  to  carry  home  the 
pay  of  their  men,  and  many  others  availed  them 
selves  of  the  opportunity.  They  carried  a  very 
large  sum  of  money  in  multitudinous  small  pack 
ages,  and  all  reached  their  destination,  bringing 
unimagined  relief  to  households  in  every  corner 
of  the  two  States.  The  presidential  election  was 
held  in  camp  on  the  8th,  under  provision  made  for 
it  by  the  States,  and  was  regular  and  orderly  as 
those  held  at  home.  The  paymasters  with  all  their 
diligence  had  not  yet  paid  all.  Some  few  of  the 
disappointed  ones  imputed  their  ill  fortune  to  the 
Government,  and  in  despite  voted  against  Mr.  Lin- 


THE   MARCH   TO  THE   SEA.  245 

coin.    They  were  paid  in  time,  and  repented  sorely 
their  impatience. 

The  following  order  was  issued  to  corps  and 
division  headquarters  on  the  8th  of  November,  but 
was  not  published  till  the  loth: 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  KINGSTON,  GA.,  Nov.  8,  1864. 

The  general  commanding  deems  it  proper,  at  this  time, 
to  inform  the  officers  and  men  of  the  Fourteenth,  Fifteenth, 
Seventeenth,  and  Twentieth  Corps  that  he  has  organized 
them  into  an  army  for  a  special  purpose,  well  known  to  the 
War  Department  and  to  General  Grant.  It  is  sufficient  for  you 
to  know  that  it  involves  a  departure  from  our  present  base, 
and  a  long  and  difficult  inarch  to  a  new  one.  All  the 
chances  of  war  have  been  considered  and  provided  for,  as 
far  as  human  agency  can.  All  he  asks  of  you  is  to  maintain 
that  discipline,  patience,  and  courage  that  has  characterized 
you  in  the  past ;  and  he  hopes,  and  through  you,  to  strike  a 
blow  at  our  enemy  that  will  have  a  material  effect  in  pro 
ducing  what  we  all  so  much  desire — his  overthrow.  Of  all 
tilings,  the  most  important  is  that  the  men,  during  marches 
and  in  camp,  keep  their  places,  and  do  not  scatter  about  as 
stragglers  and  foragers,  to  be  picked  up  by  a  hostile  people 
in  detail.  It  is  also  of  the  utmost  importance  that  our 
wagons  should  not  be  loaded  with  anything  but  provisions 
and  ammunition.  All  surplus  servants,  noncombatants,  and 
refugees  should  now  go  to  the  rear,  and  none  should  be  en 
couraged  to  encumber  us  on  the  march.  At  some  future 
time  we  will  be  able  to  provide  for  the  poor  whites  and 
blacks  who  seek  to  escape  the  bondage  under  which  they 
are  now  suffering.  With  these  few  simple  cautions,  he  hopes 
to  lead  you  to  achievements  equal  in  importance  to  those  ot 
the  past. 

By  order  of  Major-General  W.  T.  SHERMAN. 
L.  M.  DAYTON,  Aid-de-camp. 

On  the  loth  General  Corse,  who  still  com 
manded  the  post  at  Rome,  evacuated  and  moved 
to  his  position  on  the  railroad.  He  destroyed  all 
foundries,  machine  shops,  depots,  and  such,  and 
ordered  the  provost  marshal  and  officers  of  the 
rear  guard  to  exercise  the  severest  and  most  sum 
mary  means  to  prevent  disorder,  and  not  hesitate 


246  GENERAL  SHERMAN. 

to  shoot  any  one  caught  firing  private  houses 
or  pillaging  helpless  and  inoffensive  families. 
General  Thomas  sent  a  dispatch  on  the  I2th,  in 
which  he  said :  "  I  have  no  fears  that  Beauregard 
can  do  us  any  harm  now,  and  if  he  attempts  to 
follow  you  I  will  follow  him  as  far  as  possible. 
If  he  does  not  follow  you,  I  will  then  thoroughly 
organize  my  troops,  and  believe  I  shall  have  men 
enough  to  ruin  him  unless  he  gets  out  of  the  way 
very  rapidly."  Sherman  answered,  "  Dispatch  re 
ceived  ;  all  right,"  and  then  the  telegraph  wire  was 
severed.  All  communication  between  him  and  the 
North  ceased  utterly.  No  Southern  newspaper 
that  went  North  made  mention  of  him.  He  was 
not  heard  of  again  for  a  month.  He  was  as  if  the 
earth  had  opened  and  swallowed  his  command. 

The  four  corps  strung  along  the  railroad  began 
at  once  the  work  of  destruction.  The  bridge  at 
Allatoona  was  taken  apart  in  sections  and  shipped 
North ;  the  road  from  the  Etowah  to  Allatoona 
was  thoroughly  wrecked.  Road  ties  were  piled 
up  and  burned ;  rails  laid  across  the  burning  piles 
were  heated  in  the  middle,  were  seized  at  both 
ends,  and  bent  till  the  ends  lapped ;  some,  instead, 
were  bent  spirally.  By  the  I4th  the  work  was 
done,  and  the  general  and  his  army  were  assem 
bled  at  Allatoona. 

The  army  comprised  four  corps — the  Fifteenth, 
Seventeenth,  Fourteenth,  and  Twentieth.  The 
Fifteenth  and  Seventeenth,  commanded  by  Gen 
erals  Osterhaus  and  Blair,  constituted  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee,  or  the  right  wing,  which  was  com 
manded  by  General  O.  O.  Howard.  The  Four 
teenth  (General  Jeff  C.  Davis)  and  Twentieth  (Gen 
eral  Williams)  formed  the  Army  of  Georgia,  or 
the  left  wing,  commanded  by  General  H.  W.  Slo- 
cum.  All  invalids,  all  superfluous  employees,  all 
personal  baggage,  and  all  artillery  except  one  bat 
tery  to  each  division,  had  been  sent  to  the  rear. 


THE    MARCH    TO   THE    SEA. 


247 


The  vacancy  left  by  the  invalids  was  fully  made  up 
by  men  returning  from  furlough  and  by  recruits. 
The  cavalry,  one  division,  comprising  two  brigades, 
was  commanded  by  General  Judson  Kilpatrick. 
He  was  daring,  enterprising,  untiring;  but  he  was 
a  man  of  questionable  personal  habits,  and  his  reck 
lessness  or  negligence  brought  upon  him  some  dis 
astrous  surprises.  The  Northern  army  was  an  ath 
lete  stripped  for  contest. 

Before  starting  on  the  march,  General  Sherman 
published  the  following  order.  In  connection  with 
it  are  given  here  two  letters :  one  the  well-known 
letter  to  the  mayor  of  Atlanta,  the  other  to  a  lady 
whom  Sherman  knew  when,  as  a  young  lieutenant, 
he  was  on  duty  at  Charleston,  S.  C.  The  three  to 
gether  present  a  full  explanation  of  his  conception 
of  the  mode  of  carrying  on  war  and  concluding 
peace : 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  KINGSTON,  GA.,  Nov.  9,  1864. 

1.  For  the  purpose  of  military  operations  the  army  is 
divided  into  two  wings,  viz  : 

The  right  wing,  Major-General  O.  O.  Howard  command 
ing,  composed  of  the  Fifteenth  and  Seventeenth  Corps  ;  the 
left  wing,  Major-General  H.  W.  Slocum  commanding,  com 
posed  of  the  Fourteenth  and  Twentieth  Corps. 

2.  The  habitual  order  of  march  will  be,  whenever  prac 
ticable,  by  four  roads  as  nearly  parallel  as  possible,  and  con 
verging  at  points  hereinafter  to  be  indicated  in  orders.     The 
cavalry,  Brigadier-General  Kilpatrick  commanding,  will  re 
ceive  special  orders  from  the  commander  in  chief. 

3.  There  will  be  no  general  train  of  supplies,  but  each 
corps  will  have    its   ammunition  train  and  provision  train, 
distributed    habitually    as    follows :  Behind    each    regiment 
should  follow  one  wagon  and  one  ambulance;  behind  each 
brigade  should  follow  a  due  proportion  of  ammunition  wag 
ons,  provision  wagons,  and  ambulances.     In  case  of  danger 
each  corps  commander  should  change  his  order  of  march 
by  having  his  advance  and  rear  brigades  unencumbered  by 
wheels.     The   separate    columns   will    start  habitually  at  7 
A.  M.,  and  make  about  fifteen  miles  per  day  unless  otherwise 
fixed  in  orders. 

17 


248 


GENERAL   SHERMAN. 


4.  The  army  will  forage  liberally  on  the  country  during 
the  march.     To  this  end  each  brigade  commander  will  or 
ganize  a  good  and  sufficient  foraging  party  under  the  com 
mand  of  one  or  more  discreet  officers,  who  will  gather,  near 
the  route  of  travel,  corn  or  forage  of  any  kind,  meat  of  any 
kind,  vegetables,  corn  meal,  or  whatever  is  needed  by  the 
command,  aiming  at  all  times  to  keep  in  the  wagons  at 
least  ten  days'  provisions  for  his  command  and  three  days' 
forage.     Soldiers  must  not  enter  the  dwellings  of  the  inhab 
itants  or  commit  any  trespass,  but  during  the  halt  or  camp 
they  may  be  permitted  to  gather  turnips,  potatoes,  and  other 
vegetables,  and  to  drive  in  stock  in  sight  of  their  camp.     To 
regular  foraging  parties  must   be   intrusted   the   gathering 
of  provisions  and  forage  at  any  distance  from  the  roads 
traveled. 

5.  To  corps  commanders  alone  is  intrusted  the  power  to  de 
stroy  mills,  houses,  cotton  gins,  etc.,  and  for  them  this  general 
principle  is  laid  down.    In  districts  and  neighborhoods  where 
the  army  is   unmolested,  no  destruction  of  such   property 
should  be  permitted  ;  but  should  guerrillas  or  bushwhackers 
molest  our  march,  or  should  the  inhabitants  burn  bridges  or 
obstruct  roads  or  otherwise  manifest  local  hostility,  the  army 
commanders  should  order  and  enforce  a  devastation  more 
or  less  relentless,  according  to  the  measure  of  such  hostility. 

6.  As  for  horses,  mules,  wagons,  etc.,  belonging  to  the 
inhabitants,  the  cavalry  and  artillery  may  appropriate  freely 
and  without  limit ;  discriminating,  however,  between  the  rich, 
who  are  usually  hostile,  and  the  poor  and  industrious,  usually 
neutral  or  friendly.     Foraging  parties  may  also  take  mules  or 
horses  to  replace  the  jaded  animals  of  their  trains,  or  to  serve 
as  pack  mules  for  the  regiments  or  brigades.     In  all  forag 
ing,  of  whatever  kind,  the  parties  engaged  will  refrain  from 
abusive  or  threatening  language,  and  may,  where  the  officer 
in   command  thinks  proper,  give  written  certificates  of  the 
facts,  but  no  receipts,  and  they  will  endeavor  to  leave  with 
each  family  a  reasonable  portion  for  their  maintenance. 

7.  Negroes  who  are  able-bodied  and  can  be  of  service  to 
the  several  columns  may  be  taken  along  ;  but  each  army 
commander  will  bear  in  mind  that  the  question  of  supplies  is 
a  very  important  one,  and  that  his  first  duty  is  to  see  to  those 
who  bear  arms. 

8.  The  organization  at  once  of  a  good  pioneer  battalion 
for  each  army  corps,  composed,  if  possible,  of  negroes,  should 
be  attended  to.     This  battalion  should  follow  the  advance 
guard,  repair  roads,  and  double  them,  if  possible,  so  that  the 
columns   will   not   be   delayed   after    reaching   bad   places. 


THE    MARCH    TO   THE   SEA.  249 

Also,  army  commanders  should  practice  the  habit  of  giving 
the  artillery  and  wagons  the  road,  inarching  their  troops  on 
the  side,  and  instruct  their  troops  to  assist  the  wagons  at 
steep  hills  or  bad  crossings  of  streams. 

9.  Captain  O.  M.  Poe,  chief  engineer,  will  assign  to 
each  wing  of  the  army  a  pontoon  train,  fully  equipped  and 
organized,  and  the  commanders  thereof  will  see  to  their 
being  properly  protected  at  all  times. 

By  order  of  Major-General  W.  T.  SHERMAN. 
L.  M.  DAYTON,  Aid-de-camp. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  ATLANTA,  Sept.  12,  1864. 
JAMES  M.  CALHOUN,  Mayor,  E.  E.  RAWSON,  and  S.  C. 

WELLS,  representing  City  Council  of  Atlanta. 
GENTLEMEN:  I  have  your  letter  of  the  nth,  in  the 
nature  of  a  petition  to  revoke  my  orders  removing  all  the 
inhabitants  from  Atlanta,  i  have  read  it  carefully,  and  give 
full  credit  to  your  statements  of  the  distress  that  will  be 
occasioned  by  it,  and  yet  shall  not  revoke  my  order  simply 
because  my  orders  are  not  designed  to  meet  the  humanities 
of  the  case,  but  to  prepare  for  the  future  struggles  in  which 
millions,  yea  hundreds  of  millions,  of  good  people  outside  of 
Atlanta  have  a  deep  interest.  We  must  have  peace,  not 
only  in  Atlanta,  but  in  all  America.  To  secure  this  we  must 
stop  the  war  that  now  desolates  our  once  happy  and  favored 
country.  To  stop  the  war  we  must  defeat  the  rebel  armies 
that  are  arrayed  against  the  laws  and  Constitution,  which  all 
must  respect  and  obey.  To  defeat  these  armies  we  must 
prepare  the  way  to  reach  them  in  their  recesses  provided 
with  the  arms  and  instruments  which  enable  us  to  accomplish 
our  purpose.  Now  I  know  the  vindictive  nature  of  our 
enemy,  and  that  we  may  have  many  years  of  military  opera 
tions  from  this  quarter,  and  therefore  deem  it  wise  and  pru 
dent  to  prepare  in  time.  The  use  of  Atlanta  for  a  warlike 
purpose  is  inconsistent  with  its  character  as  a  home  for  fami 
lies.  There  will  be  no  manufactures,  commerce,  or  agricul 
ture  here  for  the  maintenance  of  families,  and,  sooner  or 
later,  want  will  compel  the  inhabitants  to  go.  Why  not  go 
now  when  all  the  arrangements  are  completed  for  the  trans 
fer,  instead  of  waiting  till  the  plunging  shot  of  contending  ar 
mies  will  renew  the  scenes  of  the  past  month  ?  Of  course,  I 
do  not  apprehend  any  such  thing  at  this  moment,  but  you 
do  not  suppose  this  army  will  be  here  till  the  war  is  over.  I 
can  not  discuss  this  subject  with  you  fairly,  because  I  can 
not  impart  to  you  what  I  propose  to  do  ;  but  I  assert  that 


250 


GENERAL   SHERMAN. 


my  military  plans  make  it  necessary  for  the  inhabitants  to  go 
away,  and  I  can  only  renew  my  offer  of  services  to  make 
their  exodus  in  any  direction  as  easy  and  comfortable  as  pos 
sible.  You  can  not  qualify  war  in  harsher  terms  than  I  will. 
War  is  cruelty,  and  you  can  not  refine  it,  and  those  who 
brought  war  on  our  country  deserve  all  the  curses  and  male 
dictions  a  people  can  pour  out.  I  know  I  had  no  hand  in 
making  this  war,  and  I  know  that  I  will  make  more  sacri 
fices  than  any  of  you  to-day  to  secure  peace.  But  you  can 
not  have  peace  and  a  division  of  our  country.  If  the  United 
States  submits  to  a  division  now,  it  will  not  stop,  but  will  go 
on  till  we  reap  the  fate  of  Mexico,  which  is  eternal  war.  The 
United  States  does  and  must  assert  its  authority  wherever 
it  has  power  ;  if  it  relaxes  one  bit  to  pressure  it  is  gone, 
and  I  know  that  such  is  not  the  National  feeling.  This 
feeling  assumes  various  shapes,  but  always  comes  back  to 
that  of  Union.  Once  admit  the  Union,  once  acknowledge 
the  authority  of  the  National  Government,  and  instead  of  de 
voting  your  houses  and  streets  and  roads  to  the  dread  uses 
of  war,  I  and  this  army  at  once  become  your  protectors  and 
supporters,  shielding  you  from  danger,  let  it  come  from  what 
quarter  it  may.  I  know  that  a  few  individuals  can  not  resist 
a  torrent  of  error  and  passion  such  as  swept  the  South  into 
rebellion,  but  you  can  point  out,  so  we  may  know,  those  who 
desire  a  government  and  those  who  insist  on  war  and  its 
desolation. 

You  might  as  well  appeal  against  the  thunderstorms  as 
against  the  terrible  hardships  of  war.  They  are  inevitable, 
and  the  only  way  the  people  of  Atlanta  can  hope  to  live  in 
peace  and  quiet  at  home  is  to  stop  this  war,  which  can 
alone  be  done  by  admitting  that  it  began  in  error  and  is  per 
petuated  in  pride.  We  don't  want  your  negroes,  or  your 
horses,  or  your  land,  or  anything  you  have  ;  but  we  do  want 
and  will  have  a  just  obedience  to  the  laws  of  the  United 
States.  That  we  will  have,  and  if  it  involves  the  destruction 
of  your  improvements  we  can  not  help  it.  You  have  here 
tofore  read  public  sentiment  in  your  newspapers,  that  live  by 
falsehood  and  excitement,  and  the  quicker  you  seek  the  truth 
in  other  quarters  the  better  for  you. 

I  repeat,  then,  that  by  the  original  compact  of  Govern 
ment  the  United  States  held  certain  rights  in  Georgia  which 
have  never  been  relinquished,  and  never  will  be  ;  that  the 
South  began  the  war  by  seizing  forts,  arsenals,  mints,  custom 
houses,  etc.,  long  before  Mr.  Lincoln  was  installed,  and 
before  the  South  had  one  jot  or  tittle  of  provocation.  I  my 
self  have  seen  in  Missouri,  Kentucky,  Tennessee,  and  Mis- 


THE   MARCH    TO   THE   SEA. 


251 


sissippi  hundreds  and  thousands  of  women  and  children  flee 
ing  from  your  armies  and  desperadoes,  hungry  and  with 
bleeding  feet.  In  Memphis,  Vicksburg,  and  Mississippi  we 
fed  thousands  upon  thousands  of  families  of  rebel  soldiers 
left  on  our  hands,  and  whom  we  could  not  see  starve.  Now 
that  war  comes  home  to  you,  you  feel  very  different ;  you 
deprecate  its  horrors,  but  did  not  feel  them  when  you  sent 
carloads  of  soldiers  and  ammunition  and  molded  shells  and 
shot  to  carry  war  into  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  and  deso 
late  the  homes  of  hundreds  and  thousands  of  good  people, 
who  only  asked  to  live  in  peace  at  their  old  homes  and  under 
the  Government  of  their  inheritance.  But  these  comparisons 
are  idle.  I  want  peace,  and  believe  it  can  only  be  reached 
through  Union  and  war,  and  I  will  conduct  war  purely  with 
a  view  to  perfect  and  early  success. 

But,  my  dear  sirs,  when  that  peace  does  come,  you  may 
call  on  me  for  anything.  Then  I  will  share  with  you  the  last 
cracker,  and  watch  with  you  to  shield  your  homes  and  fami 
lies  against  danger  from  every  quarter.  Now  you  must  go, 
and  take  with  you  the  old  and  feeble  ;  feed  and  nurse  them, 
and  build  for  them,  in  more  quiet  places,  proper  habitations 
to  shield  them  against  the  weather  until  the  mad  passions  of 
men  cool  down,  and  allow  the  Union  and  peace  once  more 
to  settle  on  your  old  homes  at  Atlanta. 
Yours  in  haste, 

W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Major-General. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  Division  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  MARIETTA,  GA.,  June  jo  1864. 
Mrs.  ANNIE  OILMAN  BOWER,  Baltimore,  Md. 

DEAR  MADAM  :  Your  welcome  letter  of  June  i8th  came 
to  me  amid  the  sound  of  battle,  and,  as  you  say,  little  did  I 
dream  when  I  knew  you,  playing  as  a  schoolgirl  on  Sullivan's 
Island  beach,  that  I  should  control  a  vast  army  pointing, 
like  the  swarm  of  Alaric,  toward  the  plains  of  the  South. 
Why,  oh  why,  is  this  ?  If  I  know  my  own  heart,  it  beats  as 
warmly  as  ever  toward  those  kind  and  generous  families  that 
greeted  us  with  such  warm  hospitality  in  days  long  past 
but  still  present  in  memory  ;  and  to-day  were  Frank  and 
Mrs.  Porcher,  or  Eliza  Gilman,  or  Mary  Lamb,  or  Mar 
garet  Blake,  the  Barksdales,  the  Quarles,  the  Poyas,  indeed, 
any  and  all  our  cherished  circle,  their  children,  or  even  their 
children's  children,  to  come  to  me  as  of  old,  the  stern  feelings 
of  duty  would  melt  as  snow  before  a  genial  sun,  and  I  be 
lieve  I  would  strip  my  own  children  that  they  might  be  shel 
tered.  And  yet  they  call  me  barbarian,  vandal,  a  monster, 


252  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

and  all  the  epithets  that  language  can  invent  that  are  sig 
nificant  of  malignity  and  hate  !  All  I  pretend  to  say,  on 
earth  as  in  heaven,  man  must  submit  to  some  arbiter.  He 
must  not  throw  off  his  allegiance  to  his  Government  or  his 
God  without  just  reason  or  cause.  The  South  has  no  cause, 
not  even  a  pretext.  Indeed,  by  her  unjustifiable  course  she 
has  thrown  away  the  proud  history  of  the  past,  and  laid  open 
her  fair  country  to  the  tread  of  devastating  war.  '  She  has 
bantered  and  bullied  us  to  the  conflict.  Had  we  declined 
battle  America  would  have  sunk  back  coward  and  craven, 
meriting  the  contempt  of  all  mankind.  As  a  nation  we  were 
forced  to  accept  battle,  and  that  once  begun  it  has  gone  on 
till  the  war  has  assumed  proportions  at  which  we,  in  the 
hurly-burly,  sometimes  stand  aghast.  I  would  not  subjugate 
the  South  in  the  sense  so  offensively  assumed,  but  I  would 
make  every  citizen  of  the  land  obey  the  common  law,  submit 
to  the  same  that  we  do — no  more,  no  less — our  equals  and 
not  our  superiors.  I  know  and  you  know  that  there  were 
young  men  in  our  day,  men  no  longer  young  but  who  control 
their  fellows,  who  assumed  to  the  gentlemen  of  the  South  a 
superiority  of  courage,  and  boastingly  defied  us  of  Northern 
birth  to  arms.  God  only  knows  how  reluctantly  we  accepted 
the  issue,  but  once  the  issue  joined,  like  in  other  ages,  the 
Northern  races,  though  slow  to  anger,  once  aroused  are  more 
terrible  than  the  more  inflammable  of  the  South.  Even  yet 
my  heart  bleeds  when  I  see  the  carnage  of  battle,  the  deso 
lation  of  homes,  the  bitter  anguish  of  families  ;  but  the  very 
moment  the  men  of  the  South  say  that  instead  of  appealing 
to  war  they  should  have  appealed  to  reason,  to  our  Congress, 
to  our  courts,  to  religion,  and  to  the  experience  of  history,  then 
will  I  say  peace,  peace.  Go  back  to  your  points  of  error  and 
resume  your  places  as  American  citizens,  with  all  their  proud 
heritages.  Whether  I  shall  live  to  see  this  period  is  problem 
atical,  but  you  may,  and  may  tell  your  mother  and  sisters 
that  I  never  forget  one  kind  look  or  greeting,  or  ever  wished 
to  efface  its  remembrance,  but  putting  on  the  armor  of  war  I 
did  it  that  our  common  country  should  not  perish  in  infamy 
and  disgrace.  I  am  married — have  a  wife  and  six  children 
living  in  Lancaster,  Ohio.  My  career  has  been  an  eventful 
one,  but  I  hope  when  the  clouds  of  anger  and  passion  are 
dispersed,  and  truth  emerges  bright  and  clear,  you  and  all 
who  knew  me  in  early  years  will  not  blush  that  we  were  once 
close  friends.  Tell  Eliza  for  me  that  I  hope  she  will  live  to 
realize  that  the  doctrine  of  secession  is  as  monstrous  in  our 
civil  code  as  disobedience  was  in  the  divine  law.  And 
should  the  fortunes  of  war  ever  bring  your  mother  or  sisters 


THE    MARCH    TO   THE   SEA. 


253 


or  any  of  the  old  clique  under  the  shelter  of  my  authority,  I 
do  not  believe  they  will  have  cause  to  regret  it. 

Give  my  love  to  your  children,  and  the  assurance  of  my 
respect  to  your  honored  husband.  Truly, 

W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Major-General. 

These  together  repeat  the  ancient  maxim,  Dc- 
bcllarc  snpcrbos,  parccrc  victis — relentless  war  was 
against  the  armed  foe,  grace  and  mercy  to  the  con 
quered  who  submit. 

On  the  I4th  Colonel  Poe,  with  a  working  party, 
destroyed  the  railroad  depot,  machine  shops,  and 
other  structures  that  would  aid  the  operations  of 
war,  leaving  untouched  dwellings,  stores,  churches, 
municipal  buildings.  Next  day  the  army  moved. 
The  number  of  men  in  the  command,  commis 
sioned  officers  and  enlisted,  on  detail  or  present  for 
duty  was  :  In  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  28,365  ;  in 
the  Army  of  Georgia,  28,708 ;  in  Kilpatrick's  com 
mand,  including  a  four-gun  battery,  5,130;  total, 
62,204.  These  numbers  are  taken  from  the  report 
of  the  3Oth  of  November. 

The  troops  took  the  road,  ignorant  whither 
they  were  going,  but  buoyant,  confident,  expect 
ing  to  reach  the  sea  at  some  point,  sure  of  dimin 
ishing  the  territory  from  which  Lee  could  draw 
recruits  and  supplies,  and  some  sanguine  of  reach 
ing  Richmond  in  time  to  take  part  in  an  engage 
ment  which  would  end  the  war.  The  Army  of 
Georgia  moved  to  the  east,  apparently  striking  for 
Augusta ;  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  to  the  south, 
in  the  direction  of  Macon,  with  its  right  flank  cov 
ered  by  Kilpatrick. 

The  Fourteenth  Corps  thoroughly  destroyed 
the  railroad  at  Madison,  and  a  division  was  sent 
beyond  to  the  Oconee  to  destroy  the  railroad 
bridge  there.  Turning  south,  all  reached  Milledge- 
ville  on  the  23d.  The  Fourteenth  Corps  moved 
eastward  as  far  as  Covington,  and  thence  south 
east  to  Milledgeville,  arriving  there  on  the  23d. 


254  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

The  Seventeenth  Corps  marched  southeast  by 
Jonesboro  and  McDonough  to  the  crossing  of  the 
Ockmulgee,  at  Planter's  Factory,  and  the  Fifteenth, 
taking  at  first  a  more  southerly  course,  changed 
direction  so  as  to  join  the  Seventeenth  at  the  cross 
ing.  Kilpatrick,  covering  the  right  flank  of  the 
army,  continued  south  to  Lovejoy's,  where  a  por 
tion  of  Wheeler's  command  held  the  old  works. 
Dividing  his  force  into  two  columns,  one  dis 
mounted,  charged  upon  and  carried  the  works, 
while  the  other  pursued  the  artillery  and  captured 
two  guns.  He  then  turned  and  reached  Planter's 
Factory,  while  the  infantry  were  still  crossing.  The 
farther  bank  of  the  river  was  high,  steep,  and  of 
clay,  made  slippery  by  rain.  The  troops  had  to 
help  the  mules  to  get  wagons  up  the  ascent.  The 
Seventeenth  Corps  reached  Gordon,  on  the  Macon 
and  Savannah  Railroad,  twelve  miles  south  of  Mil- 
ledgeville.  Part  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps  was  guard 
ing  and  aiding  trains  over  the  impassable  road, 
while  C.  R.  Woods's  division  moved  to  guard  the 
rear  toward  Macon.  Hardee  had  been  relieved 
of  the  command  of  a  corps  in  Hood's  army  and  ap 
pointed  to  command  a  department  comprising 
Savannah  and  adjacent  territory  in  Georgia  and 
South  Carolina.  When  Sherman  left  Atlanta  the 
whole  field  of  operations  in  Georgia  was  added  to 
the  department.  Hardee  was  in  Macon  on  the 
2ist  with  Governor  Brown,  of  Georgia,  and  learned 
that  the  only  force  in  his  department  besides  Mc- 
Law's  division,  which  was  the  garrison  of  Savan 
nah,  was  Wheeler's  cavalry  and  Smith's  division 
of  Georgia  militia.  Feeling  sure  that  Macon  was 
not  threatened,  he  ordered  Smith  to  Augusta,  and 
at  once  returned  to  Savannah. 

On  the  22d  Kilpatrick  made  a  dash  upon  the 
railroad  near  Macon.  Wolcutt's  brigade,  sent  out 
by  General  Woods  to  reconnoiter  toward  Macon, 
pushed  back  a  detachment  of  Wheeler's  cavalry, 


THE   MARCH   TO  THE  SEA.  255 

and  fell  back  to  Griswold.  Wolcutt  placed  his  com 
mand  in  the  edge  of  the  timber,  with  swampy  land 
on  each  flank,  and  awaited  the  advance  of  Smith's 
division,  which  approached  supported  by  Wheel 
er's  cavalry.  The  Confederate  infantry  advanced  in 
three  lines,  and  reached  with  little  loss  a  ravine  or 
depression  parallel  with  Wolcutt's  line,  and  only 
seventy-five  yards  from  it.  When  the  Confederate 
lines  appeared  emerging  from  the  hollow,  so  deadly 
a  fire  at  short  range  met  them  that  they  fell  back 
in  disorder  to  shelter.  Three  times  the  assault  was 
made,  and  every  time  with  disastrous  loss.  They 
withdrew,  leaving,  the  reports  say,  three  hundred 
dead  on  the  field. 

Detailed  foraging  parties  brought  in  abundant 
supplies  of  corn  and  fodder  for  the  animals,  and 
sweet  potatoes,  corn  meal,  bacon,  and  poultry  for 
the  men.  Fine  mules  took  the  place  of  the  jaded 
animals  in  the  teams,  and  horses  were  found  to 
replenish  the  cavalry  and  artillery.  Napoleon  says, 
in  his  maxims,  there  are  two  ways  of  maintaining 
an  army  in  the  enemy's  country — one,  by  requisi 
tion  on  municipal  authorities ;  the  other,  by  direct 
seizure.  In  Georgia  there  was  no  choice ;  direct 
seizure  was  the  only  resource.  But  pillaging  from 
dwellings  was  prohibited,  and  an  order  prescribed, 
death  as  the  penalty  for  any  one  convicted  by  court- 
martial  of  such  offense.  A  soldier  of  the  first  divi 
sion  of  the  Seventeenth  Corps  was  charged  with 
stealing  a  quilt  from  a  dwelling  near  Gordon.  The 
court-martial  found  him  guilty,  and  sentenced  him 
"  to  be  shot  to  death  by  musketry,  at  such  time  and 
place  as  the  commanding  general  may  direct."  The 
proceedings  and  findings  were  approved,  but  Gen 
eral  Howard  commuted  the  sentence  to  imprison 
ment  during  the  war  at  Dry  Tortugas,  Fla.  The 
prisoner  was  taken  by  guards  to  Tortugas,  and  re 
mained  imprisoned  there  until  released  by  order  of 
the  adjutant  general  of  the  army,  dated  May  27, 1865. 


256  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

The  army  assembled  at  Milledgeville  and  Gor 
don  on  the  23d,  and  resumed  the  march  on  the 
24th.  The  right  wing  followed  the  Savannah  Rail 
road,  destroying  it  on  the  way.  The  left  wing 
moved  by  roads  north  of  the  railroad,  and  generally 
parallel  to  it.  The  Oconee  was  swollen,  and  with  a 
rapid  current.  General  H.  C.  Wayne  with  a  small 
force  of  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery  held  the 
railroad  crossing  of  the  Oconee  and  fortified  it. 
But  General  Howard  succeeded  in  laying  two  pon 
toon  bridges,  one  four  miles  above  and  the  other 
below,  while  engaging  Wayne  in  his  works,  and 
crossed  one  corps  on  each  bridge.  Kilpatrick  was 
sent  to  destroy  the  important  railroad  bridge 
over  Brier  Creek,  on  the  branch  road  to  Augusta. 
Wheeler,  with  the  Confederate  cavalry,  a  large 
body,  started  in  pursuit,  overtook  in  the  night 
Kilpatrick's  rear  guard  of  two  regiments,  ran  over 
them,  and  drove  them  on  to  the  main  body.  Kil 
patrick  was  so  pushed  that  he  barely  set  fire  to  the 
bridge,  and  had  to  turn  to  the  south.  He  was  reck 
less  enough  to  sleep  one  night  in  a  house  distant 
from  his  camp,  having  one  regiment  for  guard. 
Wheeler,  learning  the  fact,  dashed  in  the  night  upon 
the  little  camp  so  suddenly  that  commander  and  men 
rushed  from  their  sleep,  and  ran  to  the  woods  in 
rout.  After  this  Kilpatrick  brought  his  men,  jaded 
and  thinned  by  loss,  to  the  lines  of  the  army.  Gen 
eral  Sherman  ordered  captured  horses  to  be  turned 
over  to  him.  After  a  few  days'  rest,  the  cavalry 
set  out  again  to  burn  the  bridge  and  to  fight  Wheel 
er.  Coming  upon  him  near  Waynesboro,  Kil 
patrick  broke  his  line,  put  him  to  retreat,  and  drove 
him  through  Waynesboro.  Wheeler  took  position 
beyond  and  awaited  attack.  Kilpatrick,  coming 
up  on  the  5th  of  December,  finding  that  Wheeler's 
line  outreached  his  on  both  flanks,  massed,  and 
with  a  rush  broke  through  Wheeler's  center,  and 
forced  him  to  retreat.  Kilpatrick  this  time  de- 


THE    MARCH    TO   THE   SEA.  257 

stroyed  the  railroad  bridge  and  smaller  bridge  over 
Brier  Creek.  He  returned  to  the  route  of  the 
army,  and  there  was  no  more  righting  till  Savannah 
was  reached.  Kilpatrick  had  been  expected  to 
reach  Millen  in  time  to  release  the  prisoners  of 
war  confined  there.  But  his  protracted  engage 
ments  with  Wheeler  gave  opportunity  to  the  Con 
federate  authorities  to  remove  the  ten  thousand 
National  soldiers  confined  there  to  Florence,  in 
South  Carolina,  and  when  the  Seventeenth  Corps 
reached  Millen,  on  the  3d  of  December,  the  prison 
was  empty. 

Up  to  this  date  the  Confederate  authorities 
were  uncertain  as  to  Sherman's  destination.  When 
Augusta  seemed  to  be  his  objective  point,  Presi 
dent  Davis  sent  Bragg  thither,  and  gave  him  com 
mand  to  the  coast,  including  Savannah  and  Hood. 
When  the  probability  inclined  to  Savannah,  Beau- 
regard's  jurisdiction  was  extended  to  the  Atlan 
tic,  embracing  Bragg  and  Hood,  so  that  his  au 
thority  extended  from  the  coast  of  Georgia  to  the 
western  boundary  of  Texas.  Beauregard  insisted 
that  Sherman's  ultimate  design  was  to  re-enforce 
Grant  before  Richmond.  He  ordered  Hood  to 
move  into  Tennessee  to  make  a  diversion  in  relief 
of  Lee,  and  when  he  learned  that  A.  J.  Smith  was 
leaving  Missouri  to  report  to  Thomas,  he  ordered 
Kirby  Smith,  who  was  in  command  west  of  the  Mis 
sissippi,  to  send  two  divisions  to  the  aid  of  Hood,  or 
else  to  invade  Missouri  himself  and  compel  the 
return  of  A.  J.  Smith  in  Missouri. 

The  four  corps  were  abreast  at  Millen,  the  Fif 
teenth  Corps  south  of  the  Ogeechee,the  Seventeenth 
north  of  and  near  to  the  river,  and  the  Twentieth 
and  Fourteenth  four  and  ten  miles  to  the  north, 
presenting  a  front  of  twenty  miles.  From  Millen 
onward  the  two  rivers  Savannah  and  Ogeechee  ap 
proach  each  other,  restricting  the  field  for  forag 
ing,  and  the  substitution  of  rice  fields  in  place  of 


258  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

corn  and  potatoes  very  largely  cut  off  the  supply 
of  subsistence.  The  roads  passed  at  times  through 
fragrant  pine  forest,  whose  tall  trunks  stood  far 
apart,  though  the  dense  foliage  far  overhead  inter 
laced  and  shut  out  the  sun.  At  other  times  the 
struggle  to  wade  through  and  get  the  trains  through 
deep  and  tangled  swamps  kept  weary  columns  on 
the  march  till  late  in  the  night.  On  the  5th  of  De 
cember  the  Seventeenth  Corps  came  upon  some 
fieldworks  thrown  up  by  McLaws's  division,  but 
abandoned.  On  the  7th  and  8th  the  roads  were 
found  obstructed  by  felled  trees.  The  men  who 
did  the  work  were  ascertained,  and  their  houses 
were  burned  by  order.  On  the  8th  a  newspaper 
was  found  which  gave  in  one  paragraph  a  brief 
account  of  Hood's  bloody  repulse  at  Franklin, 
and  of  the  loss  of  thirteen  of  his  general  officers 
killed  or  wounded.  With  the  rejoicing  over  the 
victory  was  regret  at  the  death  of  some  familiar 
names,  especially  General  Cleburne,  commander  of 
"  Cleburne's  Fighting  Division." 

On  the  Qth  a  torpedo  exploded  in  the  road,  kill 
ing  a  staff  officer  and  his  horse.  General  Sherman 
sent  the  prisoners  to  the  front  with  spades  to  dig 
up  any  more  that  might  be  found.  But  there  were 
no  more.  In  the  afternoon,  the  head  of  the  col 
umn  having  advanced  into  a  swamp,  found  that  a 
battery  at  the  exit  on  the  other  side  commanded 
the  road.  The  troops,  diverging  from  the  road  to 
right  and  left,  protected  from  view  by  the  dense 
growth,  emerged  on  the  flanks  of  the  works,  and 
found  them  abandoned.  Warned  by  the  plashing 
and  crackling,  the  defenders  had  evacuated  and 
taken  a  waiting  train  for  Savannah.  On  the  loth 
the  army  was  deployed  in  front  of  the  defenses  of 
the  city,  and  on  the  I2th  was  in  position. 

The  sources  of  a  small  creek  which,  flowing 
north,  emptied  into  the  Savannah  River  about  three 
miles  above  the  city,  interlaced  the  head  of  a  still 


THE   MARCH   TO   THE   SEA.  259 

smaller  stream,  which,  flowing  south  through  a 
swamp,  formed  the  Little  Ogeechee.  The  low  flat 
of  land  on  each  side  had  been  turned  into  rice 
fields,  and  a  system  of  embankments  kept  the  water 
in  the  creek  about  seven  feet,  and  on  the  sub 
merged  land  about  four  feet  deep.  The  water  sur 
face  varied  from  two  hundred  to  five  hundred  yards 
in  width,  and  wasx:rossed  only  by  a  few  roads,  each 
built  upon  an  embankment,  and  having  a  bridge 
over  the  channel  of  the  creek.  The  shore  toward 
Savannah  was  lined  with  infantry  intrenchments, 
and  batteries  crowning  every  rising  ground  and 
every  jutting  point  swept  with  cross  fire  the  roads 
and  the  water  surface.  The  batteries  were  armed 
with  eighty-one  siege  guns  and  forty-eight  field- 
pieces,  and  the  force  that  defended  this  line  num 
bered  something  over  twelve  thousand  officers  and 
men.  The  besiegers  were  not  in  a  continuous  line, 
but  encamped  in  groves  of  timber  adjoining  the 
water,  out  of  view,  and  with  trenches  for  shelter 
during  cannonade.  Batteries  mounting  fifty-six 
guns  were  placed  at  convenient  points  to  engage 
the  batteries  across  the  water.  The  Twentieth 
Corps,  on  the  extreme  left,  threw  some  troops  upon 
the  islands  in  the  river.  On  its  right  was  the  Four 
teenth,  then  the  Seventeenth  and  Fifteenth,  which 
stretched  to  Kings  Bridge  over  the  Ogeechee, 
twelve  miles  from  Savannah. 

Subsistence  was  nearly  exhausted,  animals  were 
living  partly  and  men  almost  wholly  upon  rice. 
The  first  necessity  was  to  open  communication 
with  the  fleet,  which  had  already  been  advised  of 
Sherman's  arrival,  and  which  was  supposed  to  be 
in  Ossabaw  Sound,  the  mouth  of  the  Ogeechee. 
The  passage  down  the  river  was  obstructed  by  Fort 
McAllister  on  its  bank,  just  below  the  great  bend. 
General  Sherman  promptly  on  arriving  directed 
General  Howard  to  repair  Kings  Bridge,  which  had 
been  partially  destroyed,  and  send  a  division  to 


26o  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

capture  the  fort.  The  repairs  were  finished  by  the 
night  of  the  I2th,  and  General  Hazen's  division 
marched  over  at  sunrise  on  the  I3th  to  the  right 
bank  of  the  river. 

The  fort  was  an  irregular  quadrilateral,  stand 
ing  upon  the  river  bank.  The  front  and  the  flanks 
were  solid  ramparts,  armed  with  heavy  guns.  The 
gorge  was  closed  by  lighter  intrenchment,  with 
fieldpieces  in  barbette.  The  armament  was  eleven 
siege  guns,  one  ten-inch  mortar,  and  twelve  field- 
pieces.  The  work  was  surrounded  by  a  ditch,  with 
a  stout  palisade  along  the  middle.  The  adjoining 

¥  round  had  been  covered  by  a  forest  of  live  oaks, 
he  branches  of  those  near  the  fort  had  been  cut 
and  used  in  constructing  a  heavy  abattis,  while  the 
stumps  were  left  standing.  The  ground  was  thickly 
planted  with  torpedoes.  The  garrison  comprised 
over  two  hundred  men,  commanded  by  Major 
Anderson. 

Hazen  formed  his  three  brigades  in  three  sepa 
rate  lines,  facing  respectively  the  rear  and  the  flanks 
of  the  fort.  General  Sherman,  who  had  ridden  in 
the  saddle  down  the  left  bank  of  the  river  and  taken 
a  position  upon  a  lookout  on  the  Cheves  planta 
tion,  across  the  big  bend,  getting  anxious  when  the 
sun  had  declined  till  it  was  only  an  hour  high,  sig 
naled  to  Hazen  to  attack  at  once.  The  three  lines 
issued  simultaneously  from  the  surrounding  woods, 
each  preceded  by  a  strong  line  of  skirmishers,  and 
advanced  rapidly,  converging  upon  the  fort.  Artil 
lery  and  musketry  fire  poured  from  the  ramparts, 
and  as  the  assailants  approached  torpedoes  ex 
ploded  beneath  their  tread.  The  skirmishers,  tak 
ing  shelter  behind  the  standing  trunks,  drove  the 
artillerists  from  their  guns  and  silenced  the  mus 
ketry.  The  lines  rushed  into  the  ditch,  tore  down 
the  palisades,  and  clambered  over  the  walls. 

Anderson  refused  to  surrender,  and  the  fight 
ing  continued  till  the  defenders  separately  surren- 


THE   MARCH   TO   THE   SEA.  26l 

dered.  Hazen  lost  twenty-four  killed  and  one  hun 
dred  and  ten  wounded ;  the  loss  of  the  garrison 
was  forty-eight.  General  Sherman  found  a  row- 
boat  and  was  rowed  down  to  General  Hazen's  tem 
porary  headquarters,  then  walked  to  the  fort,  and 
was  rowed  six  miles  down  the  windings  of  the 
river  until  he  came  upon  a  small  steamer,  the  Dan 
delion,  which  had  been  sent  up  from  the  fleet  for 
news.  After  writing  hasty  dispatches  to  the  Secre 
tary  of  War,  General  Grant,  Admiral  Dahlgren, 
and  General  Foster,  he  returned  to  the  fort  and  to 
General  Hazen's  headquarters.  He  took  his  place 
on  the  floor,  where  Hazen  and  his  staff  were  lying 
asleep,  but  before  long  was  roused  by  a  messenger 
from  General  Foster,  who  was  an  invalid  on  a 
steamer  below,  and  begged  an  interview.  While 
hearing  Foster's  report,  he  continued  the  voyage 
till  Admiral  Dahlgren  was  found  on  his  flagship 
in  \Vassabaw  Sound.  Arrangements  were  made  by 
General  Foster  to  forward  the  supplies  accumu 
lated  at  Port  Royal  in  anticipation  of  Sherman's 
arrival,  and  adding  to  them  some  siege  guns.  The 
admiral  undertook  to  provide  light-draught  steam 
ers  for  their  transport,  and  Sherman  returned,  ar 
riving  at  the  lines  by  noon  of  the  I5th. 

On  the  i6th  steamboats  began  to  arrive  with 
supplies.  One  of  them  brought  mail.  Colonel 
Mark-land,  special  mail  agent  for  Sherman's  army, 
had  been  at  Baltimore  gathering  in  mail  matter  for 
all  members  of  the  army,  and  took  the  accumula 
tion  ^to  Port  Royal  on  the  first  intimation  of  Sher 
man's  approach  to  the  coast.  Ambulances  carried 
the  assorted  mails  to  every  brigade  headquarters. 
Few  men  received  nothing.  Over  fifty  thousand 
sat  by  the  evening  camp  fires  poring  over  their 
letters,  transported  for  the  time  to  their  homes  and 
families.  Sherman  received  two  letters  from  Gen 
eral  Grant,  one  dated  the  3d,  the  other  the  6th  of 
December.  In  the  latter  Grant  said :  "  Mv  idea 


262  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

now  is  that  you  establish  a  base  on  the  seacoast, 
fortify  and  leave  it  all  your  artillery  and  cavalry, 
and  enough  infantry  to  protect  them,  and  at  the 
same  time  so  threaten  their  interior  that  the  militia 
of  the  South  will  have  to  be  kept  at  home.  With 
the  balance  of  your  command  come  here  by  water 
with  all  dispatch.  Select  yourself  the  officer  to 
leave  in  command,  but  you  I  want  in  person  unless 
you  see  objections  to  this  plan  which  I  can  not 
see.  Use  every  vessel  going  to  you  for  the  purpose 
of  transportation."  This  letter  was  a  crushing  dis 
appointment  to  Sherman.  He  felt  that  the  march 
to  Savannah  was  only  the  preliminary  step  to  his 
plan.  The  main  achievement  was  to  be  a  march 
across  the  Carolinas,  abbreviating  day  by  day,  by 
every  day's  march,  the  field  of  supplies  for  Lee, 
gradually  isolating  him  from  support,  and  bring 
ing  in  re-enforcement  to  Grant  an  army  complete, 
compact,  inured  to  fatigue,  and  exultant.  To  give 
up  this,  to  dismember  his  command,  and  take  a 
fragment,  jaded  by  a  sea  voyage,  to  join  the  disci 
plined  and  equipped  Army  of  the  Potomac,  seemed 
a  poor  exchange. 

But  a  soldier  has  only  to  obey.  Immediately 
on  reading  Grant's  letter,  Sherman  began  to  carry 
out  its  directions.  Before  the  day  was  over  he  had 
selected  Fort  McAllister  as  the  site  of  his  fortified 
base,  determined  its  general  design,  and  ordered 
Colonel  Poe,  his  chief  engineer,  to  reconnoiter  the 
ground  for  the  purpose.  On  the  same  day  he  wrote 
to  General  Grant  a  report  in  brief  of  his  march, 
with  a  full  statement  of  his  present  situation  and 
the  steps  he  had  already  taken  to  carry  out  the  plan 
of  operations  as  indicated  by  General  Grant.  Of 
the  campaign  of  which  he  had  proposed  for  him 
self,  he  said :  "  Indeed,  with  my  present  command 
I  had  expected,  after  reducing  Savannah,  instantly 
to  march  to  Columbia,  S.  C.,  thence  to  Raleigh,  and 
thence  to  report  to  you.  But  this  would  consume, 


THE   MARCH    TO   THE  SEA. 


263 


it  may  be,  six  weeks'  time  after  the  fall  of  Savan 
nah,  whereas  by  sea  I  can  probably  meet  you  with 
my  men  and  arms  before  the  middle  of  January." 

Meanwhile  there  was  no  relaxation  in  the  siege. 
He  distributed  and  mounted  siege  guns  that  he  ob 
tained  from  General  Foster,  and  made  incessant 
reconnoissance  to  find  some  practicable  passage 
over  to  the  enemy's  lines.  On  the  morning  of  the 
1 7th,  he  sent  by  flag  of  truce  to  General  Hardee  a 
summons  to  surrender.  Next  morning  came  the 
answer,  a  refusal. 

An  assault  must  be  made.  But  first  he  deter 
mined  that  a  road  by  which  Hardee  could  escape 
should  be  occupied.  Hardee  could  lay  a  pontoon 
bridge  from  the  city  across  the  river,  and  by  a  mud 
road  for  twelve  miles  gain  the  railroad.  General 
Slocum  desired  to  take  from  his  army  sufficient 
force — an  entire  corps,  if  needed — cross  the  river, 
and  seize  the  road.  He  had  captured  two  of  the 
gunboats  which  Hardee  had  in  the  river,  one  of 
which  was  burned  and  the  other  disabled,  had  oc 
cupied  the  islands  opposite  his  flank,  and  planted 
a  brigade  on  the  farther  shore.  But  the  enemy  still 
had  four  gunboats,  and  Sherman  preferred  to  get 
General  Foster  to  land  a  force  from  seaward  and 
occupy  the  road.  On  the  evening  of  the  i8th  he 
left  for  Hilton  Head,  when  General  Foster  heartily 
promised  to  give  the  co-operation  desired.  Late  in 
the  evening  of  the  2Oth  the  pickets  of  Geary's  di 
vision  of  the  Twentieth  Corps  and  of  Leggett's  di 
vision  of  the  Seventeenth  Corps  heard  sounds  of 
evacuation,  and  the  two  divisions,  starting  at  day 
light,  found  the  city  abandoned  by  Hardee,  who  had 
left  with  his  garrison  and  light  artillery.  Geary 
having  but  three  miles  to  march,  while  Leggett  had 
six,  entered  first.  General  Sherman,  returning  in 
the  evening  of  the  2ist,  was  met  on  the  way  by  a 
messenger  with  the  news  of  the  occupation  of  the 
Southern  city. 
18 


264  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

To  the  damage  done  in  the  march  by  the  de 
struction  of  two  hundred  miles  of  railway,  with 
bridges,  trestles,  depots,  and  auxiliary  structures, 
and  the  capture  of  thousands  of  horses,  mules,  and 
cattle,  as  well  as  enormous  quantities  of  subsistence, 
was  now  added  in  the  capture  of  Savannah  the  cap 
ture  of  two  hundred  and  fifty  pieces  of  artillery, 
with  large  stores  of  ammunition  and  locomotives 
and  cars,  and  four  steamboats,  besides  the  destruc 
tion  of  an  ironclad  gunboat  and  a  ram,  destroyed 
by  Hardee  to  prevent  their  capture.  General  Sher 
man's  dispatch  to  the  President,  "  I  beg  to  present 
you  as  a  Christmas  gift  the  city  of  Savannah,  with 
one  hundred  and  fifty  heavy  guns  and  plenty  of  am 
munition,  and  also  about  twenty-five  thousand  bales 
of  cotton,"  reached  Mr.  Lincoln  Christmas  Day,  and 
spread  joy  through  the  land. 

Savannah  was  under  military  laws.  General 
Geary  was  the  first  commander.  Subject  to  mili 
tary  law,  the  mayor  and  council  resumed  their  func 
tions,  the  municipal  courts  were  opened,  schools 
and  churches  were  filled,  customers  thronged  the 
shops,  and  the  streets,  enlivened  by  soldiers  in  uni 
form,  had  the  appearance  of  a  holiday.  All  was 
peace,  harmony,  and  ease.  General  Sherman  pub 
lished  an  order  prescribing  the  limits  of  privilege, 
and  the  city  resumed  a  share  of  prosperity.  On 
the  nth  of  January  the  Secretary  of  War  arrived, 
accompanied  by  the  quartermaster  general  and  the 
adjutant  general  of  the  army,  and  by  a  retinue  of 
civilians,  who  came  to  take  possession  of  the  cap 
tured  property  and  to  administer  the  affairs  of  the 
Confederate  city. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

THE    CAROLINAS. 

GENERAL  GRANT'S  letter  to  Sherman,  notifying 
him  to  bring  his  army  by  sea  to  Richmond,  was 
written  on  the  6th  of  December,  four  days  before 
Sherman  reached  the  defenses  of  Savannah.  On 
the  1 8th  he  wrote  that  it  would  take  too  long  to 
move  the  army  by  sea  by  obtainable  transporta 
tion,  and  it  seemed  better  that  Sherman  should, 
after  capturing  Savannah  and  its  garrison,  operate 
in  South  Carolina.  Receiving  Sherman's  sugges 
tion  of  a  march  across  the  Carolinas,  he  at  once,  on 
the  27th  of  December,  wrote  in  hearty  concurrence, 
and  on  the  2ist  of  January  advised  Sherman  of  his 
co-operation,  ordering  General  Schofield's  entire 
corps  to  the  East,  to  advance  up  the  Neuse  River 
by  Newbern  to  Goldsboro,  and  General  Alfred  H. 
Terry,  who  had  already  captured  Fort  Fisher,  to 
take  Wilmington,  and  to  proceed  thence  to  the 
same  rendezvous. 

Recruits  came  from  the  North,  and  men  re 
turning  from  furlough  and  from  hospitals.  The 
morning  report  of  the  ist  of  February  showed  in 
the  command  fifty-eight  thousand  nine  hundred 
and  twenty-three  infantry,  forty-four  hundred  and 
thirty-eight  cavalry,  and  seventeen  hundred  and 
eighteen  artillery;  total,  sixty  thousand  and  sev 
enty-nine.  The  six-mule  wagons  numbered  about 
twenty-five  hundred ;  there  were  six  hundred  two- 
mule  ambulances,  sixty-eight  guns,  with  six  horses 
to  each,  and  sixty-eight  four-horse  caissons.  No 
tents  were  carried  but  one  office  tent  to  each  head- 

265 


266  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

quarters.  On  the  march  each  corps  was  -to  move 
by  a  separate  road,  and  only  artillery,  ambulances, 
and  wagons  were  to  use  roads ;  troops  were  to 
make  their  way  alongside.  Each  division  had  its 
own  supply  train.  As  nearly  as  practicable,  twenty 
days'  rations  of  bread  and  about  twenty  days'  of 
coffee,  sugar,  and  salt  were  taken.  But  little  meat 
was  carried  in  the  wagons ;  some  divisions  carried 
none.  Reliance  was  placed  on  cattle  driven  and 
on  foraging.  The  wagons  were  loaded  very  light, 
the  strongest  carrying  little  more  than  a  ton.  The 
roads  in  lower  South  Carolina  were  known  to  be 
miserable,  but  it  was  impossible  to  form  a  concep 
tion  of  their  indescribable  execrableness  without 
actual  experience. 

The  advance  of  the  Seventeenth  Corps  left  Sa 
vannah  on  the  4th  of  January,  1865,  embarked  in 
the  night  at  Thunderbolt,  and  reached  Beaufort 
next  evening.  The  whole  of  the  corps  was  on  the 
island  by  the  evening  of  the  6th.  On  the  I4th  the 
corps  crossed  by  a  pontoon  bridge  from  the  north 
ern  end  of  the  island,  and  pushed  out  toward  Poco- 
taligo.  The  Confederate  cavalry  made  a  gallant 
resistance,  and  were  aided  by  defensive  works 
strongly  placed,  as  well  as  by  the  natural  difficulties 
of  morass  and  lagoons.  By  sunset  the  enemy  was 
pushed  into  a  strong  work  with  massive  ramparts, 
armed  with  seventeen  guns,  some  of  them  of  heavy 
caliber,  and  protected  by  a  very  wide  and  deep 
wet  ditch.  The  work  was  evacuated  after  mid 
night  and  the  armament  carried  off.  Next  morn 
ing  the  corps  occupied  Pocotaligo  station  on  the 
railroad. 

General  Logan  returned  from  leave  and  resumed 
command  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps.  This  corps  pro 
posed  to  join  the  Seventeenth  by  marching  from 
the  bank  of  the  river  opposite  Savannah  over  a 
strip  of  ground  bordered  by  swamp  on  both  sides. 
John  E.  Smith  had  hardly  started  when  a  continu- 


THE   CAROLINAS.  267 

ous  deluging  rain  turned  the  soil  to  ooze.  -  The 
rising  water  broke  the  dikes,  flooded  the  road  near 
the  river,  and  threatened  to  sweep  away  the  divi 
sion  ;  they  barely  succeeded  in  struggling  to  solid 
ground.  Corse's  division  marched  up  the  bank 
of  the  Savannah  to  Sisterville  with  the  left  wing 
and  Kilpatrick.  The  other  two  divisions  of  the 
Fifteenth  Corps  proceeded  by  boat  to  Beaufort, 
and  joined  General  J.  E.  Smith  at  Coosawhatchie, 
near  Pocotaligo. 

General  Blair,  while  filling  his  trains  and  con 
structing  fortifications  and  intrenchments  to  be  oc 
cupied  by  General  Foster's  troops,  made  demon 
strations  from  time  to  time  at  points  on  the  Salkie- 
hatchie  River,  to  keep  up  the  impression  that 
Charleston  was  the  point  aimed  at.  Meanwhile 
General  Jeff  C.  Davis  was  toiling  at  the  task  of 
building  a  pontoon  bridge  over  the  Savannah,  a 
large  river,  whose  banks  were  several  feet  deep 
under  the  overflow,  and,  after  the  flood  subsided, 
clearing  out  miles  of  road  filled  with  a  mass  of  drift, 
compacted  with  artificial  obstructions  and  planted 
with  torpedoes. 

Part  of  the  left  wing  was  across  the  river  by  the 
4th  of  February,  and  ready  to  march  on  the  5th. 
Order  to  move  on  the  5th  of  February  was  issued, 
and  the  campaign  for  Columbia  was  begun  while 
the  Confederates  were  speculating  whether  Au 
gusta  or  Charleston  was  the  objective  point.  Blair 
marched  northwest  along  the  swamp  of  the  Salkie- 
hatchie,  while  Logan,  with  three  divisions  of  his 
corps,  moved  by  parallel  courses,  about  fifteen  miles 
away,  along  the  swamp  of  the  Coosawhatchie.  The 
troops  plunged  and  staggered  through  the  mud, 
pausing  to  remove  the  felled  trees  that  obstructed 
the  way,  and  skirmishing  all  the  while  with  the 
cavalry  that  pertinaciously  opposed  their  progress. 
Blair  reached  Whippy  Swamp  where  it  joins  the 
Salkiehatchie  at  8  P.  M. 


268  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

Next  morning  the  first  and  fourth  divisions 
crossed  Whippy  Swamp  and  proceeded  to  Rivers's 
Bridge  over  the  Salkiehatchie.  The  third  division 
continued  along  the  outer  border  of  Whippy 
Swamp,  with  directions  to  cross  at  Anglesea  Post 
Office,  and  hold  the  bridge  at  that  point  till  the 
Fifteenth  Corps  should  arrive  on  its  way  to  Bu- 
ford's  Bridge.  At  Rivers's  Bridge  the  Salkiehatchie 
spreads  in  winter  into  a  number  of  streams,  wind 
ing  between  bars  of  mud,  supporting  a  thick  growth 
of  trees,  making  a  tangle  of  swamp  and  water  a 
mile  and  a  half  across.  The  only  passage  was  a 
straight  causeway,  with  bridges  over  the  streams, 
which  was  commanded  its  whole  length  by  a  bat 
tery  erected  on  the  farther  bank. 

The  cavalry  which  had  doggedly  contested 
Blair's  progress  was  so  closely  followed  by  Blair's 
advance  that  all  the  bridges,  except  the  main  one 
close  under  the  battery,  were  saved.  The  guns  of 
the  battery  opened  fire,  and  killed  and  wounded 
some  of  the  pursuers  before  they  could  leap  from 
the  causeway  down  into  the  swamp.  Colonel 
Wager  Swayne,  a  most  valuable  officer  and  most 
estimable  man,  was  severely  wounded.  Mower's 
division  above  the  bridge  and  Giles  A.  Smith's 
below,  by  wading,  cutting  ways  through  the  woods, 
and  building  bridges,  forced  their  way  over  on  the 
3d  of  February,  and  emerged  on  dry  land.  The 
works,  being  entirely  open  at  the  rear,  were  flanked 
and  abandoned.  The  forces  holding  works  defend 
ing  Buford's  Bridge  above  and  Broxton's  Bridge 
below  at  the  same  time  evacuated  and  withdrew. 
General  Howard  reports  the  loss,  all  of  which  was 
in  Mower's  division,  as  ten  or  twelve  killed  and 
about  seventy  wounded.  Colonel  Harrison,  who 
commanded  the  Confederate  troops,  reported  his 
loss  as  eight  killed,  forty-four  wounded,  and  fifteen 
missing. 

General  Logan,  reaching  the  bridge  over  Whip- 


THE   CAROLINAS.  269 

py  Swamp  held  by  the  third  division,  passed  on 
to  Buford's  Bridge  over  the  Salkiehatchie,  and 
found  it  destroyed  and  the  works  guarding  it  aban 
doned.  The  Fifteenth  and  Seventeenth  Corps 
moved  on  the  6th,  through  rain  and  mud  and 
swamp,  to  the  crossings  of  the  Little  Salkiehatchie. 
Both  corps  found  the  bridges  destroyed.  Logan 
pushed  his  troops  through  the  streams  and  swamp, 
and,  emerging  from  them  in  front  of  a  long  line 
of  intrenchment,  charged  upon  the  works  and  car 
ried  them.  The  Seventeenth  Corps  found  the 
bridge  in  its  front  destroyed  and  abandoned.  On 
the  yth  both  corps  reached  the  railroad  running 
from  Branchville  to  Augusta,  making  the  connec 
tion  between  Charleston  and  Augusta.  General 
Corse,  who  had  left  the  Savannah  River  in  rear  of 
the  Twentieth  Corps,  and  for  part  of  the  way  had 
dragged  through  swampy  road,  made  deep  quag 
mire  by  the  heavy  rains  and  the  passage  of  two 
army  corps,  did  not  overtake  Logan  until  the  nth. 
The  Twentieth  Corps,  diverging  to  the  left  from 
the  Fifteenth  at  Buford's  Bridge,  struck  the  rail 
road  at  Blackville  on  the  Qth;  Kilpatrick  reached 
it  at  Barnwell  on  the  same  day.  The  Fourteenth 
Corps,  after  crossing  the  Savannah  at  Sister's 
Ferry,  and  moving  out  to  solid  ground,  marched 
up  the  river,  approaching  Augusta,  reached  the 
railroad  at  Williston  on  the  I2th.  The  railroad  was 
thoroughly  destroyed  for  a  distance  of  forty  miles. 
It  was  apprehended  that  this  important  road  might 
not  be  yielded  without  a  battle.  General  Howard, 
when  he  had  approached  within  five  miles  of  it, 
began  to  deploy.  Just  then  a  horseman  in  tattered 
clothing,  one  of  the  foragers,  came  galloping  from 
the  front  and  called  to  him :  "  Hurry  up,  general ; 
we  have  got  the  railroad." 

It  had  been  learned  that  rails  merely  bent  could 
be  put  through  a  rolling  mill  and  straightened,  while 
if  they  were  given  a  spiral  twist  they  would  have  to 


270  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

be  melted  and  run  out  again.  Accordingly,  in  this 
campaign  the  twist  was  required.  In  one  case  a 
brigade  failed  to  observe  the  order,  and  was  re 
quired  to  return  and  do  the  work  over.  To  collect 
fuel  to  straighten  the  rails  after  heating  them,  and 
then  give  them  the  required  twist,  was  a  very  dif 
ficult  task.  The  engineer  regiment  had  implements 
made  for  the  purpose.  The  soldiers  fastened  rail 
road  chairs  with  telegraph  wire  to  poles ;  clamping 
one  to  each  end  of  a  heated  rail,  and  pulling  them 
around  in  opposite  directions,  gave  the  required 
twist. 

While  Sherman's  army  was  at  work  destroying 
the  communications  of  the  State  as  it  advanced, 
the  Confederate  commanders  were  taking  account 
of  their  resources.  Generals  Beauregard,  Hardee, 
and  D.  H.  Hill  held  a  conference  in  Georgia,  near 
Augusta,  on  the  2d  of  February.  They  estimated 
Hardee's  available  "  effective  "  in  South  Carolina 
at  fourteen  thousand  five  hundred ;  Georgia  militia, 
fourteen  hundred  and  fifty ;  the  Army  of  the  Ten 
nessee,  ten  thousand  eight  hundred  ;  and  Wheeler's 
cavalry,  sixty-seven  hundred ;  aggregate,  thirty- 
three  thousand  four  hundred  and  fifty.  But  the 
wreckage  of  Hood's  army  was  drifting  across  north 
ern  Georgia,  to  be  finally  stranded  in  North  Caro 
lina.  Each  corps  commander  still  bore  his  flag,  and, 
gathering  his  remaining  followers  under  it,  main 
tained  the  name  and  organization  of  a  corps.  At 
the  time  of  the  conference  only  Lee's  corps  had 
arrived.  Generals  Cheatham's  and  Stewart's  came 
in  detachments  from  time  to  time,  the  last  report 
ing  at  Bentonville. 

Having  completed  the  destruction  of  the  road, 
and  impressed  the  defenders  of  Augusta  that  they 
were  Sherman's  aim,  he  set  out  definitely  for  Co 
lumbia.  Kilpatrick,  to  continue  the  impression, 
was  sent  to  Aiken,  close  to  Augusta,  and  General 
Howard  turned  eastward  to  Orangeburg,  also  to 


THE   CAROLINAS.  2?I 

break  up  the  railroad  at  that  point,  and  destroy  the 
communication  between  Columbia  and  Charleston. 
The  Fifteenth  and  Seventeenth  Corps  resumed  the 
march  on  the  9th.  They  found  the  bridges  over 
the  south  fork  of  the  Edisto  destroyed,  and  troops 
in  intrenchments  defending  the  crossings.  Logan's 
men  waded  the  streams ;  Blair  found  a  place  where 
solid  land  extended  to  the  river  confined  to  one 
stream.  Mower  laid  a  pontoon  bridge,  and  crossed 
after  nightfall.  On  the  farther  side  the  land  was 
covered  with  thick  timber  and  flooded  with  the 
overflow.  The  division  marched  through  icy  water, 
waist  deep,  and  the  darkness  till  solid  ground  was 
reached.  The  gleam  of  moonlight  upon  their  rifles 
disclosed  their  presence,  and  while  they  plodded  on 
with  frozen  clothing  the  enemy  withdrew. 

Both  corps  started  for  the  north  fork  of  the 
Edisto  on  the  morning  of  the  nth,  the  Seventeenth 
Corps  taking  the  direct  road  to  Orangeburg.  The 
foragers  in  advance  came  soon  upon  the  enemy's 
mounted  scouts,  forced  them  back  upon  the  main 
body  of  cavalry,  and  sent  back  for  re-enforcements. 
The  Ninth  Illinois  mounted  infantry  went  to  the 
front  and  pushed  the  cavalry  to  the  shelter  of  a 
light  intrenchment.  The  infantry  column  then 
coming  up,  the  cavalry  broke  into  retreat.  The 
Twentieth  Ohio  infantry  was  detached,  and,  pur 
suing  at  a  double  quick,  saved  the  small  bridges 
over  the  smaller  currents  of  the  river  till,  coming 
to  a  bend  in  the  road,  the  men  found  themselves 
near  to  the  main  stream  and  its  bridge,  with  a  bat 
tery  on  rising  ground  beyond.  A  skirmish  line 
was  pushed  forward  in  the  overflowed  forest  to  the 
edge  of  the  main  stream,  and,  standing  in  the  cold 
water,  skirmished  with  the  Confederate  line  across 
the  river,  and  prevented  parties  from  approaching 
the  bridge  to  burn  it.  General  Giles  A.  Smith  com 
ing  up  with  his  division,  placed  a  battery  in  a  field 
where  it  could  command  the  bridge  and  reach  the 


2/2  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

Confederate  works.  But  after  dark  a  small  party 
made  a  hasty  dash  to  the  bridge  and  lighted  a  fire, 
which  burned  some  of  the  planking,  but  did  not 
injure  the  timbers. 

An  exploring  party  from  the  third  division 
found,  less  than  a  mile  below  the  bridge,  a  place 
where  solid  ground  extended  to  the  river,  while  a 
swamp  covered  the  farther  shore.  A  road  was 
made  in  the  night  to  the  spot.  Next  morning  the 
third  division  crossed  by  pontoons,  and  waded 
through  the  swamp  to  a  great  field  which  extended 
to  the  high  ground  near  the  bridge.  A  squad  with 
one  gun  was  firing  across  the  bridge  at  Smith's  di 
vision.  One  brigade  was  sent  by  a  crossroad  di 
rectly  to  the  railroad  and  began  its  destruction. 
The  first  brigade  in  column  of  regiments  marched 
to  the  heights.  The  gun  squad  then,  perceiving  the 
approaching  column,  fired  a  few  wild  shots  at  it, 
and  quickly  withdrew.  Colonel  Proudfit,  of  the 
Twelfth  Wisconsin,  was  appointed  provost  marshal, 
and  his  regiment  detailed  as  police,  and  the  rest 
of  the  brigade  proceeded  to  destroy  the  railroad. 
Smith  quickly  repaired  the  bridge,  and  the  rest  of 
the  corps  and  the  trains  passed  over  it  by  evening. 
The  force  defending  Orangeburg  comprised  John 
son's  (formerly  Stowall's),  Palmer's,  and  Pettus's 
brigade  of  Lee's  corps,  and  a  portion  of  Young's 
cavalry.  The  loss  of  the  third  division  was  two 
wounded ;  the  known  loss  of  the  Confederates  was 
six  killed,  fourteen  wounded,  and  twenty-six  taken 
prisoners. 

At  the  same  time  General  Logan  forced  a  cross 
ing  a  few  miles  farther  up  the  river.  The  bridge 
being  destroyed,  one  division  forced  its  way  across 
above  the  bridgeway  and  the  other  below.  The 
Confederates  were  driven  from  their  works  at  2.30 
p.  M.,  many  throwing  their  arms  away  in  their 
haste.  General  Logan's  loss  was  one  man  killed 
and  five  wounded;  the  Confederates,  three  killed, 


THE   CAROLINAS. 


273 


wounded  unknown,  and  eighty  prisoners.     About 
two  hundred  stand  of  arms  were  taken. 

General  Howard  marched  easily  on  the  I3th  and 
I4th,  destroying  the  railroad  between  Orangeburg 
and  Columbia.  On  the  I5th  General  Logan,  hav 
ing  the  advance,  found  his  progress  stoutly  con 
tested,  but  pushed  his  opponents  steadily  back  to 
Congaree  Creek,  which  empties  into  Congaree 
River,  about  six  miles  below  Columbia.  Hampton's 
cavalry  crossed  the  creek,  destroyed  the  bridge 
over  it,  and  took  post  behind  a  line  of  intrench- 
ment,  with  artillery.  Logan  sent  a  brigade  up  the 
creek  far  enough  to  cross  beyond  the  extremity 
of  the  intrenchment,  and  when  the  enemy  with 
drew  to  another  line  nearer  the  city  the  Fifteenth 
followed,  and  drew  up  before  it  by  nightfall.  The 
Confederates  abandoned  this  line  in  the  night, 
crossed  the  river,  and  burned  the  bridges.  Next 
morning  an  artillery  fire,  ineffective,  opened  from 
the  city  across  the  river.  A  few  responsive  guns 
replied.  Soldiers  could  be  seen  loitering  by  the 
river  bank,  and  smoke  rising  in  portions  of  the 
city.  The  Congaree  was  quite  too  wide  and  rapid 
to  be  bridged  by  resources  within  reach  of  the 
army.  The  Fifteenth  Corps  moved  up  above  the 
junction  of  the  Saluda  and  Broad,  the  confluents 
of  the  Congaree,  built  with  ease  a  bridge  across  the 
Saluda,  and  afterward  constructed  another  over  the 
Broad  with  great  difficulty  and  under  sharp  opposi 
tion.  The  troops  on  the  way  to  the  crossing  passed 
by  Camp  Sorghum,  where  twelve  hundred  officers, 
prisoners  of  war,  had  marched  to  an  open  field,  and 
then,  without  shelter,  lay  on  the  ground,  under  the 
burning  sun  and  dews  of  night,  and  rain  and  wind, 
except  a  few  who  were  able  to  scratch  holes  in  the 
ground  and  cover  them  with  brush.  The  bridge 
over  the  Broad  was  completed  in  the  night  of  the 
1 6th,  and  early  next  morning  the  troops  began  to 
cross,  Stone's  brigade  of  Woods's  division  leading. 


274  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

The  mayor  of  Columbia  met  General  Woods 
and  surrendered  the  city  to  him;  Stone's  brigade 
was  put  on  duty  to  preserve  order.  Cotton  was 
burning  in  piles  in  the  streets.  A  violent  wind 
storm  whirled  flaming  bunches  through  the  air. 
People  to  ingratiate  the  guards  supplied  them  with 
whisky.  Houses  caught  fire.  Undoubtedly  men 
who  had  been  prisoners  of  war  and  escaped  aided 
the  spread  of  the  flames.  It  is  not  unlikely  that  in 
Sherman's  army  there  were  some  soldiers  who  did 
the  same.  Stone's  brigade  was  relieved ;  the  rest  of 
Woods's  division  and  Hazen's  finely  disciplined  di 
vision  were  brought  into  the  city.  General  Sher 
man,  General  Howard,  General  Logan,  and  his 
division  commanders  personally  directed  and  super 
intended  the  efforts  to  stay  the  spread  of  the  con 
flagration  and  to  remove  furniture  from  houses. 
But  all  efforts  were  futile  against  the  great  sheets 
of  flame  driven  by  the  blast,  until  after  midnight 
the  windstorm  lulled.  The  greater  part  of  the  city 
was  a  mass  of  cinder. 

General  Sherman  gave  up  his  own  quarters  to 
homeless  families,  and  divided  his  own  provisions 
with  them  and  others.  A  preposterous  story  was 
started  that  General  Sherman  ordered  the  burning 
of  the  city ;  the  order  that  he  made  is  the  following : 

SPECIAL  FIELD  ORDERS,  No.  26. 

i.  General  Howard  will  cross  the  Saluda  and  Broad 
Rivers  as  near  their  mouth  as  possible,  occupy  Columbia, 
destroy  the  public  building's,  railroad  properties,  manufactur 
ing-  and  machine  shops,  but  will  spare  libraries  and  asylums 
and  private  dwellings.  He  will  then  move  to  Winnsboro, 
destroying  en  route  utterly  that  section  of  the  railroad.  He 
will  also  cause  all  bridges,  trestles,  water  tanks,  and  depots 
on  the  railroad  back  to  the  Wateree  to  be  burned,  switches 
broken,  and  such  other  destruction  as  he  can  find  time  to 
accomplish  consistent  with  the  proper  celerity.  For  move 
ments  of  his  army,  he  will  select  roads  that  cross  the  Wateree 
to  the  south  of  Lancaster. 


THE   CAROLINAS.  275 

General  Slocum  with  the  head  of  the  left  wing 
reached  the  Saluda  a  few  miles  higher  up.  He 
crossed  the  Saluda  and  the  Broad  on  the  2Oth,  and 
destroyed  the  railroad  down  nearly  to  Columbia. 
He  moved  next  day  to  Winnsboro,  and  destroyed 
thence  northward  the  Charlotte  and  South  Caro 
lina  Railroad,  and  on  the  22d  began  crossing  the 
Catawba  at  Rock  Mount  Ferry.  The  river  was 
swollen  and  rapid  and  filled  with  drift,  and  when 
the  Twentieth  Corps,  the  cavalry,  and  one  division 
of  the  Fourteenth  Corps  had  crossed,  the  bridge 
gave  way,  and  much  of  it  was  swept  off  by  the 
current.  General  Williams,  commanding  the 
Twentieth  Corps,  continued  on  his  route,  and, 
being  obliged  to  corduroy  the  impassable  road 
most  of  the  way,  made  only  sixteen  miles  by  the 
26th.  General  Slocum,  learning  here  of  the  de 
tention  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps,  halted  the  Twen 
tieth  and  returned  to  the  river.  Fortunately  the 
river  fell,  the  bridge  was  repaired,  and  the  water- 
bound  divisions  crossed.  The  two  corps,  Four 
teenth  and  Twentieth,  marching  by  different  roads 
over  oozy  soil,  saturated  by  continuous  rain,  im 
peded  by  creeks  swollen  to  torrents,  with  banks 
submerged,  reached  Sneedsboro  on  the  Great 
Pedee,  above  Cheraw,  on  the  4th  of  March.  One 
day  the  Twentieth  Corps  advanced  only  five  miles, 
being  obliged  to  corduroy  the  entire  distance. 

The  Seventeenth  Corps  left  Columbia  on  the 
1 8th  and  reached  Winnsboro  on  the  22d,  having 
destroyed  the  railroad  the  entire  distance,  and  on 
the  23d  reached  the  Wateree.  The  progress  to 
Winnsboro  was  stubbornly  contested  by  Wade 
Hampton's  cavalry  and  Lee's  corps.  Most  of  the 
prisoners  taken  belonged  to  Lee's  corps.  The  Fif 
teenth  Corps,  leaving  Columbia,  proceeded  down 
the  river,  destroying  the  railroad  for  twenty  miles, 
then  turning  to  the  north,  joined  the  Seventeenth 
Corps,  on  the  river  called  there  the  Wateree,  but 


276  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

named  the  Catawba  farther  up.  The  river  was 
swollen  by  heavy  rains ;  the  pontoons  of  both  corps 
were  required  to  bridge  it.  The  troops  began  to 
cross  before  noon,  and  the  rear  was  over  by  nine 
o'clock*  next  morning.  The  third  division  of  the 
Seventeenth  Corps  waited  till  the  pontoons  were 
taken  up  and  packed,  and  camped  at  night  at  Rus 
sell  Corner,  eight  miles  in  rear  of  corps  headquar 
ters,  and  the  bridge  train  three  miles  in  rear  of  the 
division.  Next  day  the  road  was  worse.  One  bri 
gade  was  ordered  to  give  aid  where  wagons  were 
mired  beyond  the  power  of  the  teams  to  pull  them 
out ;  the  other  brigade  was  required  to  repair 
impassable  places  in  the  road.  Four  miles  of  cor 
duroy  were  made.  The  division  camped  at  night 
ten  miles  in  rear  of  corps  headquarters,  and  the 
bridge  train  five  miles  in  rear  of  the  division.  The 
division  went  into  camp  next  night  at  Little  Lynch's 
Creek,  and  was  there  overtaken  by  the  bridge  train. 
The  men  worked  until  1.30  A.  M.  constructing 
causeway  and  bridge,  and  resumed  march  before 
daylight,  having  made  fires  to  light  the  wagons 
over  the  narrow  track  in  the  dark  and  fog,  and 
overtook  the  corps  at  Lynch's  Creek  in  the  after 
noon. 

General  Giles  A.  Smith  with  the  advance  of  the 
corps  reached  Lynch's  Creek  by  noon  of  the  26th 
of  February,  and  found  the  bridge  standing  in  the 
middle  of  a  great  expanse  of  water  a  mile  wide. 
A  regiment  waded  over  the  submerged  roadway  to 
solid  ground.  The  First  Michigan  engineer  regi 
ment,  working  all  night,  constructed  a  footway  for 
troops  by  next  morning,  and  Mower's  division 
crossed.  Working  from  both  shores  during  the 
whole  of  the  27th,  about  twenty-five  hundred  offi 
cers  and  men,  standing  in  water  waist  deep  in 
places,  completed  by  5  P.  M.  eight  hundred  and 
fifty  feet  of  bridging  and  seven  thousand  feet  of 
corduroy  road  laid  on  stringers.  Next  day,  the 


THE  CAROLINAS.  277 

28th,  the  remainder  of  the  corps  crossed,  and,  after 
marching  nineteen  miles,  the  corps  went  into  camp 
thirteen  miles  from  Cheraw. 

Tidings  came  that  Hardee  evacuated  Charles 
ton  when  he  learned  of  Sherman's  entry  into  Co 
lumbia,  and  was  now  in  Cheraw  with  his  whole 
command.  General  Sherman  was  with  Slocum  and 
the  left  wing.  General  Howard  was  with  Logan, 
whose  corps  was  struggling  to  effect  a  crossing 
over  Lynch's  Creek  farther  down.  Blair  in 
trenched,  reconnoitered,  and  waited  ;  Logan  crossed 
on  the  2d  of  March,  and  Blair  moved  on  the  3d. 
The  rear  of  Hardee's  command  crossed  the  Pedee 
and  set  fire  to  the  bridge  saturated  with  combusti 
bles  as  the  head  of  Blair's  column  drew  near. 

The  railroad  from  Charleston  ended  at  Cheraw, 
and,  as  it  was  impossible  to  move  stores  by  wagon 
as  fast  as  they  were  brought  by  rail,  a  great  amount 
accumulated.  The  capture  included  twenty-five 
pieces  of  artillery,  five  thousand  rounds  of  artillery 
ammunition,  twenty  thousand  rounds  of  infantry 
ammunition,  two  thousand  stand  of  small  arms, 
one  thousand  sabers,  thirty-six  hundred  barrels  of 
powder,  and  a  great  store  of  C.  S.  A.  cotton.  All 
was  destroyed  except  three  guns  carried  off  as 
trophies. 

The  Fourteenth  Corps  constructed  a  bridge  ten 
miles  above  Cheraw,  and  crossed  on  the  7th  of 
March.  The  Twentieth  Corps  moved  down  to 
Cheraw,  and  crossed  on  the  bridge  of  the  right 
wing.  The  Fifteenth  and  Seventeenth  crossed  in 
detachments,  and,  moving  a  few  miles  each  day, 
assembled  about  Bennettsville  on  the  6th.  The 
country  between  Columbia  and  Cheraw  was  scanti 
ly  supplied  with  subsistence,  and  the  foragers  gath 
ered  little.  The  supplies  in  the  wagons  were  nearly 
exhausted.  Coffee  and  sugar  remained,  and  a  small 
amount  of  bread  reserved  for  emergency.  The 
men  were  hungry.  The  country  from  Cheraw  to 


278  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

Bennettsville  and  a  day's  march  beyond  abounded 
with  subsistence.  It  was  a  feast  at  the  end  of  each 
day's  march. 

The  foragers  consisted  regularly  of  parties  of  an 
officer  and  a  dozen  men  or  less  from  each  regiment, 
who  reported  to  the  provost  marshal  of  the  divi 
sion  before  setting  out  in  the  morning.  At  first 
they  were  on  foot,  and  visited  only  plantations  near 
the  road.  But  soon  they  all  had  horses,  and  their 
explorations  extended  ten  miles  off  from  the  flanks. 
They  brought  in  ham,  bacon,  and  poultry,  sweet 
potatoes  and  corn  meal,  horses  and  mules,  and 
sometimes  impressed  vehicles  to  convey  their  cap 
tures  to  camp.  Occasionally  a  grist-mill  was  found. 
The  party  would  proceed  to  grind  corn  and  send 
to  camp  for  wagons  to  take  the  meal.  They  seemed 
to  have  instinctive  perception  of  the  selection  of 
camping  ground,  and  never  failed  to  report  with 
their  spoils.  Sometimes  they  reached  the  ground 
along  with  the  staff  officers,  who  rode  in  advance 
to  select  the  ground  and  assign  place  to  the  divi 
sions.  When  ground  was  designated  for  each  bri 
gade,  the  forage  parties,  knowing  the  relative  posi 
tion  of  the  regiments  in  the  brigade,  would  repair 
each  to  the  line  of  its  own  regiment.  The  weary 
troops,  dragging  in  through  the  night,  would  find 
fires  glowing  with  cheer,  and  piles  of  food  giving 
welcome. 

The  foragers  often  came  upon  parties  of  Con 
federate  cavalry  miles  away  from  the  line  of  march. 
Whether  it  was  a  solitary  forager  or  a  party,  every 
one  fired  at  the  enemy  before  falling  back.  Every 
forager  within  hearing  of  the  report  galloped  to  re- 
enforce.  As  the  noise  of  the  skirmish  grew,  the 
number  of  combatants  increased,  and  so  increased 
that  the  Confederate  cavalry  was  never  able  to  pene 
trate  within  sight  of  Sherman's  column. 

Taking  articles  not  needed  for  the  subsistence 
of  the  army  was  prohibited.  There  were,  of  course, 


THE   CAROLINAS. 


279 


violations  of  this  order,  but  violations  when  re 
ported  were  punished.  A  man  who  was  convicted 
of  taking  a  watch  from  the  person  of  a  citizen  was 
drummed  out  of  the  army.  In  another  case,  where 
a  man  was  court-martialed  for  stealing  some  article 
from  a  house,  his  captain  was  put  in  arrest  for  hav 
ing  failed  to  report  the  case  promptly. 

The  irregularity  in  reaching  camp  all  through 
the  night  gave  rise  to  a  practice  that  was  adopted 
in  some  divisions.  Before  breaking  camp  in  the 
morning,  the  detail  for  picket  for  the  ensuing  night 
was  made,  and  marched  at  the  head  of  the  division 
for  the  day.  There  it  was  ready  to  serve  as  a  skir 
mish  detail  if  needed.  In  the  afternoon,  when  the 
staff  officers  rode  forward  to  select  ground  for 
camp,  the  picket  detail  followed  them  and  went  on 
post  by  daylight,  while  the  troops  arriving  late  had 
no  concern  about  being  called  for  duty. 

A  few  days  through  a  series  of  swamps  in  con 
stant  rain  brought  the  army  to  Fayetteville,  N.  C., 
on  the  Cape  Fear  River.  The  foragers  entered  first, 
but  were  driven  back  by  Wade  Hampton  and  his 
cavalry  rear  guard.  Hampton  crossed  the  bridge 
and  burned  it  just  before  the  Fourteenth  Corps 
arrived.  The  other  corps  followed,  coming  in  by 
different  roads ;  finally  Kilpatrick  appeared,  and 
General  Sherman's  army  was  assembled  on  the 
nth  of  March. 

Kilpatrick  had  not  been  in  view  on  the  march, 
but  had  rendered  important  service.  His  persist 
ent  advance  and  attacks  close  to  Augusta  kept 
troops  held  there  under  apprehension  that  Sherman 
was  behind  him  advancing  upon  the  city.  During 
the  march  to  Columbia,  and  thence  to  the  crossing 
of  the  Catawba,  he  interposed  between  the  left 
wing  and  the  cavalry  of  Butler  and  Hampton,  cov 
ering  the  rear  as  well  as  the  flank.  The  encounters 
were  daily,  and  serious  engagements  not  infrequent. 
His  impetuosity  seemed  reckless,  but  was  always 
19 


280  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

carefully  calculated.  His  men  caught  his  spirit, 
and  were  always  ready  to  charge  upon  any  force, 
no  matter  what  the  disparity  in  numbers  might  be. 
On  the  night  of  the  loth  Kilpatrick  again  slept 
in  a  house  away  from  his  camp.  Hampton  broke 
into  his  camp  after  midnight,  captured  his  artillery 
and  headquarters,  and  swept  in  many  prisoners. 
Kilpatrick  escaped  into  the  swamp.  Many  of  his 
men  did  the  same,  taking  their  arms  with  them. 
The  men  rallied,  formed,  and  charged  upon  the 
Confederates,  who  were  busy  gathering  horses  and 
other  booty.  Taken  by  surprise,  the  Confederates 
gave  way.  The  recaptured  battery  was  turned  upon 
them  at  close  quarters.  Hampton  withdrew,  carry 
ing  one  hundred  and  three  prisoners  and  a  number 
of  horses.  He  left  behind  eighty  killed,  a  consid 
erable  number  wounded,  and  thirty  men  captured. 
Kilpatrick  lost  nineteen  killed,  sixty-eight  severely 
wounded. 

A  party  from  the  third  division  of  Blair's  corps 
captured  a  small  steamboat  a  few  miles  below  the 
city.  The  value  of  the  capture  dropped  next  day, 
the  I2th,  just  after  noon,  when  a  steamboat  arrived 
bearing  dispatches  from  General  Terry,  at  Wil 
mington,  in  response  to  notice  sent  to  him  by 
Sherman  by  courier.  The  words  "  News  from 
home  "  ran  like  wild  fire  through  the  camp.  Men 
who  had  opportunity  to  see  a  newspaper  were  ora 
cles  of  intelligence  to  the  rest.  The  boat  was  sent 
back  at  six  o'clock  with  dispatches  from  General 
Sherman.  He  wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  Gen 
eral  Grant,  and  General  Halleck,  and  also  to  Gen 
eral  Schofield  in  North  Carolina,  and  General  Fos 
ter  in  South  Carolina,  now  department  command 
ers  under  him:  and  also  to  his  quartermaster  and 
commissary  officers.  There  was  need  of  clothing, 
as  well  as  of  rations.  The  men,  marching  outside 
of  the  road  and  late  into  the  night,  lost  their  shoes 
in  the  mire,  their  hats  were  brushed  off  and  lost  in 


THE   CAROLINAS.  28 1 

the  thickets,  and  their  clothing  tattered.  They  were 
a  sorry  sight.  On  the  I4th  a  tug  boat  came  up 
with  a  supply  of  oats,  a  little  coffee  and  sugar,  no 
bread,  an  inadequate  supply  of  shoes,  and  no  cloth 
ing,  there  being  none  in  Wilmington.  One  divi 
sion  received  and  issued  four  hundred  and  ninety- 
four  pairs  of  shoes,  leaving  still  one  hundred  and 
seventy-two  men  barefoot. 

Four  hundred  and  fifty  refugees  having  been 
sent  down  the  river  on  boats  on  the  I3th,  the  re 
maining  multitude,  comprising  the  army  of  colored 
people  who  had  accumulated  on  the  march,  went 
down  to  Wilmington  by  land  with  a  cavalry  escort. 
On  the  1 5th  the  advance  was  resumed.  It  became 
known  that  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston  was  now 
in  command  of  the  entire  force  in  front.  There 
was  a  visible  bracing  up,  a  watchful  readiness  in 
the  troops,  in  recognition  of  the  ability  of  their  an 
tagonist  in  the  Atlanta  campaign.  General  Sher 
man  took  notice  also  of  the  fact  that  General  Bragg 
had  reported  to  Johnston  with  the  army  that  had 
contested  Schofield's  advance  from  the  coast,  and 
sent  an  order  to  Schofield  to  meet  him  at  Goldsboro 
on  the  20th. 

Each  corps  being  on  a  separate  road,  the  Twen 
tieth  was  on  the  left  and  the  Seventeenth  on  the 
right.  The  enemy  encountered  by  the  Seventeenth 
was  bad  roads.  This  may  be  appreciated  by  tak 
ing  a  few  extracts  from  a  pocket  diary  kept  at  the 
time: 

1 5th  of  March,  marched  via  Blockersville  to  South  River. 
Thunderstorms  at  noon  killed  one  and  hurt  two  men  of  the 
Seventy-eighth  Ohio.  Rained  after  that  all  day  and  night. 
Soil  melted  like  sugar.  Laid  three  miles  of  corduroy,  and 
repaired  much.  Wagons  kept  sticking.  Men  toiled  terribly. 
I  came  to  camp  and  went  to  bed  at  2  A.  M.  None  of  the 
second  brigade  or  of  their  section  of  the  train  in  yet. 

1 6th.  At  5  A.  M.  I  sent  two  regiments,  that  had  had  some 
sleep,  to  help  the  second  brigade.  All  in  by  9  A.  M.  Then 
sent  Twelfth  Wisconsin  to  help  pontoon  train  in.  Rained 


282  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

all  day.  Train  packed  and  awaiting  completion  of  a  bridge. 
Pulled  into  road  at  2  p.  M.  Bridge  extended.  Crossed  at 
7  p.  M.  Marched  six  miles.  Crossed  a  creek,  bridge  not 
burned.  Went  to  bed  at  3  A.  M. ;  half  of  the  section  of  train 
guarded  by  first  brigade  not  in. 

1 7th.  Rear  of  train  and  Twelfth  Wisconsin  in  camp  at 
6  A.  M.  Marched  at  7  A.  M.  via  Owenville,  crossed  Cohena 
on  a  bridge  built  by  fourth  division.  Marched  within  five 
miles  of  Clinton  and  turned  to  Beaman's  Crossroads. 
Marched  nineteen  miles.  Last  part  of  train  now  coming  in 
— 2.30  A.  M. 

1 8th.  Last  wagon  of  supply  train  came  in  just  as  head  ot 
column  moved.  Fine  weather.  Organized  two  large  bri 
gade  pioneer  parties.  They  with  the  division  pioneers,  col 
ored  pioneer  battalion,  and  from  two  to  four  regiments  at 
work  ;  got  along  very  well. 

Expecting  to  find  resistance  on  his  left,  General 
Sherman  directed  General  Slocum  to  put  four  di 
visions,  two  from  each  corps,  on  the  outer  road, 
the  extreme  left,  and  the  rest  of  the  troops,  as  well 
as  the  trains,  on  a  road  to  the  right.  On  the  i6th 
the  advance  met  the  Confederates  where  North 
River  approaches  to  the  Cape  Fear.  With  a  some 
what  stubborn  resistance  they  fell  back  fighting  till 
they  reached  a  line  of  intrenchment.  Here  they 
made  a  stand.  Slocum  brought  up  his  artillery,  and 
a  brisk  combat  ensued.  Upon  the  suggestion  of 
General  Sherman,  a  brigade  was  moved  to  the  left 
to  look  for  Hardee's  flank.  It  was  found  that  the 
intrenchment  did  not  extend  to  the  river.  The  bri 
gade  passed  to  the  rear,  and  Hardee  fell  back  to 
another  fortified  line.  Slocum  followed,  but  did 
not  press  the  attack  that  night.  Next  morning  the 
works  were  found  evacuated.  The  National  loss 
was  ninety-five  killed,  five  hundred  and  thirty-three 
wounded,  and  fifty-four  missing.  Of  the  Confed 
erates,  one  hundred  and  twenty-eight  dead  were 
buried  on  the  battlefield,  one  hundred  and  seventy- 
five  prisoners  were  taken,  and  three  guns  captured. 
General  Hardee's  report  is :  "  My  loss  is  between 
four  hundred  and  five  hundred.  Among  the  miss- 


THE   CAROLINAS.  283 

ing  is  Colonel  Rhett,  commanding  brigade,  and 
among  the  killed,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Robert  de 
Treville.  Two  pieces  of  artillery  were  abandoned.^ 
The  march  of  the  i8th  brought  the  head  of 
Slocum's  column  so  near  to  Bentonville  that  Gen 
eral  Sherman,  satisfied  that  there  would  be  no  seri 
ous  opposition,  crossed  over  at  night  to  the  other 
wing  and  joined  General  Howard.  Next  day  the 
resistance  to  the  advance  was  so  obstinate  that 
General  Slocum  was  ready  to  believe  the  statement 
of  a  captured  Confederate  that  Johnston  was  pres^_ 
ent  with  his  entire  army  concentrated.  In  fact, 
Johnston  at  Raleigh  was  kept  advised  every  day  of 
the  position  of  every  part  of  Sherman's  army,  and 
had  recalled  Bragg,  who  was  opposing  the  ad 
vance  of  Schofield  up  the  Cape  Fear  and  the  Neuse 
Rivers.  He  resolved  to  strike  while  Sherman's 
corps  were  apart  on  different  roads,  and  crush 
them  separately  before  they  could  concentrate.  At 
the  rate  at  which  Slocum  was  advancing,  he  should 
make  a  junction  with  Howard  in  the  neighborhood 
of  Cox's  bridge  over  the  Neuse  by  the  night  of  the 
iQth.  Johnston  moved  rapidly  south  from  Smith- 
field,  crossed  the  Neuse,  and  took  the  road  which 
crossed  Mill  Creek  at  Bentonville,  and,  continuing 
south,  crossed  the  Averysboro  road  nearly  at  a  right 
angle.  He  had  Bragg,  Hardee,  and  Stuart,  whose 
force  he  estimated  at  fifteen  thousand  "  effectives," 
besides  the  cavalry  of  Hampton  and  Wheeler.  On 
the  i Qth,  in  the  forenoon,  General  Bragg  took  po 
sition  across  the  Averysboro  road  at  right  angles 
with  it,  about  half  a  mile  west  of  the  Bentonville 
road,  interposing  between  it  and  the  advancing 
National  columns.  General  Stewart  formed  on 
Bragg's  right,  along  the  north  side  of  Cole's  farm. 
Hardee,  who  did  not  get  into  position  till  3  p.  M., 
joined  his  left  to  Stewart's  right.  The  general 
formation  was  a  re-entrant  angle,  Stewart  at  the 
apex,  Bragg  and  Hardee  along  the  sides,  and  the 


284  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

extreme  flanks  refused.  Except  the  road  and  Cole's 
farm,  the  ground  was  mostly  covered  by  forest  and 
dense  thickets  of  scrub  oak,  very  difficult  to  move 
through. 

General  Sherman,  satisfied  that  the  danger  point 
was  passed,  left  Slocum  early  in  the  morning  of 
the  I Qth,  and  rode  across  the  country  to  join  Gen 
eral  Howard.  The  Confederate  cavalry  disputed 
even  more  obstinately  than  on  the  preceding  day 
the  advance  of  the  two  divisions  of  the  Fourteenth 
Corps.  A  strong  skirmish  line  pushed  them  stead 
ily  back,  though  slowly.  Toward  noon  Hobart's 
brigade  of  Carlin's  division  was  deployed  and  came 
upon  a  line  of  intrenchment  across  the  road.  The 
line  could  be  seen  extended  along  the  farther 
boundary  of  Cole's  farm  toward  the  north  and  west, 
while  Hobart's  skirmishers  found  it  in  the  woods, 
reaching  to  the  south.  Carlin,  still  satisfied  it  was 
only  cavalry  in  his  front,  deployed  his  division  and 
charged.  He  was  met  by  volleys  immediately  from 
infantry  rifles. 

Buell's  brigade,  sent  to  find  and  turn  the  flank 
of  the  works  on  the  farther  side  of  Cole's  farm,  was 
charged  by  the  Confederate  force  and  driven  across 
the  field.  Stewart  suffered  severely  from  the  fire 
of  a  battery  as  he  crossed  the  field,  but  prevailed  in 
pushing  Hobart  back  nearly  a  mile,  and  captured 
the  battery  on  the  way.  Davis  called  on  Fearing's 
brigade,  and  Fearing,  by  an  impetuous  charge, 
rolled  up  General  Stewart's  left  and  pressed  him 
into  the  swamp. 

There  was  a  lull  on  the  field.  A  brigade  of 
Jackson's  division  of  the  Twentieth  Corps  (Robin 
son's)  took  position  on  the  Morris  farm  about  a 
mile  south  and  west  from  the  Cole  house,  on  rising 
ground  covered  with  pines,  and  with  a  marsh  in 
front.  The  batteries  of  the  corps  joined  the  bri 
gade.  Carlin's  brigades — Buel,  Hobart,  and  Miles 
— assembled  on  the  left,  and  Fearing,  of  Morgan's 


THE  CAROLINAS.  285 

division,  on  the  right,  and  all  intrenched.  Morgan 
drew  back  his  two  remaining  brigades  and  in 
trenched,  leaving  a  gap  between  the  left  of  this  line 
and  the  right  of  Fearing.  Two  brigades  of  Jack 
son's  division — Hawley  and  Selfridge — coming  up 
later,  were  posted  in  rear  and  to  the  left  of  Robin 
son,  and  Cogswell's  brigade  of  Ward's  division  was 
added  to  the  right  of  Morgan's  line,  but  did  not 
suffice  to  fill  the  gap  between  it  and  Fearing.  John 
ston  ordered  attack  along  the  whole  line.  Bragg, 
getting  partially  into  the  rear  of  Morgan,  com 
pelled  successive  regiments  to  refuse,  until  the 
whole  line  was  gradually  wheeled  to  the  rear. 
Hardee  gained  temporary  advantage,  but  was  re 
pelled  in  repeated  assaults  by  the  well-posted  and 
well-served  artillery  of  the  Twentieth  Corps.  It 
was  dark  when  assaults  ceased.  In  the  night  John 
ston  fell  back  to  a  new  line.  The  apex  was  north 
of  Cole's  house,  and  the  flanks,  curving  back,  were 
continued  nearly  to  Mill  Creek.  Slocum  adjusted 
his  line. 

Sherman  and  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  heard 
the  sound  of  Slocum's  guns.  But  he  had  heard 
much  the  same  when  only  cavalry  with  their  artil 
lery  had  doggedly  attempted  to  delay  the  left  wing. 
So  late  as  5  P.  M.  he  received  a  dispatch  from  Slo 
cum  stating  that  only  cavalry  with  their  artillery 
was  in  his  front.  He  received  in  the  night  a  sec 
ond  dispatch,  announcing  that  Johnston  with  his 
whole  army  had  been  encountered.  Hazen's  divi 
sion  was  nearest  to  Slocum.  Sherman's  order  to 
march  at  once  in  relief  reached  him  on  the  road 
about  midnight.  He  reported  to  Slocum  at  dawn, 
having  marched  twenty  miles  since  sunset,  and 
took  position  on  Slocum's  right.  General  Sher 
man  joined  Logan,  and  the  Fifteenth  Corps  arrived 
on  the  ground  in  the  morning  and  connected  with 
Hazen.  Later  in  the  day  General  Howard  brought 
up  the  Seventeenth,  the  most  remote  of  the  corps, 


286  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

placed  the  fourth  division  on  Logan's  right,  and 
put  the  first  and  third  in  camp  in  reserve.  The 
Army  of  the  Tennessee  and  Johnston's  left  wing, 
facing  each  other,  occupied  with  their  works  the 
bluff  banks  of  a  marshy  valley,  along  which  flowed 
to  the  north  a  brook  that  joined  Mill  Creek  near 
Bentonville. 

General  Blair,  about  noon  of  the  2ist,  directed 
the  first  and  third  divisions  to  form  on  the  right 
of  his  fourth  division.  General  Mower,  command 
ing  the  first  division,  always  eager  for  fight,  and 
seeing  a  chance  for  turning  Johnston's  flank, 
pushed  on.  The  marsh  was  impassable  for  horses ; 
officers  dismounted,  and  all  waded  through.  As 
cending  the  bluff,  and  taking  a  line  of  rifle  pits, 
he  was,  without  knowing  it,  in  rear  of  the  Confed 
erate  line,  about  two  hundred  yards  from  John 
ston's  headquarters,  and  within  musket  shot  of  the 
bridge  over  Mill  Creek,  which  constituted  the  only 
line  of  retreat.  The  sound  of  a  skirmish  in  that 
quarter  created  a  panic  among  the  teamsters,  and 
the  wagons  dashed  pell-mell  for  the  bridge.  John 
ston  gathered  up  his  reserves  and  cavalry  and  at 
tacked.  Just  at  that  moment  General  Cheatham, 
with  two  divisions  which  had  left  Meridian,  Miss., 
on  the  24th  of  January,  and  had  been  striving  to 
make  a  junction,  arrived  and  reported  at  Johnston's 
headquarters.  Sherman,  hearing  of  Mower's  peril, 
and  having  given  notice  that  he  would  not  have 
an  engagement,  but  would  only  force  Johnston 
across  the  Neuse,  and  not  aware  of  Mower's  actual 
situation,  sent  orders  of  recall,  opened  fire  along 
his  whole  line,  and  pushed  his  skirmishers  close  up 
to  the  enemy's  works  to  make  a  diversion  in  Mow 
er's  favor.  Fighting  with  a  bold  front,  and  at  the 
same  time  moving  by  the  left  flank,  brigades  pass 
ing  alternately  in  rear  of  those  at  halt  and  en 
gaged,  he  reached  his  assigned  position  without 
disaster. 


THE   CAROLINAS. 


287 


Johnston  withdrew  in  the  night,  and  crossed  the 
Neuse  to  Smithfield.  The  reported  National  loss 
in  the  three  days  was :  Killed,  one  hundred  and 
ninety-four ;  wounded,  eleven  hundred  and  twelve ; 
missing,  two  hundred  and  twenty-one ;  total,  fif 
teen  hundred  and  twenty-seven.  The  reported  Con 
federate  loss  was :  Killed,  two  hundred  and  thirty- 
nine  ;  wounded,  sixteen  hundred  and  ninety-four ; 
missing,  six  hundred  and  seventy-three ;  total, 
twenty-six  hundred  and  six. 

The  Confederate  reports  state  that  nine  hundred 
and  three  prisoners  were  captured.  The  National 
reports  do  not  give  the  number  of  Confederates 
captured.  While  the  National  reports  of  casual 
ties  were,  as  a  rule,  certainly  made  out  with  greater 
care  and  accuracy  than  the  Confederate,  they  were 
by  no  means  infallible.  General  Sherman  in  his 
report  says  that  General  Howard  reported  twelve 
hundred  and  eighty-seven  prisoners  captured  by 
his  command  at  Bentonville.  General  Howard's 
report  gives  twelve  hundred  and  eighty-seven  as 
the  number  captured  by  his  command  from  Savan 
nah  to  Goldsboro,  while  Logan  and  Blair,  the  corps 
commanders,  give  the  number  of  prisoners  taken 
by  their  respective  corps  as :  By  Logan,  six  hun 
dred  and  forty ;  by  Blair,  three  hundred  and  eighty, 
in  the  entire  campaign. 

Easy  marches  brought  the  army  to  Goldsboro 
on  the  24th,  where  General  Schofield  had  just  ar 
rived  with  Generals  J.  D.  Cox  and  Terry,  com 
manding  the  Twenty-third  and  the  Tenth  Corps. 
When  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  approached  the 
city,  General  Sherman  sent  an  order  for  trains  to 
move  aside  and  troops  to  close  up,  and  stood  by 
the  roadside,  accompanied  by  Schofield,  Cox,  and 
Terry.  As  the  troops  passed  in  columns  of  fours, 
an  embryo  review,  General  Howard  and  the  corps 
and  division  commanders  took  their  places  as  their 
commands  passed.  Many  being  barefoot,  some 


288  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

with  bare  legs,  most  with  clothes  torn,  and  heads 
covered  with  a  grotesque  variety  of  gear,  they 
made  a  sorry  array  of  apparel,  but  they  marched 
jubilant,  stalwart,  masterful. 

The  Tenth  and  Twenty-third  Corps  were  in 
Goldsboro  as  a  part  of  General  Grant's  co-opera 
tion  with  Sherman's  plans.  He  sent  General  Terry 
with  a  land  force  to  capture  Fort  Fisher,  a  strong 
fortress  commanding  the  mouth  of  Cape  Fear 
River.  Admiral  Porter,  with  a  fleet  of  sixty  vessels, 
assisted.  On  the  I5th  of  January  a  terrific  bom 
bardment  by  the  fleet,  followed  by  a  rushing  charge 
by  the  troops  and  a  fierce  fight  within  the  fortress, 
captured  the  works  with  the  garrison  and  arma 
ment.  The  other  forts  about  the  mouth  of  the 
river  were  evacuated,  and  the  river  was  open  to 
the  National  fleet. 

General  Schofield  in  Tennessee  received  orders 
to  repair  to  the  east  to  proceed  against  Wilming 
ton  and  Newbern,  and  effect  a  junction  with  Sher 
man.  He  was  with  his  corps  in  Washington  and 
Alexandria  on  the  ist  of  February  ready  to  embark, 
but  detained  by  ice  in  the  river  and  lack  of  trans 
portation.  He  embarked  on  the  4th  with  Cox's 
division,  leaving  the  rest  to  follow,  and  landed  at 
Fort  Fisher  on  the  Qth.  Terry  was  in  front  of  Gen 
eral  Hoke,  whose  intrenchments  extended  from  the 
east  or  left  bank  of  the  Cape  Fear  River  to  a  large 
lagoon.  After  ineffectual  efforts  to  reach  Hoke's 
rear,  Schofield  took  Cox  to  the  west  or  right  bank, 
to  proceed  against  a  force  posted  farther  up  the 
river.  Placing  part  of  his  command  in  front  of  the 
works,  which  extended  from  the  river  to  a  large 
pond,  he  made  a  detour  of  fifteen  miles  around  the 
pond.  The  Confederate  commander,  finding  his 
rear  threatened,  abandoned  the  fort,  leaving  the 
armament,  and  retreated  eight  miles  up  the  river 
to  a  position  behind  Town  Creek.  Hoke  at  the 
same  time  retreated  to  a  new  position  on  a  line 


SAVAKXAH 

TO 

COLUMBIA 


THE   CAROLINAS.  289 

with  Town  Creek,  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  river, 
having  his  front  protected  by  a  creek,  his  right  by 
the  river,  and  his  left  by  a  swamp.  Terry  followed, 
and  intrenched. 

Colonel  Simonson,  who  in  the  absence  of  Gen 
eral  Hagood  commanded  the  Confederate  force  on 
the  right  bank  of  the  river,  took  position  on  the 
north  bank  of  Town  Creek,  a  few  miles  from  the 
river,  upon  a  bluff,  where  he  had  a  battery  with 
artillery.  A  bridge  crossed  the  creek  at  this  point, 
approached  by  a  causeway  through  a  swamp.  Cox 
posted  his  artillery  on  the  nearest  firm  ground  in 
front  of  the  Confederate  works,  and,  leaving  Colo 
nel  Henderson  with  a  brigade  at  this  point,  led 
his  other  three  brigades  lower  down  the  stream. 
Early  in  the  morning  of  the  2Oth  Henderson  opened 
fire  with  his  guns  upon  Simonson's  battery,  and 
advanced  a  heavy  line  of  skirmishers  wading 
through  the  swamp  to  the  shore  of  the  creek,  dis 
abling  Simonson's  heaviest  gun,  and  compelled  his 
men  to  keep  covered  behind  the  shelter  of  his 
works.  Cox  meanwhile,  with  a  flatboat  able  to 
carry  fifty  men  at  a  load,  was  diligently  passing  his 
command  over,  without  exciting  alarm  or  sus 
picion.  By  the  middle  of  the  afternoon  the  three 
brigades  were  over.  Cox  pushed  through  the 
swamp  to  Simonson's  rear  and  captured  him,  three 
hundred  and  seventy-five  of  his  men,  and  his  guns. 

Next  day  Cox  marched  up  the  river,  and,  re 
constructing  a  partially  destroyed  pontoon  bridge, 
occupied  the  marshy  island  in  the  river  in  front 
of  Wilmington.  Soon  heavy  columns  of  smoke 
were  seen  rising,  indicating  preparations  for  evacu 
ation.  Next  morning,  the  22d  of  February,  Gen 
eral  Cox  completed  the  crossing  and  entered  the 
abandoned  city. 

The  next  step  was  to  capture  Kinston,  a  point 
accessible  both  by  water  and  rail  from  the  sea,  lying 
farther  inland,  and  nearer  than  Wilmington  to 


290 


GENERAL   SHERMAN. 


Goldsboro.  Three  divisions  were  added  to  the 
force  under  Schofield,  and  Cox  was  called  from 
Wilmington  to  take  immediate  command  of  the 
expedition.  The  railroad  from  Newbern  to  Kins- 
ton  ran  from  Newbern  to  Southwest  Creek,  three 
miles  from  Kinston,  through  a  continuous  swamp. 
West  of  Southwest  Creek  was  solid  ground.  About 
two  miles  east  of  the  creek,  and  parallel  to  it,  a 
ridge  of  firm  ground  extended  into  the  swamp  from 
the  bank  of  Neuse  River.  Halfway  bet\veen  the 
creek  and  this  ridge  a  dirt  road,  called  the  Britis'h 
road,  ran  across  the  swamp  from  north  to  south. 

On  the  7th  Cox  rapidly  moved  the  divisions 
of  Carter  and  Palmer  out  to  the  ridge,  where  they 
threw  up  works  facing  west  about  a  mile  apart, 
Palmer  at  the  north  covering  the  railroad,  and  Car 
ter  at  the  south,  crossing  and  covering  the  Dover 
road.  This  road  leaving  Kinston  ran  east,  cross 
ing  Southwest  Creek  on  a  bridge,  and  crossing 
British  road,  continued  through  the  swamp  toward 
Newbern.  Colonel  Upham  was  posted  with  two 
regiments  at  the  crossing  of  the  Dover  and  British 
roads,  and  a  regiment  of  New  York  cavalry  was 
detached  to  watch  the  crossings  of  Southwest 
Creek,  which  was  not  fordable.  General  Ruger 
with  his  division  was  stationed  about  three  miles 
in  rear  of  Palmer,  where  he  could  protect  the  work 
ing  party  repairing  the  railroad,  and  also  be  in 
readiness  to  go  to  the  support  of  Palmer  or  Carter 
if  needed. 

On  the  morning  of  the  8th  Bragg  crossed 
Southwest  Creek  with  Hoke's  division  and  the 
fragment  of  Hood's  army,  still  styled  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee.  The  cavalry  disappeared  without 
giving  warning.  Bragg  fell  upon  Upham's  two 
regiments  of  fresh  recruits.  Upham  got  away  with 
his  own  regiment;  the  other  was  almost  wholly 
captured.  Bragg  then  advanced  against  Carter, 
who,  being  intrenched,  made  defense.  Cox,  who 


THE   CAROLINAS.  29! 

was  at  the  time  in  consultation  with  General  Scho- 
field,  sent  Ruger  forward  in  support.  Palmer  was 
ordered  to  send  one  brigade  rapidly  to  aid  Carter, 
and  with  the  rest  of  his  division  to  make  a  demon 
stration  toward  Southwest  Creek.  Ruger  filled  the 
space  between  Palmer  and  Carter,  and  quickly 
threw  up  defensive  works  of  logs.  Bragg  reformed 
his  lines,  made  assault,  and  was  repulsed.  There 
was  skirmishing  on  the  9th,  and  extension  and 
strengthening  of  the  National  lines.  Bragg  made 
repeated  assaults  on  the  loth,  and  was  repulsed 
at  every  attempt.  Colonel  McQuiston  made  a  sally 
from  General  Cox's  left,  fell  upon  Bragg's  right, 
routed  it,  and  returned  with  two  hundred  and  sixty- 
six  prisoners  captured,  in  time  to  aid  in  repelling 
an  assault  upon  the  center  and  right.  Bragg  found 
it  was  impracticable  to  advance  through  the  swamp 
and  thickets  and  attack  intrenchments  with  success. 
The  re-enforcements  sent  by  Johnston  had  come 
with  orders  to  hold  the  railroad  trains  ready  to 
bring  them  back  immediately  after  the  righting 
was  over  to  participate  in  his  concentration  before 
Sherman.  Bragg  withdrew  in  the  night  with  the 
entire  force,  and  joined  Johnston  in  time  to  take 
part  in  the  battle  at  Bentonville. 

The  casualties  on  the  National  side,  as  shown 
by  the  revised  consolidation  of  the  returns,  were: 
Killed,  sixty-five ;  wounded,  three  hundred  and 
nineteen ;  missing,  nine  hundred  and  fifty-three ; 
total,  thirteen  hundred  and  thirty-seven.  The  Con 
federate  reports  consist  of  a  few  brief  telegrams 
from  Bragg  to  Johnston,  which  give  no  informa 
tion  as  to  casualties,  and  the  report  of  D.  H.  Hill, 
temporary  commander  of  Lee's  corps,  which  is  too 
spiteful  to  be  quite  trustworthy.  He  reports  that 
the  corps,  comprising  five  brigades,  numbered 
thirteen  hundred  and  twenty-eight  "  effectives/* 
and  that  the  casualties  were  eleven  killed,  one  hun 
dred  and  seven  wounded,  and  sixteen  missing.  In 


292  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

his  report  of  the  battle  of  Bentonville,  he  states 
that  the  corps  went  into  battle  on  the  igth  num 
bering  twenty-six  hundred  and  eighty-seven  "  ef 
fectives."  Johnston,  in  a  report  to  General  Lee, 
dated  nth  of  March,  said  that  General  Bragg's  loss 
in  the  recent  engagement  was  about  five  hundred. 
Hoke's  command  was  larger  than  Hill's.  Its  re 
turn  for  the  1 7th  of  March,  after  the  battles  of  Wil 
mington,  Kinston,  and  the  first  day  of  Benton 
ville,  was :  "  Effectives,"  forty-seven  hundred  and 
seventy-five  infantry ;  artillery,  seven  hundred  and 
eighty-two ;  total,  fifty-five  hundred  and  fifty-seven. 
Schofield  repaired  the  railroad  to  Kinston.  He 
ordered  Terry  to  advance  from  Wilmington  by  the 
railroad  to  Goldsboro,  to  which  point  he  proceeded 
in  person  with  Cox's  command,  arriving  there  on 
the  2 1  st.  The  campaign  of  the  Carolinas  was  defi 
nitely  concluded  on  the  24th  of  March,  when  the 
six  corps — the  Tenth,  Fourteenth,  Fifteenth,  Sev 
enteenth,  Twentieth,  and  Twenty-third — assembled 
there  about  their  leader. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

THE    END    OF    THE    WAR. 

AT  Goldsboro  Sherman  came  into  full  com 
munication  with  the  world.  He  found  there  Gen 
eral  Grant's  aid-de-camp,  Lieutenant  Dunn,  with 
letters.  In  one  Grant,  mentioning  the  co-operative 
movement  on  foot,  said :  "  Wilson  started  on 
Monday  with  twelve  thousand  cavalry  from  East- 
port.  Stoneman  started  on  the  same  day  from  East 
Tennessee  toward  Lynchburg.  Thomas  is  mov 
ing  the  Fourth  Corps  to  Bull's  Gap.  Canby  is 
moving  with  a  formidable  force  on  Mobile  and  the 
interior  of  Alabama.  I  ordered  Gillmore,  as  soon 
as  the  fall  of  Charleston  was  known,  to  hold  all 
important  posts  on  the  seacoast,  and  to  send  to 
Wilmington  all  surplus  forces.  Thomas  was  also 
directed  to  forward  to  Newbern  all  troops  be 
longing  to  the  corps  with  you.  I  understand  this 
will  give  you  about  five  thousand  men,  besides 
those  brought  East  with  Meagher.  I  have  been 
telegraphing  Meigs  to  hasten  up  locomotives  and 
cars  for  you." 

General  Sherman  determined  to  have  personal 
consultation  with  General  Grant  while  his  army 
grouped  around  Goldsboro  was  getting  supplied. 
As  soon  as  the  last  rail  was  laid  in  repairs,  leav 
ing  General  Schofield  in  command,  he  started  on 
the  evening  of  the  25th  on  a  locomotive  for  New 
bern.  At  Moorhead  City  he  took  boat  to  General 
Grant's  headquarters  at  City  Point.  When  he  en 
tered  Grant's  quarters,  they  grasped  hands  and 

293 


294 


THE   END   OF   THE   WAR.  295 

stood  in  silence,  eye  to  eye,  soul  to  soul,  in  closer 
communion  than  words  could  utter. 

Sherman  had  two  long  interviews  with  Presi 
dent  Lincoln  on  his  boat.  Admiral  Porter  was 
present  at  one.  Both  Sherman  and  Porter  have 
made  record  of  the  conversation.  Both  mention 
the  tender  earnestness  with  which  the  President 
pressed  and  repeated  his  hope  that  there  would  be 
no  more  slaughter,  his  wish  that  the  war  might 
close  without  another  battle,  and  the  disbanded 
soldiers  return  home  to  their  farms  and  work 
shops.  General  Sherman  also  relates  that  the  Presi 
dent,  by  telling  a  story,  intimated  that  he  would 
be  glad  if  Jefferson  Davis  should  get  away,  pro 
vided  he  escaped  "  unbeknownst."  Arrangements 
being  made  for  the  organization  and  supply  of  his 
army,  Sherman  undertook  to  be  ready  to  move  on 
the  loth  of  April,  and  returned  to  Goldsboro,  ar 
riving  there  on  the  3Oth  of  March. 

The  army,  as  in  the  Atlanta  campaign,  com 
prised  a  center  and  right  and  left  wings.  General 
Schofield  commanded  the  center,  or  the  Army  of 
the  Ohio ;  General  Howard,  the  right  wing,  or  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee ;  and  General  Slocum,  the 
left  wing,  which  had  heretofore  been  called,  but 
was  now  regularly  constituted,  the  Army  of 
Georgia,  a  separate  army  in  the  field.  The  Army 
of  the  Tennessee  comprised  the  Fifteenth  Corps, 
commanded  by  General  Logan,  and  the  Seventeenth, 
commanded  by  General  Blair,  and  numbered 
twenty-eight  thousand  one  hundred  and  seventeen 
infantry,  fifty-three  cavalry,  and  six  hundred  and 
sixty-four  artillery.  The  Army  of  the  Ohio  com 
prised  the  Tenth  Corps,  commanded  by  General 
Terry,  and  the  Twenty-third,  commanded  by  Gen 
eral  Cox,  and  numbered  twenty-five  thousand  seven 
hundred  and  twenty-seven  infantry  and  six  hun 
dred  and  sixty-five  artillery.  The  Army  of  Georgia 
comprised  the  Fourteenth  Corps,  commanded  by 

20 


296  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

General  Davis,  and  the  Twentieth,  commanded  by 
General  Mower,  and  numbered  twenty-seven  thou 
sand  one  hundred  and  twenty-four  infantry  and 
nine  hundred  and  thirty-nine  artillery.  In  addi 
tion,  General  Kilpatrick's  cavalry  division  con 
tained  fifty-four  hundred  and  eighty-four  cavalry 
and  one  hundred  and  seventy-five  artillery.  The 
aggregate  was,  on  the  loth  of  April :  Infantry, 
eighty  thousand  nine  hundred  and  sixty-eight ; 
cavalry,  fifty-five  hundred  and  thirty-seven ;  artil 
lery,  twenty-four  hundred  and  forty-three ;  aggre 
gate,  eighty-eight  thousand  nine  hundred  and  forty- 
eight.  The  artillery  had  ninety-one  guns. 

News  came  to  Goldsboro  on  the  6th  of  April 
that  Lee  had  evacuated  Richmond  and  was  hurry 
ing  away  with  his  army  and  the  Confederate  Gov 
ernment.  A  dispatch  was  received  from  Grant  on 
the  8th,  ending,  "  Rebel  armies  now  are  the  only 
strategic  points  to  strike  at."  Throwing  up  the 
plan  of  campaign  published  in  field  orders  on  the 
5th,  he  started  on  the  loth  direct  for  Johnston  in 
his  camp  at  Smithfield,  which  was  found  the  next 
day  abandoned,  and  the  bridge  across  the  Neuse 
burned.  In  the  night  Sherman  received  news  of 
the  surrender  of  Lee.  On  the  march  next  day  the 
tidings  was  given  to  the  columns  on  the  march. 
The  men  were  wild  with  joy.  The  universal  shout 
was,  "  Lee  has  surrendered,  and  wre  are  going 
home!  "  An  ambitious  desire  to  have  one  fight  with 
Lee's  army  had  been  quite  generally  felt,  but  it 
was  agreed  about  the  camp  fires  that  night  that  it 
was  better  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  should 
have  achieved  its  final  victory  without  extrane 
ous  aid. 

On  the  I4th  a  flag  of  truce  came  from  General 
Johnston  proposing  a  suppression  of  hostilities,  and 
that  General  Grant  be  requested  to  "  take  like 
action  in  regard  to  other  armies,  the  object  being 
to  permit  the  civil  authorities  to  enter  into  the 


THE    END   OF    THE   WAR.  297 

needful  arrangement  to  terminate  the  existing 
war."  Sherman  replied :  "  That  a  basis  of  action 
may  be  had,  I  undertake  to  abide  by  the  same  terms 
and  conditions  as  were  made  by  Generals  Grant  and 
Lee  at  Appomattox  Courthouse  on  the  9th  instant 
relative  to  our  two  armies ;  and,  furthermore,  to 
obtain  from  General  Grant  an  order  to  suspend 
any  movement  of  our  troops  in  the  direction  of 
Virginia." 

On  the  morning  of  the  I7th,  as  General  Sher 
man  was  entering  the  car  to  go  out  and  meet  Gen 
eral  Johnston,  the  telegraph  operator  asked  him  to 
wait  till  he  received  an  important  cipher  dispatch 
from  Mr.  Stanton.  It  was  the  announcement  of 
the  murder  of  Lincoln.  When  the  two  generals 
met  and  withdrew  to  a  little  farmhouse  which  was 
vacated  for  them,  Sherman  showed  the  dispatch ; 
Johnston  was  shocked,  and  did  not  attempt  to  con 
ceal  his  distress,  and  denounced  the  act  as  a  dis 
grace  to  the  age.  There  was  much  serious  con 
versation  upon  the  horrible  deed  before  the  busi 
ness  of  the  interview  was  reached.  Then  Sherman 
urged  that  Johnston  could  with  propriety  do  what 
Lee  had  already  done ;  Johnston  agreed  to  this,  but 
thought  that,  instead  of  surrendering  piecemeal, 
terms  might  be  arranged  which  would  embrace  all 
the  Confederate  armies,  and,  upon  his  undertaking 
to  procure  authority  from  Jefferson  Davis,  the 
conference  was  adjudged  till  noon  next  day. 

Next  morning  the  tidings  of  the  murder  of  the 
President  was  promulgated  in  orders.  The  men 
sat  all  day,  each  in  front  of  his  shelter  tent,  somber, 
brooding,  silent.  The  stillness  was  appalling.  A 
word  would  have  sent  eighty  thousand  furious  men, 
a  whirling  tornado,  desolating  the  land.  Sherman, 
accompanied  by  a  party  of  officers,  went  on  his  er 
rand  of  peace  to  negotiate  the  surrender  of  the 
Confederate  armies.  When  the  two  generals  met, 
Johnston  proposed  that  General  Breckinridge 


298 


GENERAL    SHERMAN. 


should  be  admitted  to  the  conference,  not  as  a 
member  of  the  Confederate  Government,  but  as  an 
officer  in  the  Confederate  army.  Breckinridge  was 
an  adroit  politician,  and  as  he  presented  the  propo 
sition  of  making  terms  of  an  immediate  termina 
tion  of  the  war  and  the  spread  of  universal  peace, 
General  Sherman's  imagination  so  took  fire  at 
the  prospect  of  such  a  boon  to  the  weary  nation 
that  he  drafted  the  following  articles  to  be  sub 
mitted  to  the  Government  at  Washington.  They 
were  at  once  accepted  : 

1.  The  contending  armies  now  in  the  field  to  maintain 
the  statu  quo  until  notice  is  given  by  the  commanding  gen 
eral  of  any  one  to  its  opponent,  and  reasonable  time — say, 
forty-eight  hours — allowed. 

2.  The  Confederate  armies  now  in  existence  to  be  dis 
banded  and  conducted  to  their  several  State  capitals,  there 
to  deposit  their  arms  and  public  property  in  the  State  arsenal, 
and  each  officer  and  man  to  execute  and  file  an  agreement 
to  cease  from  acts  of  war,  and  to  abide  the  action  of  the 
State  and    Federal   authority.     The   number   of  arms   and 
munitions  of  war  to  be  reported  to  the  chief  of  ordnance  at 
Washington  city,  subject  to  the  future  action  of  the  Con 
gress  of  the  United  States,  and  in  the  meantime  to  be  used 
solely  to  maintain  peace  and  order  within  the  borders  of  the 
States  respectively. 

3.  The  recognition  by  the  Executive  of  the  United  States 
of  the  several  State  governments  on  their  officers  and  legis 
latures  taking  the  oaths  prescribed  by  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States,  and,  where  conflicting  State  governments 
have  resulted  from  the  war,  the  legitimacy  of  all  shall  be 
submitted  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States. 

4.  The  re-establishment  ot  all  the  Federal  courts  of  the 
several  States,  with  powers  as  defined  by  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States  and  of  the  States  respectively. 

5.  The  people  and  the  inhabitants  of  all  the  States  to  be 
guaranteed,  so  far  as  the  Executive  can,  their  political  rights 
and  franchises,  as  well  as  their  rights  of  person  and  property, 
as  defined  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  and  of 
the  States  respectively. 

6.  The   Executive  authority  of  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  not  to  disturb  any  of  the  people  by  reason  of 
the  late  war,  so  long  as  they  live  in  peace  and  quiet,  abstain 


THE   END   OF    THE   WAR.  299 

from  acts  of  armed  hostility,  and  obey  the  laws  in  existence 
at  the  place  of  their  residence. 

7.  In  general  terms — the  war  to  cease  ;  a  general  am 
nesty,  so  far  as  the  Executive  of  the  United  States  can  com 
mand,  on  condition  of  the  disbandment  of  the  Confederate 
armies,  the  distribution  of  the  arms,  and  the  resumption  of 
peaceful  pursuits  by  the  officers  and  men  hitherto  composing 
the  armies. 

Not  being  fully  empowered  by  our  respective  principals 
to  fulfill  these  terms,  we  individually  and  officially  pledge 
ourselves  to  promptly  obtain  the  necessary  authority,  and  to 
carry  out  the  above  programme. 

General  Sherman  was  at  fault;  of  course  he, 
only  the  commander  of  one  of  the  armies  in  the 
field,  had  no  authority  to  make  any  such  an  ar 
rangement  or  enter  into  any  such  negotiation,  and 
the  terms  were  not  such  as  should  have  been  made. 
But  it  was  in  accord  with  his  uniform  declarations 
through  the  war.  While  prosecuting  war  with 
rigor,  he  said  on  every  occasion  that  he  was  ready 
to  give  fullest  amnesty  to  all  who  should  surrender 
and  submit  to  the  National  Government.  He  was 
confident  that  he  was  only  carrying  out  the  earnest 
wish  and  purpose  of  President  Lincoln  as  ex 
pressed  in  the  conversation  at  City  Point.  He  had 
received  no  such  warning  as  was  sent  to  Grant — to 
restrict  his  action  to  the  surrender  of  Lee's  army, 
and  to  leave  all  other  matters  to  the  Executive. 
He  knew  that  after  Lee's  surrender  General  Weit- 
zel  had  convened  the  Confederate  Legislature  in 
Richmond,  and  had  not  heard  that  Weitzel's  order 
had  been  disapproved  and  rescinded.  And,  finally, 
he  acted  the  more  freely  because  his  action  was 
only  provisional,  and  without  effect  unless  ratified. 

But  he  was  sure  that  he  was  right,  and  elated 
that  he  was  the  instrument  of  bringing  such  a 
boon  to  the  country.  He  sent  Major  Hitchcock 
with  the  articles  of  agreement  to  General  Grant  on 
the  2Oth.  When  Grant  read  them  he  sent  the  paper 
with  his  disapproval  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  with 


3°° 


GENERAL   SHERMAN. 


recommendation  to  submit  it  at  once  to  President 
Johnson  and  the  whole  Cabinet.  Grant  was  or 
dered  to  proceed  at  once  to  Sherman's  headquar 
ters,  terminate  the  truce,  and  direct  the  move 
ments  of  the  army. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  24th  Major  Hitch 
cock  appeared  on  his  return,  and  with  him  was 
General  Grant.  The  general  directed  General 
Sherman  to  give  at  once  notice  to  terminate  the 
truce  at  the  end  of  forty-eight  hours,  and  then 
resume  hostilities  and  press  pursuit.  The  notice 
was  immediately  sent,  and  at  the  same  time  a  de 
mand  for  surrender  of  Johnston's  army  on  the  same 
terms  as  were  given  to  General  Lee  at  Appomat- 
tox.  At  the  same  time  orders  were  issued  to  be 
ready  to  move  on  the  expiration  of  forty-eight 
hours.  Message  was  sent  to  the  same  effect  to 
General  Gillmore  in  South  Carolina,  with  instruc 
tions  to  send  the  same  to  General  Wilson  in 
Georgia.  On  the  25th  word  came  from  Johnston 
requesting  another  interview  next  day.  On  the 
26th  Johnston  surrendered  the  troops  under  his 
command  upon  the  terms  granted  by  Grant  to  Lee. 
General  Grant  approved,  and  took  the  agreement 
of  capitulation  with  him  to  Washington  on  the 
27th.  Sherman  made  the  necessary  orders  to  carry 
out  the  terms  of  the  capitulation,  appointed  Gen 
eral  Schofield  to  superintend  the  details,  and  started 
for  Savannah  to  insure  communication  with  Gen 
eral  Wilson.  The  incident  was  closed. 

The  murder  of  Lincoln,  the  attempted  assassina 
tion  of  Seward,  and  the  purposed  murder  of  other 
high  officials  horrified  the  people  and  unnerved  the 
Cabinet.  Vice-President  Johnson,  who  succeeded 
to  the  presidency,  was  known  to  be  loyal  to  the 
Union,  but  otherwise  was,  to  the  people,  an  un 
known  quantity.  Doubt  and  distrust  and  vague 
apprehension  prevailed.  Stanton,  with  his  intense 
loyalty  to  the  nation,  could  be  arbitrary  and  cruel, 


THE   END  OF   THE   WAR.  301 

and  could  trample  on  plans  and  persons  whom  he 
deemed  inimical  to  the  nation.  He  seems,  all  at 
once,  to  have  lost  faith  in  Sherman's  loyalty,  as 
well  as  his  discretion.  He  immediately  dispatched 
to  General  Dix,  who  gave  it  to  the  New  York 
papers,  the  following  communication : 

Yesterday  evening  a  bearer  of  dispatches  arrived  from 
General  Sherman.  An  agreement  for  a  suspension  of  hos 
tilities,  and  a  memorandum  of  what  is  called  a  basis  for 
peace,  had  been  entered  into  on  the  i8th  inst.  by  General 
Sherman,  with  the  rebel  General  Johnston.  Brigadier-Gen 
eral  Breckinridge  was  present  at  the  conference. 

A  cabinet  meeting  was  held  at  eight  o'clock  in  the  even 
ing,  at  which  the  action  of  General  Sherman  was  disap 
proved  by  the  President,  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  by  General 
Grant,  and  by  every  member  of  the  Cabinet.  General  Sher 
man  was  ordered  to  resume  hostilities  immediately,  and  was 
directed  that  the  instructions  given  by  the  late  President  in 
the  following  telegram,  which  was  penned  by  Mr.  Lincoln 
himself  at  the  Capitol  on  the  night  of  the  3d  of  March,  were 
approved  by  President  Andrew  Johnson,  and  were  reiterated 
to  govern  the  action  of  military  commanders. 

On  the  night  of  the  3d  of  March,  while  President  Lincoln 
and  his  Cabinet  were  at  the  Capitol,  a  telegram  from  General 
Grant  was  brought  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  informing  him 
that  General  Lee  had  requested  an  interview  or  conference 
to  make  an  arrangement  for  terms  of  peace.  The  letter  of 
General  Lee  was  published  in  a  letter  to  Davis  and  to  the 
rebel  Congress.  General  Grant's  telegram  was  submitted 
to  Mr.  Lincoln,  who,  after  pondering  a  few  minutes,  took  up 
his  pen  and  wrote  with  his  own  hand  the  following  reply, 
which  he  submitted  to  the  Secretary  of  State  and  Secretary 
of  War.  It  was  then  dated,  addressed,  and  signed  by  the 
Secretary  of  War,  and  telegraphed  to  General  Grant : 

WASHINGTON,  March  3,  1863 — 12  P.  M. 
Lieutenant-General  GRANT  : 

The  President  directs  me  to  say  to  you  that  he  wishes  you 
to  have  no  conference  with  General  Lee,  unless  it  be  for  the 
capitulation  of  General  Lee's  army,  or  on  some  minor  or 
purely  military  matter.  He  instructs  me  to  say  that  you 
are  not  to  decide,  discuss,  or  confer  upon  any  political  ques 
tions.  Such  questions  the  President  holds  in  his  own  hands, 
and  will  submit  them  to  no  military  conferences  or  conven- 


3<D2 


GENERAL   SHERMAN. 


tions.     Meantime  you  are  to  press  to  the  utmost  your  mili 
tary  advantages. 

EDWIN  M.  STANTON,  Secretary  of  War. 

The  orders  of  General  Sherman  to  General  Stoneman,  to 
withdraw  from  Salisbury  and  join  him,  will  probably  open  the 
way  for  Davis  to  escape  to  New  Mexico  or  Europe  with  his 
plunder,  which  is  reported  to  be  very  large,  including  not 
only  the  plunder  of  the  Richmond  banks,  but  previous  accu 
mulations. 

A  dispatch  received  by  this  department  from  Richmond 
says :  "  It  is  stated  here,  by  respectable  parties,  that  the 
amount  of  specie  taken  South  by  Jeff  Davis  and  his  par 
tisans  is  very  large,  including  not  only  the  plunder  of  the 
Richmond  banks,  but  previous  accumulations.  They  hope, 
it  is  said,  to  make,  terms  with  General  Sherman,  or  some 
other  commander,  by  which  they  will  be  permitted  with 
their  effects,  including  this  gold  plunder,  to  go  to  Mexico  or 
Europe.  Johnston's  negotiations  looked  to  this  end." 

After  the  Cabinet  meeting  last  night  General  Grant 
started  for  North  Carolina  to  direct  operations  against  John 
ston's  army.  The  reasons  for  disapproval  were  : 

1.  It  was  an  exercise  of  authority  not  vested  in  General 
Sherman,  and  on  its  face  shows  that  both  he  and  Johnston 
knew  that  General  Sherman  had  no  authority  to  enter  into 
any  such  arrangement. 

2.  It  was  a  practical  acknowledgment  of  the  rebel  gov 
ernment. 

3.  It   undertook  to  re-establish  the  rebel  State  govern 
ment  that  had   been   overthrown  at  the  sacrifice  of  many 
thousand  loyal  lives  and  an  immense  treasury,  and  placed  the 
arms  and  munitions  of  war  in  the  hands   of  the  rebels  at 
their  respective  capitals,  which  might  be  used  as  soon  as  the 
armies  of  the  United  States  were  disbanded,  and  used  to 
conquer  and  subdue  the  loyal  States. 

4.  By  the  restoration  of  the  rebel  authority  in  their  re 
spective  States,  they  would  be  enabled  to  re-establish  slavery. 

5.  It   might   furnish   a  ground  of  responsibility  for  the 
Federal  Government  to  pay  the  rebel  debts,  and  certainly 
subject  the  loyal  citizens  of  rebel  States  to  debts  contracted 
by  rebels  in  the  States. 

6.  It  would  put  in  dispute  the  existence  of  loyal  State 
governments  and  the  new  State  of  West  Virginia,  which  had 
been  recognized  by  every  department  of  the  United  States 
Government. 

7.  It  practically  abolished  the  confiscation  laws  and  re- 


THE   END  OF   THE  WAR.  303 

lieved  the  rebels  of  every  degree,  who  had  slaughtered  our 
people,  from  all  pains  and  penalties  for  their  crimes. 

8.  It  gave  terms  that  had  been  deliberately,  repeatedly, 
and  solemnly  refused  by  President  Lincoln,  and  better  terms 
than  the  rebels  had  ever  asked  in  their  most  prosperous 
conditions. 

9.  It  formed  no  basis  of  true  and  lasting  peace,  but  re 
lieved  the  rebels  from  the  presence  of  our  victories,  and  left 
them   in  condition  to  renew  their  efforts  to  overthrow  the 
United    Slates   Government,   and    subdue   the   loyal   States 
whenever  their  strength  was  recruited  and  any  opportunity 
was  offered. 

General  Halleck  was  relieved  from  his  position 
as  chief  of  staff  and  appointed  commander  of  the 
Military  Division  of  the  James,  comprising  the 
State  of  Virginia  and  so  much  of  North  Carolina 
as  was  not  occupied  by  Sherman.  Generals  Meade 
and  Sheridan  came  under  his  command.  General 
Grant  dispatched  to  Halleck  on  the  22d  of  April 
from  Fortress  Monroe :  "  The  truce  entered  into 
by  General  Sherman  will  be  ended  as  soon  as  I  can 
reach  Raleigh.  Move  Sheridan  with  his  cavalry 
toward  Greensboro  as  soon  as  possible.  I  think 
it  will  be  well  to  send  one  corps  of  infantry  with 
the  cavalry.  The  infantry  need  not  go  farther 
than  Danville  unless  they  receive  orders  hereafter." 
Johnston  was  at  Greensboro  and  Sherman  at 
Raleigh,  with  their  respective  commands  disposed 
in  front  of  each. 

General  Halleck  on  the  same  day  ordered  Sheri 
dan  :  "  You  will  move  with  your  cavalry  immedi 
ately  on  Greensboro.  You  will  then  act  as  circum 
stances  seem  to  require,  unless  you  receive  instruc 
tions  from  General  Grant,  who  is  on  his  way  to 
Raleigh.  General  Meade  has  been  directed  to  place 
I  an  infantry  corps  under  your  direction.  It  is  said 
here  that  there  is  a  large  amount  of  specie  on  the 
road  between  here  and  Charlotte.  It  is  supposed 
to  have  been  taken  at  different  points  from  the  rail 
road.  .  .  .  While  pushing  south  with  all  possible 


304 


GENERAL   SHERMAN. 


dispatch,  look  into  these  things."     Sheridan  prom 
ised  to  be  ready  to  move  on  the  25th. 

On  the  23d  Halleck  dispatched  to  Sheridan : 
"  Pay  no  attention  to  the  Sherman  and  Johnston 
truce.  It  has  been  disapproved  by  the  President. 
Try  to  cut  off  Jeff  Davis's  specie."  Halleck  being 
advised  that  General  Meade  had  received  notice 
from  the  Confederate  commander  that  a  second 
truce  had  been  arranged  between  Johnston  and 
Sherman,  dispatched  to  him  on  the  26th :  "  To 
avoid  all  misunderstanding,  telegraph  again  to 
General  Wright  to  observe  no  truce  not  made  by 
General  Grant,  but  do  all  in  his  power  to  cut  off  the 
enemy's  retreat.  General  Grant  has  reached  Ra 
leigh,  and  ordered  an  immediate  resumption  of  hos 
tilities.  The  enemy's  object  now  is  to  permit  the 
leaders  to  escape  South  by  their  dilatory  negotia 
tions."  On  the  27th  Meade  telegraphed  to  Gen 
eral  Wright  that  he  was  not  to  pay  any  attention 
to  dispatches  concerning  truces  without  official 
instruction  from  General  Grant  or  General  Sher 
man,  and  informed  General  Halleck  that  he  had 
sent  such  instructions.  Halleck  replied  to  Meade 
the  same  day :  "  Impress  upon  General  Wright 
and  General  Sheridan  that  they  are  not  to  regard 
any  dispatches  from  General  Sherman,  direct  or 
through  rebel  authorities.  They  will  obey  only  the 
orders  from  General  Grant  or  myself.  They  will 
push  on  with  all  possible  dispatch  and  carry  out 
their  original  orders  without  regard  to  General 
Sherman's  arrangements."  General  Sheridan  found 
obstacles  which  prevented  his  reaching  Danville,  and 
Wright  claimed  that  if  he  was  to  advance  against 
Johnston  at  Greensboro  he  should  do  so  only  in 
connection  with  a  simultaneous  movement  by  Sher 
man.  In  the  night  of  the  same  day  Meade  sent  Hal- 
leek's  last  dispatch  to  Wright,  and  next  morning, 
the  28th,  Halleck  notified  Meade  of  the  surrender, 
recalled  Sheridan,  and  stayed  Wright  at  Danville. 


THE  END  OF   THE  WAR.  305 

On  the  27th  Secretary  Stanton  sent  a  second 
letter  to  General  Dix,  which  was  also  published  in 
the  papers.  It  reads  : 

The  department  has  received  the  following;  dispatch 
from  Major-General  Halleck,  commanding  the  Military  Divi 
sion  of  the  James.  Generals  Canby  and  Thomas  were  in 
structed  some  days  ago  that  Sherman's  arrangements  with 
Johnston  were  disapproved  by  the  President,  and  they  were 
ordered  to  disregard  it,  and  push  the  enemy  in  every  direc 
tion  : 

RICHMOND,  VA.,  April  26—9.30  p.  M. 

Generals  Meade,  Sheridan,  and  Wright  are  acting  under 
orders  to  pay  no  regard  to  any  truce  or  orders  of  General 
Sherman  respecting  hostilities,  on  the  ground  that  Sherman's 
agreement  could  bind  his  command  only,  and  no  other. 

They  are  directed  to  push  forward,  regardless  of  orders 
from  any  one  except  from  General  Grant,  and  cut  off  Gen 
eral  Johnston's  retreat. 

Beauregard  has  telegraphed  to  Danville  that  a  new  ar 
rangement  has  been  made  with  Sherman,  and  that  the  ad 
vance  of  the  Sixth  Corps  was  to  be  suspended  until  further 
orders. 

I  have  telegraphed  back  to  obey  no  orders  of  Sherman, 
but  to  push  forward  as  rapidly  as  possible. 

The  bankers  have  information  to-day  that  Jeff  Davis's 
specie  is  moving  south  from  Goldsboro  in  wagons  as  fast  as 
possible. 

I  suggest  that  orders  be  telegraphed  through  General 
Thomas  that  Wilson  obey  no  orders  from  Sherman,  and 
notifying  him  and  Canby,  and  all  commanders  on  the  Mis 
sissippi,  to  take  measures  to  intercept  the  rebel  chiefs  and 
their  plunder.  The  specie  taken  with  them  is  estimated  here 
at  from  six  to  thirteen  million  dollars. 

General  Sherman  on  the  28th  appointed  Gen 
eral  Schofield,  with  the  aid  of  General  Cox,  to  take 
charge  of  paroling  the  surrendered  troops  and 
make  arrangements  for  their  departure,  and  di 
rected  General  Howard  to  take  the  right  and  left 
wings  by  easy  marches  to  Richmond,  where  he 
could  rejoin  them  on  his  return  from  the  South. 
Next  day  he  left  for  Charleston  and  Savannah.  He 


3o6  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

read  in  the  newspapers  with  amazement  the  com 
munications  of  Stanton  and  Halleck,  and  the  in 
flammatory  editorials  in  the  newspapers.  He  did 
not  heed  the  shameful  insinuation  of  personal  in 
terest  in  the  phantom  treasure  of  the  fleeing  Presi 
dent,  but  to  be  denounced  by  authority  and  vilified 
by  the  press  as  a  military  outcast,  incapacitated  to 
make  a  valid  order,  stung  him  to  the  quick. 

The  paroling  of  Johnston's  army  and  detach 
ments  occasioned  some  relaxation  of  the  terms  of 
the  surrender.  Enlisted  men,  as  well  as  officers, 
were  allowed  by  General  Schofield  to  take  home 
horses  and  other  property  belonging  to  them.  The 
total  number  of  paroles,  as  ascertained  by  revision 
of  the  rolls,  is  thirty-nine  thousand  and  twelve. 

The  march  from  Petersburg,  beginning  on  the 
ist  and  arriving  on  the  7th  of  May,  was  a  contrast 
with  the  march  across  South  Carolina.  Good  roads 
and  fine  weather  made  easy  marching  and  early 
camps.  There  was  absolutely  no  foraging,  either 
authorized  or  illicit.  There  was  no  straggling.  At 
every  halt  the  men  stacked  arms  and  remained  by 
their  stacks.  They  had  marched  far  and  toiled  and 
suffered  much  to  reach  Richmond,  and  at  last  they 
were  to  meet  their  comrades  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac.  General  Howard,  on  reaching  Peters 
burg,  reported  his  arrival  to  General  Halleck. 
Halleck's  greeting  came  promptly :  "  Your  com 
mand  will  be  encamped  at  or  near  Manchester,  and 
not  be  permitted  to  enter  Richmond  until  prepared 
to  march  through  the  city."  The  command  went 
into  camp  about  Manchester,  across  the  river  from 
Richmond,  and  found  guards  posted  across  every 
road  to  prevent  any  member  of  Sherman's  army 
from  going  into  the  city. 

When  General  Sherman  returned  from  the 
South,  he  was  met  by  a  note  from  General  Halleck 
professing  friendship,  and  asking  him  to  be  his 
guest  while  in  Richmond.  Sherman  declined  both 


THE   END   OF   THE   WAR.  307 

the  invitation  and  the  friendship.  On  the  nth, 
General  Logan  having  been  appointed  commander 
of  the  Army  of  the  lennessee  in  place  of  General 
Howard,  who  had  been  called  to  Washington  to 
organize  the  Freedman's  Bureau,  the  army  passed 
through  Richmond  on  its  way  to  Washington,  with 
colors  furled,  equipped  for  march,  at  route  step, 
and  with  trains  in  the  column. 

The  army  reached  the  neighborhood  of  Alex 
andria  on  the  1 9th  of  May,  and  went  into  camp. 
Orders  had  been  sent  from  Raleigh  for  uniforms, 
hats,  equipment,  headquarter  colors,  and  every 
thing  required  to  make  the  troops  presentable  for 
the  final  review.  The  supplies  were  arriving,  and 
all  was  busy  preparation.  General  Sherman  was 
invited  to  the  city  by  many  friends.  General  Grant 
met  him.  The  President  and  members  of  the  Cabi 
net  received  him  cordially,  and  voluntarily  assured 
him  that  they  knew  nothing  of  Stanton's  mem 
oranda  before  they  were  seen  in  the  newspapers. 
On  the  23d,  the  day  of  the  review  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  Sherman's  army  moved  nearer  to  the 
city,  and  went  into  bivouac  between  Four  Mile 
Run  and  the  Long  Bridge. 

Early  the  next  morning  the  troops  crossed  the 
bridge  and  massed  in  open  ground  north  and  east 
of  the  Capitol.  At  nine  o'clock  General  Sherman, 
accompanied  by  General  Howard  and  followed  by 
his  staff,  moved,  leading  the  column  of  the  Fif 
teenth,  Seventeenth,  Fourteenth,  and  Twentieth 
Corps,  marching  division  front,  two  companies 
abreast.  As  they  turned  the  Capitol  grounds  into 
Pennsylvania  Avenue  a  thrilling  spectacle  came 
into  view.  As  far  as  the  eye  could  reach  toward 
the  Treasury  Building  the  sidewalks  were  packed 
with  a  dense  multitude,  which  the  lines  of  cavalry 
stationed  along  the  sides  to  keep  the  roadway  clear 
could  hardly  prevent  from  bulging  into  the  street. 
Every  step  and  porch  and  doorway,  every  balcony 


308  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

and  window,  the  roofs  where  parapets  made  it  prac 
ticable,  were  mosaic  of  human  heads. 

The  men  were  inspired  by  the  view.  Elate, 
erect,  eyes  steady  to  the  front,  they  moved  with 
alert  and  vigorous  step,  lines  dressed  with  abso 
lute  precision,  and  intervals  perfectly  preserved. 
The  reviewing  stand  was  in  front  of  the  White 
House,  where  the  President  stood  with  his  Cabi 
net  and  other  high  officials,  and  Mrs.  Sherman  and 
other  ladies.  Facing  this,  on  the  other  side  of  the 
avenue,  were  long  ranks  of  seats,  rilled  with  the 
diplomatic  corps  and  other  notabilities,  and  thou 
sands  of  others.  The  steady  tide  passed  between 
for  six  hours  and  a  half  without  a  flaw.  When  Gen 
eral  Sherman  took  his  place  the  President,  the 
members  of  the  Cabinet,  and  others  pressed  for 
ward  to  welcome  him.  He  had  hearty  greeting 
from  all,  till  Mr.  Stanton  approached  with  out 
stretched  hand.  Sherman  declined  and  refused  to 
recognize  him.  The  army  passed  by.  Armies, 
corps,  and  divisions  filed  off  as  guided  to  designated 
camp  grounds  in  the  outskirts  of  the  city.  Gen 
eral  Sherman's  "  bummers  "  reposed  in  the  grounds 
and  groves  of  the  country  seats  surrounding  the 
Capitol,  and  there  read  the  farewell  address  of  their 
great  commander: 

The  general  commanding  announces  to  the  Armies  of 
the  Tennessee  and  Georgia  that  the  time  has  come  for  us  to 
part.  Our  work  is  done,  and  armed  enemies  no  longer  defy 
us.  Some  of  you  will  go  to  your  homes,  and  others  will  be 
retained  in  military  service  till  further  orders.  And  now  that 
we  are  about  to  separate,  to  mingle  with  the  civil  world,  it 
becomes  a  pleasing  duty  to  recall  to  mind  the  situation  of 
National  affairs  when,  but  little  more  than  a  year  ago,  we 
were  gathered  about  the  cliffs  of  Lookout  Mountain,  and  all 
the  future  was  wrapped  in  doubt  and  uncertainty. 

Three  armies  had  come  together  from  distant  fields,  with 
separate  histories,  yet  bound  by  one  common  cause — the 
union  of  our  country  and  the  perpetuation  of  the  Govern 
ment  of  our  inheritance.  There  is  no  need  to  recall  to  your 


THE    END   OF   THE    WAR. 


309 


memories  Tunnel  Hill,  with  Rocky  Face  Mountain  and  Buz 
zard  Roost  Gap,  and  the  ugly  forts  of  Dalton  behind.  We 
were  in  earnest,  and  paused  not  for  danger  and  difficulty, 
but  dashed  through  Snake  Creek  Gap  and  fell  on  Resaca; 
then  on  the  Etowah,  to  Dallas,  Kenesaw  ;  and  the  heats  of 
summer  found  us  on  the  banks  of  the  Chattahoochee,  far 
from  home  and  dependent  on  a  single  road  for  supplies. 
Again  we  were  not  to  be  held  back  by  any  obstacle,  and 
crossed  over  and  fought  four  hard  battles  for  the  possession 
of  the  citadel  of  Atlanta.  That  was  the  crisis  of  our  history. 
A  doubt  still  clouded  our  future,  but  we  solved  the  problem, 
destroyed  Atlanta,  struck  boldly  across  the  State  of  Georgia, 
severed  all  the  main  arteries  of  life  to  our  enemy,  and  Christ 
mas  found  us  at  Savannah. 

Waiting  there  only  long  enough  to  fill  our  wagons,  we 
again  began  a  march  which,  for  peril,  labor,  and  results,  will 
compare  with  any  ever  made  by  an  organized  army.  The 
floods  of  the  Savannah,  the  swamps  of  the  Combahee  and 
Edisto,  the  "  high  hills  "  and  rocks  of  the  Santee,  the  flat 
quagmires  of  the  Pedee  and  Cape  Fear  Rivers,  were  all 
passed  in  midwinter,  with  its  floods  and  rains,  in  the  face  of 
an  accumulating  enemy  ;  and,  after  the  battles  of  Averys- 
boro  and  Bentonville,  we  once  more  came  out  of  the  wilder 
ness  to  meet  our  friends  at  Goldsboro.  Even  then  we 
paused  only  long  enough  to  get  new  clothing,  to  reload  our 
wagons,  again  pushed  on  to  Raleigh  and  beyond,  until  we 
met  our  enemy  suing  for  peace  instead  of  war,  and  offering 
to  submit  to  the  injured  laws  of  his  and  our  country.  As 
long  as  that  enemy  was  defiant,  nor  mountains,  nor  rivers, 
nor  swamps,  nor  hunger,  nor  cold  had  checked  us  ;  but 
when  he  who  had  fought  us  hard  and  persistently  offered 
submission,  your  general  thought  it  wrong  to  pursue  him 
farther,  and  negotiations  followed,  which  resulted,  as  you  all 
know,  in  his  surrender. 

How  far  the  operations  of  this  army  contributed  to  the 
final  overthrow  of  the  Confederacy  and  the  peace  which  now 
dawns  upon  us,  must  be  judged  by  others,  not  by  us  ;  but 
that  you  have  done  all  that  men  could  do  has  been  admitted 
by  those  in  authority,  and  we  have  a  right  to  join  in  the  uni 
versal  joy  that  fills  our  land  because  the  war  is  over,  and  our 
Government  stands  vindicated  before  the  world  by  the  joint 
action  of  the  volunteer  armies  and  navies  of  the  United 
States. 

To  such  as  remain  in  the  service,  your  general  need  only 
remind  you  that  success  in  the  past  was  clue  to  hard  work 
and  discipline,  and  that  the  same  work  and  discipline  are 


3io 


GENERAL   SHERMAN. 


equally  important  in  the  future.  To  such  as  go  home,  he 
will  only  say  that  our  favored  country  is  so  grand,  so  exten 
sive,  so  diversified  in  climate,  soil,  and  productions,  that 
every  man  may  find  a  home  and  occupation  suitecf  to  his 
taste  ;  none  should  yield  to  the  natural  impatience  sure  to 
result  from  our  past  life  of  excitement  and  adventure.  You 
will  be  invited  to  seek  new  adventures  abroad  ;  do  not  yield 
to  the  temptation,  for  it  will  lead  only  to  death  and  disap 
pointment. 

Your  general  now  bids  you  farewell,  with  the  full  belief  that, 
as  in  war  you  have  been  good  soldiers,  so  in  peace  you  will 
make  good  citizens  ;  and  if,  unfortunately,  new  war  should 
arise  in  our  country,  "  Sherman's  army  "  will  be  the  first  to 
buckle  on  its  old  armor,  and  come  forth  to  defend  and  main 
tain  the  Government  of  our  inheritance. 

By  order  of  Major-General  W.  T.  SHERMAN. 
L.  M.  DAYTON,  Assistant  Adjutant-General. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

POST    BELLUM. 

THE  great  review  at  Washington  was  hardly 
over  when  Sherman  took  advantage  of  the  oppor 
tunity  to  throw  off  the  harness  and  enjoy  the  "  twen 
ty  days'  leave  of  absence  to  see  the  young  folks," 
which,  in  September  of  the  preceding  year,  he  had 
jocularly  written  to  Grant  they  might  hope  for 
after  the  one  had  received  Lee's  surrender  and  the 
other  had  marched  to  the  Atlantic.  It  was  barely 
more  than  twenty  days,  for  on  the  27th  of  June 
the  peace  establishment  of  departments  was  an 
nounced,  and  under  the  same  title  as  his  last  glori 
ous  war  command,  the  West  and  Northwest,  to 
the  Rocky  Mountains,  was  organized  as  the  Mili 
tary  Division  of  the  Mississippi,  and  assigned  to 
him,  with  his  headquarters  at  St.  Louis. 

He  settled  his  family  there,  with  bright  hopes 
of  happiness  in  the  home  life  which  would  be  per 
mitted  him  by  the  routine  duties  of  a  time  of  peace. 
His  house  was  a  solid  square  mansion,  with  its 
pleasant  garden,  and  in  a  bright  working  room  with 
cheerful  outlook,  with  books,  maps,  and  papers 
about  him,  he  was  soon  making  his  leisure  hours 
profitable  by  systematizing  the  files  of  his  private 
papers,  and  arranging  the  material  out  of  which 
afterward  came  his  Memoirs. 

The  inspection  of  the  frontier  posts,  visits  to  the 
Indian  tribes  under  his  care,  and  to  the  Union  Pa 
cific  Railway,  as  its  construction  was  vigorously 
pushed  toward  the  mountains,  gave  him  enough 
21  311 


GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

outdoor  work  to  satisfy  his  active  habit  of  body, 
and  left  him  still  time  "  to  rest,  study,  and  make 
the  acquaintance  of  my  family,"  which  he  naively 
told  the  President  he  really  wanted.  A  year  of 
thorough  enjoyment  of  this  uneventful  though 
quietly  busy  life  passed,  when  he  found  himself  in 
voluntarily  drawn  into  the  vortex  of  turbulent 
political  conflict  which  marked  the  administration 
of  President  Johnson.  In  September,  1866,  he  was 
summoned  in  haste  from  the  mountains  of  New 
Mexico  to  Washington  for  the  purpose,  as  it  turned 
out,  of  being  put  in  command  of  the  whole  army 
for  a  time,  while  General  Grant  should  go  upon  a 
special  mission  to  escort  the  minister  (Mr.  Camp 
bell)  accredited  to  President  Juarez,  of  Mexico,  who 
was  keeping  up  a  show  of  resistance  to  the  French 
occupation  and  the  rule  of  Maximilian.  The  grade 
of  general  had  been  conferred  on  Grant  by  law, 
and  Sherman  had  succeeded  to  that  of  lieutenant 
general,  and,  had  the  temporary  change  been  made 
with  Grant's  consent,  there  would  have  been  noth 
ing  noteworthy  in  the  matter. 

But  Sherman  found  Grant  full  of  the  conviction 
that  some  sinister  purpose  was  at  the  bottom  of 
what  he  considered  an  improper  effort  to  send  him 
out  of  the  country.  Supposed  intrigues  with  re 
gard  to  the  next  term  of  the  presidency  were  more 
or  less  involved,  and  Grant  was  resolved  that  he 
would  take  the  consequences  of  a  refusal  to  obey 
the  President's  order,  on  the  ostensible  ground  that 
such  a  personal  escort,  without  troops,  was  not  a 
military  duty  of  the  general  in  chief.  While  Sher 
man  thought  it  a  mistake  on  Grant's  part  to  enter 
tain  the  idea  of  being  a  presidential  candidate,  their 
friendship  was  such  that  he  placed  himself  by 
Grant's  side  the  moment  an  issue  was  joined.  He 
went  to  the  President,  and  so  strongly  opposed  the 
idea  of  forcing  upon  the  general  an  unwelcome  duty 
of  questionable  legality  that  Johnson  yielded  on 


POST    BELLUM. 


313 


condition  that  Sherman  himself  would  go  with  Mr. 
Campbell.  The  result  was  an  official  promenade 
to  Cuba,  and  thence  to  Vera  Cruz,  Tampico,  and 
Brazos  Santiago,  without  finding  the  Mexican 
President.  The  demonstration  was  part  of  the 
diplomatic  pressure  upon  Louis  Napoleon  which 
constrained  him  to  withdraw  his  army  and  caused 
Maximilian's  downfall. 

Grant  and  Sherman  had  both  been  regarded  as 
friendly  to  President  Johnson's  theory  of  restora 
tion  of  the  rebellious  States,  and  in  the  first  stages 
of  the  quarrel  between  the  President  and  Secretary 
Stanton  both  sided  with  the  President.  They 
strongly  resented  Stanton's  concentration  of  all 
military  power  in  the  War  Office,  and  his  habit  of 
ignoring  the  general  in  the  peace  administration  of 
army  affairs.  Both  were  strong  advocates  of  the 
plan  of  having  all  staff  bureaus  report  through  the 
general,  so  that  he  might  not  only  have  knowledge 
of  whatever  affected  the  army,  but  might  be  regu 
larly  heard  upon  all  important  matters  of  adminis 
tration  before  they  were  decided  upon.  Every  of 
ficer  in  turn  who  has  commanded  the  army,  from 
General  Scott  downward,  has  protested  against  a 
system  which  has  practically  resulted  in  making 
the  staff  bureaus  independent  of  the  military  head 
of  the  army,  and  in  allowing  an  adjutant  general, 
who  might  have  the  ambition  to  do  so,  to  use  the 
whole  power  of  the  Secretary  and  reduce  the  gen 
eral  in  chief  to  a  nullity.*  The  antagonism  between 
Grant  and  Stanton  was  such  that  when  the  latter 
abandoned  the  President's  policy  and  went  into  op 
position  but  still  refused  to  resign  his  place  in  the 
Cabinet,  Grant  was  quite  willing  to  assist  Mr.  John 
son  in  testing  the  constitutionality  of  the  Tenure  of 
Office  Act  in  the  courts.  He  accepted  the  position 

*  For  a  full  discussion  of  this  subject,  see  General  Schofield's 
Forty-six  Years  in  the  Army,  chapters  xxii  and  xxvi. 


314  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

of  Secretary  of  War  in  the  interim  when  the  Presi 
dent  removed  Mr.  Stanton,  but,  on  more  carefully 
studying  the  law  when  the  Senate  refused  to  consent 
to  the  removal,  he  declined  to  carry  resistance  to 
Stanton's  return  as  far  as  Mr.  Johnson  thought  he 
had  agreed  to  do.  Differences  between  him  and 
the  President  began  here,  which  grew  rapidly  larger 
as  events  more  and  more  indicated  Grant  to  be 
the  almost  inevitable  candidate  of  the  Republican 
party  for  the  presidency  if  he  avoided  open  quarrel 
with  the  party  leaders  in  Congress.  He  believed 
the  Tenure  of  Office  Act  to  be  impolitic,  if  not  un 
constitutional,  and  when  he  became  President  he 
was  not  long  in  compassing  its  repeal ;  but  he  saw 
no  reason  for  making  himself  a  champion  of  oppo 
sition  to  it  in  the  peculiar  condition  of  affairs  which 
then  existed.  He  believed  that  Stanton  was  under 
moral,  if  not  legal,  obligation  to  relieve  the  Presi 
dent  of  the  embarrassment  of  his  presence  in  the 
Cabinet  after  the  rupture  between  them,  but  he 
declined  to  defy  the  law  and  make  himself  liable 
to  its  penalties.  He  and  his  advisers  thought  there 
was  the  same  kind  of  political  finesse  in  this  matter 
that  they  had  seen  in  the  plan  of  sending  him  to 
Mexico,  and  their  distrust  of  Johnson  soon  over 
shadowed  that  which  they  had  felt  toward  Stanton. 
Many  circumstances  tended  to  make  General 
Sherman  influential  with  President  Johnson  and  a 
useful  peacemaker.  Their  opinions  on  the  solution 
of  the  great  political  problem  of  the  day  were  not 
far  apart.  The  President  had  assured  the  general 
that  he  had  known  nothing  of  Mr.  Stanton's  pub 
lished  strictures  on  the  Johnston  convention  till  he 
saw  them  in  print.*  Sherman  had  as  early  as  No 
vember,  1865,  called  his  brother's  attention  to  the 
drift  of  Mr.  Johnson  toward  the  basis  of  settlement 
indicated  in  the  terms  he  offered  to  the  Confederate 
general. f  He  had,  with  characteristic  point,  put 

*  Memoirs,  ii,  375.  f  Sherman  Letters,  p.  257. 


POST    BELLUM. 


315 


the  situation  tersely  in  the  same  correspondence. 
"  We  can  not  keep  the  South  out  long,"  he  had  said, 
"  and  it  is  a  physical  impossibility  for  us  to  guard 
the  entire  South  by  armies ;  nor  can  we  change 
opinions  by  force,  .  .  .  and  for  some  time  the 
marching  of  State  governments  must  be  controlled 
by  the  same  class  of  whites  as  went  into  the  rebellion 
against  us."  *  "  It  is  surely  unfortunate,"  he  said 
again,  "  that  the  President  is  thus  thrown  seem 
ingly  on  the  old  mischievous  anti-war  Democrats, 
but  from  his  standpoint  he  had  no  alternative.  To 
outsiders  it  looks  as  though  he  was  purposely  forced 
into  that  category."  f 

When,  therefore,  President  Johnson  found  him 
self  in  strained  relations  to  Grant,  it  was  almost  in 
evitable  that  he  should  turn  to  General  Sherman 
for  aid  in  breaking  the  deadlock  in  the  War  Depart 
ment.  The  resolution  of  the  Senate  refusing  con 
sent  to  Johnson's  removal  of  Stanton  was  passed 
on  January  13,  1868.  Sherman,  who  was  in  Wash 
ington  attending  meetings  of  his  commission  to 
revise  the  army  regulations,  had  known  of  Grant's 
opinion  that  he  must  not  be  put  in  antagonism  to 
Congress  by  continuing  to  exercise  the  office  of 
Secretary,  had  prompted  Grant  to  have  an  under 
standing  with  the  President  on  the  subject,  and  was 
present  at  a  subsequent  interview  between  them 
when  their  conversation  indicated  a  fair  mutual  un 
derstanding.  Grant  had  expected  that  Stanton 
would  notify  him  a  couple  of  days  in  advance  of 
his  demand  for  restoration  to  his  office,  according 
to  the  precedent  Stanton  himself  had  set  in  yielding 
the  office  to  Grant,  ad  interim,  in  the  previous 
August.  This  would  have  allowed  time  for  the 
attorney  general  to  take  the  case  into  court  upon 
application  for  an  injunction,  or,  if  that  could  have 
been  arranged,  for  Mr.  Stanton  to  apply  for  a  man- 

*  Sherman  Letters,  p.  254.  f  Id.,  p.  264. 


316  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

damus.  But  the  course  actually  taken  was  to  serve 
upon  General  Grant  a  copy  of  the  resolution  of  the 
Senate  as  soon  as  passed ;  and  he,  having  been  per 
suaded  that  he  should  incur  the  penalties  of  a  law 
breaker  if  he  delayed  acquiescence,  turned  over  the 
keys  of  the  office  to  the  adjutant  general  at  once.* 

Sherman  was  strong  in  the  conviction  that  only 
mischief  to  the  country  and  to  the  army  could  re 
sult  from  the  effort  to  nullify  the  authority  of  the 
President  over  the  army  or  to  force  into  intimate 
Cabinet  relations  to  him  one  who  was  personally 
hostile.  He  was  earnestly  active  in  trying  to  find 
some  solution  of  the  difficulty.  His  own  relations 
to  Stanton  had  become  pleasant,  they  having  tacitly 
agreed  to  ignore  the  incidents  attending  the  con 
vention  with  Johnston,  and  he  offered  to  go  to 
Stanton,  either  with  Grant  or  alone,  and  to  say  to 
him  that  he  ought  to  resign.  He  suggested  to 
Grant,  and  they  both  urged  upon  the  President, 
that  he  should  send  to  the  Senate  the  name  of  a 
person  to  be  Secretary  of  War  who,  as  they  thought, 
would  be  acceptable,  and  whose  confirmation  would 
effect  a  change  without  the  rougher  form  of  re 
moval.  They  did  not  know  that  the  person  they 
named  had  been  engaged  in  a  friendly  correspond 
ence  with  Mr.  Johnson,  urging  him  to  find  some 
reasonable  method  of  avoiding  sharp  antagonism 
with  Congress,  and  had  perhaps  given  offense  in 
that  way.  That  they  did  not  know  this  was  good 
evidence  of  their  avoidance  of  even  usual  personal 
conferences,  as  was  also  the  fact  that  he  they  named 
never  knew  of  it  till  their  correspondence  found 
its  way  into  print  nearly  twenty  years  afterward,  f 

The  well-meant  effort  at  conciliation  failed,  and 
affairs  drifted  on  to  the  attempted  impeachment  of 
Mr.  Johnson — to  intelligent  lovers  of  their  coun- 

*  General  E.  D.  Townsend's  Anecdotes  of  the  Civil  War,  p.  124. 
f  North  American  Review,  July,  1886,  p.  83. 


POST   BELLUM.  317 

try  the  nightmare  period  of  our  politics.  Sherman 
found  it  hard  to  overcome  his  aversion  to  meddling 
with  politics  at  all ;  but  the  army  was  so  directly  in 
volved  in  the  controversy  that  he  thought  it  a  sort 
of  official  duty  to  do  what  he  could  to  make  decent 
administration  possible,  and  this,  with  his  friend 
ship  for  Grant,  overcame  his  scruples.  He  wrote 
to  the  latter :  "I'm  afraid  that  acting  as  a  go-be 
tween  for  three  persons  I  may  share  the  usual  fate 
of  meddlers,  and  at  last  get  kicks  from  all.  We 
ought  not  to  be  involved  in  politics,  but  for  the 
sake  of  the  army  we  are  justified  in  trying  at  least 
to  cut  this  Gordian  knot."*  The  efforts  were  not 
wholly  without  fruit.  A  little  later  Mr.  Evarts  re 
newed  them,  and  a  compromise  was  arranged  by 
which  General  Schofield  became  Secretary  of  War 
and  Mr.  Stanton  retired.! 

One  phase  of  the  estrangement  between  the 
President  and  General  Grant  disturbed  him  more 
than  all  the  rest.  In  his  irritation  at  finding  the 
War  Department  and  the  army  taken  practically 
out  of  his  executive  control,  Mr.  Johnson  conceived 
the  idea  of  making  Sherman  brevet  general,  and 
assigning  to  him  the  duties  of  general  in  chief. 
Sherman  met  this  with  the  refusal  of  the  promo 
tion,  and  even  wrote  to  his  brother,  the  Senator, 
asking  him  earnestly  to  oppose  the  confirmation  if 
his  name  should  be  sent  to  the  Senate.  He  was 
resolved  not  to  suffer  himself  to  be  put  in  antag 
onism  or  rivalry  to  Grant,  and  declared  with  reso 
lute  purpose  that  he  would  resign  his  commission 
in  the  army  and  retire  to  a  life  of  poverty  rather 
than  allow  himself  to  be  made  use  of  to  humiliate 
his  friend.J;  He  had  taken  this  position  early,  for 
no  sooner  had  he  completed  his  march  to  the  sea 


*  Memoirs,  ii,  424. 

\  Schofield,  Forty-six  Years  in  the  Army,  p.  413. 

\  Sherman  Letters,  pp.  282,  297,  303. 


31 8  GENERAL  SHERMAN. 

than  suggestions  were  made  of  giving  him  addi 
tional  rank  as  evidence  of  popular  appreciation. 
He  wrote  to  John  Sherman  from  Savannah,  in  Jan 
uary,  1865:  "I  deem  it  unwise  to  make  another 
lieutenant  general,  or  to  create  the  rank  of  gen 
eral.  I  will  accept  no  commission  that  would  tend 
to  create  a  rivalry  with  Grant.  I  want  him  to  hold 
what  he  has  earned  and  got.  I  have  all  the  rank 
I  want.  ...  Of  military  titles  I  have  now  the 
maximum,  and  it  makes  no  difference  whether  that 
be  major  general  or  marshal.  It  means  the  same 
thing.  I  have  commanded  a  hundred  thousand 
men  in  battle  and  on  the  march,  successfully,  and 
that  is  enough  for  reputation."*  As  to  political 
offices,  he  desired  it  to  be  known  that  he  would  be 
offended  by  any  mooting  of  his  name  in  connection 
with  them. 

General  Sherman  had  been  summoned  to  Wash 
ington  when  he  was  at  a  council  with  the  chiefs 
of  the  tribes  of  Indians  who  had  been  making  des 
ultory  war  on  the  frontier,  but  who  had  been 
induced  to  meet  the  peace  commission  of  the  United 
States,  at  the  head  of  which  the  general  was.  The 
meeting  was  at  North  Platte,  in  Nebraska,  and  the 
leading  men  of  the  Ogallala,  Brule  Sioux,  and  the 
Cheyennes  met  them  there.  The  great  and  burn 
ing  question  was  the  demand  of  the  Indians  that 
the  construction  of  the  Powder  River  and  Smoky 
Hill  Railroads  be  abandoned  because  they  broke 
up  and  frightened  away  the  buffalo  herds.  The 
meeting  was  a  noteworthy  one  for  the  importance 
of  the  personages,  red  and  white ;  for  Spotted  Tail, 
Man-afraid-of-his-horses,  Swift  Bear,  Big  Mouth, 
Pawnee-killer,  and  others  represented  the  Indians, 
while  Generals  Sherman,  Harney,  Terry,  and  Augur 
of  the  army  were  there,  with  Senator  Henderson, 
Commissioner  Taylor,  and  other  noted  civilians. 

*  Sherman  Letters,  p.  245. 


POST   BELLUM.  319 

Henry  M.  Stanley  was  there,  beginning  his  travels 
and  adventures,  and  giving  us  a  picture  of  the  ne 
gotiations,  which  is  one  of  the  best  extant  repre 
sentations  of  an  Indian  council.* 

There  was  plain  talk  on  both  sides.  The  In 
dians  seemed  to  realize  that  the  time  had  come  when 
they  must  perish  along  with  the  wild  game  unless 
they  could  stop  the  progress  of  the  whites.  Their 
first  speaker  said :  "  Ever  since  I've  been  born  I 
have  eaten  wild  meat.  My  father  and  grandfather 
ate  wild  meat  before  me.  We  can  not  give  up 
quickly  the  customs  of  our  fathers."  This  was  the 
keynote.  The  conditions  of  Indian  life  could  not 
be  preserved  unless  the  building  of  railroads  was 
stopped. 

Sherman  told  them  frankly  that  it  was  vain  to 
hope  to  stop  the  spread  of  the  white  people.  They 
should  be  paid  damages  for  the  loss  to  them,  but 
the  only  hope  for  their  future  was  in  learning  to 
till  the  earth  and  to  raise  cattle.  He  pointed  to 
the  increased  travel  across  the  country  which  they 
themselves  had  seen,  and  told  them  they  could  see 
for  themselves  that  "  the  slow  ox  wagon  will  not 
answer  the  white  man.  We  build  iron  roads,  and 
you  can  not  stop  the  locomotive  any  more  than 
you  can  stop  the  sun  or  moon."  He  urged  them 
to 'agree  upon  reservations  of  good  land  at  once. 
"  You  see  for  yourselves  that  the  white  men  are 
collecting  in  all  directions  in  spite  of  all  you  can 
do.  The  white  men  are  taking  all  the  good  land. 
If  you  don't  choose  your  homes  now,  it  will  be 
too  late  next  year."  It  was  a  pathetic,  hopeless 
sort  of  discussion,  in  which  these  children  of  wild 
Nature  and  of  the  boundless  prairies  argued  for 
their  right  to  remain  what  they  were,  and  to  bid 
a  resistless  tide  of  change  to  stand  still. 

*  My  Early  Travels  and  Adventures.  By  Henry  M.  Stanley, 
vol.  i,  p.  197,  etc. 


320 


GENERAL  SHERMAN. 


The  characteristics  of  the  general  were  never 
more  clearly  shown.  His  honest,  square  dealing 
sought  no  subterfuge.  Pie  tried  to  make  them 
realize  the  truth,  unwelcome  as  it  might  be,  that 
their  only  salvation  was  in  getting  into  some  sort 
of  harmony  with  the  civilization  of  the  white  men. 
Stanley  has  gone  back  with  evident  interest,  to  this 
his  first  close  contact  with  uncivilized  man,  after 
his  romantic  explorations  of  darkest  Africa  had 
opened  the  way  for  still  more  vast  experiments  in 
the  struggle  for  life  and  the  survival  of  the  fittest 
between  the  progressive  and  the  unprogressive 
races.  It  is  safe  to  say  that  in  all  his  wanderings  he 
nowhere  saw  franker  dealing  with  the  weaker  peo 
ples  or  heard  more  sincere  warning  of  the  destruc 
tion  which  must  inevitably  follow  their  brave  but 
hopeless  efforts  to  stop  the  progress  of  a  world. 

The  summer  of  1868  brought  the  nomination 
of  Grant  for  the  presidency,  and  his  election  in  the 
autumn  was  a  notice  to  Sherman  that  his  quiet 
home  life  in  St.  Louis  must  soon  be  broken  up. 
He  had  been  kept  busy  with  the  perplexing  strife 
at  the  National  capital,  and  had  not  had  the  full 
measure  of  rest  which  he  had  wished  for ;  but  it  was 
always  a  relief  to  him  to  feel  that  when  the  duty 
that  summoned  him  to  Washington  was  done  he 
could  get  away  from  the  intrigue  and  turmoil  of 
the  capital  to  the  peace  of  his  family  circle,  and  to 
the  healthful  ranging  of  the  great  plains,  visiting 
his  military  posts,  where  the  moral  tone  was  the 
wholesome  one  begot  by  plain  living  and  the  hon 
est  performance  of  the  soldier's  duty.  The  thing 
which  most  chafed  him  at  Washington  was  the 
constant  urgency  of  selfish  personal  reasons  to 
override  the  discipline,  system,  and  order  which 
are  the  essence  of  good  military  administration. 

The  social  life  of  the  place  was  attractive  to 
him,  and  intercourse  with  statesmen  and  diplo 
matists  gave  delightful  stimulus  to  his  own  powers 


POST   BELLUM.  321 

of  thought  and  conversation,  especially  as  he  could 
not  be  insensible  to  the  fact  that  his  society  was 
eagerly  sought  by  the  ablest  and  most  brilliant 
people.  His  unreserved  freedom  of  expression  and 
his  racy  way  of  hitting  off  the  point  of  discussion 
had  a  never-failing  charm  and  freshness.  It  was 
the  same  originality  of  view  and  power  of  reach 
ing  the  heart  of  things  by  a  happy  phrase  which  is 
found  abundantly  in  his  familiar  correspondence, 
as  when  he  said,  apropos  to  the  notion  that  legisla 
tion  accomplishes  everything,  that  "  as  long  as 
cases  have  to  be  tried  by  juries,  all  laws  counter  to 
the  prejudices  of  the  whole  people  are  waste 
paper  " ;  or,  again,  when  speaking  of  conflicts  be 
tween  principle  and  prejudice,  he  said,  "  A  voter 
has  as  much  right  to  his  prejudices  as  to  his  vote."  * 

In  Washington,  however,  he  found  it  impossible 
to  apply  his  working  hours  to  the  efficient  perform 
ance  of  duty.  He  was  constantly  besieged  by  all 
sorts  of  people  to  let  some  pressure  of  personal 
favor  overcome  his  ideas  of  right  system.  The 
resistance  to  importunity  vexed  him,  and  left  his 
mind  too  much  disturbed  to  resume  the  calm  con 
sideration  of  large  questions.  He  was  very  loath, 
therefore,  to  consider  the  necessity  of  making  his 
residence  in  Washington  when  General  Grant 
should  become  president,  as  it  was  evident  he 
would  have  to  do. 

Shortly  after  the  November  election  a  meeting 
of  soldiers  of  the  Western  volunteer  armies  was 
held  at  Chicago,  which  was  the  most  notable  re 
union  of  the  sort  ever  held.  It  was,  in  fact,  a  great 
celebration  of  the  elevation  to  the  presidency  of 
the  general  who  had  built  up  his  renown  in  leading 
them  to  victories  from  Donelson  to  Missionary 
Ridge,  and  yet  everything  which  could  be  called 
politics  was  carefully  excluded.  Sherman  himself 

*  Sherman  Letters,  pp.  288,  298. 


322  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

had  originated  the  plan,  and  had  fixed  the  joint 
anniversary  of  the  battle  of  Nashville  and  the  oc 
cupation  of  Savannah  as  the  time  for  the  renewal 
of  comradeship,  while  Grant  was  still  the  general 
of  the  army.  The  invited  guests  included  the  army 
and  corps  commanders  of  the  Eastern  armies,  the 

feneral  officers  of  the  regular  army,  and  civil  of- 
cials  of  the  nation  and  of  the  States  which  had 
given  their  quotas  to  the  National  defense.  Gen 
eral  Thomas  was  made  the  chairman  of  the  public 
meeting,  and  was  supported  by  Grant  on  his  right 
and  Sherman  on  his  left.  The  latter  presided  at  the 
banquet.  Nearly  every  soldier  of  distinction  in 
the  rosters  of  the  civil  war  was  there.  Sherman's 
address  of  welcome  struck  nobly  the  keynote  of 
patriotic  devotion,  of  the  citizenship  of  the  Ameri 
can  soldier,  and  the  perpetuation  of  the  National 
union.  It  was  a  great  love-feast  of  the  men  who 
had  saved  the  country,  and  most  of  whom  had  put 
off  the  uniform  and  resumed  the  industries  of  civil 
life.  They  now  met  again  to  hail  with  boundless 
enthusiasm  the  great  commanders  who  had  led 
them  to  victory. 

In  the  moments  of  private  conversation  which 
Grant  and  Sherman  could  snatch  from  the  festivi 
ties  of  the  occasion,  the  President-elect  outlined  his 
purpose  as  to  army  organization,  and  informed  Sher 
man  that  he  would  be  called  to  Washington  to  suc 
ceed  to  the  office  of  general,  and  to  carry  into  ef 
fect  changes  which  Grant  had  urged  since  1866 
affecting  the  scope  of  the  general's  authority.  He 
also  indicated  his  purpose  to  give  Sheridan  the 
position  of  lieutenant  general,  to  become  vacant  by 
Sherman's  promotion.  This  last  was  a  matter  fruit 
ful  in  heartburnings.  Halleck  and  Meade  were 
Sheridan's  seniors  as  major  generals  in  the  regular 
army,  and  Thomas  had  many  friends  who  claimed 
that  injustice  had  been  done  him  when  Sheridan 
had  been  promoted  first  to  this  rank.  They  urged 


POST    BELLUM.  323 

that  the  appointment  of  Thomas  as  lieutenant  gen 
eral  would  be  but  the  correction  of  an  old  injus 
tice.  In  this  matter  Thomas  had  the  sympathies 
and  good  wishes  of  most  of  the  officers  and  men  who 
had  served  under  Sherman ;  but  Grant  seems  to 
have  decided  the  question  according  to  his  candid 
judgment  as  to  the  power  of  prompt  initiative  and 
vigorous  aggressive  action  which  the  general  in 
chief  ought  to  have.  He  had  reached  the  settled 
conviction  that,  next  to  Sherman,  Sheridan  of  all 
the  generals,  tested  by  large  responsibilities,  had 
shown  the  highest  qualities  for  supreme  command. 
There  was  room  for  honest  difference  of  opinion 
among  those  competent  to  judge,  but  Grant  can 
not  be  blamed  for  acting  on  his  own  judgment,  the 
law  having  cast  on  him  the  responsibility. 

In  the  organization  of  his  Cabinet,  President 
Grant  retained  General  Schofield  for  a  time  in  the 
War  Department,  where  he  was  serving  under  the 
arrangement  negotiated  for  Mr.  Johnson  by  Mr. 
Evarts.  This  was  for  the  purpose  of  getting  fairly 
launched  the  plan  for  rearranging  the  relations  of 
the  general  of  the  army  with  the  Secretary  of  War, 
which  Schofield  thoroughly  approved.  On  the  day 
after  the  President's  inauguration  an  order  was  pre 
pared  and  issued  under  his  instructions  by  General 
Schofield,  which  briefly  and  comprehensively  gave 
to  Sherman  "  command  of  the  army  of  the  United 
States,"  and  directed  the  chiefs  of  staff  corps,  de 
partments,  and  bureaus  to  report  to  and  act  under 
his  orders ;  business  requiring  the  action  of  the 
President  or  Secretary  would  be  submitted  by  the 
general  to  the  Secretary,  and  all  orders  from  them 
would  be  transmitted  through  the  general.* 

Sherman,  of  course,  issued  his  own  formal  order 
assuming  the  command  and  directing  the  method 

*  Schofield's  Forty-six  Years  in  the  Army,  p.  421.     Sherman's 
Memoirs,  ii,  441. 


324  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

of  action  under  the  presidential  order.  As  the  plan 
was  Grant's  own,  the  result  of  his  experience  both 
as  general  and  as  acting  Secretary — a  plan  he  had 
for  years  wished  to  see  in  operation,  and  believed 
to  be  necessary  for  the  public  interests,  as  well  as 
those  of  the  army — it  certainly  looked  as  if  a  re 
form  in  administration  had  never  been  introduced 
with  a  better  prospect  of  permanence.  Eight  years 
of  Grant's  incumbency  would  smooth  difficulties, 
remove  obstacles,  educate  a  class  of  staff  and  bureau 
officers,  who  would  be  habituated  to  the  system 
and  know  its  value.  Sherman  settled  himself  to  his 
work  with  the  feeling  that  his  strong  desire  to 
make  our  little  army  a  model  of  efficiency  and  in 
telligent  organization  was  in  the  way  of  speedy  ac 
complishment. 

The  reform  lasted  just  three  weeks.  Within 
that  time  General  Rawlins,  Grant's  confidential 
staff  officer  through  the  whole  war,  was  appointed 
to  the  Cabinet  place,  and  was  at  once  surrounded 
by  interested  persons,  military  and  civil,  in  Con 
gress  and  in  the  army,  who  dinned  into  his  ears 
the  assertion  that  his  office  had  been  emasculated, 
and  that  the  War  Department  had  lost  all  its  power 
and  dignity.  No  one  knew  better  than  Rawlins  the 
intolerable  position  in  which  Grant  had  found  him 
self  under  the  peace  establishment  as  a  general 
without  real  command,  but  he  was  a  sick  man,  soon 
to  drop  into  his  grave,  and  did  not  meet  the  in 
sidious  suggestions  as  he  would  have  done  when 
in  healthy  vigor. 

On  the  27th  of  March  another  order  was  is 
sued  from  the  War  Department,  made  like  that  of 
the  5th,  "  by  direction  of  the  President,"  rescinding 
the  whole  of  the  earlier  one  except  the  personal 
assignment  of  Sherman  to  the  command  of  the 
army,  and  restoring  the  old  system  of  independent 
staff  bureaus  dealing  directly  with  the  Secretary  of 
War.  It  need  not  be  said  that  Sherman  was  as- 


POST   BELLUM.  325 

tounded  and  distressed  beyond  expression.  The 
sudden  wreck  of  his  hopes  of  improvement  of  the 
army  was  accompanied  by  a  wound  to  his  personal 
feelings  which  seemed  incredible.  To  the  country 
he  seemed  to  be  exhibited  as  a  man  who  had  by 
some  indirect  means  grasped  a  power  which  the 
President  never  intended  to  confer,  and  who  was 
so  quickly  made  to  lay  it  down  again  with  utter 
humiliation. 

A  painful  interview  with  the  President  followed. 
It  began  as  an  informal  conversational  discussion 
between  intimate  friends.  The  President  repeated 
the  familiar  complaints  of  congressmen,  that  their 
personal  requests  and  desires  could  not  be  pre 
sented  to  a  military  officer  guided  by  military  rules 
as  they  were  to  civil  heads  of  departments,  and 
that  doubts  might  exist  as  to  the  legal  right  thus 
to  control  the  bureaus.  Sherman  reminded  him 
that  all  those  things  had  been  considered  and  dis 
posed  of  long  ago — as  early,  indeed,  as  January, 
1866,  when  Grant  had  written  a  clear  and  strong 
communication  to  Mr.  Stanton  on  the  subject. 
The  points  had  been  talked  over  many  times  since 
then,  and  always  with  the  strong  reiteration  of 
Grant's  conviction  that  what  he  had  now  done  on 
the  5th  of  March  ought  to  be  done.  This  was  in 
disputable,  and  brought  out  other  reasons.  "  Raw- 
lins,"  said  Grant,  "  feels  badly  about  it ;  it  worries 
him,  and  he  is  not  well."  "  But,  Grant,"  replied 
Sherman,  "  ought  a  public  measure  that  you  have 
advocated  for  years,  and  which  he  has  known  you 
were  determined  upon,  to  be  set  aside  for  such 
a  reason?  Ought  he  not  to  acquiesce  in  what  he 
knew  was  your  fixed  purpose,  and  what  was  done 
before  he  entered  the  War  Department?  "  "  Yes," 
said  Grant,  "  it  would  ordinarily  be  so,  but  I  don't 
like  to  give  him  pain  now  ;  so,  Sherman,  you'll  have 
to  publish  the  rescinding  order."  "  But,  Grant,  it's 
your  own  order  that  you  revoke,  not  mine,  and 


326  GENERAL  SHERMAN. 

think  how  it  will  look  to  the  whole  world !  "  In 
the  dire  strait  between  judgment  and  feeling,  Grant 
became  a  little  testy,  and  replied,  "  Well,  if  it's  my 
own  order,  I  can  rescind  it,  can't  I  ?  "  Sadly,  Sher 
man  dropped  the  familiarity  of  comradeship,  and, 
rising,  bowed  formally,  saying:  "Yes,  Mr.  Presi 
dent,  you  have  the  power  to  revoke  your  own  order ; 
you  shall  be  obeyed.  Good  morning,  sir."  Such 
was  the  interview  as  Sherman  told  it  to  a  friend 
within  a  few  hours,  while  he  was  still  deeply  agi 
tated  by  it. 

During  the  few  weeks  that  Rawlins  was  able 
to  attend  to  business,  he  strove  to  make  Sherman's 
position  more  tolerable  by  voluntarily  sending 
through  army  headquarters  the  orders  and  com 
munications  which  affected  discipline  and  organiza 
tion,  and,  no  doubt,  Grant  urged  this  mode  of  soft 
ening  the  effect  of  what  had  been  done;  but  Raw 
lins  died  early  in  September.  General  Belknap,  his 
successor,  had  commanded  a  brigade  in  the  Army 
of  the  Tennessee,  and  had  been  distinguished  for 
bravery  in  the  field,  but  it  must  be  said  that  he  was 
spoiled  by  his  elevation  to  the  War  Department. 
The  old  method  of  ignoring  the  general  in  chief  and 
consulting  only  with  bureau  subordinates  was  soon 
in  vogue  again,  and  Sherman  found  himself  in  the 
humiliating  position  of  learning  from  the  news 
papers  of  orders  and  decisions  relating  to  the  dis 
cipline  of  the  army  issued  without  his  knowledge, 
though  sometimes  in  his  name. 

After  less  formal  protests  had  failed,  Sherman 
put  the  whole  subject  before  the  Secretary  of  War 
in  a  formal  communication  on  the  7th  of  August, 
1870,  and  transmitted  a  copy  to  the  President.  The 
latter  replied,  promising  to  bring  the  Secretary  and 
general  together,  and  at  least  to  define  clearly  the 
duties  of  each.  Admitting  that  his  views  as  gen 
eral  had  been  essentially  the  same  as  Sherman's, 
he  still  urged  that  it  was  supposed  that  some  recent 


POST   BELLUM.  327 

acts  of  Congress  were  partially  inconsistent  with 
these,  and  must  control,  even  if  they  were  wrong.* 
But  such  recent  acts  had  been  made  at  the  instance 
of  the  Secretary,  and  with  the  presumed  assent  of 
the  President.  Nothing  was,  in  fact,  done  to  meet 
the  general's  views,  and  matters  went  from  bad  to 
worse,  till  near  the  close  of  Grant's  second  term, 
in  1876,  when  the  country  was  shocked  by  Gen 
eral  Belknap's  downfall  and  his  confession  of  mal 
versation  in  office. 

In  July,  1871,  Sherman  wrote  to  his  brother: 
"  My  office  has  been  by  law  stripped  of  all  the  in 
fluence  and  prestige  it  possessed  under  Grant,  and 
even  in  matters  of  discipline  and  army  control  I 
am  neglected,  overlooked,  or  snubbed."  f  Later, 
he  wrote  to  another  friend :  "  There  is,  in  fact,  no 
use  for  a  general  now,  provided  the  law  and  cus 
tom  sanction  the  issuance  of  orders  direct  by  the 
adjutant  general  in  the  name  of  the  Secretary  of 
War,  and,  should  a  fair  opportunity  offer,  I  would 
save  Congress  the  trouble  of  abolishing  my  office." 
Vexatious  as  all  this  was  personally,  the  real  grief 
to  him,  as  his  whole  correspondence  shows,  was 
that  all  his  hopes  of  improving  the  army  itself  in 
the  ways  Grant  and  he  had  so  often  discussed  and 
so  thoroughly  agreed  upon,  were  dashed  to  the 
ground.  He  resolved  that  he  would  ask  leave  to 
remove  his  personal  headquarters  again  to  St. 
Louis,  unless  the  coming  year  should  show  a 
marked  change  for  the  better. 

An  opportunity  to  visit  Europe  under  attract 
ive  circumstances  offered  in  the  fall  of  1871,  and 
he  took  a  leave  of  absence  for  a  year,  making  the 
tour  of  the  Continent.  His  reception  was  so  cor 
dial  and  appreciative  that  the  journey  was  every 
way  most  enjoyable.  He  returned  in  September, 

*  Sherman's  Memoirs,  ii,  446,  450. 
f  Sherman  Letters,  p.  331. 

22 


328  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

1872,  refreshed  and  invigorated,  and  hopeful  that 
in  the  second  term  of  his  administration  President 
Grant  would  revert  to  the  good  principles  of  army 
organization  which  he  really  believed  in.  When 
he  had  heard  abroad  of  the  curious  turn  of  events 
in  the  candidacy  of  Greeley,  he  had,  in  a  letter  to 
Senator  Sherman,  hit  off  the  situation  with  char 
acteristic  wit  and  penetration.  "  Grant,  who  never 
was  a  Republican,"  he  said,  "  is  your  candidate, 
and  Greeley,  who  never  was  a  Democrat,  but  quite 
the  reverse,  is  the  Democratic  candidate."  * 

Finding  even  less  prospect  of  satisfactory  defi 
nition  of  his  duties  than  when  he  went  away,  his 
purpose  took  shape  to  cut  loose,  as  far  as  possible, 
from  apparent  responsibility  for  what  he  condemned 
and  could  not  control.  He  arranged  to  dispose  of 
his  Washington  house,  and  in  the  summer  of  1874 
applied  for  leave  to  remove  his  headquarters  to  St. 
Louis,  which  was  granted. 

The  first  months  of  Sherman's  return  to  the 
quiet  life  of  his  St.  Louis  home  gave  him  the  op 
portunity  for  a  final  revision  of  his  Memoirs,  and 
at  the  beginning  of  1875  he  yielded  to  a  very  gen 
eral  wish  that  its  publication  might  not  be  delayed. 
He  wrote  to  his  brother  on  the  23d  of  January, 
"  You  will  be  surprised,  and  maybe  alarmed,  that 
I  have  at  last  agreed  to  publish  in  book  form  my 
Memoirs."  His  career  had  given  rise  to  so  much 
discussion,  and  his  breach  with  the  Secretary  of 
War  and  a  knot  of  officers  who  affected  to  repre 
sent  the  President  was  so  pronounced,  that  it  would 
not  have  been  strange  if  the  Senator  had  been 
alarmed  at  the  inevitable  storm  of  criticism  and 
controversy  which  would  follow  the  printing.  In 
the  same  letter  the  general  said  that  he  had  "  care 
fully  eliminated  everything  calculated  to  raise  con 
troversy,  except  where  sustained  by  documents  em- 

*  Sherman  Letters,  p.  337. 


POST    BELLUM.  329 

braced  in  the  work  itself,  and  then  only  with  minor 
parties."  *  Reading  this  in  the  light  of  the  fuller 
knowledge  we  now  have,  we  can  see  that  it  showed 
the  rule  which  he  had  sincerely  followed.  He 
meant  to  be  frank  in  his  judgments  and  honest  in 
his  revelations  of  his  own  heart  and  intellect  in 
his  great  career,  but  he  aimed  at  waiving  discus 
sion  over  all  matters  in  which  he  could  not  pro 
duce  written  evidence  for  his  conclusions. 

The  book  was  originally  written  for  posthumous 
publication,  and  was  designed,  as  it  should  be,  to 
give  that  intimate  view  of  his  career  and  of  the 
events  in  which  he  had  an  important  part,  which 
he  wished  to  leave  behind  him  as  the  authoritative 
exposition  of  his  own  actions,  purposes,  and  mo 
tives.  Had  it  been  written  with  a  view  to  present 
publication,  it  would  naturally  have  been  more 
guarded  in  its  trenchant  passages,  and  therefore  less 
valuable  as  a  revelation  of  his  own  opinions,  though 
it  would  have  avoided  much  controversy.  Speak 
ing  of  this  in  a  letter  to  a  friend,  written  in  the 
height  of  the  din  of  criticism,  he  adhered  to  his 
judgment  that  a  true  history' of  the  war  must  needs 
cause  some  chafing.  He  illustrated  it  by  a  refer 
ence  to  Van  Home's  History  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,  then  just  published,  saying :  "  Van 
Home  has  done  well,  but  his  universal  praise  and 
evident  partiality  for  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland 
makes  too  smooth  a  tale  for  one  of  war  and  con 
flict ;  still,  for  his  comfort  it  was  the  best  course. " 

The  class  of  criticisms  which  stung  him  most 
were  those  which  seemed  ingeniously  contrived  to 
put  him  in  antagonism  to  Grant  and  Thomas,  and 
he  was  fully  convinced  that  there  was  something 
very  like  a  conspiracy  in  the  circle  already  men 
tioned  to  estrange  the  President  from  him  by  in 
sinuations  that  he  had  arrogated  to  himself  credit 

*  Sherman  Letters,  p.  343. 


330  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

which  had  belonged  to  the  general  in  chief.  Such 
efforts,  however,  failed,  and  General  Grant  was 
frankly  explicit  in  praise  of  the  candor  and  ac 
curacy  of  the  Memoirs.  Sherman  did  not  allow 
himself  to  be  seriously  disturbed  by  criticism  which 
he  knew  to  be  unfair,  saying  that  the  common  sense 
of  the  people  would  dispose  of  that.  He  brushed 
it  aside  with  a  humorous  contempt,  as  when  he 

said  of  one  of  the  most  persistent  assailants,  " 

is  a  most  pestiferous  newspaper  bee,  and  has  the 
perseverance  of  the  ant."  Candid  efforts  to  cor 
rect  him  he  took  with  perfect  kindness,  and  soon 
announced  that  he  should  revise  the  work  in  a  sec 
ond  edition  and  add  an  appendix,  in  which  he 
would  give  opportunity  for  explanation  to  some 
whom  he  had  been  obliged  to  blame,  and  supply 
some  omissions  which  had  been  inadvertently  left 
in  the  first  writing.  "  In  the  text,"  he  said,  "  I 
would  omit  some  personal  expressions  which  I 
ought  not  to  have  used,  but  would  leave  the  narra 
tive  substantially  unchanged,  save  where  manifest 
errors  have  been  proved."  In  the  unpublished  let 
ter  from  which  this  is  quoted,  he  explained  the 
general  purpose  of  his  appendix  by  a  reference  to 
the  1823  edition  of  Napoleon's  Memoirs,  of  which 
"  several  volumes  contain  letters  of  parties  who  took 
issue  with  him  on  certain  points,  written  subse 
quent  to  the  publication,  and  simply  embodied  for 
what  they  are  worth.  It  occurred  to  me,"  he  added, 
"  that  forty  to  sixty  pages  of  fine  print  might  be 
added  which  would  satisfy  parties." 

It  will  give  unity  to  the  effort  to  understand  his 
character  to  pass  on  to  some  of  his  latest  expres 
sions  of  his  judgment  in  regard  to  men  and  events 
which  had  been  brought  into  controversy  after  the 
publication  of  the  Memoirs,  and  his  frankness  in 
discussing  his  own  qualities.  In  1882  the  volume 
Atlanta,  in  the  Scribners'  series  of  Campaign  His 
tories,  appeared,  and  led  to  renewed  correspondence 


POST   BELLUM.  33! 

between  him  and  its  author.  "  As  to  your  per 
sonal  description  of  myself,"  *  he  said,  *'  it  is  suf 
ficiently  flattering  to  gratify  a  reasonable  pride, 
but  I  would  prefer  to  go  down  in  history  not  as 
irritable,  but  impatient  of  restraint  or  contradiction. 
After  I  have  laid  awake  all  night  thinking  of  some 
thing  to  be  done,  and  have  resolved  on  the  steps, 
I  admit  that  it  ruffles  me  to  have  suggestions  some 
times  from  parties  not  in  possession  of  all  the  facts." 
In  the  description  referred  to  he  had  not  been 
called  irritable,  but  a  nervous  temperament,  with 
a  tendency  to  irritability,  had  been  ascribed  to  him, 
and  used  to  heighten  the  effect  of  his  calm  and 
equable  self-control  in  the  crisis  of  really  great 
events.f  Few,  if  any,  great  soldiers  could  be 
named  whose  bearing  toward  subordinates  was 
more  truly  considerate  and  personally  kind. 

In  the  same  volume  the  statement  of  his  action 
in  supplying  the  vacancy  made  by  McPherson's 
death, J  had  suggested  to  those  who  could  read 
between  the  lines  that  the  whole  story  of  that 
change  had  not  been  told,  and  this  drew  out  from 
Sherman  an  explanation  more  full  than  he  has  else 
where  given  :  "  I  don't  know  that  I  ever  revealed  to 
you  what  transpired  at  the  time  I  recommended  that 
Howard  should  succeed  McPherson.  When  I  suc 
ceeded  Grant  at  Nashville,  I  found  that  consider 
able  feeling  existed  between  the  Armies  of  the  Ten 
nessee  and  Cumberland — an  old  feud,  probably  be 
ginning  at  Shiloh,  when  the  Cumberland  claimed 
to  have  saved  us  from  destruction,  and  did  not 
give  us  credit  for  the  hard  fighting  of  that  first  day. 

*  Atlanta,  p.  21. 

f  The  suggestion  quoted  from  his  letter  was  simply  a  bit  of 
candid  introspection  on  his  part,  and  not  a  complaint  at  impartial 
judgment  by  another.  In  the  same  letter  he  said  :  "  As  a  matter 
of  course  I  had  to  be  a  central  figure,  and  you  have  drawn  a  por 
trait  more  to  my  liking  than  others  I  have  seen." 

\  Id.,  p.  178. 


332  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

While  I  was  down  the  Mississippi  (Meridian  ex 
pedition),  and  before  McPherson  had  joined  at 
Huntsville,  Logan  was  in  command  of  that  part  of 
the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  which  was  posted  along 
the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad,  about  Pulas- 
ki,  Huntsville,  etc.,  and  claimed  with  a  show  of  jus 
tice  that  in  the  matter  of  supplies  and  railroad  facili 
ties  his  men  and  officers  were  discriminated  against 
in  favor  of  the  Cumberland,  who  claimed  to  own  the 
Nashville  road.  That  was  the  reason  of  my  order 
assuming  to  myself  absolute  control  of  railroads, 
and  putting  all  army  and  corps  commanders  on  a 
perfect  equality  in  the  matter  of  passes  or  orders 
for  supplies.  Thomas  was  very  angry  with  Logan, 
accused  him  of  meddling  and  of  bitter  jealousy. 
When  McPherson  was  dead,  and  another  com 
mander  was  indispensable,  I  was  disposed  to  leave 
Logan  in  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee, 
and  called  Thomas  and  Schofield  for  consultation 
to  Thomas  J.  Wood's  camp,  near  the  left  of  Thom 
as's  army.  When  I  told  Thomas,  he  was  unusually 
emphatic  that  he  never  could  or  would  act  in  unison 
with  Logan;  indeed,  that  he  would  not  stay  if  he 
was  to  be  brought  in  contact  with  him  as  an  equal. 
Thomas,  instead  of  being  so  equable  as  his  reputa 
tion  makes  him,  had  a  good  many  crotchets,  and 
his  army  was  so  large,  so  compact,  and  had  in  him 
justly  such  faith  that  I  could  not  risk  his  displeas 
ure.  The  result  was  as  you  know,  and  I  had  to 
stand  the  brunt  of  Logan's  anger  and  hatred,  which 
has  been  constant,  and  may  be  eternal.  I  first 
thought  of  calling  on  the  President  for  a  successor, 
leaving  him  to  act ;  but  there  was  no  time  for  delay, 
and,  as  Howard  fell  under  my  personal  observation 
on  the  Knoxville  march  and  afterward,  I  knew  that 
he  was  skillful,  and  would  obey  orders  as  to  the 
nice  marches  which  I  knew  lay  before  us,  so  I 
recommended  him.  On  this  point,  however,  I  am 
well  satisfied  with  your  text." 


POST   BELLUM. 


333 


The  bill  for  retiring  army  officers  was  then  be 
fore  Congress,  and  so  evident  was  the  advantage 
to  the  country  to  be  found  in  the  tested,  abilities  of 
the  general,  his  great  prestige  with  the  whole  civi 
lized  world,  and  his  hold  upon  the  nation's  confi 
dence,  that  there  was  a  widespread  feeling  that  an 
ordinary  rule  for  retiring  officers  should  not  apply 
to  him.  It  was  for  the  public  advantage  that  his 
genius  should  continue  to  direct  the  army  if  we 
should  be  again  involved  in  war.  Especially  did 
this  seem  true  in  view  of  the  recent  example  of 
Moltke,  past  seventy,  conducting  the  great  Franco- 
German  campaign.  Physical  strength  and  activity 
were  doubtless  needed  in  subordinate  places,  but 
wisdom  and  experience  combined  with  such  force 
of  will  as  Sherman's  was  of  inestimable  value  at  the 
head  of  the  army.  In  these  circumstances  he  was 
urged  to  allow  the  truth  to  be  made  known  to 
Logan,  whose  influence  in  the  Senate  on  military 
matters  was  properly  large,  so  that  he  might  not  be 
affected  by  old  irritaticns. 

In  his  very  prompt  reply  he  srJd  :  "  I  have  never 
told  Logan  about  Thomas,  for  when  an  order  is 
made  I  assume  all  the  responsibility,  and  have  too 
much  pride  to  explain  the  reasons  to  one  who  feels 
aggrieved.  The  order  was  made  by  President  Lin 
coln  as  the  consequence  of  a  telegraphic  dispatch 
from  me,  simply  advising  that  Howard  should 
succeed  McPherson ;  and  I  hold,  as  Howard  ful 
filled  well  my  purpose,  and  my  purpose  worked 
great  good,  that  I  am  bound  to  apologize  to  no 
man  on  earth.  ...  I  have  not  asked  a  favor  of 
a  man  in  Congress,  and  scorn  to  do  it,  for  I 
believe  they  should  make  just  and  fair  laws  for  all 
alike." 

The  final  form  of  the  law  was  one  in  which 
Sherman  acquiesced,  and  it  should  also  be  said 
that  when  the  collisions  and  cross-purposes  of 
active  public  life  were  over,  his  genial  and  placable 


334  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

spirit  found  satisfaction  in  burying  differences, 
and  his  last  years  witnessed  a  cordial  understand 
ing  with  General  Logan  and  a  renewal  of  their 
early  friendship. 

The  correspondence  of  the  same  season  drew 
from  him  some  emphatic  statements  of  his  object 
and  aim  in  his  march  to  the  sea,  which  ought  to  be 
preserved  in  his  own  words,  though  they  are  in 
accord  with  the  account  given  in  an  earlier  chap 
ter.  "  Howard  can  tell  you,"  he  wrote,  "  that  I 
informed  him  long  before  we  left  Atlanta  that  if  I 
could  place  our  army  at  Columbia,  S.  C.,  the  war 
would  be  substantially  concluded,  because  Lee 
could  not  remain  longer  in  Richmond,  and  preced 
ing  events  had  demonstrated  that  the  Southern 
Army  of  Virginia  had  lost  confidence  in  its  ability 
to  fight  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  outside  of  in- 
trenchments,  in  the  same  ratio  that  the  latter  had 
gained  confidence.  Therefore  I  believe  that  moral 
ly  the  war  was  over  when  I  reached  Columbia  free 
to  follow  up  to  Virginia  Lee's  only  line  of  supply. 
This  was  my  firm  belief  from  the  day  Hood  began 
his  desperate  attempt  to  force  me  to  retreat  from 
Atlanta  by  getting  on  our  railroad.  Having  this 
grand  purpose  in  mind,  the  details  are  as  you  know 
them.  I  did  not  and  could  not  foresee  the  thou 
sand  things  that  might  happen,  but  I  did  tenacious 
ly  hold  fast  to  the  purpose  to  reach  Lee's  line  of 
supply  and  follow  it  up  to  a  conclusion.  Halleck 
may,  in  his  mind,  have  contemplated  such  a  possi 
bility,  so  may  Buell,  so  may  Rosecrans,  so  may 
Grant,  but  I  did  it,  and  chose  the  time,  place,  and 
manner.  This  is  all  I  claim  as  to  the  origin  of  the 
march  to  the  sea.  .  .  .  The  process  of  condensing 
history  has  begun,  and  will  proceed  even  further, 
till  chapters  become  paragraphs,  and  paragraphs 
mere  sentences.  The  results  clearly  stated,  with 
the  causes  which  produced  those  results,  will  be 
all  the  next  generation  will  ask.  The  fame  or  gen- 


POST  BELLUM.  335 

eral  reputation  of  the  leaders  will  not  be  much 
changed." 

The  same  season  witnessed  the  publication  of 
the  second  volume  of  Badeau's  Military  History  of 
Grant  and  Van  Home's  Life  of  Thomas,  and,  as 
these  were  nearly  coincident  with  the  appearance  of 
another  volume  in  the  Scribners'  series  of  cam 
paigns  narrating  his  March  to  the  Sea,  it  very  natu 
rally  drew  from  Sherman  a  letter  commenting  on 
the  claims  made  by  the  several  writers  for  the  sub 
jects  of  their  memoirs.  He  had  expressed  his  grati 
fication  that  his  actions,  fully  explained  as  to  mo 
tives,  had  been  allowed  to  speak  for  themselves, 
without  adulation,  and  the  letter  is  so  sincere  a  bit 
of  autobiography  that  its  value  will  warrant  its 
quotation  at  length : 

"  In  Washington  the  wise  men  say,  '  Don't 
hurry,  let  your  letters  remain  a  week,  and  they  an 
swer  themselves/  But  for  better  or  worse,  my  hab 
its  are  fixed,  and  I  find  that  when  I  enact  my  own 
part  it  harmonizes  with  the  past  and  connects  the  fu 
ture.  .  .  .  With  emphasis  and  without  qualification 
I  re-echo  your  sentiment  that  both  Grant  and 
Thomas  will  be  damaged  by  the  fulsome  flattery  of 
their  eulogists  and  historians  Badeau  and  Van 
Home.  Man  is  mortal  and  full  of  infirmity.  To 
paint  him  as  unerring,  as  perfect  in  judgment,  tem 
per,  and  action,  at  all  times  and  under  all  circum 
stances,  must  with  the  wise  raise  doubts.  Such  a 
man  is  too  good  for  this  world,  and  the  reader  gets 
palled  with  adulation  and  flattery.  Many  a  good 
man  felt  a  sense  of  relief  when  he  learned  that  Wash 
ington  swore  at  Lee  at  Monmouth,  and  I  have  been 
more  moved  to  attempt  great  things  by  drop  ex 
pressions  of  a  common  soldier,  '  I'll  be  glad  to  live 
on  rice  chaff  if  Uncle  Billy  can  only  take  Savannah/ 
than  by  the  declaration  of  the  London  Times,  '  The 
act,  if  .1  failure,  will  be  adjudged  the  act  of  a  mad 
man  ;  if  successful,  it  will  take  rank  with  the  deeds  of 


336  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

great  men  ' — this  before  the  event  of  my  coming  out 
of  the  wilderness  at  Savannah.*  I  know  how  I  felt 
in  October,  1864,  when  I  pleaded  for  the  privilege 

*  The  editorial  of  the  Times  which  Sherman  briefly  para 
phrases  was  in  the  issue  of  December  3,  1864,  upon  the  report  of 
his  cutting  loose  from  Atlanta.  It  has  been  already  referred  to 
(vide  p.  242),  and  began  with  a  statement  of  the  fact.  "  It  is 
commonly  believed  that  Sherman  has  plunged  either  into  Alabama 
or  Georgia,  and  that  he  will  appear  on  the  coast  of  one  of  those 
States  in  due  time.  In  this  case,  however,  how  will  it  fare  with 
him?  .  .  .  He  would  be  throwing  himself  headlong  into  a  hostile 
country  of  immense  extent  without  any  line  of  communications. 
He  has  cut  himself  off  from  his  base  so  completely  and  deliber 
ately  that  he  can  not  even  send  intelligence  of  his  movements. 
He  has  converted  his  entire  army  into  a  flying  column  for  an  ex 
pedition  involving  most  formidable  distances.  .  .  .  The  roads  may 
be  broken  up,  bridges  destroyed,  and  provisions  carried  away, 
while  it  is  certain  that  even  if  the  Federal  commander  should  ul 
timately  appear  before  Charleston,  a  hard  siege  would  still  await 
him  at  the  end  of  his  unparalleled  march.  Nevertheless,  he  is 
beyond  doubt  both  an  able  and  a  resolute  soldier,  and  he  may 
know  better  than  any  of  his  countrymen  what  are  the  real  chances 
of  his  enterprise.  That  it  is  a  most  momentous  enterprise  can  not 
be  denied  ;  but  it  is  exactly  one  of  those  enterprises  which  are 
judged  by  the  event.  It  may  either  make  Sherman  the  most 
famous  general  of  the  North  or  it  may  prove  the  ruin  of  his  repu 
tation,  his  army,  and  even  his  cause  together." 

When  the  news  came  that  he  had  reached  the  sea,  the  Times 
of  January  5,  1865,  said  :  "General  Sherman's  campaign  in  Geor 
gia  will  undoubtedly  rank  hereafter  with  the  most  memorable 
operations  of  modern  war.  ...  It  speaks  well  for  Sherman's  dis 
cernment  and  resolution  that-he  could  plunge  into  such  a  region 
with  unwavering  confidence.  .  .  .  Still,  the  great  fact  that  after 
marching  nearly  a  hundred  miles — from  Chattanooga  to  Atlanta — 
he  should  then  have  marched  two  hundred  and  fifty  more,  and 
brought  his  army,  after  all,  in  good  condition  and  efficiency  to 
the  seacoast,  is  a  testimonial  to  professional  qualities  of  no  com 
mon  order." 

Returning  to  the  subject  on  January  gth,  the  Times  said : 
"  The  capture  of  Savannah  completes  the  history  of  Sherman's 
march,  and  stamps  it  as  one  of  the  ablest,  certainly  one  of  the 
most  singular,  military  achievements  of  the  war.  .  .  .  The  march 
through  the  whole  of  Georgia,  ending  in  the  capture  of  the  chief 
city  of  the  State,  is  an  exception  to  nearly  all  the  events  of  the 
previous  campaigns  that  keep  any  place  in  the  memory.  .  .  .  The 
most  remarkable  exploit  during  four  years  of  conflict  has  been 
achieved  by  a  comparatively  small  army  with  a  loss  of  only  a 
fiftieth  part  of  its  numbers." 


POST  BELLUM.  337 

of  marching  a  thousand  miles  through  an  enemy's 
country  to  help  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  then 
checkmated  at  Petersburg,  and  I  know  how  I  felt 
when  Badeau  demonstrated  long  afterward  that  I 
was  only  doing  what  I  was  bid  to  do  at  the  divine 
inspiration  of  a  superior.  Grant  says  nothing; 
there  is  wisdom  in  this.  I  spoke  out  and  recorded 
my  thoughts  over  my  own  signature.  This  may 
have  been  impolitic,  but  a  hundred  years  hence  it 
will  seem  very  different.  The  truth  is  mighty  and 
will  prevail.  Your  two  books  are  links  in  the  chain 
which  will  be  strengthened  by  every  line  and  para 
graph  written  at  that  day.  I  thank  you  for  not  in 
dulging  in  flattery,  for  that  is  not  only  obnoxious 
to  me,  but  must  be  to  all  thoughtful  men. 

"  Grant  had  his  qualities  ;  Thomas  had  his.  Each 
is  entitled  to  high  honor  for  their  deeds  in  aiding 
to  put  down  a  rebellion  which,  if  successful,  would 
have  been  horrible  in  its  after  results.  But  when 
the  historian  comes  to  paint  the  portraits  of  the 
general  actors,  he  errs  quite  as  much  in  overcolor- 
ing  as  in  neglecting  important  incidents. 

"  I  knew  Thomas  as  a  boy  at  West  Point.  We 
recited  together  four  years  in  the  same  section, 
served  as  lieutenants  in  the  same  regiment  ten 
years,  and  for  Van  Home  to  paint  him  for  me  seems 
an  arrant  piece  of  presumption.  I  am  glad  of  the 
fame  and  hold  his  memory  has  on  the  public,  for 
this  is  a  bond  of  union,  a  piece  of  valuable  property 
to  every  American;  but  when  Van  H.  intimates 
that  Grant  and  I  did  not  do  him  full  justice,  he 
simply  is  ridiculous.  Thomas  leaned  on  me,  and 
never  to  the  hour  of  his  death  did  he  have  reason 
to  believe  that  his  memory  was  less  precious  to  me 
than  my  own.  Never  since  the  world  began  did 
such  absolute  confidence  exist  between  commander 
and  commanded,  and  among  the  many  mistakes  I 
made  I  trace  some  to  his  earnest,  vehement  advice. 

.  Those  who  attributed  to  Thomas  that  calm, 


338  GENERAL  SHERMAN. 

gentle,  yet  forcible  character,  entirely  miscon 
ceived  the  man.  No  man  in  my  army  had  more 
little  causes  of  grievance ;  none  chafed  more  over 
little  things.  When  Sheridan  was  made  lieutenant 
general,  I  was  the  peacemaker  between  him  and 
Grant.  Thomas  was  vehement,  abusive,  and  vio 
lent.  Grant  was  kind,  firm,  and  conciliatory.  But 
I  am  sure  in  your  studies  you  have  hit  on  episodes 
which  prove  what  I  write.  Thomas  was  too  slow  in 
his  combinations  at  Nashville,  and  the  impatience 
of  Grant,  Lincoln,  and  all  in  the  East  was  natural. 
The  glorious  result  at  Nashville  was  partly  the  re 
sult  of  accident  and  partly  of  design — a  truth  that 
may  be  said  of  all  collisions.  But  Nashville  was 
not  as  conclusive  as  Van  Home  thinks  he  has 
proved.  The  final  result  was  Richmond,  and  there 
I  think  Grant  is  entitled  to  all  honor.  Whether 
Appomattox  would  have  been  had  I  stayed  at  At 
lanta  or  followed  Hood  westward,  I  do  not  believe ; 
but  I  leave  that  to  those  who  study  cause  and  effect. 
I  think  you  have  given  a  clear,  impartial  narrative 
of  events,  and  those  who  come  after  us  and  reap 
the  fruits  of  our  labors  must  in  time  settle  the  rela 
tive  merits  of  each.  I  know  that  Thomas  had  he 
been  in  my  place  would  never  have  gone  beyond 
Atlanta,  had  he  gone  that  far.  I  know  that  Grant 
had  no  faith  that  I  could  reach  Goldsboro  in  time 
to  co-operate  with  his  spring  campaign.  What  in 
fluence  my  personal  action  had  on  the  grand  final 
result  I  have  my  own  thoughts  and  convictions,  but 
I  do  not  ask  anybody  to  adopt  them.  The  deeds 
are  in  the  past,  the  record  is  sufficiently  clear,  and 
I  am  willing  to  abide  the  final  judgment  of  man 
kind." 

General  Sherman's  quiet  life  in  St.  Louis  was 
rudely  interrupted  by  the  impeachment  and  resig 
nation  of  the  Secretary  of  War  in  March,  1876,  as 
Grant's  administration  was  entering  upon  the  last 
year  of  his  second  term.  As  a  matter  of  politics, 


POST   BELLUM.  339 

the  embarrassment  of  the  situation  was  complicated 
with  the  approach  of  the  presidential  election,  pre- 
ceeded  by  nominating  conventions.  It  was  not  only 
known  that  a  third  term  was  desired  by  the  Presi 
dent,  but  it  was  matter  of  common  fame  that  mem 
bers  of  the  "  whisky  ring  "  excused  their  frauds  on 
the  plea  that  they  were  expending  much  money  to 
organize  the  movement  for  a  renomination.  The 
embezzlements  involved  the  reputation  of  more  than 
one  in  close  relations  to  the  President  besides  Secre 
tary  Belknap.  So  far  as  the  War  Office  was  con 
cerned,  the  opportunity  for  wrongdoing  had  grown 
directly  out  of  legislation  obtained  by  administra 
tive  influence,  which  had  taken  from  the  general 
of  the  army  the  right  to  be  the  medium  of  the  trans 
mission  of  orders  to  the  army,  and  the  appointment 
of  post  traders.  The  sale  of  these  traderships  had 
been  the  particular  crime  which  ruined  the  Secre 
tary  of  War. 

The  air  was  full  of  rumors  that  Congress  would 
pass  some  act  or  resolution  compelling  Sherman's 
return  to  Washington.  Had  this  been  done  as  part 
of  a  policy  of  correcting  the  blunder  that  had  been 
committed,  and  of  returning  to  the  general  by  law 
the  rights  and  responsibilities  that  had  been  taken 
from  him,  it  would  have  been  right.  He,  however, 
very  naturally  demurred  to  being  called  to  a  posi 
tion  where  the  public  would  assume  that  he  was  a 
check  upon  actions  over  which  he  had  no  control 
and  of  which  he  was  not  even  informed.  He  wrote 
to  his  brother :  "  I  will  not  go  to  Washington  unless 
ordered,  and  it  would  be  an  outrage  if  Congress, 
under  a  temporary  excitement,  should  compel  my 
removal  back.  I  came  out  at  my  own  expense,  and 
never  charged  a  cent  for  transportation,  which  I 
could  have  done.  I  can  better  command  the  army 
from  here  than  from  there.  The  causes  that  made 
a  Belknap  remain  and  will  remain."  * 

*  Sherman  Letters,  p.  349. 


340 


GENERAL   SHERMAN. 


The  appointment  of  Judge  Taft,  of  Ohio,  to  fill 
the  vacancy  in  the  War  Department,  however,  did 
everything  which  personal  selection  could  do  to 
smooth  the  relations  between  the  Secretary  and  the 
general.  Mr.  Taft  was  a  gentleman  of  large  mind 
and  scholarly  training,  an  able  jurist,  and  a  broad, 
judicial  character,  with  the  highest  standards  of 
public  integrity  and  disinterestedness.  He  was,  be 
sides,  fully  appreciative  of  the  great  qualities  of 
General  Sherman,  and  sincerely  desirous  of  having 
the  benefit  of  his  advice  in  performing  the  duties 
of  his  office.  When  such  a  man,  with  characteristic 
suavity  and  sincerity,  asked  Sherman  to  come  back 
and  try  what  mutual  efforts  to  promote  the  public 
interests  could  do  to  remove  the  reproach  from 
army  administration,  the  general  yielded  at  once  to 
the  appeal.  A  conference  secured  a  cordial  good 
understanding,  and  on  the  6th  of  April  Secretary 
Taft  published  a  presidential  order  re-establish 
ing  the  headquarters  of  the  army  at  WTashing- 
ton,  and  directing  that  all  orders  and  instruc 
tions  relative  to  military  operations  or  affecting 
the  military  control  and  discipline  of  the  army 
should  be  promulgated  through  the  general, 
while  the  departments  of  the  adjutant  general 
and  the  inspector  general  should  also  report  to 
him  and  be  under  his  control  in  all  matters  re 
lating  thereto. 

This  order  included  all  that  General  Sherman 
desired,  and  put  his  personal  and  official  relations 
to  the  War  Department  on  a  footing  of  unbroken 
cordiality  during  the  whole  of  his  service  on  the 
active  list.  But  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that,  as 
the  order  was  a  voluntary  concession  of  the  Presi 
dent  and  Secretary,  it  could  be  modified  or  revoked, 
openly  or  tacitly.  Sherman's  successors  found  that 
the  tendency  to  ignore  it  and  to  return  under  one 
pretext  or  another  to  the  former  methods  was  too 
strong  for  them,  so  that  the  old  troubles  became 


POST   BELLUM.  34! 

perennial  for  lack  of  legislative  definition  of  au 
thority.* 

In  the  unpublished  private  correspondence  be 
fore  quoted  Sherman  spoke  out  his  heartfelt  satis 
faction  at  the  prospect  of  reform.  Writing  on  April 
1 5th,  he  said:  "I  hope  in  recent  events  you  will 
derive  consolation  and  assurance  that  a  better  era 
is  dawning  on  the  country.  If  I  can,  you  may  be 
assured  that  everything  like  corruption  and  the 
false  glitter  given  by  wealth  basely  acquired  shall 
be  punished  in  the  army.  Now  the  tongue  of  scan 
dal  is  so  loose  that  there  is  danger  of  even  the  best 
reputations  suffering.  Babcock  is  still  so  far  de 
tached  from  the  army,  being  on  civil  duty,  responsi 
ble  only  to  the  President  and  Congress,  that  I  could 
not  if  I  would  cause  his  arraignment  and  trial  by  a 
court-martial.  A  court  of  inquiry  can  only  be  or 
dered  by  the  President,  or  by  a  department  or  army 
commander  on  the  demand  of  the  accused.  .  .  .  We 
are  all  pleased  with  Judge  Taft,  who  is  a  man  of 
probity  and  learning.  It  is  a  pleasure  to  confer 
with  such  a  man,  who  does  not  fear  to  seek  advice 
of  others  in  a  sphere  where  he  has  had  no  experi 
ence.  Schofield's  going  to  West  Point  will  elevate 
the  academy,  and  silence  the  little  jealousies  that 
have  endangered  its  safety." 

The  last  sentence  refers  to  the  general's  almost 
parental  interest  in  the  young  men  entering  the 
army.  His  sympathy  also  with  the  junior  grades 
of  officers  was  of  the  same  spirit,  and  his  pride  in 
them  and  faith  in  their  patriotism  and  high  ideal 
was  very  great.  Returning  to  the  subject  on  Octo 
ber  24th,  he  wrote :  "  Our  friend  General  Schofield 
has  laid  hold  of  his  new  charge,  the  Military  Acad 
emy,  with  his  usual  force,  and  I  doubt  not  that  in 
stitution  will  receive  a  new  impulse  from  his  prac 
tical  sense  and  knowledge  of  the  wants  of  our  pro- 

*  See  Schofield's  Forty-six  Years  in  the  Army,  chapter  xxii. 


342 


GENERAL   SHERMAN. 


fession.  I  also  believe  the  army,  especially  in  the 
junior  branches,  is  as  pure  and  honorable,  as  zeal 
ous  to  do  right,  as  in  the  brightest  days  of  the 
republic.  Surely  it  can  not  be,  it  must  not  be,  that 
our  young  republic  is  declining  in  morals.  Still,  we 
are  incident  to  human  infirmities,  and  it  may  be 
that  since  the  war  our  public  men  have  not  risen 
to  the  occasion  or  been  equal  to  the  emergency." 

It  was,  of  course,  inevitable  that  General  Sher 
man  should  be  often  approached  with  the  sugges 
tion  that  he  should  consent  to  be  a  candidate  for 
the  presidency.  His  real  unwillingness  to  accept 
any  political  office  was  known  to  his  close  friends, 
but  most  people  were  disposed  to  think  it  might  be 
overcome,  or  that,  like  the  proverbial  nolo  episcopari, 
it  might  even  cover  a  disposition  to  coquet  with  the 
idea.  The  better  acquainted  one  becomes  with  his 
character,  the  more  certain  it  is  that  his  strong  ex 
pressions  on  this  subject  were,  without  exaggera 
tion,  the  index  of  his  inmost  feelings  and  most  fixed 
rule  of  life. 

As  early  as  January,  1865,  when  his  march  to 
the  sea  was  just  completed,  the  quidnuncs  began 
to  talk  of  a  political  career  for  him  when  the  war 
should  be  ended.  "  If  you  ever  hear  anybody  use 
my  name  in  connection  with  a  political  office,"  he 
wrote  to  John  Sherman,  "  tell  them  you  know  me 
well  enough  to  assure  them  that  I  would  be  offended 
by  any  such  association."  *  Again,  in  November, 
1866,  he  said,  "  I  am  determined  to  keep  out  of 
political  or  even  quasi-political  office."  f  When  the 
end  of  Grant's  first  term  approached,  the  question 
of  his  renomination  was  warmly  discussed,  and 
General  Sherman,  far  out  on  the  frontier  of  Texas, 
got  copies  of  the  New  York  Herald  strongly  advo 
cating  his  own  nomination.  Once  more  he  wrote 
to  his  brother  (May  18,  1871),  "  You  may  say  for 

*  Shefmau  Letters,  p.  245.  f  Id.,  p.  282. 


POST   BELLUM.  343 

me,  and  publish  it  too,  that  in  no  event  and  under 
no  circumstances  will  I  ever  be  a  candidate  for 
President  or  any  other  political  office,  and  I  mean 
every  word  of  it."  *  Similar  statements  which  were 
published  were  interpreted  by  many  to  mean  only 
that  he  would  not  allow  himself  to  be  used  in  rivalry 
to  Grant,  and  the  persistent  recurrence  of  the  effort 
to  bring  him  forward  as  a  candidate  drew  from  him, 
in  1874,  the  emphatic  repetition  of  his  decision  that 
"  no  matter  what  the  temptation,  I  will  never  allow 
my  name  to  be  used  by  any  party."  f  HC  coupled 
this  with  the  opinion  that  the  obligation  of  the  coun 
try  to  the  army  had  been  sufficiently  recognized, 
"  and  the  time  has  come  to  return  to  the  civil  list."  \ 

The  topic  came  up  with  a  sort  of  periodicity, 
drawing  out  from  him  always  the  same  blunt,  de 
cisive  negative,  but  in  1884  circumstances  combined 
to  make  the  effort  to  change  his  resolution  a  strong 
er  and  much  more  determined  one  than  ever  be 
fore.  Though  he  had  always  refused  to  be  regarded 
as  a  party  man,  his  strong  sympathy  with  all  who 
had  been  most  active  in  carrying  the  country 
through  the  civil  war  made  him  feel  drawn  toward 
the  public  men  of  the  Republican  party.  The  great 
prominence  of  his  brother  the  Senator  naturally 
counted  for  much  in  such  circumstances.  Without 
departing  from  the  habitual  rule  of  refusing  to  med 
dle  in  politics,  he  would  have  been  glad,  no  doubt, 
to  see  the  highest  civil  honors  fall  to  his  brother, 
as  he  himself  had  reaped  the  military  ones.  But 
though  this  impulse  would  strengthen  his  fixed  de 
cision  to  refuse  political  office,  that  decision  was 
based  on  other  reasons,  and  the  event  showed  that 
it  was  set  beyond  reconsideration. 

As  the  time  approached  when  nominations  must 
be  made,  the  fact  that  the  general  was  now  on  the 
retired  list  of  the  army,  while  his  mental  and  phys- 

*  Sherman  Letters,  p.  330.         f  Id.,  p.  340.         \  Id.,  p.  341. 
23 


344 


GENERAL   SHERMAN. 


ical  vigor  was  unimpaired,  led  to  a  widespread  dis 
position  to  call  upon  him  to  complete  the  series  of 
public  stations  in  which  he  had,  one  by  one,  suc 
ceeded  to  Grant.  Mr.  Elaine  had  the  largest  fol 
lowing,  but  he  was  not  certain  of  nomination,  and 
frankly  preferred  General  Sherman  if  he  were  him 
self  to  be  disappointed  in  the  nomination.  By  the 
beginning  of  May  matters  had  so  far  taken  shape 
that  Senator  Sherman  wrote  to  his  brother :  "  It  is 
certain  that  if  Elaine  is  not  nominated  in  the  early 
ballots  a  movement  will  be  made  for  your  nomina 
tion,  and  if  entered  upon  will  go  like  wild  fire.  .  .  . 
My  own  opinion  is  still  that,  while  you  ought  not 
to  seek,  or  even  beforehand  consent  to  accept  a 
nomination,  yet  if  it  comes  unsought  and  with  cor 
dial  unanimity  you  ought  to  acquiesce.  ...  I  see 
no  prospect  or  possibility  of  my  nomination,  and 
not  much  of  my  election  if  nominated,  but  yours  is 
easy.  Elaine  could  readily  turn  his  strength  to  you 
if  he  can  not  get  a  majority,  and  I  think  means  to 
do  so."  The  general  replied  :  "  The  more  I  reflect, 
the  more  convinced  I  am  that  I  was  wise  and  pru 
dent  in  taking  the  exact  course  I  have,  and  that 
it  would  be  the  height  of  folly  to  yield  to  any  false 
ambition  to  allow  the  use  of  my  name  for  any  politi 
cal  office.  ...  If  you  count  yourself  out,  I  will  be 
absolutely  neutral,  and  honestly  believe  we  are  ap 
proaching  that  epoch  in  our  history  when  King 
Log  is  about  as  good  as  King  Stork."  * 

The  general  was  at  this  time  in  possession  of  a 
confidential  letter  from  Mr.  Elaine  (afterward  pub 
lished  by  the  consent  of  the  latter)  saying  that,  in 
the  event  of  a  break  in  the  nominating  convention, 
it  was  inevitable  that  his  name  would  be  used,  and 
that  he  ought  to  regard  a  nomination  in  such  a  case 
as  he  would  a  soldier's  detail  to  duty,  which  he 
must  not  decline.  But  General  Sherman  had  .taken 

*  Sherman  Letters,  pp.  359,  360. 


POST    BELLUM.  345 

the  most  effective  mode  to  prevent  the  offer,  in  de 
claring  that  he  would  respectfully  refuse  it  if  made. 
As  soon  as  the  nomination  of  Blaine  and  Logan  was 
announced,  he  wrote,  kt  I  feel  such  a  sense  of  relief 
that  I  would  approve  of  anything."  Telling  his 
brother  the  steps  he  had  taken,  and  his  forecast  of 
what  might  happen,  he  added  with  unmistakable 
emphasis,  "  Anyhow,  I  escaped,  and  that  to  me  was 
salvation."  *  He  recognized  the  distinction  be 
tween  his  own  position  and  that  of  Mr.  Blaine  and 
his  brother,  who  had  been  long  trained  in  political 
life,  and  said  that  their  ambition  to  reach  the  high 
est  round  of  the  ladder  in  their  chosen  career  was 
legitimate  and  right.  His  decision  of  character  was 
never  better  shown  than  in  the  unwavering  confi 
dence  with  which  he  adhered  to  a  line  of  action  he 
had  resolved  upon  long  years  before.  His  bearing 
and  action  in  the  final  decisive  moment  were  equally 
characteristic.  The  convention  was  in  session,  and 
he  was  in  his  study  at  St.  Louis,  smoking  and  chat 
ting  with  his  son  Thomas.  A  telegraph  messenger 
came  in  with  a  dispatch  from  the  friend  (Senator 
Henderson)  who  was  his  authorized  representative 
in  the  convention.  It  was  the  announcement  that 
the  critical  moment  had  come  when  his  nomination 
would  be  carried  by  storm  unless  he  peremptorily 
forbade.  Without  a  change  of  countenance,  he 
dashed  off  the  prompt  reply  that  if  in  spite  of  his 
declination  he  should  be  nominated,  he  would  de 
cline  with  an  emphasis  which  might  be  construed 
as  disrespectful.  He  passed  the  dispatch  and  his 
answer  to  his  son  to  read,  and  without  a  comment 
resumed  his  cigar  and  the  conversation,  as  if  it  were 
a  matter  of  no  consequence. 

Such  was  his  final  leave-taking  of  the  fretting 
cares  of  public  life.  Some  six  years  of  retirement 
followed,  in  which  he  found  enjoyment  in  the  re- 

*  Sherman  Letters,  p.  361. 


346  GENERAL   SHERMAN. 

unions  of  his  old  comrades  and  in  the  public  anni 
versaries  and  functions  for  which  he  was  always  in 
great  demand.  His  racy  and  trenchant  style  of  ex 
temporaneous  discussion  of  every  subject  suggested 
by  the  occasion,  or  which  was  of  current  popular 
interest,  offered  a  remarkable  example  of  unreserved 
disclosure  of  a  great  man's  heart  and  motives,  and 
it  became  plainly  apparent  that  the  whole  country 
felt  honored  at  being  thus  taken  into  his  confidence. 
In  his  most  unguarded  words  his  principles  were 
always  clear,  noble,  intensely  patriotic,  and  his  care 
less  colloquial  expressions  often  covered  a  practi 
cal  wisdom  and  insight  of  a  most  striking  kind. 
Every  year  added  to  the  proof  of  his  having  chosen 
the  better  part  in  avoiding  the  conflicts  of  partisan 
politics,  for  he  was  right  in  his  judgment  that  it 
mattered  little  whether  King  Log  or  King  Stork 
were  on  the  throne.  The  exuberant  manifestations 
of  popular  good  will  were  always  grateful  to  him, 
if  sometimes  a  little  fatiguing,  and  he  could  not  be 
insensible  to  the  proofs  that  his  place  was  a  warm 
and  a  safe  one  in  the  hearts  of  his  countrymen. 

He  had  moved  his  home  from  St.  Louis  to  New 
York  in  1886,  and  gave  a  great  deal  of  labor  to  the 
systematic  filing  and  labeling  of  his  voluminous 
papers  and  correspondence.  He  used  to  tell  his 
friends  that  everything  was  there  in  order,  every 
letter  he  had  received  and  its  answer,  and  every 
document  that  had  any  historical  value.  The  same 
system  and  thrift  marked  all  his  private  business. 
He  enjoyed  with  his  family  and  friends  the  full  so 
cial  advantages  that  his  means  allowed,  but  he  was 
one  who  had  a  horror  of  debt  and  of  laxity  in  meet 
ing  business  obligations,  and  was  never  tempted 
into  pecuniary  embarrassments  or  dangerous  risks. 

Mrs.  Sherman  died  in  1888,  and  though  he  had 
fully  expected  to  precede  her  to  the  grave,  and  the 
loss  of  the  good  woman  who  had  been  the  faithful 
companion  of  his  whole  career  from  the  day  when 


Tomb  of  General  Sherman  in  St.   Louis  cemetery. 


POST   BELLUM.  347 

his  father's  death  left  him  an  orphaned  child,  whom 
she  at  first  welcomed  as  a  brother  in  the  Ewing 
home,  was  a  loss  that  sadly  bereaved  him,  yet  he 
received  the  blow  with  patience,  finding  content,  as 
he  said,  in  the  knowledge  that  "  no  mortal  was  ever 
better  prepared  to  put  on  immortality,"  and  that 
in  due  time  he  would  resume  his  place  by  her  side. 

Through  the  closing  years  he  kept  up  his  philo 
sophic  cheerfulness,  often  at  the  dinner  table  of  de 
voted  friends,  and  cordially  welcoming  all  who 
knew  him  to  his  own  home.  Only  a  week  before 
his  last  illness  he  wrote  to  John  Sherman,  "  I  am 
drifting  along  in  the  old  rut,  in  good  strength,  at 
tending  about  four  dinners  a  week  at  public  or  pri 
vate  houses,  and  generally  wind  up  for  gossip  at 
the  Union  League  Club."  *  The  members  of  the 
club  still  love  to  point  out  his  favorite  corner  where 
he  sat  nearly  every  evening  in  witty  chat  or  wise 
discussion  of  things  past  and  present,  surrounded 
by  an  eager  group  of  younger  men,  learning  devo 
tion  to  country  by  the  best  of  all  instruction,  in 
word  and  in  illustrious  example. 

Returning  home  in  the  evening  of  February  4, 
1891,  from  a  dramatic  performance,  he  caught  cold, 
and  in  a  day  or  two  erysipelas  of  the  face  and  throat 
appeared,  and  he  rapidly  became  very  ill,  his  age, 
of  course,  telling  against  him.  His  seventieth  birth 
day  came  on  the  8th,  and,  after  several  days  of  par 
tial  or  complete  unconsciousness,  he  died  on  the 
I4th,  having  fully  and  greatly  rounded  out  the  nor 
mal  allotment  of  the  years  of  man's  life.  He  was 
modestly  laid  in  the  grave  beside  his  wife's  resting 
place  at  St.  Louis,  according  to  the  directions  he 
had  minutely  given,  and  the  mourning  of  the  whole 
land  was  heartfelt  and  deep. 

*  Sherman  Letters,  p.  381. 


INDEX. 


Adams,  John  Quincy,  3. 
Adams,  General  Wirt,    i84. 
Allatoona,  battle  of,  233. 
Allatoona  Pass,  210. 
Allen,  General  Robert,  199. 
Anderson,  Lars,  29. 
Anderson,  General  Patton,  49, 

53.  57- 
Anderson,  General  Robert,  27, 

29,  31. 

Appomattox,  surrender  at,  296. 
Arkansas  Post,  102. 
Armstrong,  General,  150. 
Army  of  the  Cumberland,  329, 

331.  332. 

Army  of  the  Potomac,  307. 
Army  of  the    Tennessee,    105, 

219,  285-287,  331,  332. 
Atlanta  campaign,  204,  330. 
Atlanta  captured,  224. 
Augusta  captured,  269. 

Baird,  General  Absalom,  169. 
Banks,  General  N.  P.,  147,  157, 

187,  188. 

Bate,  General  W.  B.,  169,  172. 
Baton  Rouge  arsenal,  19. 
Baxter,  Captain  A.  S.,  73. 
Beauregard,    General,    20,    22, 

24,40,  51,  52,  59,  64,  66,  99, 

232,  270. 

Belknap,  General,  326,  327,  339. 
Benton,  Thomas  H.,  3,  9. 
Bentonville,  battle  of,  283. 
Biddle,  Commodore,  9,  10. 
Blaine,  James  G.,  344,  345. 
Blair,  General   F.   P.,  100,   159, 

195,  267. 


Bowen,  General,  45. 
Bowling  Green,  Ky.,  30,  36. 
Bragg,  General  Braxton,  14,  20, 

40,  62,  64,  75,  153,  163,  175. 
Breckenridge,    General,  44,  59, 

60,  297. 
Buckland,  General,  42,  43,  48, 

49.  54,  65. 

Buckner,  Simon  B.,  29,  30. 
Bucll,  General  Don  Carlos,  14, 

18,   32,   37,    40,   65,    68,    80, 

193- 

Bull  Run,  battle  of,  24,  25. 
Burnside,    General,    160,     166, 

179,  1 80. 

Calhoun,  John  C.,  3. 
Cameron,  Simon,  31,  32. 
Camp  Dick  Robinson,  29. 
Chalmers,   General,  43,  47,  58, 

59.  64,  65. 

Champion's  Hill,  125,  126. 
Charleston  evacuated,  277. 
Chattanooga,  victory  of,  175. 
Cheatham,  General,  41,  45,  59, 

60,  176,  215,  216. 
Chickasaw  Bayou,  99,  TOO. 
Churchill,  General  T.  J.,    IO2, 

103. 

Clark,  General,  45. 
Clay,  Henry,  3,  13,  27. 
Cleburne,  General,  41,   44,  49, 

54,  163,  166,  178,  258. 
Columbia  captured,  273. 
Corinth,  capture  of,  81. 
Corse,    General,  158,    170,   233, 

245; 

Corwin,  Thomas,  13. 
349 


350 


GENERAL   SHERMAN. 


Cox,   General  J.    D.,  287,  289, 

290-292,  305. 

Crittenden,  General,  65,  67,  69. 
Crittenden,  John  J.,  27. 
Crump's  Landing,  37,  50,  73. 
Curtis,  General,  36. 

Dahlgren,  Admiral,  261. 
Dana,  Charles  A.,  162. 
Davies,    General     Thomas    A., 

88. 
Davis,  Jefferson,    30,    95,    164, 

221,  223,  267,  295,  297. 
Dix,  General  John  A.,  301,  305. 
Dodge,  General  G.  M.,  181,  206. 

Edwards  Station,  128,  129. 
Evarts,  William  M.,  i,  317. 
Ewing,  General  Hugh,  105, 

159,  161. 

Ewing,  Miss  Ellen  B.,  6,  13. 
Ewing,  Thomas,  2,  3,  13,  17. 
Ezra  Church,  battle  of,  220. 

Farragut,  Admiral,  98,  99. 

Fayetteville  falls,  279. 

Floyd,  John  B.,  18. 

Foote,  Admiral,  36. 

Forrest,  General,  95,  183. 

Fort  Donelson,  36,  38. 

Fort  Fisher,  288. 

Fort  Henry,  37,  38. 

Fort  Hindman,  102. 

Fort  McAllister,  262. 

Fort  Moultrie,  6. 

Fort  Pickering,  89. 

Fort  Robinet,  88. 

Foster,  General  John   G  ,    190, 

261,  263,  280. 
Fremont,   General  John   C.,    8, 

29,  30. 

Gardner,  General  Frank,  147. 
Geary,  General,  157,  167,  264. 
Gettysburg,  battle  of,  147. 
Gibson,  General  R.  L.,  50,  62. 
Gladden,  General,  64. 
Grand  Gulf,  120. 
Granger,  General  Gordon,  163, 
195. 


Grant,  General  U.  S.,  30,  36-39, 
41-44,  63-62,  72,  73,  76,  77, 
94,  96-98,  104,  105,  115,  143, 
156,  160,  162,  171-173,  181, 
188,  189,  195,  196,  231,  240, 
261,  280,  293,  294,  299,  300, 
312,  313,  315,  316,  320,  322, 
324-326,  328,  335,  337. 

Grierson,  General,  119. 

Guthrie,  James,  30,  32,  200. 

Haines's  Bluff,  101,  129. 
Halleck,  General  Henry  W.,  32- 

37,   39-41,  43,  79,  179,  232, 

280,  303,  322. 

Hamilton,  General  C.  S.,  94. 
Hampton,  General  Wade,  275, 

279,  283. 
Hancock,  General  Winfield  S., 

14- 

Hank  in  son's  Ferry,  121. 
Hardee,    General,    45,    57,    63, 

166,  176,  218,  223,  263,  270, 

277,  282. 

Harper's  Ferry  seized,  22. 
Harrison,  General  William  H., 

2,  5- 

Harvard  graduates,  12. 
Havre  de  Grace,  4. 
Hazen,  General  W.  B.,  156,  260, 

261. 

Henderson,  Senator,  345. 
Herron,  General,  142,  146. 
Hickenlooper,  Capt.  A.,  61, 130. 
Hildebrand,  42,  53,  54,  65. 
Hill,  General  D.  H.,  270,  291. 
Hilton  Head,  262. 
Hindman,  General,  44,  62. 
Hoke,  General,  290,  292. 
Holly  Springs,  87,  89,  96. 
Hood,  General,  209,  211,   215, 

216,     219,     221,     223,     224, 

232. 
Hooker,     General    Joseph,    n, 

156,  167,  195,  207. 
Howard,    General    O.    O.,    155, 

170,  195,  206,  268,  269. 
Hunter,  Hocking,  3. 
Hurlbut,  General  S.,  38,  50,  59- 

61,  183,  185. 


INDEX. 


351 


Jackson  captured,  125. 

Jack>on,  General  Andrew,  3,  59. 

Johnson,  Andrew,  194, 197,  300, 
308,  312,  313,  315,  310- 

Johnson,  General  Bushrod,  50, 
52,  59,  163. 

Johnston,  General  Albert  Sid 
ney,  5,  36,  40,  44,  46,  48,  60. 

Johnston,    General    Joseph   E., 

24,  94,  95,  nS,  140,  143,  201, 
211,  212,  281,  297. 

Kearny,  General,  S,  9. 
Kilpatrick,  General,  269,  270, 

279,  296. 
King,  James,  15. 
Knox,  Thomas  W.,  113. 

Lancaster,  Ohio,  2,  6. 
Lauman,  General,  50,  77. 
Lee,  General   Robert   E.,   147, 

242,  292,  296,  297. 
Lee,  General  Stephen  D.,  159, 

160,  184,  211,  220. 
Leggett,  General,  263. 
Lightbum,  General,  165. 
Lincoln.  Abraham,  22,  28,  114, 

179,  192,  294,  295,  299,  303. 
Little  Ogeechee,  259. 
Logan,  General,    83,   181,   195, 

218,  266,  332,  345. 
Long,  General,  180. 
Longstreet,  General,  157,  166. 
Lookout  Mountain  taken,  168. 
Lovejoy's  station,  224. 

Mangum,  Willie  P.,  3. 
March  to  the  sea,  334. 
Mason,  Colonel  R.  B.,  9,  10, 

ii. 

McArthur,  General,  50,  60,  182. 
McClellan,  General  George  B., 

29,32. 
McClernand,   General  John  A., 

3Q,  49-52,  55.  67,  102-104. 
McCook,     General     Alexander 

McD.,  31,  67-09. 
McDowell,  General  Irwin,    24, 

25,  55. 

McGoffin,  Beriah,  27,  28. 


McLaws,  General,  258. 
McPherson.  General  James  B., 

35,  4i,  83, 181,  191,  205,  212, 

218.  331. 

Meade,  General,  303,  322. 
Medill.  Governor,  3. 
Meigs,  General  M.,  14,  15,  162, 

201. 

Mexican  War,  26. 

Milliken's  Bend,  98. 

Missionary  Ridge,  168. 

Mitchell,  General,  83. 

Monterey,  Cal..  8. 

Morgan,    General    C.    \V.t   98, 

154- 

Morton,  Oliver  P.,  29. 
Mower,  General,  187,  268. 

Napoleon,  Louis.  313. 

Nelson,    General   William,    29, 

3L  56,  65,  66,  69. 
New  Hope  Church,  209. 

Ord,  General,  89. 
Osterhaus,   General,    157,    1*9, 
167. 

Palmer,  General  John  M.,  205, 

221,  290,  291. 
Parke,  General  J.  G.,  142,  190, 

191. 

Patterson,  General  Robert,  24. 
Pemberton,    General,    89,   118, 

125,  140,  143. 

Pillow,  General  Gideon  JM  30. 
Pittsburg  Landing,  39,  76. 
Polk.  General  L.,  40,  48,  60,  63, 

185,  211. 
Pope,  General  John,  33,  34,  36, 

79>  I99- 

Port  Gibson,  120. 
Port  Hudson,  147. 
i  Porter,  Admiral,  103,  108,  109, 

no,  118,  187,  288,  294,  295. 
Premiss,  General  B.  M.,  39,  41, 

50,  5S-6o. 
Price,  General,  S6,  87. 

Queen  of  the  West,  117. 
Qaimby,  General.  105, 108. 


352 


GENERAL   SHERMAN. 


Rawlins,  General,  324,  326, 
Roddy,  General,  153. 
Rosecrans,     General,    83,     86, 

151,  190-192. 
Rousseau,    General    Lovell    A., 

29. 

Ruger,  General,  290,  291. 
Ruggles,  General,  45,  62. 

Savannah  captured,  263. 
Schofield,    General,    190,    191, 
195,   206,  265,  280,  281,  292, 

317,  341. 
Scott,   General  Winfield,    8,  12, 

23,  24,  313. 

Seminole  Indians,  5. 

Seward,  William  H.,  300. 

Sheridan,  General,  172,  I73> 
303,  304,  322. 

Sherman,  Charles  R.,  I,  3. 

Sherman,  Edmund,  i. 

Sherman,  John,  22,  24,  318,  327, 
328,  342,  343,  347. 

Sherman,  Mrs.  W.  T.,  33,  308, 
346. 

Sherman,  Roger,  I. 

Sherman,  Taylor,  i. 

Sherman,  William  Tecumseh, 
ancestors,  i  ;  birth,  2  ;  ap 
pointed  a  cadet,  3 ;  appears 
at  West  Point,  4  ;  graduates, 

5  ;  appointed    lieutenant,    5  ; 
engaged,  6 ;  at  Fort  Moultrie, 

6  ;  at  Marietta,  Ga.,  7  ;    sails 
for   California,    8  ;     adjutant 
general,  9  ;  arrests  Nash,  10  ; 
sails  for  New  York,  12  ;  mar 
riage,  13  ;  appointed  captain, 
14 ;  sails  for   California,   14  ; 
returns  to  the  East,  17;  super 
intendent  of  military  school, 
18  ;  resignation,  19;  appointed 
colonel,    23  ;  Bull    Run,    24  ; 
brigadier   general,     27  ;       in 
Kentucky,    30 ;    takes    com 
mand,   31  ;    relieved,   32  ;    in 
Missouri,  32  ;  at  Paducah,  35; 
at  Pittsburg  Landing,  39  ;  at 
Shiloh,  41  ;  his  position.  42 
engaged,    51  ;  falls  back,  55 


meets    Grant,   62  ;  new  posi 
tion,  65  ;  moves  forward,  68  ; 
new    command,    79 ;   advises 
Grant,  83  ;  at   Memphis,  85  ; 
letter  to  mayor,  90  ;  to  Sec 
retary  Chase,  92;  to  the  Yazoo 
98  ;  defeated,  101  ;  falls  back, 
102  ;      commands    Fifteenth 
Corps,  105  ;  aids  Porter,  no  ; 
writes  to    Rawlins,    112  ;    in 
trouble     with     Knox,      113; 
writes  to  Grant,  115  ;  moves 
on    Jackson,     123  ;    destroys 
public  property,  125  ;  moves 
against        Vicksburg,       131  ; 
moves  on  Jackson,  147  ;  pro 
moted,  149  ;  ordered  to  Chat 
tanooga,  158  ;  sent  to  relieve 
Burnside,  180  ;  at  home,  182  ; 
nearly     captured,     184  ;     in 
Vicksburg,  187  ;  goes  to  New 
Orleans,  187  ;  promotion,  188; 
at  Nashville,    195  ;  writes  to 
Grant,     196 ;     his    character, 
198  ;     prepares     for     spring 
campaign,  200  ;  Atlanta  cam 
paign,  204;   Kennesaw,  213 ; 
Peach  Tree  Creek,  216  ;  de 
feats    Hood,     217  ;     Atlanta 
captured,    ^224^ ;     congratula 
tions,  .2^;  march  to  the  sea, 
231  ;  his  order,  245  ;  letter  to 
mayor,    249 ;    letter  to    Mrs. 
Bower,  251  ;  arrives  near  Sa 
vannah,    261  ;    captures    the 
city,  263  ;  Christmas  gift,  264; 
through    the   Carolinas,   265 ; 
capturing     Columbia,      273  ; 
Fayetteville  taken,  279  ;  news 
from   home,    280 ;    battle    of 
Bentonville,       283  ;      meets 
Grant,  293  ;   Healy's  picture 
of,  294  ;  learns  of  Lee's  sur 
render,    296  ;    hears   of  Lin 
coln's  death,  297  ;  Sherman's 
mistake,  299  ;  treaty  revoked, 
300  ;     marches    to    Virginia, 
305  ;     review    of    his    army, 

307  ;    address   to   his   troops, 

308  ;  a   new  command,  311  ; 


INDEX. 


353 


visits  Mexico,  312  ;  as  a  peace 
maker,  314 ;  Indian  treaty, 
318  ;  at  Chicago  meeting,  322  ; 
becomes  general,  323  ;  pain 
ful  interview,  325  ;  visits 
Europe,  327  ;  removes  to  St. 
Louis,  328  ;  publishes  mem 
oirs,  329  ;  returns  to  Wash 
ington,  340 ;  declines  civil 
office,  342  ;  retirement,  346  ; 
New  York  home,  346 ;  his 
death  and  burial,  347. 

Sloat,  Commodore,  8. 

Slocum,  General,  155,  195. 

Smith,  General  A.  J.,  14, 98, 187. 

Smith,  General  Charles  F., 
37-40,  77. 

Smith,  General  Giles  A.,  271. 

Smith,  General  John  E.,  158, 
266. 

Smith,  General  Kilby,  187. 

Smith,  General  Morgan  L.,  170. 

Smith,  General  P.  F.,  n. 

Stanbery,  Henry,  3. 

Stanley,  Henry  M.,  319. 

Stanton,  Edwin  M.,  297,  301, 
302,  308,  313,  314,  315- 

Steele,  General,  157,  187. 

Steele's  Bayou,  109. 

Stevenson,  General,  166. 

Stewart,  General  A.  P.,  57,  62, 
169,  176,  215,  270. 

Stockton,  Commodore,  8. 

Stoneman,  General,  293. 

Stuart,  Colonel  David,  5,  42,  58, 
60. 

Sutler,  Captain,  10,  12. 

Taft,  Judge,  340,  341. 

Taylor,   General.  Richard,   146, 

241. 
Taylor,  General  Zachary,  2,  7,  8, 

13,  241. 

Tenure  of  Office  Act,  314. 
Terry,  General,  265,  280,  287. 
Thirteenth  Army  Corps,  94. 


Thomas,  General  George  H.,  24, 
27,  31,  80,  155,  162,  192-194, 

197,    198,    2OI,    2O7,    322,    332, 

337-  338. 

Thomas,  General  Lorenzo,  31. 
Turchin,  General,  156,  175. 
Tuttle,  General,  157. 
Twiggs,  General  David  E.,  20. 
Tyler,  General   Robert  O.,  23, 

25- 

Union  League  Club,  347. 
United   States   Military  Acade 
my,  341. 

Van  Buren,  Martin,  3. 

Van  Dorn,  General  Earl,  85,  87, 

96. 

Van  Vliet,  General  Stewart,  14. 
Veatch,  General,  50,  57. 
Vicksburg  assaulted,  131. 
Vicksburg  besieged,  138. 
Vicksburg  campaign,  117. 
Vigilance  Committee,  15,  16. 
Von  Moltke,  Marshal,  333. 

Wallace,  General  Lewis,  38,  72, 

73- 

Wallace,  W.  H.  L.,  38,  56,  63. 
WTebster,  Daniel,  2,  3,  13. 
Weitzel,  General,  299. 
Wheeler,  General  Joseph,   153, 

154,  216,  217,  222,  270,  283. 
Williams,  General,  98,  99,  275. 
Wilson,  General  J.  G.,  294. 
Wilson's  Creek,  191. 
Winslow,  General,  184. 
Withers,  General,  45,  60.  64. 
Wood,  General  Thomas  J.,  31, 

32,  70,  163. 
Wood,  John  E.,  16. 
Wright,  Silas,  8,  304. 

Yerba  Buena,  n. 
Zollicoffer,  Felix  K.,  29,  30. 


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also  the  best,  considered  purely  as  a  narrative.  Mr.  Hemment  was  at  the  right  places 
at  the  right  times.  .  .  .  No  series  of  pictures  as  good  as  this  on  the  scenes  and  events 
of  the  war  has  been  made  by  any  other  man."  —  Boston  Herald. 

"  Clever  and  picturesque.  .  .  .  Over  one  hundred  capital  instantaneous  photographs 
illustrate  Mr.  Hemment's  well-  written  record,  and  not  the  least  of  the  book's  recom 
mendations  is  the  outspoken  simplicity  of  its  style  and  the  strong  impression  it  makes 
upon  the  reader  of  being  the  uninfluenced  evidence  of  an  eye-witness  who  '  draws  the 
thing  as  he  sees  it,'  and  without  exaggeration  or  prejudice."  —  Sunday-School  Time  s. 

"  Will  have  a  permanent  value  and  a  popularity  which  doubtless  the  more  technical 
books  will  lack."  —  A  rmy  and  Navy  Register. 

"  Accurate  as  well  as  picturesque.  .  .  .  Mr.  Hemment  has  done  his  work  well.  In 
point  of  faithful  realism  there  has  thus  far  been  nothing  better  in  the  whole  war  litera 
ture."  —  Boston  Journal. 


"The  pictures.  comprise  the  best  set  of  war  views  that  we  have  se^n."  ^Philadelphia 
Inquirer. 

"  He  is  able  to  give  us  consecutive  pictures  of  the  war,  possessing  the  great  value 
of  viewing  it  from  beginning  to  end."  —  Baltimore  ^>un. 

**  It  is  a  history  of  the  war  that  will  become  more  valuable  as  time  passes,  for  it  is, 
in  its  pictures,  an  unimpeachable  record  of  events."  —  Cleveland  Piain  Dealer. 


R 


ECOLLECTIONS  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.  By 
CHARLES  A.  DANA.  With  Portrait.  Large  121110.  Cloth,  gilt 
top,  uncut,  $2.00. 

•  "  Out  of  his  rich  material  Mr.  Dana  has  woven  a  marvelous  narrative.  .  .  . 
Written,  as  the  book  is,  in  Mr.  Dana's  inimitable  English,  it  is  worthy  to  rank  with  the 
autobiography  of  Grant  in  the  list  of  the  really  great  works  which  will  bear  down  to 
posterity  the  true  story  of  the  great  war  for  freedom  and  for  the  Union." — Boston 
Journal. 

"  It  is  a  book  filled  with  vitality  and  warm  with  strong  life.  It  tells  history  in  the 
strongest  and  most  impressive  manner,  and  the  personality  of  the  writer  gives  it  an  ad 
ditional  interest.  It  is  one  of  the  valuable  books  ot  the  year.  ...  It  is  sincere  even  in 
its  prejudices;  the  most  original  and  enduring  work  of  a  strong  thinker.  The  book  is 
a  most  important  contribution  to  the  history  of  the  civil  war ;  it  is  readable  from  first 
page  to  last,  and  its  vitality  will  outlast  that  of  more  elaborate  works  on  the  same  sub 
ject."—  Boston  Saturday  Evening  Gazette. 

"The  book  will  rank  among  the  trustworthy  sources  of  knowledge  of  the  civil 
war."—  New  York  Evening  Post. 

"As  interesting  as  a  novel."— Buffalo  Commercial. 

"  The  book  is  one  of  absorbing  interest."— Providence  Journal. 


D.  APPLETON  AND   COMPANY,  NEW  YORK. 


D.  APPLETON    AND   COMPANY'S   PUBLICATIONS. 


L 


TWO   SUCCESSFUL   AMERICAN   NOVELS. 

ATITUDE  19°.  A  Romance  of  the  West  Indies  in 
the  Year  of  our  Lord  1820.  Being  a  faithful  account  and  true, 
of  the  painful  adventures  of  the  Skipper,  the  Bo's'n,  the  Smith, 
the  Mate,  and  Cynthia.  By  Mrs.  SCHUYLER  CROWNINSHIELD. 
Illustrated.  I2mo.  Cloth,  $1.50. 

"  '  Latitude  19°  '  is  a  novel  of  incident,  of  the  open  air,  of  the  sea,  the  shore,  the 
mountain  eyrie,  and  of  breathing,  living  entities,  who  deal  with  Natuie  at  first  liand.  .  .  . 
The  adventures  described  are  peculiarly  novel  and  interesting.  .  .  .  Packed  with 
incidents,  infused  with  humor  and  wit,  and  faithful  to  the  types  introduced,  this  book 
will  surely  appeal  to  the  large  audience  already  won,  and  beget  new  friends  among 
those  who  believe  in  fiction  that  is  healthy  without  being  maudlin,  and  is  strong  with 
out  losing  the  truth." — New  York  Herald, 

"  A  story  filled  with  rapid  and  exciting  action  from  the  first  page  to  the  last.  A 
fecundity  of  invention  that  never  lags,  and  a  judiciously  used  vein  of  humor." — The 
Critic. 

"  A  volume  of  deep,  undeniable  charm.  A  unique  book  from  a  fresh,  sure,  vigorous 
pen." — Boston  Journal. 

"  Adventurous  and  romantic  enough  to  satisfy  the  most  exacting  reader.  .  .  . 
Abounds  in  situations  which  make  the  blood  run  cold,  and  yet,  full  of  surprises  as  it  is, 
one  is  continually  amazed  by  the  plausibility  of  the  main  incidents  of  the  narrative. 
...  A  very  successful  effort  to  por'ray  the  sort  of  adventures  that  might  have  taken 
place  in  the  West  Indies  seventy  five  or  eighty  years  ago.  .  .  .  Very  entertaining  witn 
its  dry  humor." — Boston  Herald. 


A 


HERALD  OF  THE  WEST.  An  American 
Story  of  1811-1815.  By  J.  A.  AI.TSIIELER,  author  of  "A 
Soldier  of  Manhattan  "  and  "  The  Sun  of  Saratoga."  I2mo. 
Cloth,  $1-50. 

"  '  A  Herald  of  the  West '  is  a  romance  of  our  history  which  has  not  been  surpassed 
in  dramatic  force,  vivid  coloring,  and  historical  interest.  ...  In  these  days  when  the 
flush  of  war  has  only  just  passed,  the  book  ought  to  find  thousands  of  readers,  for  it 
teaches  patriotism  without  intolerance,  and  it  shows,  what  the  war  with  Spain  has 
demonstrated  anew,  the  power  of  the  American  icople  when  they  are  deeply  roused  by 
some  great  wrong." — San  Francisco  Chronicle. 

"The  book  throughout  is  extremely  well  written.  It  is  condensed,  vivid,  pictu 
resque.  ...  A  rattling  good  story,  and  unrivaled  in  fiction  for  its  presentation  of  the 
American  feeling  toward  England  during  our  second  conflict." — Boston  Herald. 

"  Holds  the  attention  continuously.  .  .  .  The  book  abounds  in  thiilling  attractions. 
.  .  .  It  is  a  solid  and  dignified  acquisition  to  the  romantic  literature  of  our  own  coun 
try,  built  around  facts  and  real  persons." — Chicago  Times- H erald 

"  In  a  style  that  is  strong  and  broad,  the  author  of  this  timely  novel  takes  up  a 
nascent  period  of  our  national  history  and  founds  upon  it  a  story  of  absorbing  interest." 
—Philadelphia  Item. 

"  Mr.  Altsheler  has  given  us  an  accurate  as  well  as  picturesque  portrayal  of  the 
social  and  political  conditions  which  prevailed  in  the  republic  in  the  era  made  famous 
by  the  second  war  with  Great  Britain." — Brooklyn  Eagle. 


D.  APPLETON  AND   COMPANY,  NEW  YORK. 


D.   APPLETON   AND  COMPANY'S  PUBLICATIONS. 


D 


"A   BOOK   THAT    WILL   LIVE." 

AVID  HARUM.     A  Story  of  American  Life.     By 
EDWARD  NOYES  WESTCOTT.     i2mo.     Cloth,  $1.50. 

"Mr.  Westcott  has  done  for  central  New  York  what  Mr.  Cable,  Mr.  Page,  and 
Mr.  Harris  have  done  for  different  parts  of  the  South,  and  what  Miss  Jewett  and  Miss 
Wilkins  are  doing  for  New  England,  and  Mr.  Hamlin  Garland  lor  the  West.  .  .  . 
'David  Harum'  is  a  masterly  delineation  of  an  American  type.  .  .  .  Here  is  life  with 
all  its  joys  and  sorrows.  .  .  .  David  Harum  lives  in  these  pages  as  he  will  live  in  the 
mind  of  the  reader.  .  .  .  He  deserves  to  be  known  by  all  good  Americans;  he  is  one 
of  them  in  boundless  energy,  in  large-heartedness,  in  shrewdness,  and  in  humor." — 
The  Critic. 

"  Thoroughly  a  pure,  original,  and  fresh  American  type.  David  Harum  is  a 
character  whose  qualities  of  mind  and  heart,  eccentricities,  and  dry  humor  will  win  for 
his  creator  notable  distinction.  Buoyancy,  life,  and  cheerfulness  are  dominant  notes. 
In  its  vividness  and  force  the  story  is  a  strong,  fresh  picture  of  American  life.  Original 
and  true,  it  is  worth  the  same  distinction  which  is  accorded  the  genre  pictures  of 
peculiar  types  and  places  sketched  by  Mr.  George  W.  Cable,  Mr.  Joel  Chandler 
Harris,  Mr.  Thomas  Nelson  Page,  Miss  Wilkins,  Miss  Jewett,  Mr.  Garland,  Miss 
French,  Miss  Murfree,  Mr.  Gilbert  Parker,  Mr.  Owen  Wister,  and  Bret  Harte.  .  .  . 
A  pretty  love  story  also  adds  to  the  attractiveness  of  the  book,  that  will  be  appreciated 
at  once  by  every  one  who  enjoys  real  humor,  strong  character,  true  pictures  of  life,  and 
work  that  is  '  racy  of  the  soil.' "" — Boston  Herald. 

"  Mr.  Westcott  has  created  a  new  and  interesting  type.  .  .  .  The  character  sketch 
ing  and  building,  so  far  as  David  Harum  is  concerned,  is  well-nigh  perfect.  The  book 
is  wonderfully  bright,  readable,  and  graphic."- — A Jeiv  York  Times. 

"The  main  character  ought  to  become  familiar  to  thousands  of  readers,  and  will 
probably  take  his  place  in  time  beside  Joel  Chandler  Harris's  and  Thomas  Nelson 
Page's  and  Miss  Wilkins's  creations." — Chicago  Times-Herald. 

"  We  give  Edward  Noyes  Wesfcott  his  true  place  in  American  letters  — placing 
him  as  a  humorist  next  to  Mark  Twain,  as  a  master  of  dialect  above  Lowell,  as  a 
descriptive  writer  equal  to  Eret  Harte,  and,  on  the  whole,  as  a  novelist  on  a  par  with 
the  best  of  those  who  live  and  have  their  being  in  the  heart  of  hearts  of  American 
readers.  If  the  author  is  dead— lamentable  fact — his  book  will  live." — Philadelphia 
Item. 

"  True,  strong,  and  thoroughly  alive,  with  a  humor  like  that  of  Abraham  Lincoln 
and  a  nature  as  sweet  at  the  core.  The  spirit  of  the  book  is  genial  and  wholesome,  and 
the  love  story  is  in  keeping  with  it.  ...  The  book  adds  one  more  to  the  interesting 
list  of  native  fiction  destined  to  live,  portraying  certain  localities  and  types  of  American 
life  and  manners."— Boston  Literary  World. 

"  A  notable  contribution  to  those  sectional  studies  of  American  life  by  which  our 
literature  has  been  so  greatly  enriched  in  the  past  generation.  ...  A  work  of  unusual 
met  it. ' ' — Philadelphia  Press. 

"  One  of  the  few  distinct  and  living  types  in  the  American  gallery." — St.  Louis 
Globe- Democrat. 

"  The  quaint  character  of 'David  Harum'  proves  to  be  an  inexhaustible  source  of 
amusement. —  Chicago  Evening  Post. 

"  It  would  be  hard  to  say  wherein  the  author  could  have  bettered  the  portrait  he 
sets  before  us."—  Providence  Journal. 

"  Full  of  wit  and  sweetness." — Baltimore  Herald. 

"  Merits  the  heartiest  and  most  unequivocal  praise.  ...  It  is  a  pleasure  to  call  the 
reader's  attention  to  this  strong  and  most  original  novel,  a  novel  that  is  a  decided  and 
most  enduring  addition  to  American  literature." — Boston  Saturday  Evening  Gazette. 


D.   APPLETON    AND    COMPANY,   NEW  YORK. 


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